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notions of access and opacity both between and within subjects, exploring early
modern attitudes towards phenomenological issues. This leads to a discussion of
mirrors and mirroring in early modern society, focusing especially on the relation of
mirror-motifs to models of cognition and subjectivity.
These five chapters provide the context for the examination of Shakespeare's
use of mirrors in Chapters 6 and 7. The modern and early modern conceptualization
of the human subject and cognition as embodied, embedded and extended newly
illuminates Shakespeare's mirror-motifs, which reveal the boundaries between the
subject and the world fluctuating between permeability and impermeability,
exploring issues of how and to what extent various mirrors function as extensions of
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O brave new world
That has such people in't! (Tempest 5.1.186-7)
Recent developments in cognitive science and neuroscience reveal cognition and
subjectivity to be distributed in the brain and body and extended out into the world:
'the extended mind hypothesis' (EM). This thesis aims to demonstrate the potential
usefulness of the humanities' extending their knowledge about current research in
cognitive science and neuroscience. Trends in literary criticism have recently focused
on various kinds of social constructivism in which bodies are presented as cultural
constructs (notably in new historicism, cultural materialism, and feminist, queer and
globalisation studies). However, EM suggests another perspective that takes account
of sociocultural and technological environments as natural components of cognitive
processing, which are enabled by functional and neurological plasticity. EM enables
a reassessment of ideas about the subject as either autonomous or as only socially
constructed, which may have constrained understandings of historical, as well as
modern, subjectivity.
Furthermore, early modern texts suggest that ideas about human extendedness
are not simply a product of our own age. Arguably, EM is a hybrid paradigm taking
different forms in different cultures. Its particular parallels with early modern
discourses' constructions of cognition and subjectivity as humourally embodied,
socioculturally embedded, and technologically and intersubjectively extended are
examined here, with the final chapters focusing specifically on the exploration of
how these themes operate in, and alter a reading of, Shakespeare's mirror-motifs.
Nevertheless, this thesis presumes that both the 'mind' and 'subject' are
metaphorical concepts: they therefore extend more fluidly into the world than the
biological brain or body structure, which contribute to their conceptual capacity. The
mind cannot be literally described: even those who would reduce it to the biological
brain are hampered by the current incompleteness of knowledge of its physical
nature, and there is a manifest difference in scale between neural activity and the
capacities of the mind. Therefore analysis of the mind should take into account not
only the findings of current neuroscience but also the more or less helpful literal and
literary metaphors employed; practical and imaginative fictions that shape and are
shaped by the brain, language, and sociocultural and technological trends. Similarly,
the subject is not reducible to the biological organism, although its body is a
participating factor in its formation. Scientific terms and cultural and literary history
are already implicated in each other. This recognition invites the exploration of how
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innovative work in cognitive science and neuroscience can help us to explore anew
the metaphors of the mind and subject conceived of in the early modern period.
Despite, and because of, the comprehensive nature of the terms 'Early Modern'
and 'Extended Mind', the former potentially covering the period from the fifteenth
till the eighteenth century, and the latter expanding the term 'mind' to include bodily
and non-biological resources, it is worth noting at the outset that the bounds of the
discussion in this thesis are at once wider and necessarily more limited than may
initially be suggested. Modern thinking about the extended mind was initially
expansive in welcoming evidence of the significant role that human embodiment and
embeddedness play in cognition as part of the mind's extendedness. Internal
fractures between 'embodied', 'embedded' and 'extended' theories of cognition are
growing as the terms become increasingly refined, but in considering the early
modern understanding of the human cognitive economy, this thesis draws on all
these notions, with the term 'extendedness' used in its most liberal sense.1 The
constraining parameters of the discussion are represented by the second half of the
title: 'the Shakespearean Subject of the Mirror'. The thesis aims towards an analysis
of Shakespeare's use of mirror-motifs. Discussions in the early modern sections are
therefore guided not only by ideas related to the extended mind and subject, but also
by the particular interests and emphasises raised by the Shakespearean material.
Chapter 1 provides an introductory background to the approaches that are
employed in this thesis. It begins with an overview of the development of theories
related to the idea of the mind as extended beyond the brain, and the subject beyond
the body, through the use of supplementary tools and resources. This overview
focuses in particular on Clark's seminal descriptions of EM, as well as indicating
reasons for points of divergence from mainstream EM. Chapter 2 explores this
research's relation to recent psychoanalytical, cultural and literary theories. This
thesis argues that the social constructivist models that pervade literary studies in fact
have a neurological basis; our ability to be constructed by cultural forces relates to
the plasticity of the human brain. At the same time, it can be argued that our
extendedness tempers any notion of universal centring that might be claimed for
embodiment, since humans might also be understood as being subject to decentring
forces. Thus, these two chapters aim to consider a range of ideas related to modern
EM, and then to demonstrate where an EM approach fits in relation to theoretical
models currently employed in literary analyses.
1 Further brief discussion of relevant debates follows in Chapter 1.
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Chapters 3, 4 and 5 explore early modern notions of the mind and of the subject
as extended into the body and the world, concentrating on texts circulating during
Shakespeare's lifetime. Early modern notions about cognition and subjectivity hold
remarkable parallels, as well as significant contrasts, with recent theories that
cognition and subjectivity are extended into the world. Chapter 3 considers early
modern understandings of the body, the mind and the soul, and the relation between
them and the world in which they exist. This establishes that several notions of
extendedness were operative, variously overlapping and conflicting: the mind's
operations through the body and the world in relation to the humours, passions,
spirits and soul, and the mind's extension through intellective flights. Chapter 4
explores attitudes to forms of language and memory. The memory arts were
understood as a form of cognitive extension that could supplement the reconstructive
and leaky nature of the biological memory. Interest in language's role in the mind
and in making one human is also evident, especially in contemporary rhetorical texts
and character writings, with language being described as fundamentally formative
and even as another perceptual modality, a sixth sense; yet, it was also considered an
unreliable, unruly and feminine asset, perhaps less trustworthy than bodily gestures
and facial expression in overcoming the distance between inner and outer. Chapter 5
explores early modern notions of a human as composed of many agencies, and
conversely of more than one human acting together as one agent. This raised issues
of access and opacity both between and within subjects, heightening consciousness
of the role of clothes and social training, and increasing interest in the means of
reading other subjects and oneself. The last section then analyses the early modern
mirror as a technological and literary instrument that was used to portray and clarify
understandings of the human subject and mind.
The backdrop having being set, Chapters 6 and 7 proceed with an in depth
study of mirror-motifs as used by Shakespeare. Close exploration of one literary
resource, the mirror and its interactions with questions of cognition and subjectivity,
allows a detailed consideration of how notions of embodiment, embeddedness, and
extendedness were explored imaginatively in Shakespeare's works, and tend to
engage with notions of permeability, opacity and hybridity. The extended forms of
mind and subjectivity operative in the early modern period are reflected in the use of
the mirror-motif to signify other objects, concepts, words, states and characters. A
primary emphasis in all of the uses of these metaphorical or literal mirrors is on
exploring the extent to which they function as an extension of a character;
demonstrating that the boundaries constructed between internal and external, and
subject and object can be permeable and contestable in Shakespeare's works.
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Thus, a three-fold resonance is established: EM is compatible with and yet
interrogative of recent cultural and literary theory, it harmonizes with issues raised
by early modern texts, and it is attuned to the manifestations of cognition and
subjectivity evident in the mirror-motif extracts from Shakespeare's works.
All references to Shakespeare are to The Norton Shakespeare. References to
Montaigne's texts are to The Complete Works. All references to John Donne's poetry
are to The Major Works, and all references to Ben Jonson's poetry are to The
Complete Poems. Early modern dictionaries are listed in the bibliography under their
authors' names. Transcriptions of early modern texts retain original spelling, with the
following exceptions: variant forms of 's' are modernised and contractions are
silently expanded. In the case of plays and poems cited directly from early modern
editions, page or signature references rather than act, scene or line numbers are
provided.
Parts ofChapter 5 have previously been published in 'Chaucer and the Subject of the
Mirror' and 'Early Modern Mirrors,' in The Book of the Mirror, edited by Miranda
Anderson (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007).
With thanks to Sarah Carpenter, a mirror of clarity, and to family and friends.
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The Extended Mind Hypothesis
In Mindware the philosopher Andy Clark presents a paradigm of how scholars
construct academic works and theories:
The brain supported some rereading of old texts, materials, and notes. While rereading
these, it responded by generating a few fragmentary ideas and criticisms. These ideas
and criticisms were then stored as more marks on paper, in margins, on computer discs,
etc. The brain then played a role in reorganizing these data on clean sheets, adding
new on-line reactions and ideas. The cycle of reading, responding, and external
reorganization is repeated, again and again. Finally, there is a product. A story,
argument or theory. But this intellectual product owes a lot to those repeated loops out
into the environment. Credit belongs to the embodied, embedded agent in the world.
(142)
The particular paradigm Clark proposes here is of a cognitive system that consists of
brain, body and world: the extended mind hypothesis (EM). EM's proposal is that
human cognitive processes can involve coalitions of biological and non-bio logical
resources, rather than being confined to neural circuitry. This constitutes the main
theoretical influence on this thesis: in this opening chapter there is an exploration of
philosophical, psychological, linguistic, and cognitive and neuroscientific research
related to EM, in order to establish evidence and arguments for this approach. The
breadth of the range of research considered reflects the mass of interactions that
emerge between disciplines, when discussing the multifaceted and multilayered
nature of the mind. This thesis takes an expansive approach to the concept of an
extended mind, including under the umbrella of EM, the various cognitive roles of:
embodiment in a material body; embeddedness in a sociocultural and environmental
setting; as well as extendedness through technological and other resources. All these
forms of cognitive processes are potentially of interest and significance to an
understanding of the human cognitive economy.
Another aim of this chapter is to expand on the ways in which EM and the
related research can provide scaffolding for a reappraisal of human subjectivity.
Clark suggests that EM's proposals 'interact with vexing questions about personal
identity and the nature of the self, but he acknowledges that as yet these remain
unresolved (Supersizing 161-2). The particular interest in how EM interacts with
understandings of subjectivity, relates to this thesis' employment of EM as a means
of reading Shakespearean subjectivity; after having established evidence for early
modern parallels in their depictions of cognition and subjectivity, primarily
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concentrating on the period contemporaneous with Shakespeare, the central literary
focus. This thesis proposes that EM is a modern manifestation of a paradigm that
existed in a different but related form in the early modern period. The paradigm of
human 'cognitive hybridization' (Clark, Natural-Born 4) represents human nature's
persisting ability to reach outside of itself and incorporate aspects of the world into
its functioning and subjectivity; so that although this hybridity is itself a continuing
factor, humans vary and develop in relation to their context. This thesis contends that
the early modern period, like the current period of sociocultural and technological
transformation, displays an especially marked consciousness, concern and
celebration over humans' extendedness.
The hypothesis that humans have cognitive processes that loop out into the
body and the world, invites a reconsideration of other theories that involve
assumptions or speculations about the relationship between the mind, body and
world. The more polyvalent models explored in this chapter will be used in the later
chapters, to throw light on representations of cognition and subjectivity in
contemporary psychoanalytical, cultural and cognitive literary studies, before turning
to the parallels with early modern thinking and texts. This will all contribute to a
study in the concluding chapters of the fertile use of the mirror, as a visual and
figurative resource for cognition and subjectivity in Shakespeare's works. The rest of
this section of the chapter gives a brief description of how the extended mind
hypothesis developed, before turning in the following sections, to the exploration of
research relevant to the claims that are made here for an extended view of human
subjectivity and cognition.
In the opening quotation, Clark presents the means by which a theory develops,
in order to demonstrate the use by the subject of the tools ofpen, paper and computer
to externalise its thoughts in a stable form that allows for further reflection, and
clearer and higher level thoughts on the original murky and mundane ones. The
suggestion is that rather than a disembodied or brain-bound intellect pouring its
preformed ideas onto the page, the tools used participate in the development of
secondary thoughts. The extent to which tools become a part of the process of
cognition is reflected in the fact that tools which are used repeatedly become
transparent in use (Natural-Born 37, 48). Provided nothing goes wrong, as you write
you do not normally think of the pen or the keyboard as separate objects, as your
flow or stutter of thoughts appear on the page or screen; anymore than you think of
the neural synapses firing in your brain, or the hands that you are using to control the
pen, or type the letters, or hold this page. Furthermore, the words used are
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themselves another form of 'mind tool',2 since language itself is a fundamental part
of the human cognitive repertoire that makes possible the initial concretisation of an
idea. These are some of the essential points of Clark's proposal that we are 'natural-
born cyborgs': we are composed entirely of internal and external tools: 'Tools R Us,
and always have been' (33, 37).
Clark's proposal expands upon a theory called 'distributed cognition', which
was developed in the 1990s by the cognitive anthropologist Ed Hutchins; the term is
sometimes used interchangeably with 'extended mind'. In his renowned study of ship
navigation, Cognition in the Wild, Hutchins made a case for the human cognitive
system as embodied and extended into the material world through equipment and
other social agents. Hutchins describes navigation tools as artefacts that incorporate
within them aspects of the expertise necessary for accurate calculations to be made,
whilst the navigation team operate collectively as a cognitive and computational
system (155, xiv). Unlike Clark, his research in this area has primarily focused upon
technical working environments and tasks, such as the navigation team on board a
ship collectively plotting its course into a harbour; therefore whilst still a useful
resource, this limits the wider applicability of Hutchins' proposals to the literary
focus of this study.
Clark first encountered such ideas in a particular passage by Rumelhart and his
colleagues in their 1986 paper on 'parallel distributed processing' (PDP) (Mindware
142). The PDP model has become the prevailing form of 'connectionism', which
more generally describes mental phenomena as emerging from interconnected
networks of elementary units, and the terms are now often used synonymously. The
discovery that the neural system consists of distributed networks of units processing
information in parallel led to the PDP model of knowledge as stored in the
reinforceable connections between units. This can more easily be conceptualised
through comparing it with the way that through sport we can strengthen our muscle
connections; similarly through experience we can strengthen our neural connections,
reinforcing and creating new pathways. The passage referred to by Clark describes
the tendency of the associative and pattern-completing brain to rely on external
resources to overcome its limitations. It depicts our typical use of a pen and paper as
tools to complete difficult mathematical sums: we divide the task into simple pattern
completing sections easily perceivable and manageable by our brain and store the
accumulation of data on paper.
; This term was coined by Richard L. Gregory, Mind in Science 48.
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Each cycle of this operation involves first creating a representation through
manipulation of the environment, then a processing of this (actual physical)
representation by means of our well tuned perceptual apparatus leading to a further
modification of this representation. By doing this we reduce a very abstract conceptual
problem to a series of operations that are very concrete.. .Indeed, on this view, the
external environment becomes a key extension to our mind. (Rumelhart et al. 45-46)
Rumelhart and his co-authors go on to explain that because our brains are good at
pattern matching, modelling our world and manipulating our environment, we tend to
use external or internalised mental models to reason (46). Hutchins also credits this
passage with influencing his theory, paraphrasing it here:
These tools permit the people using them to do the tasks that need to be done while
doing the kinds of things people are good at: recognizing patterns, modelling simple
dynamics of the world, and manipulating objects in the environment. (155)
Although both Hutchins and Clark were indebted to a connectionist theory of the
architecture of the brain in outlining their respective theories of the mind as
distributed or extended, most connectionists remain 'internalists' about cognition.
Michael Wheeler describes that most research in orthodox cognitive science remains
'recognizably Cartesian in character', in terms of a number of principles, including
an 'explanatory dualism', that posits 'a divide between mind and the rest of nature'
(14, 27). Yet, Clark emphasises that whilst cognitive systems may always have
connectionist core systems, since these may prove indispensable, this does not mean
that other kinds of representational and computational resources can not come to act
'as proper parts ofmore complex, hybrid, distributed, cognitive wholes' (Supersizing
107). The connectionist core is for Clark an important part of the story.
The possibility of diverse resources acting as part of the cognitive system was
originally highlighted in Andy Clark and David Chalmers' seminal paper, 'The
Extended Mind', in which they proposed EM and suggested the Parity Principle as a
rule of thumb:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it
to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive
process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process.
(222)
In 'Memento's Revenge' Clark elaborated that the external cognitive resource should
also be 'reliably available and typically invoked'; 'more-or-less automatically
endorsed'; and 'easily accessible' (6-7). Many critics and some proponents of EM
misinterpreted parity as necessarily implying process-level identity; that is, that the
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external cognitive resource (exogram) must act in the same way as the internal
cognitive resource (engram). But in Supersizing the Mind Clark restates that the
original idea of EM was, as suggested in the above quote, always only that the
exograms must work in such a way that if it was internal we would count it as a
cognitive process (77-78, 91). Clark has explained that it is best to consider the
exogram having the same form of functionality 'as at most part of a sufficient
condition for cognitive extension, rather than as a necessary feature' ('Author's
Response' 99). External resources can also be radically unlike the internal ones, as
Clark describes, the brain 'must learn to interface with the external media in ways
that maximally exploit their particular capacities'; they can be 'alien but
complementary' {Being There 220). Thus, whilst a computer, does not store or
compute information in the same way as the brain, it can for that very reason be
useful in supplementing neural capacities. Through their differences, as well as
similarities, various forms of representational and computational resources can
supplement biological limitations.
In consequence, EM places in question the meanings of the terms 'external'
and 'internal'. Although used conventionally here as skin boundary markers,
'internal' in this context could instead be understood to refer to contributory factors
to the cognitive system; in the same way fixed boundaries between the subject and
the world are placed in question. John Sutton argues that the various forms EM
resources can take allow us to: break down traditional boundaries between the object
and subject; explore the heterogeneity of interactions; and analyse the boundaries
between the inner and outer, and the natural and artificial 'as hard-won and fragile
developmental and cultural achievements, always open to renegotiation'
('Exograms'). As Clark says, EM persistently invites and explores the question:
'Where does the Mind Stop and the Rest of the World Begin?' (Being There 213).
This key question of where the mind stops and the world begins is also evident
in various early twentieth century influences on proponents of embodied, embedded
and extended accounts, including briefly: Heidegger's human 'being-in-the-world';
Merleau-Ponty's connatural 'body-subject' whose consciousness of the world occurs
through the medium of the body; and Vygotsky's educative and sociocultural 'Zone
of Proximal Development', also known as 'scaffolding', in which the
intrapsychological is a product of the interpsychological. Whilst there is insufficient
space here to discuss the complexities of the theories proposed by these thinkers, the
common element amongst them is their rejection of the traditional conception of the
disembodied Cartesian cogito in favour of a view of human cognition as a predicate
of our active engagement in the world. As with the other thinkers discussed in this
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chapter they have in various ways led to the reconceptualisation of the mind as
embodied, embedded and extended through the utilisation of the body, objects,
words, or other social agents as elements of cognitive processing.
The following sections of this chapter explore a wide range of research that
provides surprising evidence of the extent to which human cognition is materially,
socioculturally and technologically constructed; it also reveals the neurological
mechanisms that enable this cognitive flexibility. The examination of this evidence
also addresses Adler and Gross' pertinent charge of the lack of actual scientific
evidence given in literary studies that purport to use cognitive theory, by providing
the scientific background behind the theoretical reconfigurations proposed (202). Our
starting point in the next section is an examination of how the distributed nature of
cognition in the brain relates to recent theories about polyphonic consciousness and
how the illusory conceit of a singular stream of consciousness is linked to the illusion
of an executive and autonomous subjectivity. This will be discussed later in relation
to early modern conjectures about the brain, for whilst these had a considerably less
well developed scientific basis, there is nevertheless evidence of comparable
understandings of the brain's operations as distributed, fluid and plastic; and, then as
now, this led to questions about the variability and the agency of the subject, and its
opacity to itself as well as to others.
Mind, Consciousness and Self
As you sit there in your chair you are more or less aware of the feeling of your legs
against its surface, of the surge and murmur of sounds in the room around you and
beyond, of the meanings of the words along which your eyes flit, and of a multitude
of other thoughts, incessantly and instantaneously forming and passing. Your eyes
circuit the room before you focus back on the paper crinkling in your hands, as you
try to ignore the faint buzz of your computer in the background, the vague urge to go
and make a cup of coffee, and the crick in your neck. Tactile, proprioceptive,
auditory, visual and language understanding experiences: these are just a few of the
many modes of consciousness that you are experiencing now, as you check these
words against your sense of your self, at this moment in time and against the
continually adjusted narrative that stretches from the past into the future. Entering
into the slim round of bone that encases your brain we discover that within it, your
brain's myriad cognitive processes, that are simultaneously criss-crossing your
neurological pathways, have varying levels of autonomy, some conscious and many
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more non-conscious, and with varying degrees of direct or indirect interactions with
other stimuli both within and surrounding you.
Here in the brain we begin the search for the elusive 'self or 'subject',
through an examination of theories of how brain processes work. One way in which
the slipperiness of 'the subject' can be countered is by dissecting it into more
manageable pieces; although this can mistakenly lead next to the question of in
which of these 'the real' subject is. Similar difficulties plague the terms 'mind' and
'consciousness' as shall be seen. The intention of this section of the chapter is to
present research that suggests that the self, or subject, does not exist solely in any
particular piece, nor does it stop at the skull or skin boundary. Evidence for this lies
in the plasticity and diversity of neurological and physiological processes and their
co-opting of sociocultural and technological resources as part of the subject. By
deconstructing traditional folk psychology models of the mind, consciousness and
the self, the extent to which everyday talk of these concepts has created mirages of
unified fixities is revealed.
An intense and complex debate in cognitive science continues over the nature
of consciousness, and in particular about phenomenal consciousness, qualia, or the
'what-it's-likeness' of experiencing something, which also tends to be tied to the
idea of being 'a subject', and especially ofbeing a subject of a particular kind (Nagel
165-80). Explaining why there are qualia was famously described by David
Chalmers as 'the hard problem' because of the difficulty of the questions ofwhy and
how subjective qualitative experience arises ('Facing' 200-3). Our inability to
encompass the nature of the human mind in thought, and in particular the mystifying
puzzle of conscious experience, continues to resist the scientific impetus that has led
to the proposition of the wonder of a world and humanity created by evolutionary
rather than divine processes. Concerning the disputes over qualia, Daniel Dennett
comments: 'It is just astonishing to see how often "academic" discussions of
phenomenological controversies degenerate into desk-thumping cacophony, with
everybody talking past everybody else.' (Consciousness 67). In fact, this debate
wavers hither and thither to such an extent that Clark declares: 'the word
"consciousness" does not seem to aim at a single, steady target' (Mindware 171). A
similar argument about the mind is observed by Clark and Jesse Prinz in their
unpublished joint paper, which worries that it has become a 'terminally unstable
term' since according to the diversity of tastes around, the mind was either being
3 It is worth mentioning at the outset, that the terms such as 'self and 'subject' are sometimes used
interchangeably in following different thinkers' and their disciplines' preferences; where explicit and
useful definitions are made these will be given.
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shrunk too small or bloated too big: 'there is no unified, coherent understanding of
the very idea of "mind" at work in various philosophical and scientific projects all of
which claim to be studying aspects of the mental' (qtd. in Clark, 'Memento's' 37).
The too-small-for-some version, Clark suggests, would claim that the mind is
restricted to the few neural structures that are arguably most directly responsible for
our sense of self; this would locate your self as being a resident of the neural
structure known as the anterior cingulated gyrus (Natural-Born 214). The too-big-
for-others version is what Clark proposes and what is being argued for here: neural,
biological, material, sociocultural, environmental and technological resources are
dynamically involved in cognition and subjectivity.
The extended mind hypothesis has been influenced by the connectionist
architecture of the brain, understanding of which in turn is based on recent
neuroscientific discoveries about the brain's anatomy, and aptly these have largely
been made possible by the development ofmore advanced technology. This increase
in our knowledge of the brain originally came through lesion studies which allowed
neuroscientists to roughly connect lesions in one area of the brain with certain mental
defects caused, which thereby suggested their normal local functional specialisation,
although this technique led to an overly modularised view of the functioning of the
brain. Since then the progress of further research has literally added much more
detail to our picture, through using new equipment with a broad range of temporal
and spatial scales, such as: positron emission topography (PET), which maps
chemical changes and blood flow; electroencephalography (EEG), which measures
electrical activity; magnetoencephalography (MEG), which records minute magnetic
fields; magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), which detect increases in blood flow. In fact with the more
powerful new fMRI equipment we no longer see just a snapshot, we can now see a
mirroring of our brain in real-time action (Damasio, Feeling 14).
These new technologies have revealed that the brain works neither as a single
network nor as a series of entirely independent modules, since the intraconnected
areas of the brain are also dynamically interconnected and interactive. Within
specialised modules (e.g. visual in the occipital lobe) more particular specialisation
occurs within specific zones (e.g. colour at V4), but higher order processing often
occurs when the information is sent back out again far across the brain (in this case
to the TPO or temporal, parietal and occipital lobes' crossways) (Ramachandran and
Hubbard 55).Yet, rather than strict modularization or localisation of functions, 'most
brain areas participate in functions across several task categories', with, for example,
motor areas participating in language and memory related tasks (Anderson 164).
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Although diversity of opinion and fertile metaphors abound about exactly how
the brain works, the general idea, as described by Clark, follows the connectionist
model, with interlinked activations of a mass of parallel processing units that are
distributed across the brain (Mindware 62-83). Synapses participate in both the cause
and the effect of neural activity: patterns of neural activity are generated in response
to excitatory or inhibitory inputs, caused by the synapses' modulatory effects, and
this activity in turn modifies the synapses themselves. It has become accepted
knowledge and a motivating force in neuroscientific research that experiences
modify not only the activity but also the organization ofneural circuitry. As Citri and
Malenka state: 'One of the most important and fascinating properties of the
mammalian brain is its plasticity; the capacity of the neural activity generated by an
experience to modify neural circuit function and thereby modify subsequent thoughts,
feelings and behavioural8). Mental representations, such as sensory impressions, are
a dynamic pattern of activation whose data then disappear, having thus modified the
extended network of connections where the implicit information is now
superpositionally stored as an integrated trace. Sutton remarks this 'leads
connectionists, in the extreme, to say that we never create the same concept twice',
since a concept is never reproduced but always reconstructed. This fuels his
persuasive suggestion that the context-constrained nature of remembering is
'specifically indexed to the cognitive system, body history, and current cues in which
they occur' (.Philosophy 8). Traces which structure the brain depend both on the body
and the world in which it exists.
The philosophers, Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie, draw on the connectionist
model as a basis for their theory of consciousness ('Connectionist' 137). They
describe how rather than a singular stream of consciousness, there are instead a mass
of parallel tributaries, with many independent sites of instantaneous consciousness
(146). O'Brien and Opie explain that our phenomenal experience is a 'complex
aggregate ofmany elements' that are relatively independent of one another, so that if
you close your eyes for a moment now, the other modes of consciousness will not
also shut down; Tike the parallel tracks on a multi-track recording, the loss of any
one mode of consciousness merely reduces the total sound' ('Multiplicity' 114).
Instead of the centralised 'consciousness-making site', which has been favoured by
some connectionists,4 they suggest that the feeling of polyphonic consciousness as
unified arises from the spatial and temporal representational coherence produced by
4
For a well known example of a centralised consciousness-making version see Baars' 'Theatre of
Consciousness' 292-309.
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'the confluence of points of view generated'. And they describe this flowing together
as produced by 'a serial stream of self-directed thought': by a 'self-maker' (118).
The metaphor of multiple drafts of consciousness that are continuously being
created by the semi-independent PDP channels is used by Daniel Dennett to make
the point that there is neither a single narrative nor a canonical final draft
('Consciousness 113). Similar to O'Brien and Opie's 'self-maker', Dennett describes
a linguistically created top-level 'user-illusion' or 'Joycean Machine' that creates the
illusion of a single stream of consciousness (214). It spins an ongoing self-directed
narrative that seems to fix cognitive contents into a serial stream of contents,
although on a non-conscious level the multiple PDP channels are perpetually in
motion:
There is no single, definitive "stream of consciousness," because there is no central
Headquarters, no Cartesian Theater, where "it all comes together" for the perusal of a
Central Meaner. Instead of such a single stream (however wide), there are multiple
channels in which specialist circuits try, in parallel pandemoniums, to do their various
things, creating Multiple Drafts as they go. (253-54)
Like O' Brien and Opie, Dennett's motivation in creating this model, was to counter
the conventional 'Cartesian Theater' model of an observer or audience in the brain to
which unconscious modules are sent for conscious appreciation (137). Another way
Dennett attempts to allegorise and so facilitate communication of his understanding
of consciousness is through describing it as 'fame' in the brain; the part of the neural
structure which is acting itself becomes conscious of its action and then
communicates it to other parts of the brain (.Brainchildren 137-9). Thus, models of a
human consciousness that is not singular or centralised are developing in tandem
with the notion that a fixed executive self is itself generated as a functional chimera.
Clark points out that a rejection of 'a central meaner' is not in itself necessary
to make the case for EM (Supersizing 131-33). Yet evidence relating to his
technological contentions has nevertheless led him to argue that our being self-aware
and narrative-constructing leads to the hallucination of an essential self which does
not exist:
There is no self, if by self we mean some central cognitive essence that makes me who
and what I am. In its place there is just the 'soft self: a rough-and-tumble, control-
sharing coalition of processes - some neural, some bodily, some technological - and
an ongoing drive to tell a story, to paint a picture in which 'I' am the central player.
(Natural-Born 138)
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According to models like this the human subject and mind is more opaquely complex
than a straightforwardly linear narrative construction could imitate. Clark has 'John's
Brain' explain: 'My single voice, then, is no more than a literary conceit.' ('I am'
147) Nor are non-conscious cognitive processes necessarily low-level, as Clark
demonstrates with his reminder of the way seemingly magical, inspired or intuitive
ideas have of 'popping up in our heads' (Natural-Born 134). Moreover, Clark and
Chalmers point out that since 'all sorts of processes beyond the boundaries of
consciousness play a crucial role in cognitive processing: in the retrieval of
memories, linguistic processes and skill acquisition, for example,' it makes clear that
consciousness is not equivalent to cognition (7). The fact that consciousness is
internal is therefore no reason to deny that external processes can be cognitive.
The 'no self theory arrived at by these theorists is clearly not just a variation
on nihilism, which reifies emptiness into an oxymoronic 'solid absence'. Varela,
Thompson and Rosch in their radical and influential book, The Embodied Mind,
stress the importance of distinguishing between post-Nietzschean nihilistic thought
and the discovery of a self-less mind. They advise that 'the discovery of mind
without self requires 'that we revise our naive idea of what a cognizing subject is
(its lack of solidity, its divided dynamics, and its generation from unconscious
processes)' (127). An understanding of the mind as self-less enables both a dawning
realisation of the automatic nature of habitual routines and that the self is co-
dependent on the other: 'The realization of groundlessness as nonegocentric
responsiveness however, requires that we acknowledge the other with whom we
dependently cooriginate' (254). This is an ethical transformation, for an awareness of
our interrelatedness to others leads to a deeper sense of our shared responsibility.
In Natural-Born Cyborgs, Andy Clark affirms the importance of the potential
consequences ofthe extended mind theory for all sectors of society:
This is a confrontation long overdue, and it is one with implications for our science,
morals, education, law, and social policy; for these are the governing institutions
within which we - the soft selves, the palpitating biotechnological hybrids - must
solve our problems, build our lives, and cherish our loves. (139)
However, Clark does not tackle the question of how his rejection of the traditional
central executive self in favour of a coalition soft self can be made responsible within
that society other than his implicit trust in the positiveness of acknowledging this as
the true make up of the human subject. In response to Alice Juarrero's questioning of
'how responsible agency is to be fleshed out' (Juarrero 153), once it is allowed that it
is 'tools all the way down', Clark concedes he does 'not have a good answer' ('We
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Have' 179). His suspicions are that both the idea of selves and of moral
responsibility are 'forensic' notions that are not metaphysical necessities but rather 'a
matter of habit and ofpractical convenience' (179). In respect to these notions, Judith
Butler offers a method ofmoving forward which will be examined in the following
chapter, but which can be related to Varela and his colleagues' theory that a self-less
mind could lead not to negativity, but to an affirming of our co-dependence and
collective responsibility. The ethical issues pertaining to a self which is mutable and
multiple are raised again later in my reading of Shakespeare's works.
This section has presented some of the arguments made for the distributed and
dynamic nature of cognition within the brain and examined how recognition of the
illusory conceit of singular, unified and centralised consciousness is connected with
the mirage of the autonomous narrative self. In addition, the participation of non-
conscious processes in cognition prevents consciousness acting as an insurmountable
distinction between biological and non-biological resources. The following two
sections of this chapter provide evidence against brain-bound theories of cognition
and subjectivity by presenting some of the key ways in which cognitive processes
involve the body.
Embodiment and Neural Plasticity
Evidence is accumulating both of the manifold roles that the body plays in cognitive
processes and of the plasticity of the body schema in the brain, which enables it to
incorporate non-biological resources or extend the human subject beyond its
biological periphery. This section examines some of that evidence, whilst also
considering concerns that strong sensorimotor models may have thereby replaced a
neural with a biological chauvinism. In later chapters this evidence will be compared
with early modern theories about brain and body interactions, as even where dualist
notions are explicitly pursued, somatic notions of psychology tend to provide the
theoretical underpinning with physical processes typically understood as
participating in the cognitive economy. Furthermore, as in current theories, except
only in terms of collective concepts rather than on a neuroscientific basis, the
plasticity of the body image of the early modern subject was one of the means which
enabled the body's supplementation and transformation by non-biological resources.
Varela, Thompson and Rosch's book The Embodied Mind contributed to the
reworking of this area of cognitive science, as they challenged earlier classical views
of cognition as occurring through a computational manoeuvring of internal symbolic
representations. Instead they emphasise our 'structural coupling' with the world,
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claiming that 'cognition has no ultimate foundation or ground beyond its history of
embodiment' (xx, 151). They define embodiment as composing a phenomenological
and cognitive framework: 'embodiment has this double sense: it encompasses both
the body as a lived, experiential structure and the body as the context or milieu of
cognitive mechanisms' (xvi). Yet, whilst their reminder of the body's role in
enacting cognitive processes is significant, they emphasize the body's importance to
such an extent that the world as an independent entity is seemingly undermined by
the subject's encompassing of it:
We reflect on a world that is not made, but found, and yet it is also our structure that
enables us to reflect upon this world. Thus in reflection we find ourselves in a circle:
we are in a world that seems to be there before reflection begins, but that world is not
separate from us. (3)
This theory taken literally presents the world as apparently constructed by the
embodied and enactive cognitive structures of organisms, with the found world
apparently dependent on the human finder. To claim that there is nothing outside the
body would not be an epistemological advance, and it strangely echoes the hubris of
poststructural theories of language, which in the extreme posit that 'there is nothing
outside of the text' (Derrida, OfGrammatology 158); moderation in any such claims
is necessary but eschewed by both these examples.
The theory of 'enactive cognition' has been developed by Alva Noe in his work
on visual perception. In his book Action in Perception he explains that we do not
need to ground ourselves using internal representations because we have the practical
knowledge and bodily capacities to access this information from the world: thus,
when we want to pick up a coffee cup we can use our eyes to guide our hand rather
than relying on an internal model (24). Noe goes on to explain that although there is
a lack of a commitment to the snapshot image stored internally, we nevertheless feel
aware of the details of our environment, which seem present in the internal image
although absent. This is because of our sense of virtual access to this information due
to our possession of the sensorimotor skills needed to scrutinize the world for details.
Noe explains that: 'To bring detail into consciousness, it is necessary to probe the
environment, by turning your eyes and your head' ('Experience' 421). Thus, the
enactive view of cognition presents evidence and theories that challenge current
conceptions of the boundaries of the mind by suggesting ways in which cognitive
processes involve the body.
Yet in various recent works Clark raises the danger that the emphasis on
embodiment will lead to a 'new-wave-body-centrism'. Clark points out that there
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exists a tension between models in which the body makes an ineliminable 'Special
Contribution' and models such as EM, which present a 'Larger Mechanism Story'.
The 'Larger Mechanism Story' argues that cognitive processes can be realized
through multiple different types of resources, not only corporeal ones ('Pressing' 37,
57). Clark critiques Noe, not for his view of perception as enactive, as this evidence
he adopts as an argument for EM ('Soft Selves' 106), but for a 'sensorimotor
chauvinism' that argues for the necessity of a human body for human perception
('Pressing' 56-7; 'Cognitive' 43-64). Such a strong sensorimotor model, Clark
argues, is in danger of veiling the many quasi-independent forms of representation
and processing that exist, with the result that it is possible to be 'systematically
insensitive to some of the goings-on at the sensorimotor frontier' ('Cognitive' 64, 53).
The distinction being made here is that whilst a body is required it is not necessarily
a body 'just like ours' ('Pressing' 43).
Nor is it just humans who are capable of such fluidity concerning physical and
identity structures. J. Scott Turner has shown in his ecological research that even
basic life forms commonly use social and environmental offloading and he contends
that 'animal-built structures are properly considered organs of physiology'(2).
Meanwhile, neuroscientific evidence, such as the experiments on the
teletransportation of self-perspective by H. Henrik Ehrsson, reflects the increasing
potential for manipulations of human physical identity. Ehrsson gives volunteers the
illusion of first-person visual experience from the perspective of a life-sized
mannequin by fitting them with a video headset, which tracked the room as if from
the perspective point of the mannequin, whilst a researcher touched the dummy at the
same time as the subject was touched. These multisensory correlations 'are sufficient
to determine the perceived location of one's body' and through the manipulation of
these an 'out of body' perceptual illusion results, with the subject quickly coming to
feel as if they are the mannequin and are viewing another person's body rather than
their own (1048). On the microscopic level, Hannah Landecker, whilst discussing the
increasing potential for spatial and temporal flexibility of living cells, asks: 'What is
the social and cultural task of being biological entities - being simultaneously
biological things and human persons - when the biological is fundamentally plastic?'
Thus, natural processes, as well as human's increasing ability to technologically
modify these processes, reveal human and animal nature, as adaptable and extendible
into the world. What constitutes 'human' is constantly laid open to question by our
tendency towards hybridity, recently most noticeably in relation to robotics,
microprocessesing, nanotechnological, biotechnological and genetic engineering
advances (see G. Gillet or Andrew J. Ross for further discussion of this topic).
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Clark's concept that we are 'biologically based' but not 'biologically
imprisoned' ('Soft Selves' 118) has been experimentally explored by Stelarc, an
artist who through his use and incorporation of prosthetic devices has done much to
challenge traditional notions of body boundaries. Stelarc explains:
A body's authenticity is not due to the coherence of its individuality but rather to its
multiplicity of collaborative agents. What becomes important is not merely the body's
identity, but its connectivity - not its mobility or location, but its interface and
operation. (3)
Rather than a concept of the body as an entity that depends on unity or consistency,
Stelarc suggests that the important factor is the body's ability to collaborate and
connect. His point, like Clark, is that bodies do not necessarily stop at biological
boundaries, but may be composed of, and extended by, non-biological materials.
Recent neuroscientific research provides evidence that 'the body' as it is
imaged in the mind does not necessarily stop at skin boundaries, and in certain cases
this can be accounted for by the fact that experience is productive of new neural
growth. V. S. Ramachandran and D. Rogers Ramachandran demonstrated that new
neural connections and the reorganisation of the brain can emerge in humans,
through their experiments with amputee patients who experienced feeling in their
missing limbs. Through the use of mirrors in a box that made it appear as if their
missing limb was whole, patients went from feeling the missing arm to be painfully
frozen in a tight fist, to experiencing movement and with it the cessation of pain, as a
result of seeing their phantom limb reflected and apparently moving in the mirror
('Synaesthesia' 377-86). That sensation in the normal hand was referred to the
phantom, shows the closeness of vision and proprioception interactions, and it
'implies that new pathways that are precisely organized and functionally effective
can emerge in the adult human brain' (386). Thus, the adult brain remains
sufficiently plastic that it is capable of creating new neural connections in relation to
physical changes. Consequently our body schema is not fixed.
Another experiment by Berti and Frassinetti has shown that simply holding a
stick meant that the brain caused a remapping of far space to near space due to this
'artificial extension of the patient's body' (415). Similar tests by Maravati and Iriki,
involving monkeys using rakes have shown that the cells of the brain that would
normally represent the fingers quickly come to map the area of the spikes of the rake.
Prior to the ability to provide such evidence, claims about the plasticity of the
corporeal and subjective schema were already being made in the 1940s by Merleau-
Ponty. He describes a blind man's stick as 'an area of sensitivity, extending the scope
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and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight', as through habit we are
transposed into instruments or incorporate them into the body (165-6).
Drawing on evidence that our body and our constructs of it coevolve, Clark
highlights the significance of the negotiability of body boundaries and neural
plasticity for EM:
...the biological brain can literally grow a cortical architecture suited to the specific
technological environment in which it learns and matures. This symbiosis of brain and
cognitive technology, repeated again and again but with new technology sculpting
new brains in different ways, may be the origin of a golden loop, a virtuous spiral of
brain/culture influence that allows human minds to go where no animal minds have
gone before. (Mind-ware 153)
The considerable plasticity of the brain, Clark contends, makes evident that it is
therefore 'at least poised so as to be able to co-opt external structures' ('We Have'
178).
Furthermore, just as objects may be experienced as body parts so body parts
may be experienced as objects or tools. Clark and Chalmers give the example of
using our fingers to count on (221-2). Clark also refers us back to our early years,
reminding us that we had to learn how to control our body parts and initially also
experience them as objects:
First of all, consider the child's own bodily parts. It is quite possible it seems to me,
that these are first experienced (or at least simultaneously experienced) as objects in
the child's world. The child sees its own hand. It may even want to grab the toy and be
unable to control the hand well enough to do so. ('Memento's' 28)
Later, we learn to cause the correct kind of neural activity to make our limbs move as
we intend; my fingers to tap the correct keys (most of the time), for instance. Clark
and Chalmers offer as an example of the absence of any strict divide between
material tools, body parts and cognitive processes 'the old image of the slide
engineer with a slide rule hanging from his belt wherever he goes', as if it was part of
him (224). As discussed in later chapters, in the early modern period it had become
newly fashionable to have a small mirror hanging from one's waist or in one's hat;
the significance of this fashionable appendage increases in significance when
considered in light of the fact that tools can play a significant role as part of the
cognitive economy. The puzzle of understanding how human thought emerges is not,
Clark insists, a mind-body problem, but a mind-body-scaffolding problem (Natural-
Born 11).
26
Embodiment and Emulator Circuits
Embodiment has not only become a topic of interest because of the body's role in
enactive cognition and its extendibility into the world. Body-based input in cognitive
processes also comes from the role of our body states and emotions in reasoning and
social inference, and additionally reveals the role of non-conscious processes in
conscious decision making. Hierarchical binaries that polarise reason and emotion,
the body and the mind, conscious and non-conscious processes are thereby placed in
question, as is any conflation of conscious agency with the human subject. In later
sections this will be compared with a variety of early modern theories about the role
of the emotions and body states in the subject, examining both those theories which
seek to polarise reason and the emotions and those which believe or assume that they
are dynamically interwoven.
The idea that conditioning or conscious cognition alone constitute reasoning
and decision-making has been called into question through the demonstration of the
participation of the emotions and the body in these processes. This development is
particularly indebted to the works of Antonio Damasio, which have had widespread
effects in terms of how human reason, emotions and embodiment are now
understood. In Descartes' Error Damasio argues that feelings and emotions are
linked into the loop of reason. Blood based networks of arteries and veins that carry
biochemical signals are interwoven with neural networks of electrochemical
impulses in the nervous system. Damasio explains that: 'Nature appears to have built
the apparatus of rationality not just on top of the apparatus of biological regulation,
but also from it and with it' (123). This is demonstrated by the case ofPhineas Gage,
who suffered an injury to his ventromedial prefrontal cortices in 1848; although he
initially seemed unaffected, it became apparent that his personal and social behaviour
were negatively altered. Recent studies of patients with ventromedial frontal region
damage, similar to that which Gage must have suffered, have shown that this
behaviour is caused by impaired reasoning abilities. Damasio and his colleagues put
forward the 'somatic marker hypothesis', to explain the relationship between this
region of the brain and our body states, and to explain the way emotional memories
of sensed body states resurface to guide our later actions ('Somatic' 1413-20;
Descartes' 184). The somatic markers may arise in the body proper, via a 'body
loop', or just in the brain's representation of it, via an 'emotion/feeling loop', which
he also calls an 'as if body loop. These markers, or signals, arise both consciously as
'feelings' and non-consciously, when they bias choices without producing any
conscious awareness of emotion. As Clark suggested of non-conscious processes
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more generally, Damasio states of these non-conscious emotions: 'While the hidden
machinery underneath has been activated, we may never know it' ('Somatic' 1416).
In patients with this kind of injury, while their IQ, factual knowledge, language,
basic attention and working memory remain unaffected, they exhibit abnormalities in
decision making and in expression of emotion and experiencing of feelings.
Therefore, Damasio proposes that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 'holds linkages
between the facts that compose a given situation, and the emotion previously paired
with it in an individual's contingent experience' ('Somatic' 1414). These
dispositional linkages reactivate the emotion by acting on somatic effectors or
directly on somatosensory structures as if in an attempt to reconstruct an earlier
concurrence of the event and the emotion. Thus, the 'gut reaction' caused, is based
on our capacity to sense our own body states, which are experienced as being either
pleasurable and appetitive or painful and aversive.
This hypothesis is borne out by a gambling test, conducted by Bechara and his
colleagues, in which normal subjects displayed anticipatory skin conductance
responses (SCRs) before choosing a card from a less favourable deck of cards, with
higher wins but also overall higher losses.5 At first this SCR non-consciously biased
their choices toward a better deck, then later in the game choosing the better deck
was followed by the feeling of having 'a hunch', then finally there arose a conscious
awareness of the better and worse choices of decks; whereas patients with
ventromedial frontal region damage did not display any SCRs, or have a hunch, and
even after consciously working out the better choice continued to choose from the
worse decks as well (1293-95). This demonstrates that even with overt knowledge of
the better choice, but without these non-conscious biases, which are physically
measurable, advantageous behaviour is not ensured. By blurring the boundaries of
reason, and showing it to be influenced by the emotions, the body and non-conscious
processes, the idea that conscious rational mental agency is equivalent to subjectivity
is called into question.
Andy Clark also laments the stress on reason as a kind of independent
overseeing faculty. Joining Damasio here, he asserts that emotion is part of the
mechanism of reason itself: for reasoning and deliberations are constrained through
'the automatic option-pruning and choice-influencing operations of the somatic
marker system', which 'allow us to reason protectively, on the basis of past
experiences' ('Artificial' 316) Damasio further argues that without our sensing of
5 SCRs are also known as Galvanic Skin Response (GSR): it calculates an index of arousal by
measuring the electrical resistance of the skin, which is affected by the increased sweating caused by
positive or negative arousal.
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painful and pleasurable body states, 'there would be no suffering or bliss, no longing
or mercy, no tragedy or glory in the human condition' (Descartes' xxv). Moreover,
through the correlation of the mental construction of a self with the feeling of
emotions as being phenomenologically one's own, present and past body
representations participate in this neural construct, as well as in the cognitive drama
more generally. The role of body states and emotions in cognitive processes and
subjectivity resurface later in discussion of similar early modern concepts.
Further evidence exists that the 'as if loop that Damasio has described as
occurring in the brain's representation of the body, is not one of a kind, as other
circuits exist which emulate processes in the body and in the world. Whilst
Damasio's 'as if loop emulates body states, a variety of other 'as if loops can
similarly emulate body actions, visual imagery, and perception. Rick Grush suggests
that Damasio's theory of the 'as-if loop' is a special case of his emulation theory of
representation (394). Grush explains that 'in addition to simply engaging with the
body and environment, the brain constructs neural circuits that act as models of the
body and the environment' (377). During sensorimotor engagement these models,
running in parallel, provide virtual feedback signals that correct an action as it takes
place, with actual feedback arriving at a later point from the body and the
environment, to correct current actions and modify future predictions (377).
Emulator models can also run offline (that is, only in the head) for visual imagery
and perception, and Grush hypothesizes similar mechanisms for reasoning, theory of
mind and language. Yet arguably even where the model is head-bound these loops
work effectively though being modified by feedback from the body and the
environment, and through having received information from them. Clark applauds
Grush's thesis for suggesting the close relation between internal representations and
sensorimotor factors. However, in addition to 'head-bound emulatory strategies',
Clark points out that humans frequently employ the world as its own model (instead
of a mental representation), or where this is unavailable, for example, in the case of
designing a new building, employ a drawn plan as a surrogate model. These
'environmentally extended emulator circuits' allow reason to operate in a
'disengaged but not disembodied' manner (Supersizing 152-6).
Thus, according to advances in neurobio logical research, significant
contributions are made to cognition by non-conscious processes, emotions and bodily
states. In addition, the wider hypotheses of head-bound and environmental emulators,
suggest that humans' ability to predictively and creatively represent and model
outcomes, is entwined with their capacities and experience as embodied creatures in
the world. Literature, the arena of this dissertation, can be understood as another
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means of creating a representational domain for emulating reality, through the
imagination's figural bodying forth of the words, or through an acted play literally
bodying it forth in material surrogate forms. It will also be worth considering to what
extent this notion can be compared with early modern understanding of the
imaginative leaps ofwhich the human mind is capable and with the understanding of
the purpose and practise of literature and drama presented in early modern literary
texts and works on rhetoric.
Word Mind Tools
The term 'mind tools' was invented by Richard Gregory, a neuropsychologist, in
order to describe the important role of culturally inherited or designed artifacts which
simplify solving problems and enhance intelligence. Words are distinguished by
Gregory as a special category of mind tool, because of their particular importance to
human cognition, and his term reflects the fact that neuropsychologists, cognitive
scientists and philosophers sometimes refer to language as a kind of technology (48).
Daniel Dennett adopts this notion of mind tools into his taxonomy of organisms:
'Darwinian creatures' are hardwired and evolutionarily changed; 'Skinnerian
creatures' learn new strategies by reinforcement; 'Popperian creatures' use
imaginative practice in advance; and 'Gregorian creatures' use inner models
informed by constructs in their outer environment (Kind of Minds 112-34). The
spectrum of types range from those changed over evolutionary timespans, to those
who reach the highest category, we humans, whose brain shows us to be capable of
adapting more quickly via external resources. Like Gregory, Dennett argues that the
most important of the resources we are furnished with by culture is language, as it
equips the mind with concepts, labels, and representational systems:
Navigation in the abstract multidimensional world of ideas is simply impossible
without a huge stock ofmoveable, memorable landmarks that can be shared, criticized,
recorded, and looked at from different perspectives. (194)
Language enables a soaring upwards of further reflections built upon one another,
and can lead to 'an arms race of reflection' (158): I am thinking about what you will
think about what I have written. It is through language that the human mind and
notion of self emerge, and Dennett claims, through 'a radical restructuring of the
virtual architecture of the human brain' it has placed humans 'far beyond all other
earthly species' (220, 195). For Dennett, a fundamental and unique advance is made
by language in our human kind ofmind.
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In explaining his understanding of the significance of language Dennett also
adopts Richard Dawkins' term 'meme', which describes a unit of cultural
transmission (such as a tune, an idea, a way of making pots) that is propagated by
being transmitted from brain to brain (Selfish Gene 192, 196). In the extreme Dennett
claims this could lead to the conclusion that: 'A scholar is just a library's way of
making another library' (Consciousness 202). Dennett argues that meme evolution,
like biological or genetic evolution is not necessarily for the good of anything, but
suggests the extent to which human consciousness is a product of cultural evolution.
Whilst various specialist parts of our brains are shared with animals, some of these
have since been recruited for specifically human activities, and they are augmented
by both the individual and the culture inhabited, as 'thousands of memes, mostly
borne by language' inhabit and re-programme the structure of the brain turning it into
a mind (254).
Although Clark follows Dennett most of the way, in terms of an emphasis on
the dramatic effects of language on human cognition, Dennett's more emphatic
distinction of humans' basic processing profile as transfigured by language, is
modified by Clark who argues for more of a continuum between us and other
animals, with our consciousness as differing from theirs 'only in richness of content
and poise' (Mindware 176-81; 'Magic Words' 166-67). Language acts as a
complementary human cognitive resource, but 'does not bring into being the basic
apprehensions of pleasure and the sensory world in which the true mystery of
consciousness inheres' ('Magic Words' 163-65; see also 'That Special' 187-205).
Clark places stress on the similarity between humans and other creatures by
emphasising that the tendency to transform oneself and to extend into the
environment, as humans do via mind tools, is natural:
It is our natural proclivity for tool-based extension, and profound and repeated self-
transformation that explains how we humans can be so very special while at the same
time being not so very different biologically speaking, from the other animals with
whom we share both the planet and most of our genes. (Natural-Born 10)
Our learning of tags and labels, Clark declares, is akin to learning a new perceptual
modality, for it allows us to direct our thoughts on objects, rendering features of our
world concrete and remarkable, which in turn enables 'a progressive cascade ofmore
complex and increasingly abstract ideas\Mindware 144-5). Clark argues that words,
by freezing concepts or a piece of knowledge, allow it to act as a conceptual building
block, from which can be built more abstract towers of thought; whilst this 'freezing'
occurs to an extent, it seems important to remember that neither public or individual
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linguistic concepts are entirely static, as like our memories, they change with every
reconstruction. A historical instance of this mutability is evident in the changes that
have occurred in words used to describe the mind and subject themselves, and this
necessitates the consideration of how the mind and the subject have shaped and were
in turn shaped by understandings of these terms. Thus whether the particular
character of the resource itself has an effect is dependent on the particular context
and instance of its use.
The idea that language is not just about communication, but also a
developmental cognitive tool, was originally proposed in the 1930s by the
psychologist Lev Vygotsky. Vygotsky argued that the regulation and guidance of
children's behaviour by adults, through language prompts, acts as scaffolding for
their learning of new information or actions. Children integrate these prompts, by
learning to employ self-directed and inner speech to control their own cognitive
behaviour. This theory has since been proven in a series of experiments carried out
by Laura Berk and various colleagues, who have shown, for example, that when a
learner attempts to repeat a previously demonstrated task, they will be more attentive
and successful if they rehearse the assistant's instructions to them (Elias and Berk
218). The implication of this theory in which communicative interactions precede
internal development, is that social interaction is necessary for a subject's full
development of the higher cognitive faculties, including the formation of concepts.
Rumelhart and his colleagues follow Vygotsky's lead in this area, as they
describe the way cognitive processes can be informed by external instruction or by
the internalisation of external linguistic representations:
We believe that the process of following instructions is essentially the same whether
we have told ourselves or have been told what to do. Thus even here we have a kind of
internalisation of an external representational format. (47)
They also contend that externalising instructions through talking to oneself, has the
same effect as writing on paper: it assists in the solving of difficult problems and at
the same time, they point out the significant blurring between 'external' and
'internal' that occurs, since 'we ourselves produce the external representation' (47). I
take issue with their former point upon the equivalency of writing and speaking,
since distinctions between mediums can be an important factor in the heterogeneity
of interactions, with, for example, the particular cognitive tools in use contributing to
the distinctive character of individual cultures. In his book, Orality and Literacy,
Walter Ong describes writing as more statically frozen than speech through its
graphic materiality, whereas speech disappears into the air (although it may also be
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visualised in our literate minds) (32). And yet, their claim for parity, if taken in terms
only of the general implications that language has for subjects, does hold true. For in
all cases, whether externalised through writing or speech, or rehearsed internally, it
involves a doubling of the cognitive message that increases the clarity of the thought
and the focus of attention.
In Supersizing the Mind, Clark draws on evidence that language is a hybrid
resource with both biological and sociocultural origins. He employs research on the
origins of mathematics to demonstrate how this works: humans have a biologically
basic capacity for approximate reasoning and to understand the concepts of 1, 2, 3,
and a vague more-than-that-ness, but through the linguistic resources of numbering
humans also have the capacity to learn that specific number words relate to distinct
quantities (50). Previously Clark suggested that language is as biologically proper for
humans as the web for a spider, whilst writing straddles the divide between the
biologically proper web and the artefact crane ('Magic Words' 182). Following this
logic further in Supersizing he proposes that this means that the biological organism
spinning webs of cognitive scaffolding is therefore 'organism centred even if it is not
organism bound' (123). Yet arguably, whilst language contributes to our
construction of an illusory centralised self, through its intersubjective and
sociocultural character it also contributes to our distributed and decentralised nature.
Intimate forms of sociocultural and linguistic interfacing are so habitual they are
often invisible to us; right now 'my' words on the page are resounding in your mind.
These words leave the permeability of boundaries between us revealed by their
fluidly intersubjective operation, between people, and intrasubjective operation,
within a person. To argue that cognitive processes are not just formed through the
mind and the body but also by technological, sociocultural and environmental
interactions, in my view entails that humans oscillate between centring and
decentring forces, and are subject to contingency.
Within the field of cognitive linguistics, the theory that our everyday
conceptual language is not only metaphorical but generated by our embodiment has
proved widely influential. This theory is most closely associated with Lakoff and
Johnson, and as with Alva Noe, they have been criticised by Clark for a body-
centrism which claims that human-like bodies are necessary for human-like minds
('Pressing' 42-3). Since in my view, our making the abstract concrete operates
through cognitive processes that are decentring as well as centring, I would also
question the generalisation that: 'The grounding of our conceptual systems in shared
embodiment and bodily experience creates a largely centered self (Philosophy 6).
Lakoff and Johnson's concept of language tends not only towards body-centrism, but
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also to a concept of a centred self, and in my view this can lead to overly
universalising and homogenising tendencies. They focus on a fixed construct of
embodiment and argue that the mind and body are metaphorically understood as
containers: 'It also assumes the MIND IS A CONTAINER metaphor, which
establishes continuity between the mind and the body—both being CONTAINERS'
(Metaphors 148). Lakoff and Jonson's insight into how humans tends to
conceptualise non-physical domains in terms of physical ones is helpful, and
Ramachandran has discovered some evidence concerning body based metaphors, as
in his experiments with patients who have lost the ability to perform complex skills
there is also a loss of understanding of the metaphors related to them ('Marco'). Yet,
as has been discussed in this chapter, the fluid adaptability of the most plastic
creature on the planet, the human being, means that there are also a whole range of
other metaphors for conceptualising minds and bodies. The persisting tension
between notions of the subject as physically constrained and as porously
interconnected with, and physically and cognitively extending into, the world will be
discussed in later chapters in relation to early modern and Shakespearean concepts.
Lakoff and Johnson distinguish between 'the self and 'the subject', with the
higher reflective subject mainly taking the role of judging the acting lower private
inner selves, which in turn divide simply into a true self and a not-true self that is
disowned, as in 'I was not myself yesterday' (.Philosophy 278-79). Thus they allow
that the self is not singular, consistent or reason-led, yet recreate a cognitive and
territorial inflexibility in contradiction to the flexibility of our peripheries, extending
their notion of being human only as far as the next container of a Russian doll type
self by positing a centralised embodied self whose cognitive processes and identity
stop at the skin boundaries. Aspects of their theories remain of interest and to the
extent that neurophysiologieal processes are common in structure in all humans there
does exist a universality; however in that commonality the distinction between each
of us is eroded by what is shared, in conflict with their 'self as container' metaphor.
Whilst it is praiseworthy that Lakoff and Johnson have made evident the role of the
body in language, it seems ironic that a theory concerned with language, arguably
one of the most significant resources in extending human cognitive processes beyond
the body and in contributing to the illusion of a centralised self, has thus limited itself
to the domain of the body in constructing its own theory.
Whilst for EM language is understood as having biological origins, and as
occurring within an embodied being, it is not dominated by this embodiment, any
more than language has domination over our basic biological capacities. As this
chapter has described, the middle way charted by Clark is that language's cognitive
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role is complementary to our basic biological capacities, but that the dramatic
consequences of this resource are akin to the human race having learned a new
perceptual modality. Clark's theory of language presents interesting contrasts and
comparisons with psychoanalytically influenced literary theories which will be
explored in the next chapter. The relations of both of these types of theories to early
modern and specifically Shakespearean depictions of linguistic representation are
discussed in later chapters of the thesis.
Phenomenology versus heterophenomenology
In the 1970s, Thomas Nagel raised important questions concerning the nature of
consciousness and subjectivity, that still continue to occupy philosophers and
cognitive scientists, and that have insight to offer in understanding subjectivity. They
tackle the abiding problems of private versus public, and ofwhat can and cannot be
inferred by a third-person point of view about first-person intentionality. Nagel's
landmark essay 'What is it like to be a bat' in his book Mortal Questions, argued that
objective third-person psychological accounts leave out the subjective nature of
conscious first-person phenomenal experience: the 'something it is like' to be me, or
to be you, or to be a bat (170). In addition, since 'our own experience provides the
basic material for our imagination', he argues that the imagination's range is
therefore limited (169). Thus, he suggests that whilst phenomenological facts can be
objective to an extent, since one person can say of another what they infer their
experience to be, it is subjective to the extent that the more different from oneself the
other is, then the more difficult it is for us to adopt their point of view:
The distance between oneself and other species can fall anywhere on a continuum.
Even for other persons the understanding of what it is like to be them is only partial,
and when one moves to species very different from oneself, a lesser degree of partial
understanding may still be available. (172)
Nagel contends that since our subjective experience is apprehended from a particular
point of view, so any shift to a greater objectivity about that phenomenon 'takes us
farther away from it' (174). This is congruent with a sense of self explored in early
modern texts and claimed by tragic Shakespearean subjects, such as Hamlet and
Richard II, as will become apparent in later chapters. Are we then necessarily
returned to the subject as a mysterious monolith on account of this theory of
irreducible subjective experience, or should we treat irreducible qualia as an illusion?
The approach to this question adopted within this thesis, follows Ronald de Sousa's
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paper 'Twelve Varieties of Subjectivities', which breaks down the subject into a
dozen constituent parts, demonstrating that whilst there can be a particular way it is
to be a subject, it does not necessarily entail that there must therefore be a monolithic
unified subject that experiences it.
In relation to subjective experience of oneself, Nagel explains that:
My feeling-of-being-me may well be different from anyone else's analogous feeling,
and indeed is likely to be insofar as it supervenes on a number of factors that
determine different aspects of our experience of ourselves. (174)
These different aspects of experience involve, for instance, the spatio-temporal
particulars of perspective which contribute to the distinctness of tone of one's own
experience. Yet, as de Sousa points out, although part of the reason that people use
the concept T is to formulate their uniqueness, actually 'part of the reason that they
have this concept is because they are not unique'. De Sousa then elaborates his
standpoint on the issue of whether someone without phenomenological experience
would be a zombie. A zombie in the philosophical sense is someone with no
phenomenological experience, who is indistinguishable from otherwise similar
creatures with it: the questions asked are whether there could be such creatures and
what the implications would be (if any). De Sousa suggests that if it were possible
for a creature to exist who could participate in your every experience except your
qualia, then your qualia would be an incidental by-product of no interest or causal
purpose:
....if you can imagine some being whose reactions to a given scene (sound, sight
stimulus, or whatever) are like yours in every possible way, including synesthetic,
associative, recollections evoked etc.) can you really imagine that this being might not
be like you merely in lacking qualitative experience? If you can, then subjective
consciousness, as such, is strictly epiphenomenal in a sense so strong as to make it "a
concept that has no utility whatsoever" (sic)
De Sousa's argument (which culminates in a quote from Dennett) is that qualitative
experience operates through inner and external processes and is inherent to them,
rather than existing as transparent or transcendent qualia. Combined with extended
mind ideas this leads to my conclusion that subjective experience must be linked to
the experience of phenomena caused by the amalgam of our psychophysiological
underpinnings with our sociocultural and technological context. As Clark puts it:
In place of this elusive essence, the human person emerges as a shifting matrix of
biological and nonbiological parts. The self, the mind, and the person are no more to
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be extracted from that complex matrix than the smile from the Cheshire Cat. (Natural-
Born 198)
In The Bounds of Agency, the philosopher Carol Rovane, similarly to de Sousa,
argues that phenomenology is not evidence of an individual unified personal identity
and, she goes on to suggest, therefore does not preclude the possibility of
overlapping persons, who can jointly share in beliefs and desires and participate in
the actions necessary to bring these about: people can overlap although their
consciousnesses do not (207). As concerns this breaking down of the subject, Nagel
himself admitted the possibility that:
...our simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day, when the
complexities of the human control system become clearer and we become less certain
that there is anything very important that we are one of. (164)
Thus, for the subject, I would argue, even with and in fact because of all its
patchwork construction, there is 'something that it is like' to be you.
Nevertheless, there is also value in Dennett's response to Nagel and other
theorists who have insisted on a first-person phenomenology: the theory of
heterophenomenology, or third-person phenomenology. In Consciousness Explained
he argues that it is as if some philosophers are attempting to create an
insurmountable 'objective subjectivity' (136). This indicates a potential flaw in
Nagel's theory, since as Dennett explains someone may himself be mistaken about
what he has experienced. A person can claim with certainty that something is like
something for him, even if it is not actually as he thinks it, and even if he will later
misremember it. Dennett gives the listener/ reader leeway to doubt the reporter of his
own phenomenological world: you are in fact only authoritative 'about what seems
to be happening in you' not 'about what is happening in you' (96). In Kinds ofMinds
he also proposes that in humans the habit of adopting an 'intentional stance',
(viewing behaviour in terms of mental properties) spreads 'to cover both other-
interpretation and self-interpretation'; which suggests that some of the same
processes are used to fathom our own and others' mental properties (159). This
implies a shared mechanism for making inferences about our own and others' mental
experiences. Meanwhile, Timothy D. Wilson charts the discrepancy between the
many human judgements, emotions, thoughts and behaviours formed by unconscious
processes and the reasons confabulated by our conscious selves (106). This
discrepancy for Dennett suggests that the subject's phenomenological world is a self-
created and self-creating fictional theory, which can therefore be investigated for an
37
explanation ofwhy it exists, rather than remaining an insurmountable 'hard problem'
due to something that is irreducibly only subjectively available. This belief in an
objective subjectivity he suggests is a consequence of the Cartesian cogito, so that
'perhaps we are fooling ourselves about the high reliability of introspection, our
personal powers of self-observation of our own conscious minds' (Consciousness 67).
Within Shakespeare's works both first-person and third-person phenomenologies are
explored and their reliability questioned, suggesting forms of this dilemma that
emerged in the early modern context, and these are explored in later chapters.
The fact that there are arguably species- and individual-specific perceptions of
the world, does not dictate that these perceptions do not therefore participate in the
flux of the pre-existing world. Hayles, describing the consistencies, as well as the
discrepancies, between her dog Hunter's and her own perceptions has suggested the
model of 'constrained constructivism'. The consistencies argue against radical
subjectivism and solipsism; communication can take place across gaps between
species and individuals since there is a shared reference within the world. At the
same time, acknowledgement of the discrepancies and the refusal to abstract to
universal laws from an anthropomorphic perspective, guards against a falsification of
how our perceptual processes operate and the belief that 'reality is static and directly
accessible' ('Constrained' 29-31). This perspective liberates us from the notion of
representation as inert objective mirroring, without necessitating a claim that there is
nothing outside representation (40-41). Following Merleau-Ponty's view of
situatedness as enabling knowledge rather than acting as a barrier to it, Hayles argues
that:
Constrained constructivism has this double edge: while it implies relativism, it also
indicates an active construction of a reality that is meaningful to us through the
dynamic interplay between us and the world. Renouncing omniscience and coercive
power, it gains connectedness and human meaning. (41)
The argument for a heterogeneity of perceptions and experiences of the world, which
however does not vary so wildly as to preclude commonalities, and which moreover
has a point of reference outside of the perceivers, provides a basis for two-way
relationships between oneself and others and between oneself and the world, whilst
acknowledging the necessary limitations and biases of a human or individual
perspective.
Clark, in his latest book, suggests that given the insensitivity of epistemic skills
to the full range of sensorimotor information, 'then the perceptual experience of
differently embodied animals could in principle be identical, not merely similar to
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our own' (Supersizing 193). Whilst I would agree with the potential for consistencies
in specific contexts and in relation to specific explanatory principles, arguably
differences would necessarily appear across different parameters. Expanding on
Hayles' theme, to illustrate this claim, consider my dog and me perceiving an
unfortunate rabbit. Whilst on a base level my dog and I both know a rabbit is there,
the specifics of our perceptions pertaining to it wildly differ, in ways that may or
may not have a bearing, since a dog is colour blind, can scent and hear the rabbit's
movements (possibly even its heart beats), while I may only visually perceive the
rabbit, which I name in language, as it turns for its burrow, having itself perceived us.
Clark's desire to avoid biochauvinism or speciesism has perhaps pushed his claim for
potential perceptual consistencies too far, and risks instead an obfuscation of the
heterogeneity pertaining between species and individuals. That for Clark, the
importance of heterogeneity and particularity is not negated is clearly evident
elsewhere in his work, nor need my disputation of this suggestion undermine a belief
in the central EM parity principle, that posits only that if a part of the world functions
as a process which would be accepted as cognitive were it to go on in the head, then
it is for that time part of the cognitive process (Supersizing 77).
It seems that belief in subjective particularity of experience does not necessitate
belief in a monolithic unified subject that experiences it; neither does it preclude the
possibility of decentralised and overlapping persons, nor the value of
heterophenomenonological accounts. In addition, I have argued that subjectivity
whilst constraining access to reality does not condemn each one of us to solipsism:
representation is situated in relation not only to subjective perceptions and
experiences, but also to shared human characteristics and to the world. Furthermore,
in my view, representational systems that are referenced both to ourselves and to the
world, through retaining both negotiability and representationality, create an open
ended and interactive system, which fundamentally contributes to humans'
propensity for transformation and creativity.
Mirror Neurons and Extended Subjectivity
Rizzolatti and Craighero's paper 'The Mirror-Neuron System' describes the
astonishing discovery of a brain system which provides further evidence that our
cognitive processes are not exclusively centred within a container subject: 'Mirror
neurons represent the neural basis of a mechanism that creates a direct link between
the sender of a message and its receiver' (183). Originally discovered in Macaque
monkeys' premotor cortices using electrodes to record single neurons, the mirror
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neurons fire both when the monkey performs an action involving an object and when
it perceives another performing the same action: it is as if the monkey is watching
itself in a mirror. Mirror neurons have not been as precisely identified in humans,
due to the difference in techniques used, with the result that many researchers instead
refer to a 'mirror neuron system' or 'mirror system' in humans (Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia 124; Niedenthal 1003-4). The brain-imaging and neurophysiological
experiments in humans suggest that our mirror neuron system is much more diverse
and complex: it fires when another subject performs transitive and intransitive types
of action and codes the movements making up an action. This ability to internally
simulate actions viewed in another has been linked to the social aspect of human
cognition, as it contributes to our ability to imitate and understand another's actions.
Inspired by Merleau-Ponty, Rizzolatti and Craighero propose that the motor
'resonance' of visuomotor mirror neurons translates visual experience into an
internal 'personal knowledge' (179). In addition, the echo-mirror-neuron system,
located in the speech-related motor centres, resonates when a human listens to verbal
material, and leads to the capacity to replicate sound produced by others (Rizzolatti
and Craighero 186-7). Rizzolatti and Craighero's conclusion is that the mirror neuron
system contributes to both social organization through action understanding and to
human culture through imitation learning.
These may seem tall claims, and doubts have been raised not only about the
theoretical claims but also about their neurological basis (Turella et al.). Yet the
multitude of papers exploring the workings and potential implications of mirror
neurons for understanding aspects of human nature, suggests that whilst stricter
constraints may be needed, Ramachandran's prediction may come true:
I predict that mirror neurons will do for psychology what DNA did for biology: they
will provide a unifying framework and help explain a host of mental abilities that have
hitherto remained mysterious and inaccessible to experiments. ('Mirror Neurons')
The most significant claims about mirror neurons over the decade following their
discovery in 1996 were presented in Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia's book Mirrors in the
Brain. In addition to the mirror mechanisms already mentioned, Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia also mention the discovery of mirror systems in humans for primal
emotions, such as disgust, fear and pain, which means that there is a common neural
base for experiencing and perceiving these emotions. This forms a necessary
condition for empathetic (rather than colourless) processing in our inter-personal
relationships; an as //loop between our own and others' emotional experiences (173-
193). The mirror neuron mechanism 'embodies that modality ofunderstanding which,
40
prior to any form of conceptual and linguistic mediation, gives substance to our
experience of others' (193). Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia conclude that our behaviour
and social relations are vitally contributed to by the mirror neuron mechanism.
The Preface to Mirrors in the Brain opens with the authors' referring to the
theatre director Peter Brook's comment 'that with the discovery of mirror neurons,
neuroscience had finally started to understand what had long been common
knowledge in the theatre' (ix). The theatre makes use of the ways the actors'
embodied movements, sounds and facial expressions are animatedly participated in
by the spectators. Arguably Clark's extension of Grush's emulation models, as also
operative via environmental scaffolding, holds implications for understanding the
dramatic realm as well. The theatre is a particularly powerful form because operating
as a 'dramatic emulator circuit' it can combine biological mirroring mechanisms
operative in the social realm with the fluidly intersubjective and intrasubjective
nature of language which also enables our imagination to model and occupy different
realities via 'linguistic emulator circuits' (These are both my suggested terms).
Calvo-Merino and his colleagues carried out a noteworthy experiment, which is
also mentioned by Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia; however neither party discusses the full
significance of the experiment's implications in terms of the potential constraint it
suggests on the mirror mechanism and interpersonal subjectivity. In this study it was
shown that the intensity of the firing of the mirror neuron system was greater in
individuals who had specialised experience of the type of action, ballet or capoeira,
which was being performed, than was evident in the inexpert control subjects. Calvo
Merino and his colleagues conclude that: 'Our results show that this 'mirror system'
integrates observed actions of others with an individual's personal motor repertoire,
and suggest that the human brain understands actions by motor stimulation' (1243).
Therefore, whilst mirror mechanisms can be seen as bringing into question the full
extent of Nagel's claim as to the incommensurability of phenomenological
experience, yet this experiment partly bears it out through demonstrating that we will
experience more closely actions we have experienced ourselves already and which
are in our own motor repertoire. Whilst mirror neurons provide evidence of a vehicle
that biologically extends human subjects, the mental state does not remain identical
across first and third-person boundaries without the intervening factor of shared first-
person experience.
A more general neuroscientific study by Agloti and his colleagues also suggests
that specific enactive subjective experience frames future experience. Their study on
action anticipation and motor resonance in trained basketball players, demonstrated
that 'the fine-tuning of specific anticipatory 'resonance' mechanisms' endow elite
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athletes' brains (and not novices or coaches) 'with the ability to predict others'
actions ahead of their realization' (1109). Thus, whilst mirror neurons indicate the
potential for considerable sharing of various types of experience across persons, this
evidence suggests that there is also considerable particularity of subjective
experience, and that enactive cognition plays a significant role in forming our
cognitive repertoire and mirroring potential. Subjective experiences of the world are
made up of a rich and dynamic mix of shared consistencies and particular
divergences.
A theoretical account which suggests not only consistencies between perceiver
and actor but also the constraints on their sharing of experience is the late Susan
Hurley's 'shared circuits model' (SCM) which aims to explain how imitation,
deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled (1). Hurley proposes that cognitive
mechanisms allow perceivers not only the sharing of experience but also distance
from the actor through inhibitory mechanisms. These are also supplemented by
modelling mechanisms, and together they free humans from path dependent learning,
and underlie our ability to parse intentions and recombine structures, rather than
simply copy them. Furthermore, Hurley suggests that this 'recombinant flexibility'
may have influenced our ability to construct linguistic structures which, via
grammatical syntax, allow us to flexibly recombine words in order to create endless
metamorphoses of meanings (7-8). Thus Hurley proposes that it is precisely on
account of the subpersonal mirroring in humans, without any distinction between
action and perception or between self and other, that further monitoring and
inhibitory mechanisms are necessitated on the personal level in order to prevent an
undifferentiated flux between self and others. These contribute to the particular
human sense of being an individual, by making apparent the distinction between our
own versus others' actions and perceptions. The combination of the ability to share
circuits and to differentiate between our own and others' circuits enables humans to
predict and simulate reasoning about our own and others' actions, and about the
cause and effects of those actions (16-19).
Marco Iacobini in his commentary on Hurley's paper posits that the recent
discovery of 'super mirror neurons' which have a modulatory role over mirror
neuron activity, by inhibiting overt copying, is one of the mechanisms which allows
the distinction between self and other to emerge (30). Andy Clark and Julian
Kiverstein's response (on Hurley's behalf) to peer commentary concludes that what
is particularly striking about this model is the suggestion that the human mind is
'fundamentally social, as an evolved organ not of solipsistic individual cognizing,
but of social and communal co-cognizing' (52). This turns much of current debate on
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its head by suggesting that to an extent 'the problem then is not so much how to learn
about the minds of others, as how to separate her own mind from the minds of
others' (51). Although in Supersizing Clark also notes Kim Sterelny's argument that
mind-reading capacities are developed through culturally and artifactually scaffolded
training (67-68). The issue of reading one's own or another's mind and conversely of
the leakiness, blurring or lack of boundaries between the self and other(s) are
dominant themes in early modern and Shakespearean depictions of subjectivity,
whose concerns this theoretical and scientific background here suggest have in part a
neurophysiological and in part a sociocultural basis .
Another of the pertinent areas in which the mirror neuron system has acted as
theoretical catalyst is in understanding the use of gestures. In Hearing Gestures
Susan Goldin-Meadow demonstrates that, as with language, gestures are not just
about communication but act as a cognitive prop. Her analysis of learners' use of
gestures has shown that they enable the performance of more complex tasks by
freeing up other aspects of cognitive effort and allowing a redescription of the task.
Through the double medium of gesture and speech multiple representations of a
single task are possible, with gesture itself allowing for both visuo-spatial and motor
representations: gesture is seen, forms shapes and trajectories, evokes images and is
felt as an embodiment of thought by the speaker and, through mirror neurons, by the
listener (185).
Goldin-Meadow acknowledges the influence of David McNeill's work on
gesture. In Gesture and Thought McNeill develops the idea of language as 'an
imagery-language dialectic' that requires two simultaneous modes of thought (92ff).
McNeill defines Vygotsky's concept of a 'material carrier' as 'the embodiment of
meaning in a concrete enactment or material experience', in order to advance the
notion that in the motion of gestures there is offered a supplementary dimension of
meaning (98). Speech and gestures coevolved each one contributing to the other's
further development and both act as thinking in one of its many forms (99). The
reason this thought-language-hand link exists, McNeill conjectures, is due to the
human capacity to respond to our own gestures as if they belonged to someone else,
and this he hypothesizes is enabled by mirror neurons:
Mirror neurons could be the mechanism of this gestural self-response. We can posit a
self-response via one's own mirror neurons and hypothesize one's own gestures
activating the part of the brain that responds to intentional actions, including gestures,
by someone else, and thus treats one's own gestures as a social stimulus. (250)
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In more general terms, Ramachandran has posited a similar model in relation to
mirror neurons and self-awareness, in order to explain this paradoxical 'turning
inward' aspect of the self. He suggests that self-awareness uses the mirror neuron
system for 'looking at myself as if someone else is looking at me' ('Neurology'). As
with McNeill's and Hurley's theories, this reverses the conventional model, which
depicts theory ofmind (TOM), the awareness that others have beliefs and desires on
which their behaviour is based, as developing out of a pre-existing sense of self.
Instead he posits that awareness of others was internalized into introspection: 'the
TOM evolved first in response to social needs and then later, as an unexpected bonus,
came the ability to introspect on your own thoughts and intentions'.
In the later sections there will be an exploration of social and self-reflexive
mirroring in Shakespeare's time, with discussion of early modern awareness of the
use of another person or thing as an extension of oneself, in particular as a recursive
means to self-knowledge; these I have respectively called 'extended subjectivity' and
'extended reflexivity'. These terms are used to describe the mechanism by which
objects, environments, and other people, contribute to and participate in a person's
subjectivity and self-knowledge. Mirror neurons are changing our understanding of
self-other relations and invite questions about first-person versus third-person access
to our own and others' subjective experience. In texts circulating around the time that
Shakespeare was writing, notions of subjectivity and reflexivity as extended are
widely evident: as implicit or collective assumptions, as inventive and playful
conceits, and through coming into conflict with notions of autonomous individuality.
Particularly pertinent to the notion of an extended subjectivity is Stephen
Kosslyn's concept of 'social prosthetic systems' (SPSs). On the Edge website he
defines SPSs as other people whom we 'rely on to extend our reasoning abilities and
to help us regulate and constructively employ our emotions'. He explains that
another subject who becomes your SPS, 'literally lends you part of their brain', so
that 'other people's brains come to serve as extensions of your own brain'. Kosslyn
credits mirror neurons with helping us develop our social prosthetic systems, and
suggests that we need these social systems for the same reason that Clark explains
that we employ technological and sociocultural resources: because our brains are
limited. He suggests that humans are evolutionarily motivated to participate in such
systems because their 'self thereby becomes distributed over other people, who may
either help with a shared immediate short-term goal or serve as a long-term
prosthetic system ('On the Evolution' 547). Whilst Vygotskian ideas are concerned
with the internalisation of social scaffolding, Kosslyn's SPS hypothesis advances the
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idea that other people participate in the operation of our cognitive processes through
being invoked as more or less reliable supplements to our memory, our reasoning,
and our emotional faculties. Although the term SPS might seem to emphasize an
artificial crutch-like function, Kosslyn argues that SPSs are enabled by neurological
structures and may have evolved from more basic evolutionary survival goals
(.Edge); SPSs are made possible by and required because of the existing properties of
humans rather than being ad hoc add ons.
In 'Memento's Revenge' Andy Clark comments that other people would not
typically endorse Otto's notebook as a cognitive supplement as automatically as he
does himself, believing that he knows something if it is written in the notebook.
Clark goes on to suggest that the fact that Otto does not typically worry that tricksters
tamper with his notebook entries is another reason for considering it to be a cognitive
resource ('Memento's' 7, 34). Prefigured here are a couple of the concerns that
plague the use of other people as an extension of your mind: the possible
unwillingness or inability of one subject to hold as valid or even to comprehend
another subject's point of view and one subject's interest as potentially in conflict
with that of another subject; although since similar issues may plague our own
relations with our multiple different selves, this is not a reason not to consider other
people as cognitive resources. In his most recent book, Clark's argument in relation
to epistemic artefacts would also apply to SPSs. He argues that since such artefacts
exist in shared interpersonal space they are potentially more open to deceptions and
manipulations, but to the extent that we do not treat our perceptual inputs more
cautiously than we do information from our internal input (the potential unreliability
of which has been discussed), they should count unproblematically as part of the
cognitive economy (Supersizing 102-4). Indeed, Clark optimistically envisions a
future in which rather than you having to read all these words printed on paper, we
could simply hook up and you could directly channel this thesis (Natural-Bom 127-
28). And already, the 'complex reciprocal dance' of brain and techno-sociocultural
environment is described by Clark as one in which our humanity plays out 'in
concert with other brains' (87). This section has explored the ways in which the
human mirror neuron system contributes to an awareness of our own and others'
minds and suggests a basis for human empathy and theory of mind. This complex
brain mechanism contributes to humans' ability to operate skilfully in our socially
complex societies and to human's intimate and dynamic coevolution with their
sociocultural and technological scaffolding.
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Conclusions
The research discussed in this chapter reveals the embodied, embedded and extended
nature of human cognitive processes and subjectivity. This invites the reappraisal of
contemporary forms of literary theory and of concepts of human cognition and
subjectivity in other historical periods. This chapter has presented a wide range of
evidence that supports the claim that neurophysiological structures have an impact on
cognition through conscious and non-conscious processes, through willed and
autonomous subsystems, and through plastic and evolutionarily hardwired processes.
The distributed nature of the mind, the fluid and plastic nature of the brain and the
vital cognitive roles of the emotions, body states, and functions invite questions
about the opacity, variability and agency of the subject.
The perspective proposed is that human beings extend themselves and their
cognitive processes out into the worlds around them through biological,
technological, and sociocultural resources. What is immediately evident is the
necessity of wariness of the marginalisation of any particular resource's roles,
through employing interrogatively different perspectives on the way humans exist in
the world. Also evident is the opening to question of individualist, hierarchical and
reason-centred structures in our own and other societies, which shore up the myth of
a strictly demarcated, fixed and monolithic human subject. The adoption ofEM as a
theoretical basis is not an invitation for it to dominate literary interpretation, since
my understanding of literature as in part a type of emulationary model, suggests that
one of literature's values lies in it being a means of creating representational domains,
which can imaginatively play with and disrupt explanatory paradigms.
In my view, human cognition and subjectivity are subject to both centring and
aecentring forces, both in terms of its biological and its non-biological resources.
Language is a particularly significant resource, which is both centring and decentring.
This chapter has explored Clark's view that language is a new perceptual modality
that builds on natural tendencies to exploit environmental resources; so that although
it sets humans apart from other species, we retain much in common with other
animals. Combining this with Hayles' concept of 'constrained constructivism', the
view has been set forth here that representation is referenced to perceptions,
experiences, language and the world. Additional evidence from emerging research on
mirror neurons indicates both the potential for particularity of subjective experience,
as well as the sharing of experience across persons, with a rich and dynamic mix of
shared consistencies and particular divergences between beings.
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These ideas will be explored in later chapters in relation to early modern and
Shakespearean texts' expression of views about the body and mind, character and
sexuality, language and memory, and individuality and social relationships. First, in
the following chapter there is an exploration of this topic, in terms of the potential
relation between EM and various psychoanalytical, cognitive and literary theories
that influence analysis of texts. This exploration sets out to determine what kind of
relationship could exist between these types of readings and where points of variance
may be irreconcilable, and yet nevertheless valuable, in allowing for fertile readings
of polysemous literary texts, texts that are themselves steeped in diverse and




Extending Literary Theory and the Psychoanalytic Tradition
The extended mind hypothesis by its very title assures us that it does not restrict itself
to conventional or limited notions of the mind, but incorporates into its focus both
the human subject and the world. For this reason, it is worth considering how EM
might interact with theories concerned with the nature of the human mind that have
more commonly been employed in literary readings. This second chapter is, like the
first, theoretically motivated, as it sets out to establish the potential relation ofEM to
literary studies, in order to suggest a basis for the use of this theory for reading
literature. The primary focus here is on the various intersections of EM related
research with the psychoanalytical theories that to a lesser extent influence the
reading of texts in this thesis. Psychoanalytical theories are commonly concerned
with human decentring by the unconscious or by language, and they provide various
modes ofunderstanding the formation of the subject, its sexual identity and its social
relationships. This chapter opens with three sections which briefly consider: the
interdisciplinarity of literary studies and ofEM; EM's hybrid straddling of the divide
between the arts and sciences; and lastly EM's relation to psychoanalytical and new
historicist literary theories. The discussion will then focus on psychoanalytic theory
and its particular relation to EM, following a chronological trajectory from Sigmund
Freud's splitting of the self, via Jacques Lacan's constructions of subjectivity and
textuality, to Judith Butler's critical miming of Freudian and Lacanian propositions
and positing of her own. Finally, the closing section of the chapter considers the
potential relation of EM to stances taken so far by cognitive literary studies towards
psychoanalytical and postmodernist literary theory.
Interdisciplinarity
Many forms of cultural and literary theory continue to be stimulated by postmodern
continental philosophers, and amongst those, particularly by Foucault, Derrida and
Lacan who, despite numerous significant differences in their approaches and ideas,
all display concern with the relation of culture and discourse to the construction of
the subject through questioning the finiteness of boundaries between the subject and
the structures within which it operates. These philosophers share with extended mind
proponents the belief that thought arises from preconditions that a thinker is born into.
There is also a shared involvement in linguistic theory: continental philosophy and
49
postmodernism are marked by an emphasis on the constitutive powers of linguistic
structures, while earlier classical cognitive theories focused on the role of syntax and
information in computational processes. For instance, Keir Elam describes a trend in
1970s and 1980s literary criticism, which focuses on a semiotic system of linguistic
codes (141-42); this is a parallel to early cognitive science's syntactically focused
theories. There are grounds for seeing a relationship between literary theory and EM
in terms of their claims about human sociocultural and linguistic extendedness.
Literary study has always been characterised by interdisciplinarity. Terry
Eagleton reminds us that there is no 'literary theory' that arises from or relates to
literature alone:
None of the approaches...from phenomenology and semiotics to structuralism and
psychoanalysis, is simply concerned with 'literary' writing. On the contrary, they all
emerged from other areas of the humanities, and have implications well beyond
literature itself. (Literary 1)
That this interdisciplinarity should and already does stretch beyond the realm of the
humanities is reflected in Alan Liu's call for the humanities to recognise its
necessary relationship to technology; as reflected in the entwining of their
etymologies, with 'technology' deriving from the Greek techne or 'art' and 'poetry'
deriving from poeisis the verb 'to make'. Liu suggests that just as the humanities
have made use of technical methodologies since the close reading techniques of the
Russian Formalists (although in the following chapters it is evident the link goes
back further), so 'technical competence need not be oblivious to the sense of history
that is the primary means by which the humanities at once reinforce and critique
culture' (18). N. Katherine Hayles' latest book, My Mother was a Computer, is such
a project as Liu demands, as it analyses the proliferation of computational codes and
digital media and analyses their contemporary artistic and ethical implications:
"'What we make" and "what (we think) we are" coevolve together; emergence can
operate as an ethical dynamic as well as a technological one' (243). This thesis
shares with Liu and Hayles a concern with the intimacy and historicity of interactions
between what humanity thinks it is and what it produces, whether literary, material,
or indeed, itself. The interdisciplinarity of literary studies thus reflects literature's
involvement in and reflection on the multiple factors that make up life: it is therefore
a cause of celebration rather than concern that literary readings do not finish, but
only begin, with the close reading of texts.
Like literary studies, EM invites a multidisciplinary hybridity on a theoretical
level. This is particularly evident in its claim that humans are natural-born cyborgs.
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The idea of the cyborg can tend to echo ideas familiar to us from popular sci-fi
renderings, as something exotic, other, and futuristically threatening; something that
wants to be us or rule us, rather than as something that we should be at ease with that
we already are. Yet the image of the cyborg has also been usefully employed in
feminist theory as a mechanism to challenge patriarchal domination, feminist
organicism and hierarchical binaries. One example of a more complex application of
the idea of the cyborg is offered by Donna Haraway's work. Haraway explains that
whilst from one perspective 'a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of
control on the planet', from another perspective it could be 'about lived social and
bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and
machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints'
(154). Haraway argues that the aim is to see from both a positive and negative
perspective the possible outcome of our technological developments: 'The political
struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both
dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point' (154).
Double, or, indeed, multiple perspectives, which can be illuminated through
theoretical arguments, experiments or literature, are complementary components in
the process ofunderstanding our technologies, our selves and our world.
The scientific study of mind thus demands interdisciplinary effort and
multidisciplinary cooperation on a whole new scale, probing adaptive response at
multiple organisational levels including those incorporating bodily, cultural, and
environmental scaffolding. (Clark, Mindware 160-161)
EM invites and extends literary theory's openness to incorporating interdisciplinary
perspectives, by inclusively considering the complementary roles of technological,
sociocultural, biological and environmental resources in cognitive processes and the
creation of human subjects.
Yet an emphasis on interdisciplinarity also raises the provocative question as to
whether literary theorists are therefore merely parasites on other disciplines. Rather,
in my view the types of paradigms adopted by literary theorists are particular
instances of evolving explanatory models; for example, postmodernism is a
manifestation of relativism. Through employing the current manifestations of
explanatory models for understanding the world and the self, both the contingencies
and continuities with earlier manifestations become visible in literary readings.
Following Mark Robson, I understand literature as one of the ways in which we
make sense of the world and literary criticism as a means ofmaking sense of how we
make sense of the world (7). Literary criticism is a means of reflecting on the
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reflections of ourselves and the world wrought by the imagination and on what the
specifically human activities of reading, writing and engaging with literature tell us
about being human. This invites open and complex readings that critically reflect
back onto the very critical paradigms employed in our reflections. Literature and
literary theory are not then parasitical on, but instead both reflective and productive
of, new imaginings and understandings.
Arts and Sciences
In spite of the interdisciplinary basis of literary criticism, questions about the
disciplinary antagonism of the arts and sciences are of long standing, dating back at
least as far as the 1880s when T. H. Huxley's assertion that natural science was
responsible for modern civilisation was countered by Matthew Arnold's emphasis on
the greater necessity of the moral and aesthetic training of the liberal arts. The
oppositional relationship between the arts and sciences was concretised in 1959 into
that of 'two cultures' by the chemist-turned-novelist C. P. Snow. He depicted a
hierarchical dichotomy with literary intellectuals hostile to scientific and material
progress dominating positions of power. F. R. Leavis' aggressive response to Snow
was ironically taken as reinforcing the dichotomy although, as Guy Ortalano argues,
his actual intention was to critique the complacency of modern civilisation (and of
Snow) rather than science itself (Ortolano 161). A more recent instance of the
troubled relationship between the arts and sciences is the Sokal affair, the most
renowned event in the 'Science Wars' of the 1990s. The journal Social Text
published a paper by the physicist Alan Sokal that he later revealed was a satire of
relativist approaches to science in order to highlight the flaws of postmodernism;
since postmodernism has been highly influential on literary theory, the door was
open for literary intellectuals to interpret this as an attack on their discipline. Sokal
later argued that this was not intended as a generalized critique of the humanities or
social sciences, but only the excesses of French postmodern intellectual practices (xi).
It was fuelled not by antagonism towards the arts but by a desire to critique epistemic
relativism. The point of fracture here is the invoking of fixed or pre-existing
categories against proponents of relativism. This fracture line is a major cause of
current tensions between the arts and science, as reflected in the roll call of Sokal's
critiqued, which includes Lacan, Kristeva and Irigaray, along with other French
postmodernists influential within literary theory. Postmodern relativistic and social
constructivist viewpoints which repudiate anything purporting to be a fact and which
argue that social forces are primarily responsible for human concepts and behaviour
52
have dominated recent literary theory, seemingly putting it at odds with most
scientific discourse.
EM may offer a fruitful line of negotiation between these two positions. In
contradistinction to most theories, it takes a middle path between scientific fact and
social construct, arguably leaving space for the acknowledgement of both pre¬
existing categories (such as 'gene') and social categories (such as 'citizen'), and
moreover exploring their mutual entanglement. As an instance of this, EM does not
cast the biological body as merely occupying a single category, but acknowledges the
role of both scientific and social categories in the body's make up and in its
diachronic evolution. Furthermore, whilst certain scientific categories such as genes
may be classed as pre-existing, EM implies that like their social counterparts, they
are nevertheless subject to the history and evolution not only of the individual, the
species, and the world, but also of the terminologies and frameworks used to describe
them; they are representative but not transhistorical categories. EM thus invites
engagement between the arts and sciences and an acknowledgement of their shared
ground as well as their differences: both utilise and interrogate accepted conceptual
categories, and dare to imagine new forms, terminologies, and frameworks for
thinking about the mind and being human. In concert, the arts and sciences offer
multiple perspectives on these issues and encompass all aspects of being human in
the world.
Psychoanalysis, New Historicism and EM
Extended Mind theory invites a rethink of attitudes and assumptions about the mind
and subjectivity. This is why much of this chapter concentrates on the relations
between EM and that old stronghold of the mind, still influential in literary theory
and in the popular imagination: psychoanalysis. But in literary criticism,
psychoanalytical literary readings have come into conflict with new historicist
literary readings, since the latter's emphasis on specific sociocultural contexts and
power structures seems incompatible with a theory which at least in its earliest
Freudian form posited ahistorical structures. Carla Mazzio and Douglas Trevor chart
the tensions between the two theories, whilst noting that since the late 1990s there
has nevertheless been an increase in works that involve cross-pollinations, with a
psychoanalytical turn to issues of historicity and new historicism's turn to discourses
of interiority (2). They also note that psychoanalysis and new historicism share
terminologies, listing as recurring terms in both: anxiety, alienation, desire, otherness,
fetish, and symptom (3). In fact, this is not surprising since new historicism as a
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theory was influenced by post-structuralism's insistence on each period having its
own knowledge system, an insistence that emerged not only from Foucault's works,
such as The Order of Things, but that was also influenced by Lacan's emphasis on
the disciplines of psychoanalysis and history as 'sciences of the particular'
('Function' 22).
Ironically, an implicit emphasis on the need for epistemological relativism has
been applied at a metatheoretical level by critics of new historicism. Mazzio and
Trevor note that postmodernism has produced criticism against new historicism's
widespread influence (2). For instance, Louis Montrose argues that new historicism's
predominance in the 1990s put it in danger of stifling critical discourse with its 'fixed
and homogenous body of doctrines and techniques' (392). This is a threat that has
arguably been evaded by the cross-pollinations that have latterly arisen and it
suggests the vitality of future literary studies may lie in consciously implementing
and combining diverse theoretical strands.
Charges of anachronism made against modern readings of early modern texts
appear equally applicable against EM readings of earlier literature. Consider the
charge made by Margreta de Grazia against the interpretation of early modern
subjectivity (personified by Hamlet) in accordance with the latest understanding of
subjectivity. De Grazia comments: 'What we have after 1800, then, is a long
tradition of finding the most recent modern understanding of consciousness in the
answer to the question 'Why does Hamlet delay?' ('Hamlet's' section 4). Juliet
Fleming applauds de Grazia's calling 'attention to the universalising tendencies of
contemporary historicist criticism' which 'reads the Renaissance as a version of "the
Early-Now'" (section 1), but does not question the validity of de Grazia's own
evidence. De Grazia applies to the first critical work on Hamlet for her interpretation;
however this dates from 1736. Given that Hamlet was written circa 1600, a parallel
might be the use of criticism written in 2005 to interpret a play written in 1869,
which hardly constitutes proximity in the human scale of time. Cultural theory has
been working away from the concept of time as progressing toward a superior
present day, as is reflected in de Grazia's own critique. But perhaps we should also
reconsider the possibility of resonances between different ages that are not fixed by
their proximity in years.
Evelyn Tribble advocates that contrary to being anachronistic, EM effectively
calls for historically situated studies, because of'the shifting and unstable boundaries
between inner and outer, engrams and exograms, thought and cognitive artefacts'
("'To Ease'). In fact, far from being anachronistic EM is a useful means of
reminding ourselves of the cognitive significance of manifold different factors
54
operating in different times and places, which causes diverse interactions between
the mind, the body and the world. In these interactions, and in the beliefs of different
historical and geographical contexts, we can trace features which are unique to a
particular time as well as those which are common to our own. Indeed, de Grazia's
critique can itself be seen as emerging from the oscillating movement in critical
trends between emphasis on disjunction or on continuity with the present, which is
described by Lynn Enterline and David Hillman (64). Hillman goes on to suggest the
need to move beyond this dichotomy, since both the familiarity of this time out of
which our own evolved and its distance can be seen as productive of interpretive
insight, as well as a limitation (64). Hillman suggests the apposition of early modern
and psychoanalytical discourses enables the emergence of concerns shared by both,
such as the (in)accessibility and instabilities of selves and others (65, 67). Whilst EM
shares in the view of (in)accessibility and instability of selves and others, it is
without the sense of anxiety, lack and death that pervades the psychoanalytical
framework; therefore EM's apposition with early modern discourses invites the
emergence of insights into the celebration or non-conscious belief (rather than
anxiety) of human extendedness in the early modern period. EM's unremitting
optimism about human extendedness may be understood as both a strength and a
limitation in understanding early modern subjectivity; for on this issue EM focuses
on only one side, the other side ofwhich emerges from the psychoanalytical tradition
and its darker view of human extendedness. Evidence of this and of other
comparisons and contrasts will emerge in the following discussions of Freud, Lacan
and Butler.
Thus, EM is a particularly useful theory for studying literature because of its
hybrid ability to straddle the divide between postmodern relativism and the fact
based sciences, to welcome input from many disciplines in considering human
cognition and subjectivity, and in its historical sensitivity to the material contexts of
other periods. What is intended in the following sections is a general consideration of
how psychoanalysis may be brought into discourse with EM. Nevertheless, given the
focus of this thesis on Renaissance and Shakespearean thinking about subjectivity, it
is worth mentioning another potential problem with psychoanalytic literary theory.
Stephen Greenblatt contends that it is not advisable to use psychoanalysis to analyse
Renaissance texts since a subject of that period appears to be a product defined by his
communal environment, whereas according to psychoanalysis the subject, he asserts,
is instead defined by his psychic condition and viewed as the creator of his
environment, therefore psychoanalysis is an inappropriate tool (Learning 131-45). In
the following analysis ranging from the early twentieth century to current discussions
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ofpsychoanalysis, I hope to show that this reading of psychoanalysis is a limited and
in fact an ironic account of this field. It is through psychoanalysis that previous
assumptions about the subject were initially enabled to be countered in the twentieth
century: for it is in large part through influential psychoanalytical writings that the
realisation re-emerged that humans are not the unified autonomous reason-led and
bounded subject imagined by the Enlightenment, and that the subject is constructed
by, as well as constructive of, his environment.
Freud and Beyond
As well as being the father of psychoanalysis, Freud might also be considered one of
the founders of neuropsychology. (Broks 27)
Sigmund Freud made a number of claims that bear on interpretations of cognition
and subjectivity in general, and which through their later reappraisals by Lacan and
Butler have been wrought to a form that invites discourse with EM. Freud famously
conceptualised divisions within the mind: the ego, the id, the super-ego and the ego-
ideal. These divisions between different parts of the psyche at once divided and
multiplied the subject within and against itself; breaking down any assumption that
cognition or subjectivity are equivalent to unified consciousness. In 'The Ego and the
Id' he distinguishes between the id as the container of the instinctual passions and the
ego as the representative of reason and common sense, with the ego attempting to
tame the wilful id (636). Later works such as Damasio's on the emotions, discussed
in the previous chapter, have demonstrated the operation of the emotions in rational
decision-making and so attest that it is mistaken to draw such a rigid boundary and
hierarchical relation between them. Nevertheless, Freud describes the ego as 'a
bodily ego', 'a mental projection of the surface of the body', and as being
'essentially the representative of the external world, of reality', which provides
evidence of a Freudian understanding of a transposition of the mind on the body and
the world on the mind (636, 643). Freud's conception of the bodily ego as a mental
projection seems to prefigure Damasio's 'as if body loop, the mental representation
of the body in the brain. Indeed, Damasio has written that:
Freud's insights on the nature of affect are consonant with the most advanced
contemporary neuroscience views...I have proposed (without thinking of Freud but
coincident with him), that the body, real, and as represented in the brain, is the theater
for the emotions, and that feelings are largely read-outs of body changes "really"
enacted in the body and "really" constructed in an "as-if' mode in body-mapping
brain structures. ('Commentary' 38-39)
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Freud's description of the ego as an agent of external reality also resembles
Vygotsky's concept of the internalisation of external scaffolding. Freud's expansion
of this theory with the introduction of the ego-ideal, or 'who-you-want-to-be', and
the super-ego, or 'who-you-ought-to-be', as introjected parental identifications,
further blurs boundaries between the subject and its social context (637-45).
However, if we consider in more detail Freud's depiction of a child's
developmental course, which begins with the auto-erotic stage of illusory union with
the mother, and is then followed by a narcissism that forms the ego, prior to the
development of object relations, it is evident that Freud is biased towards the
primacy of the internal, which thus places him in conflict with EM. In 'Beyond the
Pleasure Principle', he depicts the ego as originally being formed in relation to itself
prior to social relationships and reverting to this relation through trauma in secondary
narcissism. The secondary sexual or 'life instincts' are an inversion of the same drive
that fuels the primary ego or 'death instincts', as 'all instincts tend toward a
restoration of an earlier state of things' via death, the post-coital cessation of
excitation, or the production of copies (612-3). Both these instincts are conservative
and were originally brought into this living state by the action of 'external disturbing
and diverting influences' upon organic inanimate matter, and any higher
development ofmatter was similarly caused in this way (613). Thus the development
of consciousness, it is suggested, was caused by external influences, although Freud
attempts to repress the significance of the external, by having the narcissistic ego's
relations to itself as primarily formative.
Also problematical for recent critical thought is Freud's description of the
development of object relations. This involves the mutually exclusive norm of a
child's identification with the parent of the same sex and desire for the parent of the
opposite sex, and thus posits as natural a distinction between desire and identification
('Ego' 640). Freud consequently elides homosexual desire or even the fact that desire
for and identification with another may be coincident. This is the well-trodden
ground of feminist critiques that have revealed the shallow foundations of Freud's
oedipal structure as based in his society's androcentricism rather than the universal
he asserts, ofwhich Shoshana Felman provides a persuasive critique:
Freud who for the first time freed thought from a certain conception of the present and
presence-to-oneself, whose notions of deferred action, of the unconscious, of the death
instinct, and of the repetition compulsion radically undermine the classical logic of
identity, remains, nevertheless, himself a prisoner of philosophy when he determines
the nature of sexual difference in function of an a priori of sameness, that is, of the
male phallus. (9)
57
Undermining the classic logic of identity is a step in the direction towards enabling
us to rethink the subject; but, in Freud's case, his mind extended out into the
particular world he lived in, and then imagined that the hierarchical structures within
that world represented universals. Thus, Freud broke through the misperception of
the inviolable unified subject, but then created a rigidly sexed and narcissistic subject
in its stead, a subject who only wanted to return to what Freud had seemingly
deprived it of, an integrity and coherency which it could find now transiently through
sexual or sublimated artistic reproductions of itself, but finally and completely only
through death.
The connection ofEM to the Freudian legacy has been scathingly noted by one
of its opponents, as Stevan Flarnard blames the EM hypothesis on too many 'years of
Freudian faith in the existence of alter egos co-habiting your head' (503). The
neuroscientific evidence employed by EM discussed in Chapter 1 unexpectedly
draws it even closer to Freudian hypotheses. V. S. Ramachandran, for instance,
describes his surprise that his neuroscientific discoveries in fact support and advance
core Freudian ideas, such as repression {Phantoms 152-6). Indeed, both he and
Damasio sit on the advisory board of the journal Neuro-Psychoanalysis launched in
1999 to advance collaboration between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. These
disciplines' shared interest in explaining the mind's functions, calls for the sharing
and reconciliation of the insights of a century ofpsychoanalytic enquiry with the new
neuroscientific insights (Solms and Nersessian 3). For although neuroscientists have
tended to be suspicious of Freudian theories, due to the extent of hypothetical
theorising (of which Freud himself was aware and which was necessitated by his
living prior to the technological advances that enable modern neuroscientific studies),
neuroscience's recent studies in traditionally Freudian areas have lea some to
reconsider what could be usefully learned and integrated ('Beyond' 623). The recent
neuroscientific turn to Freudian areas has attracted attention even from the
mainstream press, in which an article by the neuropsychologist Paul Broks noted:
Modern neuropsychology provides compelling evidence for unconscious mental
processing. For example, it can be shown experimentally that the behaviour of brain-
injured patients can be influenced by memories that are unavailable to conscious
recollection. (28)
However, Broks naturally warns against unreservedly taking up Freudian
conceptions, and adds that he is only one figure in what is a long history of thinkers
about the 'dynamic, unconscious mind', amongst whom he lists Shakespeare (28).
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This will be the focus in the later sections of this thesis: to explore what particular
form conceptions of the mind take in Shakespeare and his contemporaries' texts, and
how EM and reinterpreted psychoanalytical theories, such as Freud's, can open up
our reading of them.
The Subject and Language in Lacan
Jacques Lacan's reformulation of Freudian ideas has also had a continuing influence
upon literary studies, particularly because he combined Freudian theories with a
transformation of the structuralist concept of language popular in the mid-twentieth
century. Lacan follows Freud, in terms of presenting a hierarchically gendered
system as a universal and in dismissing notions of a transparent or autonomous
subjectivity, the latter view being borne out by the neuroscientific research harnessed
by EM. As with EM, Facan explores the role of external factors on the human mind
and subject. Yet in contrast with EM, Lacan expresses anxiety rather than optimism
about the extendedness of human subjectivity.
In one of his most famous papers, 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the
Function of the I', Lacan describes psychoanalysis as having led him to 'oppose any
philosophy directly issuing from the Cog-fro'; an opposition to the notion of the mind
as reliant on purely inner resources that is shared with EM (1). In this paper Lacan
develops his theory of the formation of the ego and the inauguration of the child into
the imaginary order, through its misrecognition of a specular image as itself. The
agency of the ego is fixed in a fictional direction, with the ego's narcissism
paradoxically fuelled by the child's identification with the internalised image. This
was a relational account that was intended to represent the relation of man to the
world (Evans, 'Introductory' 114-16):
What did I try to get across with the mirror stage?...The image of his body is the
principle of every unity he perceives in objects...all the objects of his world are
always structured around the wandering shadow of his own ego. ('Dream'166)
Thus the ego acts as a perceptual and cognitive constraint and its relation to
exteriority and interiority appears unstable and uncertain. Judith Butler describes this
passage as invoking the ego as 'an interior alterity' and 'an object of perception' and
also since imaginary she describes it as 'neither interior or exterior to the subject' but
a perpetually negotiated site of 'identificatory relation' (Bodies 75-6). Lacan depicts
the image of the body as a site of projection and identification, with the
unmanageable body itself the source of this misrecognition. Where Clark describes a
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baby's experience of its own body parts as if they are unwieldy tools it has to learn to
use, Lacan pessimistically pictures the same phenomenon in terms of an experience
of motor uncoordination that is connected to a feeling of uneasiness and
insufficiency ('Mirror' 4). Lacan asserts this is caused by the prematurity of human
babies and reveals the 'primordial Discord' that he believes structures relations
between humans and nature. This leads to the human 'assumption of the armour of
an alienating identity' and the possible reappearance in dreams of Bosch-like
phantasies of disjointed limbs (4).
Lacan describes the next stage as our inauguration into the symbolic order
through language, although again this is not strictly speaking a developmental stage
since language exists prior to our entry into it, with the subject inscribed into it at
birth 'by virtue of his proper name' ('Agency' 148). Language is not only the tool
man carves up his perceptual world with, but as with Dennett's 'user-illusion', it is
also the means by which man himself is formed: 'It is the world of words which
creates the world of things...Man speaks therefore, but it is because the symbol has
made him man' ('Function' 39). Words are described as being self-referential, and as
with Dawkins' memes, are forms that self-replicate and have their own evolutionary
history. For Lacan, words are the primary force that determines human birth, destiny,
character and death, and they are our final judge:
Symbols in fact envelop the life of man in a network so total that they join together,
before he comes into the world, those who are going to engender him "par l'os et par
la chair" [by bone and flesh]; so total that they bring to his birth, along with the gift of
the stars, if not with the gifts of the fairy spirits, the design of his destiny; so total that
they give the words which will make him faithful or renegade, the law of the acts
which will follow him right to the very place where he is not yet and beyond his death
itself; and so total that through them his end finds its meaning in the last judgement
where the verbe [word] absolves his being or condemns it...(42).
Lacan further asserts that reason is produced by words, rather than words being the
product of reason.
Like Clark, Lacan describes language as being a powerful shaping force. Yet
the difference between the two thinkers is signalled in Clark's use of the natural
metaphor ofmangrove forests (that grow from floating seeds and by trapping debris
in their roots create the land on which they stand) to describe the way in which words
can create thoughts, instead of the conventional notion of pre-existing thoughts
creating words ('Magic Words' 171-76). In contrast, Lacan developed his theory of
language by adapting the already non-organic model of language developed by
Ferdinand de Saussure, which described language as a system of signs in which
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arbitrary signifiers (sound images) refer to each other and to the signified (concepts)
rather than to things in the world (Saussure 65-70, 113). Clark and Lacan share a
parallel belief in language as fundamentally contributing to human capacities and
subjectivity, yet whilst for Clark this is not threatening, in Lacan's works it appears
an alien and tragic necessity. Whilst the more analogical model of EM traces the
relations between culture and nature, the psychoanalytical tradition is linked in with a
non-organic model of language, which creates models that emphasise a gap between
nature and culture.
Derrida, whose theory of language also continues along the lines of the non¬
organic model with the endless play of the signifying system and the absence of a
referent in the world, accused Lacan of following in the Western epistemological
tradition from Plato through to Saussure of phonocentricism, which emphasises the
power of the spoken over the written word (Postcard 478). Here it seems it is
Derrida, in his championing of grammatology ('a science ofwriting'), and in arguing
that the written word is not a secondary or inferior substitute to the spoken word {Of
Grammatology 74 ff.) who prefigures Clark's insistence that we increase our
awareness of the benefits of all our technologies:
After all, our single most fantastically successful piece of transparent cognitive
technology—written language—is not simply a poor cousin of face-to-face vocal
exchange. Instead it provides a medium both for the exchange of ideas (and more
importantly) for the active construction of thoughts. {Natural-Born 109)
Yet, Derrida's accusation of phonocentricism does not hold true, for Lacan too was
alert to the advantages offered by the various modalities of language; for instance, he
stressed the tightening up of meaning enabled by writing in comparison with the
formative effects of speech ('Agency' 147).
Lacan's comparison of his work with early cybernetics makes vivid further
conjunctions and disjunctions between his vision and that of the cognitive sciences
and EM. The first wave of cybernetics, was sparked by the post-war Macy
Conferences and was contemporaneous with A.M. Turing's landmark article
'Computing Machinery and Intelligence', best known for the claim that a Universal
Turing machine could perform any well-defined computation through attention only
to syntactical information. The stress on this possibility, in turn shaped how human
brains and subjects were being interpreted. One emphasis lay upon intelligent
computation as the defining factor of being human-like. Having considered early
cybernetic theory, Lacan instead presented an assimilative system in which language
is the machine, which 'through its combinations already governs' whilst processed
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humans are 'thrown into it' and 'caught up in its gears.' ('Psychoanalysis' 306-7).
For Lacan, it is therefore an 'illusion to seek the reality of the subject beyond the
Language barrier' ('Function' 72). The symbolic order acts like a 'sumbalon', that is
'an impression in wax' or a 'seal', and unlike the Saussurean sign 'the signifier
enters the signified'; famously as gendered urinal signs that demarcate gendered
bodies ('Function' 35, 119; 'Agency' 151). Humans' attempts at self-making, are
controlled by the imaginary and symbolic orders, which make us cogs in their
machine.
This also appears a skewed version of the early cybernetic dream and a dark
prefiguring of the second wave of cybernetics, especially Maturana and Varela's
concept of homeostatic autopoietic (self-making) and allopoietic (other-making)
processes. They describe social as well as biological and mechanical systems as
working in a recursive and closed autopoietic manner; except when a system is made
to subordinate its functions to those of a larger system allopoietically (xxix-xxx, 48).
In Lacan's theory, man is not an information processing device, but its processed
message, and his self-making system is necessarily caught up in an allopoietic
system beyond his control. Lacan's works reflect his reaction against American
psychoanalysis of the 1950s, whose intention was to create the integration of the ego
within the individual and the harmony of the individual within society. This reaction
against the 'corporation man mentality' then evident in behaviourism's attempt to
market a unified subject ('Function' 6-7), is later echoed in Varela and his
colleagues' intention that The Embodied Mind counteract a tendency to 'the
economic view of the mind' and resist attempts to market the possibility of mental
transparency and consistency in an autonomous subject (245-7).
Lacan expounds that man's identity is founded on a fiction that involves
alienation. Unlike Descartes' 'Cogito ergo sum\ he creates a split between thinking
and being: 'I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think' ('Agency'
166). EM, along with several of the theories discussed in Chapter 1, similarly
suggests the operation of a 'user illusion', a narrative construction formed partly
through the internalisation of intersubjective discourse. Yet, for Clark our existing
and our thinking are not polarised as they are for Lacan: 'We exist, as the thinking
things we are, only thanks to a baffling dance of brains, bodies, and cultural and
technological scaffolding' (Natural-Born 11). Lacan's theory of the self alienated by
the formation of the subject, relates to those parts of us that cannot be translated into
language; but cognitive science has made evident that non-conscious processes are
not alienated but functioning elements of our cognitive processes and subjectivity.
This positive take on the extended nature ofhuman cognition and subjectivity by EM
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and cognitive scientists generally, demonstrates acceptance or celebration. Lacan's
contestation of the Cartesian subject, with his more negative slant on human
subjectivity as being pointed in a fictional direction and enslaved by the symbolic
order, makes evident the dark side of the notion of the mind as extended into the
world and the potential anxiety associated with human dependence on 'mind tools'.
Lacan's anxiety, accentuated by his realisation of the extent of our dependence
on the medium of language, relates to a fear that has long beset the technology of the
written and the spoken word. He cites the Biblical 'the letter killeth while the spirit
giveth life', but 'how could the spirit live without the letter', in order to describe the
paradox whereby our entry into the symbolic order of language, and so into the
knowledge of good and evil, not only brings the epistemological subject into
existence, but alienates it from its ontological self; it is the inaugurator of temporality
and death ('Agency' 158). This reference from the Bible to the potential
destructiveness of language is in itself evidence of the long lived concern with the
way in which language, which has been so transformative of humanity, at the same
time as stabilising and labelling something also divides it, limits it and is not the
thing itself. As Lacan pessimistically puts it, the 'symbol manifests itself first of all
as the murder of the thing' ('Function' 84). For Lacan, it remains a troubling
exchange that he avows necessary: the presence of the word is the absence of the
thing, which translates into presence as a human subject as the absence of being. It
relates to a historical structure of epistemological concern about the creative and
divisionary powers and lacks of language as a formed and formative tool, which is
often reiterated in attitudes to other technologies. Thus, although Lacan shares an
interest in the fundamentally formative nature of language, unlike EM Lacan
explores the darker concerns about the intimate relationship between language and
human subjectivity.
Butler's Bodies of Discourse
Judith Butler completes our psychoanalytical trajectory offering fertile
reconfigurings of Freudian and Lacanian concepts, for she operates not at any dead
end but at a crossroads, an interstice of psychoanalytical, poststructuralist and
feminist domains. Butler's works also intersect interestingly with EM theories. What
then for Butler do embodiment, embeddedness and extendedness involve and along
what paths can extended mind ideas meet with her concepts? Bodies matter she
asserts because of the way in which a disjunction between sex and gender has made
sex a naturalised distinction: 'gender is a performance that produces the illusion of an
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inner sex or essence or psychic gender core' ('Imitation' 728). In various works,
including Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter, Butler argues that sex, like
gender, is in fact contingent and constructed. This might seem to be supported by
Anne Fausto-Sterling's work which enlists scientific research to demonstrate that sex
as a strictly demarcated binary is constructed, arguing that variations continue along
a continuum rather than there existing any sudden disjunction; with approximately
1.7 percent of children born as intersex individuals (51-3). However, it would clearly
be mistaken, to leap from sexual difference operating along a spectrum, to the
amplification of the tiny region of intermediacy as the norm. In Butler's conflation of
sex and gender as equally constructed concepts there is a lack of acknowledgement
of the physical differences that exist along the larger part of this spectrum and of the
biological factors associated with male or female sex, and which exist in addition to
the sociocultural factors that pertain to masculine and feminine gender roles. Whilst
Butler importantly makes visible the fact that ideas about sex, like ideas about gender,
are affected by sociocultural ideas and therefore can be differently constructed, her
rebuttal by exceeding the realm of the sociocultural, itself domineers over the realm
of the natural and physical.
Butler persuasively describes language as not a 'mimetic mirror' of the body,
but takes things too far, inverting the dichotomy by describing language as
performative of the body (Bodies 29-32). According to Butler, the body does not
appear outside of discursive processes that constitute it:
The body in the mirror does not represent a body that is, as it were, before the mirror:
the mirror, even as it is instigated by that unrepresentable body 'before' the mirror,
produces that body as its delirious effect... {Bodies 91)
Butler risks reinstating reason and the linguistic as privileged terms in an
immaterial/material binary hierarchy. She has acknowledged her debt in this: 'I am
not altogether out of the loop of the Enlightenment if I say, as I do, that reason's limit
is the sign of our humanity' {Giving 83). Anne Fausto-Sterling is a little closer to a
view consonant with EM, in her suggestion that 'we switch our vision (sort of putting
on 3-D glasses), so that we see nature and nurture as an indivisible, dynamic system'
(228). The image not only produces the body, the body also plays a vital role in
producing the image. Similar issues are explored later in relation to early modern
sexuality and humoural gender stereotypes.
Exposing the problematic extent to which social constructs can be naturalized,
leads Butler to a re-analysis of the transhistorical structures posited by
psychoanalysis. The symbolic, Butler argues, is not the quasi-permanent structure
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that Freud and Lacan (and latterly Zizek) present it as being. In their reliance on an
unproblematised heterosexual matrix they fail to realise that sex is a differently
reiterable construct (Bodies 22). Butler contends that the body is an estrangement
from the 'I' who claims it and is a phenomenon in the world, since it gains its sexed
contours through identificatory and exteriorising processes; this is an idea to an
extent compatible with EM, in terms of EM's notion of the plasticity of the body
image, but not to the point of the elision of biological matter. Whilst she dismisses
the notion of constructivism as a causal process or an act which occurs once with
fixed effects, she then replaces it with the concept of a temporal process produced
through a reiteration of norms:
What I would propose in place of these conceptions of construction is a return to the
notion of matter, not as a site or surface but as a process of materialization that
stabilizes over time to produce the effect of the boundary, fixity and surface that we
call matter. (9)
This questioning of the stability and fixity of boundaries holds parallels with
scientific research's discoveries to the extent that Butler depicts the body as having
negotiable properties rather than being fixed. Yet she tends again to omit recognition
of matter as a physical participant and implies that the material world itself is only
produced through this process rather than being something that exists in itself; a flaw
also to be found in Varela, Thompson and Rosch's theory of the world as apparently
found not made that was discussed in Chapter 1.
Butler adopts Irigaray's description of the term catachresis (Gk.: misuse):
catachrestic citation 'mimes mimesis' in that it refuses the concept of resemblance as
copy {Bodies 45). This notion of catachresis is drawn on in Butler's theory of
authority and the law, which exist as citational reiterations that through being
critically mimed are potentially reinventable with each reiteration as well as
predetermined (109). A similar line of argument is taken in her description of the
performativity of identity: the performance of identity is shown to be a process that
requires reiteration because it always fails to accomplish self-sameness. A reiteration
is constrained because it must be recognizable, but simultaneously by demonstrating
its lack of self-sameness the potential for intentional subversion and misuse is
evident ('Imitation' 727). Thus Butler explains that constraints do not determine the
subject: the necessity of reiteration in the performance of identity makes it 'open to
variation and plasticity' {Bodies 89, 95). In fact, this plasticity in human beings is
currently understood to be enabled in part by neurophysiological structures. As
discussed in Chapter 1, the plasticity of body boundaries and neural structures
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contribute to the human ability to incorporate and co-opt language, other subjects and
technologies in this variable and plastic way. Indeed, a neurological parallel exists to
Butler's theory, since the plasticity of brain networks, operating through the storage
of information as superpositional traces, means that a neural trace is partly
constrained but always new and reiterable. Thus, arguably our bodies and our
constructs of them coevolve and shape one another rather than any one-way
domination.
Butler also uses the logic of reiterability to demonstrate that identifications are
multiple and contestatory, rather than fixed and with oppositely sexed parents, so that
identity and desire need not be necessarily mutually exclusive, as it is portrayed by
Freud and Lacan (99). Rather than fixed and predetermined relations and networks
into which we enter, there is evident in Butler's thesis a dynamic that, as with the
scientific theories explored in Chapter 1, allows for the evolution of change; although
here the dynamic involves only signifying, and not biological, structures.
Despite the difference between their work, Butler provides a potential response
to the demand that has been made ofClark, of how a subject who is 'tools all the way
down' can be held accountable. This occurs in a defence ofpoststructuralism, against
the assertion that an incoherent and ungrounded subject cannot provide a basis for
personal or social responsibility. Butler powerfully suggests that it is the very
incoherence of identity that makes connection with another possible, and that
conversely, specificity of identity produces the loss and degradation of this
connection: coherence is purchased only at the cost of foreclosing the complexity
and crossing of identifications ofwhich we are composed. She sees the demand that
a multiply constituted subject provide one exclusive identification as a product of an
imperialist 'all-consuming humanism' which enforces a reduction and paralysis of
the subject whose plurality of identities are imbricated in one another {Bodies 16).
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler follows through on the ethical
implications of this, by further explaining how our opacity and incoherency operate
as the grounding of our social responsibility. Like Varela and his colleagues, she
argues against a unified self and describes social responsibility as a consequence of
our interrelationality. Butler defends poststructuralism against those who equate it
with moral nihilism: ethical failure is not a consequence of poststructuralism's
deconstruction of the unified subject. The alterity through which the subject is
constituted and decentred does not imply an irresponsible or irresponsive subject but
ethically connects us to other subjects: 'my own foreignness to myself is,
paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others' ('Giving' 37)
Conversely, the unforgiving judgement of ourselves and others that that demands
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self-identity, mastery and unity, involves a constitutive violence by excluding our
own and others opacity (35). A subject can be held to account simply by being
prompted to address another, with any demand for narrative coherence, requiring a
falsification of that subject's life, because of a preference for a 'seamlessness of the
story' (34). Like de Sousa, Butler notes that this demand is ironic because of the
automatically decentring action of the 'I', the transferable signifier with which the
narrative is introduced: 'The "I" is the moment of failure in every narrative effort to
give an account of oneself (35, 37). Butler advocates a sceptical stance individually
and universally:
Indeed to take responsibility for oneself is to avow the limits of any self-understanding
and to establish the limit not only as a condition for the subject, but as the predicament
of the human community itself. (37)
Conversely, the individualist moral narcissism that Butler critiques, by cutting off the
subject from the world, destroys the basis for its moral engagement with it, by failing
to understand that a precondition of our ethical responsiveness is the primacy and
irreducibility of our relations to others (Giving 107-9). An extended view of the mind
shares with Butler an awareness both of the fundamental significance ofour multiple,
plastic and opaque subjectivity and of the intimate involvement of other people in
our cognitive processes, the latter of which is most persuasively presented in
Kosslyn's account of Social Prosthetic Systems. Arguably, the discovery of the role
that mirror neurons play in our human ability to empathise with others, in addition to
Damasio's work uncovering the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, also gives
neurobiology an important role in understanding this human interrelationality which
Butler sets out to validate.
To realise both the capacities and constraints involved in being human is very
much a part of the recognition of how technologies allow us to offload our cognitive
processes. Butler focuses upon the most important of these: language. In her analysis
of the linguistic as both enabling and constraining, she shows not only the
importance of acknowledging the extent to which we are socioculturally constructed
but also that the boundaries of our constructs are variable and negotiable. Yet, whilst
Butler provides a compelling argument that an opaque self is a responsible agent, she
falls prey to reinstating a hierarchy of reason and the language over the body and
non-conscious processes. Butler shows that our plasticity allows the reiterability of
subjectivity, but does not consider the basis that exists for this in supporting
neurophysiological evidence, as her argument remains focused on sociocultural and
linguistic structures. It might be better argued that the social relationality of human
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beings is enabled by a combination of coevolving neurophysiological and
sociocultural factors. Where Butler argues that our multiplicity, mutability and
opacity do not undermine but enable ethics, Damasio would further add our
neurophysiological materiality. He argues that: 'The edifice of ethics does not
collapse, morality is not threatened, and in a normal individual the will remains the
will. What can change is our view of how biology has contributed to the origin of
certain ethical principles arising in a social context' (Descartes' 24). Chapter 1
demonstrated that whilst EM remains wary of models which confer too much
importance on the role of the brain or the body alone, it nevertheless incorporates
enlightening evidence about the role of neurology and physiology in our cognitive
processes. Butler, poststructuralism and social constructivism generally veto the role
played by biology: but the body and brain that human beings are in matter as much
as their sociocultural environment. It is together that they enable the very plasticity,
multiplicity and relationality that make us human subjects.
Reappraising
The introductory sections to this chapter discussed how despite literary theory's
increasing interdisciplinarity since the 1960s, though drawing on philosophical,
historical and psychoanalytic theories, it has tended to keep its distance from recent
scientific works and disciplines, due to the poststructural resistance to anything
interpretable as positivist claims to 'facts', 'truth' or 'reality' (Jackson 321-3; Crane
and Richardson 123, 129). Yet over the last decade or so a small number of literary
theorists have posited the potential of cognitive science to provide a valuable
contribution to the humanities and literary studies. These offer a variety of
standpoints ranging from attempts to reground literary criticism through cognitive
accounts (Mark Turner, Francis F. Steen, F. Elizabeth Hart); to the negotiation of
grounds for inclusion of cognitive science as a supplement (Patrick Colm Hogan); to
polemical attacks on literary studies' relativistic excesses with cognitive theories
presented as the necessary antidote (Joseph Carroll and lapsed Lacanian, Dylan
Evans). Yet these critics are less helpful to the consideration ofEM and literary study
than might have been expected. They have generally been heavily influenced by
cognitive linguistics, embodied mind or evolutionary psychology models that tend to
universalize human nature and this leads to the overuse of archetypal image and
narrative schemas. Rather than the notion that human minds were molded into a
fixed form in the Pleistocene era, which is the logic upon which some evolutionary
literary models appear to operate, Clark (following the work of Kim Sterelny)
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suggests that because humans have evolved capacities for the construction of
cognitive niches, this in turn leads to our inhabiting 'a rapid succession of selective
environments', which in turn favours 'the biological evolution of phenotypic
plasticity' (Supersizing 66-67). As I have argued this standpoint offers instead more
support for the view that postmodern social constructivist theories in fact have a
neurophysiological and material basis that contributes to human co-opting of external
structures, and therefore EM supports such theories at the same time as requiring that
they be rethought.
Through charting some of the nuances of psychoanalytical and poststructural
theories, in the discussion of Freud, Lacan and Butler, this chapter has explored the
relationship between this body of theory and EM. But it is also useful to explore the
particularities of an argument which has been raised against the possibility of these
theories engaging with cognitive literary theory, and to consider how this argument
would work in relation to EM. The cognitive literary theorist Mary Thomas Crane
provides a general example of the type of argument made about the incompatibility
ofpsychoanalytical and cognitive scientific concepts:
Both psychoanalytical and contemporary materialist approaches about the nature of
subject formation differ from cognitive approaches in emphasising the fragmentation
of the body and mind and in positing a more thoroughgoing and pervasive role for
language and the symbolic in the process of forming a conscious and speaking human
subject. (Shakespeare's 157)
In Crane's account of psychoanalytic approaches, she suggests that language plays a
more encompassing role; yet Daniel Dennett himself has remarked on the similarities
between his views and deconstructionist approaches. Upon reading David Lodge's
novel Nice Work, Dennett comments, he was surprised to discover that his concept of
'the self as a construct of narrative already existed in deconstructionist accounts of
literary theory (Consciousness 410-11). Crane, like many cognitive literary critics, is
greatly influenced by the embodied metaphorics of Lakoff and Johnson and bases her
conceptualisation of cognitive science predominantly on their works. The use of
cognitivism as if it were a fixed singular entity seems particularly ironic because of
the diversity of views being developed in the field of cognitive science which
conflict with this universalising tendency. This diversity in cognitive approaches led
to the conscious focusing in by this study on only one particular thread of thought
within this field, theories relating to the EM, albeit in its most expansive form which
draws on human embodiment, embeddedness and extendedness as significant factors
included under its canopy.
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The first point in Crane's quotation above argues that psychoanalytical and
materialist theories' emphasis on the fragmentation of the body and the mind
contrasts to cognitive science's unification of the mind and body. Elsewhere she
elaborates on her view of the distance between the Lacanian lack at the centre of the
subject, and cognitive theory's representation of 'a somatosensory "feeling" of self-
presence as the centre of self-consciousness' (96). But the necessity to mark the
incoherence of this feeling, acknowledged by the use of quotation marks, undermines
the clear polarisation she attempts to make between these two fields. Cognitive
scientific approaches influenced solely by embodied metaphorics or evolutionary
psychology may make this claim, yet an EM perspective provides cognitive and
neuroscientific evidence of the fragmentation and multiplicity of the processes
operating in the body, the brain, and the world. Crane's emphasis on embodiment as
a container of presence again reflects the dominant influence on her of Lakoff and
Johnson's work in cognitive linguistics (95-96, 161). Whereas EM's argument about
the human self, suggests that along with the illusoriness of its fixity and coherence, it
loops into the world as well as the body.
What makes us distinctively human is our capacity to continually restructure and
rebuild our own mental circuitry, courtesy of an empowering web of culture,
education, technology, and artefacts. Minds like ours are complex, messy, contested,
permeable, and constantly up for grabs. (Clark, Natural-Born 10)
Unlike the cognitivist literary approach that Crane presents, EM is based on the
cumulative uncovering of evidence that a human being is a physical, mental,
technological, and social amalgam with negotiable and contestable boundaries. This
is not incompatible with, although it holds repercussions for, psychoanalytical and
cultural theorising. Psychoanalysis and cultural theories can in return offer
interpretative and critical tools for unpacking some of the implications of the
extended mind hypothesis. The fertile combination is a rich resource for literary
study, and allows for a richer unpacking of ideas evident in early modern texts and
the mirror-motifs in Shakespeare's works.
Nevertheless, a significant contribution of an EM perspective to literary theory
is the notion that subjective experience need not always be shaped by theoretical
concepts, and that these do not entirely predominate over human existence. Cees van
Leeuwen comments that one-sided philosophers 'have admonished us that our
experience is shaped by the concepts we are using to describe it'; there I think he
also describes much of current literary theory's attitude. Against this view, and using
evidence from neurological studies of visual perception, he argues that 'some
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phenomena are likely to survive changes in our theoretical beliefs' (119-20).
Ramachandran uses the concept of love to argue that the initial biological sparks that
create the biochemical and neurological signals that contribute to our experience of
love should not be viewed as contradicting or undermining the reality of it; they
prove that the love is not faked ('Marco Polo'). In discussing love, Alun Anderson
suggests that whilst there are basic neurophysiological reactions the experience only
really gets complicated for us when the competing concepts we have about it
preoccupy our minds; nevertheless there is a physical as well as a cultural basis (Pers.
Comm. April 2006).
To borrow from Damasio's 2005 preface, his discovery in writing Descartes'
Error was the connecting of 'the fabric of social and cultural phenomena to specific
features of neurobiology'; and his hope was 'that a two-way bridge could be
established between neurobiology and the humanities' (xix-xx). This thesis aims at
building some of that bridge from the humanities' side by using evidence from
cognitive science and neuroscience about the plasticity of the brain and body
structures and about the diverse ways in which we are embodied, and embedded and
extended. This should not be seen as a contradiction of social constructivist theories,
but as a demonstration of what bio-mechanically enables humans to be socially
constructed, and as an invitation to further thought and discussion about the
implications of these theories for literary studies. Having argued for the relevance of
EM to literary study, what I now hope to contribute, is to show the historical
background to the debate by demonstrating an earlier awareness of ways in which
our subjectivity is extended and multiple and mutable. The early modern concepts of
the mind and subjectivity that the rest of this thesis will investigate, demonstrate
diverse facets of a distributed subjectivity and both a celebration and concern about
how the world ofwords, objects and people, make us a human subject.
EM invites an inclusive exploration of the collaborations that exist between the
technological, sociocultural, biological and environmental resources that make up
our minds and our selves, rather than limiting what makes us human to only one or
two of these factors at the expense of the others. Yet psychoanalytical works still
have much to offer. Freud's works as we have seen interconnect with neuroscientific
interests and works that have influenced EM; Lacan's views interconnect with
notions of human extendedness, but present the dark anxiety that can arise from this
awareness. Butler reveals the reiterability of discursive modes that shape our
understanding of being human and provides an important defence for the incoherence
and multiplicity of human subjectivity as in fact the grounds of ethical responsibility.
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Converse to the disbelief which generally greets the news of the extent of our
extendedness, psychoanalytical and continental philosophical ideas commonly
employed by literary theorists are already poised to interact with these ideas through
their own history of exploring our sociocultural construction. Yet the problem is
rather that social constructivist ideas have become so prevailing, that what has
perhaps become more controversial is suggesting that there could also be a
neurophysiological basis for human adaptability and that this allows for cultural and
technological resources to have the dynamic effect they have upon us. Although I am
equally wary of oversimplifying the diversity of work being done within literary
theory, a general underlying trend is that the biological has become only viable to
acknowledge and investigate in terms of it being a historical or sociocultural
construct, as evident from the discussion of Butler's works. Perhaps underlying this
is a vestigial fear that ethics cannot withstand the apparent threat of biological input
as enmeshed in our moral and rational processing; sociocultural effects as alone
responsible perhaps appear to more satisfyingly distinguish humans from other
species.
Jean Howard, in an article upon the developing field of new historicism
approvingly describes the (by no means unique) claim that it has shown that we have
no essential humanness but that our humanness is created by history. This all or
nothing approach to 'the nature or nurture question' is brought into question by
cognitive and neuroscientific research which shows that the view of humans as
constructed solely through history, is blinkered in its exclusive focus on the
environment minus the organism. Similarly, both earlier and current universalist
traditions, are mistaken in their focus on 'the universality ofman' without due regard
for the environment: that is, they both tell only part of the story. The evidence is that
what is universal about our humanness is this very adaptability to our historical
context. Our biological and cognitive processes coevolve with the technological and
sociocultural environment in which we exist. Therefore, it is not an 'either' or 'or',
but a Freudian 'and' that is called for. The irony turns out to be that this especial
adaptability to being created by history constitutes our essential humanness. There is




Early Modern Embodied and Ensouled Subjects
Man is clearly not of simple but of multiple, not of certain but of ambiguous
(,ancipitis) nature, and he is to be placed as a mean between mortal and immortal
things. (Pomponazzi 282)
Early modern attempts to understand and explain human nature's propensity for
extendedness, adaptability, and opacity were primarily portrayed in terms influenced
by Christian world models. The humanist Pietro Pomponazzi captures in the
statement above this era's awareness of the existence of these human traits, and its
significant disjunction with modern views, in the general inclusion of metaphysical
immortality in the early modern schema. In order to make more visible the parallels
and disjunctions between early modern and current thinking about human
extendedness and related issues, the following three chapters tease out key threads of
the wider discourses circulating in Shakespearean England. These wove the intricate
tapestry of views and beliefs in terms of which early modern subjects viewed
themselves. Since neither a concept nor a period are homogenous, as well as
considering representations that overtly demonstrate the embodied, embedded and
extended nature of the early modern subject, this is balanced in the following
chapters with examples that are closer ancestors to reason-centred and dualistic
concepts of cognition and subjectivity; a one-sided emphasis on the former would re-
enact in reverse, critical discourse that only perceives the latter, besides which, these
are in certain instances intertwined. As in earlier chapters, as well as forms of
extendedness that relate to the cognitive capacities, the more general understanding
of the use of other people and things as an extension of the subject ('extended
subjectivity') is explored, including forms that are a recursive means to self-
knowledge ('extended reflexivity').
The confusions apparent in twentieth and twenty-first century philosophical
debates on the meaning of the term 'mind', become further complicated in
addressing early modern accounts, where such interlinking terms as brain, mind,
spirit, and soul, are frequently exchanged one for another. For instance, Prospero in
The Tempest mentions 'My old brain is troubled,' and then continues 'A turn or two
I'll walk/ To still my beating mind' (4.1.159). Whilst crowded marginal commentary
on the Bible (1590) glosses 'the spirite of a man' as the 'minde ofman' (1 Cor. 2.11).
Donne requires an entire sermon to describe the range of possible meanings of the
word spirit: 'amongst the manifold acceptations of the word spirit...it is either the
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soul it self, or the vitall spirits... or the superior faculties of the soul' (,Sermons 5: 65).
Focusing on the period contemporary with Shakespeare, these three chapters intend
to clarify the terms used for discussing the early modern mind and subject and to
trace the ways in which these terms involved embodiment, embeddedness and
extendedness. It is proposed that the early modern human subject was understood as
extended both in terms of its material properties, which shared in and linked it to the
properties of all of sublunary creation, and as a manifestation of the wide-ranging
'soul', which linked man to God and to the souls of all levels of created life. These
coeffective factors lead to descriptions of the human mind and subject's relationships
and interactions with the world as porous, intimate and dynamic.
The early modern period is known for being both a melting pot and ablaze with
a particularly diverse array of philosophical and theological ideas: scepticism,
stoicism, and humanism combining with various forms of Catholicism and
Protestantism. In addition major social, political and technological changes were
occurring: urbanisation, secularisation, the enclosing of land, court life, wars and
disease, colonisation, the printing press, and developing technologies, including, of
course, optical technologies and a new profusion of mirrors. Katherine Rowe stresses
that it is important to view any complex cultural structure as a 'historically composite
phenomena, anchored in the biology and social practices of different periods' (178).
Every period of time's interactions with the world, creates and is created by a
multiplicity of continuities, transitions and contradictions of scripts, values and
models, some of which the period itself appears conscious of, whilst of others no
awareness is expressed. This observation results in part of my approach to the
problem of interpreting early modern experience from a twenty-first century
perspective, which can be usefully compared to that of the Dennettian
heteropnenomenoiogist discussed in Chapter 1. As heterochronoiogisis, although we
do not have immediate access to the first-person living experience of being early
modern, there is leeway to doubt their reports, because the reporters are in fact only
authoritative about what seemed to be happening. The early modern period's texts
are an assemblage ofmultiple persons' practical and imaginative fictions given in the
period's own terms, and can therefore be investigated for an explanation ofwhy they
exist, rather than remaining an insurmountable problem. Species-specific physical
factors and traits towards hybridity and plasticity provide long term resonances
across time and space, as well as ruptures between different historical and cultural
settings, enabling meaningful connections, as well as distinctions, and a gradual
accumulation of knowledge and perspectives.
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Another aspect of my approach relates more generally to the perspective
proposed in the opening chapters, that human experience and perceptions of
embodiment involve the biological body, our particularly plastic brain, and the
sociocultural beliefs, scientific knowledge and technologies of an era. Reapplying
this perspective to a different era, the implication is that although the early modern
body may have been a relatively similar biological form, the body that early modern
thinkers conceive and experience is often portrayed quite differently from that of
modern times. How does this work? A true story from Stephen Cowley (inspired by
Ed Hutchins) which is on the nature of distributed cognition can be used to illustrate:
In identifying patterns in the stars or looking through a telescope, distributed cognition
enables the crew of a ship or the rowers of a canoe to get to port. Each individual sets
off physical events based on the beliefs and artefacts of a culture. Micronesian sailors,
for example, picture themselves as using the stars and ocean to keep a canoe still while
awaiting a floating island (sic). In spite of relying on fictions, the strategy works. The
myths of Micronesia permit them to make landfall at their island destination. Physical
features of the world are woven into old stories in ways that function pragmatically.
(109-10)
A historical parallel to this is the employment of Ptolemaic geocentric astronomy in
the early modern period, which continued to co-exist alongside new heliocentric
models (Carroll 6). In The Book of the Courtier Castiglione describes this geocentric
model: 'The bowl of heaven, adorned with so many celestial lamps, and the earth in
the centre, surrounded by the elements and sustained by its own weight' (331).
Cultural beliefs and philosophical interpretations map on to underlying physical
features and processes in a way that functions practically within a society. Even
when sustaining and being sustained by fictions, these beliefs are nevertheless based
on and coevolve with the geological characteristics of the world or, as in our main
topic in this chapter, the biological characteristics ofhumans.
Awareness of the human tendency to create elegant fictions, as well as an
understanding of the mind as extended, is shared by theories in the early modern era.
In The New Organon Francis Bacon set out the methodology for his unfinished plan
for a great renewal of learning that was intended to overcome the four 'idols', 'the
illusions' which 'block men's minds', these are: general human nature; one's own
individual nature; the common understanding, and philosophical theories (40).
Bacon's damning description of the last as 'idols of the theatre' uses the variety of
different accounts of the heavens as evidence of the human tendency to create
narratives that satisfy our own understanding:
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For just as several accounts of the heavens can be fashioned from the phenomena of
the air, so, and much more, various dogmas can be based and constructed upon the
phenomena of philosophy. And the stories of this kind of theatre have something else
in common with the dramatist's theatre, that narratives made up for the stage are
neater and more elegant than true stories from history, and are the sort of thing people
prefer. (50)
The types of stories created, reveal the pattern making and human-relating tendency
of the human mind (42). Bacon argues that rather than relying on authorities and
traditions, which reflect the human tendency to create elegant patterns and leap to
abstraction, that there should instead be a more incremental and empirical testing for
the 'Interpretation ofNature' (30); a methodology partially adopted by the Royal
Society in 1660. These stories can also be seen as tending to narrow the flux of
existence to an anthropocentric middle-scope, especially when newly confronted by a
range of realities spanning the microscopic to telescopic. What is required, Bacon
contends, is that we appreciate that tools and assistance are needed by the mind as
well as the body: 'Neither the bare hand nor the unaided intellect has much power;
the work is done by tools and assistance, and the intellect needs them as much as the
hand' (33). As in the extended mind hypothesis a human being is portrayed by Bacon
as necessarily comprised of physical, mental, technological, and sociocultural factors.
In fact the range of new types of early modern technological and scientific tools
which could assist and extend the mind's abilities is not the main focus in this thesis.
An account of the intimate relation of Renaissance culture to the rise of the machine
was recently covered by Jonathan Sawday in Engines of the Imagination. In this
thesis, following instead the focus of Shakespeare's works, the focus is on the body,
the environment, language, and other people as extensions of the mind or the subject:
these are most telling of the fundamental nature of human extendedness. However, in
the later chapters these are examined in relation to one particularly influential
developing technology, the mirror, and the discussion also briefly involves the
impact of the printing press on concepts of the mind and subject. The utilisation of
new tools is simply an extension of what Shakespeare demonstrates as the
fundamental hybridity of human nature, which is creative of our adaptability and of
our conceptual abilities and limitations.
To sum up, whilst the early modern period shared an awareness of human
embodiment, embeddedness and extendedness this is expressed in accordance with
contemporary belief systems. Human extension was understood as occurring not only
through the body and material world, as in current EM theories, but also through the
mind's ability to extend via intellectual flights, which were generally believed to be
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human's most god-like quality. Since the early modern period is only authoritative
about what seems to be happening to those experiencing it, the heterochronologist is
free to re-examine the evidence, and surmise differently. The early modern period
also shared an awareness and growing scepticism over the tendency of humans to
frame experience according to individual and common human qualities and beliefs
and to accept elegant fictions and abstractions as truths.
These three chapters explore manifold early modern practical and imaginative
texts, including religious sermons, pro- and anti-theatrical pamphlets, medical,
Christian and hard-word dictionaries, character writings, jest books, advice literature,
and other historical, philosophical, rhetorical and literary works; in order to develop
a picture of how these ideas resemble or differ from current notions of embodiment,
embeddedness and extendedness, and to explore the world from which Shakespeare's
works emerged. In this chapter the focus is on early modern depictions of the
physical and spiritual elements which participated in the cognitive capacities and in
constructions of subjectivity, as well as how these connected humans into a system
comprising the wider world and beyond. Chapter 4 tackles attitudes to forms of
language and memory, in order to examine the porousness ofboundaries between the
mind, the subject, and his mnemonic and linguistic tools. Chapter 5 explores the
social nature of subjectivity, related current theories about early modern subjectivity
and early modern concerns about first-person versus third-person access to our own
and others' cognitive experiences. The chapter concludes with a discussion of early
modern mirrors, preparing the way for the final two chapters' demonstration of the
ways Shakespeare's use of the mirror-motif acts as a fertile focus for tracing
contemporary notions of embodiment, embeddedness and extendedness.
Appraising the Early Modern Mind and Body
The underlying project of aligning the properties of the human brain with its cultural
artefacts as addressed to its own uniquely adaptive traits promises to be the greatest
and most urgent challenge confronting the next generation of critics. It will be met
only by a great deal of trial and error and very hard analytical thinking, shucking as it
goes those analogies and causal assumptions that do not meet both a rigorous
definition of mind and a rigorous employment of cultural history. (Beecher 1479)
In literary studies recognition is gradually developing of the potential significance of
cognitive science and neuroscience. This section gives a brief overview of several
types of relevant work being done on the early modern mind and body that relates to
the themes and timespan considered by this thesis. Further pertinent works will be
discussed in the course of the thesis, since perhaps what is most exciting about the
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extended mind approach is that its rubric draws together a multiplicity of approaches,
including works on subjectivity, material culture and the history of the book.
Bacon's insistence on the human mind's need of tools and supplementation,
confirm that extended mind (EM) thinking is not unknown in the early modern
period. Yet pioneering thinkers pursuing these parallels are as yet few. Two such
thinkers are John Sutton and Evelyn Tribble, who have reapplied aspects of EM to
early modern thinking, the former focusing on memory and the latter on memory,
performance and worship; their work is discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to early
modern memory systems. Like Tribble, Ellen Spolsky explores the transition from
Catholic to Protestant means of worship, suggesting that iconoclasm resulted in an
epistemic 'cognitive hunger' (a term borrowed from Clark) which the spread of
literacy failed to fill; yet the claim that this is then responded to by the drama of
Shakespeare fails to make a convincing case, as Beecher has commented, partly due
to the difference of scales involved between the widespread iconoclastic reforms and
the more limited reach of the Shakespearean drama (x; Beecher 1477-79).
A few books have emerged that compare general discoveries from cognitive or
neuroscience with Shakespeare's works. Philip Davis recently published
Shakespeare Thinking which makes some fascinating observations about
Shakespeare's ability to capture the sense of cognition in motion and about his use of
'functional shift' (the use of one part of speech as another, such as the noun turned
verb 'godded'), which Davis has shown causes a heightened neural response (93).
Yet Davis abstracts his findings towards questionable conclusions, claiming that it is
not a character who speaks in Shakespeare but a life-force and that Shakespeare's
'codes' key 'into the fundamental life-structures of the brain' (9, 95). Previously, the
neurologist Paul Matthews collaborated with literary researcher Jeffrey McQuain in
The Bard on the Brain, a book that attempts to relate cognitive phenomena
uncovered through imaging techniques to famous passages from Shakespeare.
Unfortunately, the strained connections made and the lack of any reference to early
modern cognitive theories, as C. Butler argues, result in a work that serves rather as a
warning of the pitfalls of interdisciplinary collaborations between the sciences and
arts (1085). Arthur F. Kinney does provide a rich background of cognitive history in
Shakespeare and Cognition, but this is only tangentially linked to a small number of
current neuroscientific works.
Meanwhile, both Mary Crane's Shakespeare's Brain, which compared
recent work in cognitive science to readings of Shakespeare by literary and
cultural theory, and the 2004 International Shakespeare Yearbook, with a section
of six essays on cognitive science, implicitly conflate a specific interest in
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cognitive linguistics with the whole field of cognitive science. Although this
limitation is acknowledged in Graham Bradshaw's preface, in the same breath this
gap is muffled, covered over by the implication in the second half of the sentence
that it is only the findings about metaphor that are particularly worthy of study by
Shakespearean literary researchers:
Cognitive science has many mansions and quite a few battlefields which are not
visible in this volume; in the rest of this preface I want to recall some reasons why
Shakespeareans should be interested in cognitive accounts of metaphor, (x)
Nevertheless, these works are at least a movement towards a fuller acknowledgement
of cognitive science's manifold facets and their potential implications for literary
studies.
There has also been recent interest in the early modern mind and subjectivity
that does not draw on modern cognitive science. As a historical overview, Paul S.
MacDonald recently provided a two volume account of The History of the Mind,
which traces the many senses of the words 'mind' and 'soul' from Homer to Hume,
spending a chapter on the medieval and early modern usages (History 1: 245-78).
However the ambitious scope seems to have led to a reliance on secondary sources,
dictionary definitions and unreferenced quotations, which leads to the too simple
dichotomy being offered that the mind was primarily associated with the animus,
reason or intellect, and the soul with the anima, or life force (255). Critical interest
has also focused on the relation between the early modern mind and body in relation
to debates concerning Descartes' philosophy. However, along with work done on
mid-seventeenth century puritan debates, these postdate the time period considered
by this thesis, which concentrates primarily on ideas circulating during
Shakespeare's lifetime, the main literary focus.
Literary studies of the early modern mind are considerably less numerous than
those which focus on the body, although there are also a number of related
sociological and cultural studies of the period. An area of critical interest in the mind
is the topic of madness, on which Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization has
had lasting influence even amongst its critics. Foucault describes the Renaissance
and Middle Ages as periods in which the mad person was still part of society, prior to
the 'Great Confinement' that involved the debasement and incarceration of the mad,
and which occurred from the mid-seventeenth century onwards (35-36). Klaus
Doerner in Madmen and the Bourgeoisie relates this systemic confinement of the
mad to the rise of the bourgeoisie, but Roy Porter in Madness demonstrates that no
such generalised systemic confinement took place at this time (14-17; 93). Michael
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MacDonald's Mystical Bedlam, provides a nuanced account of the relation of
madness to the wider culture and of the variety of terms in use for madness, basing
his discussion primarily on the notebooks of the seventeenth century physician Dr.
Richard Napier. Yet, like Foucault he argues that there was no real change in
understandings of madness until 1660 (3). Whereas Carol Thomas Neely's
Distracted Subjects, which focuses on accounts of madness during the Renaissance,
suggests that types of madness were predominantly conceived of as temporary states,
and that there were changes in the understanding of notions of madness, especially in
terms of their increasing secularization (6).
Another related area of critical interest focuses on evidence that there were
complex associations between certain forms of melancholy and madness. For
instance, Michael Screech has shown that Platonic notions of mania as ecstatic (that
inspired mystical theology and biblical writings) had become intertwined with
Aristotle's claim that all geniuses were melancholy, so that melancholy had become
understood as a cause of mania (25-35). Yet the conflation of Elizabethan
melancholy with madness by Vieda Skultans, who in her history ofEnglish Madness
argues they are 'synonymous', is not borne out by early modern evidence (18) As
Neely has also argued, although they were clearly related and overlap, no
straightforward exchange of the two terms is possible (4). This is confirmed by The
Anatomy of Melancholy, gradually revised by Robert Burton over the two decades
from 1621. Burton refers to Montaltus' statement that '"Fear and sorrow" make it
[melancholy] differ from madness' and then goes on to approve that 'Fear and
sorrow are the true characters and inseparable companions of most melancholy'
(1.1.3.2).1 It is not surprising then that historical accounts of melancholy have also
been considered in relation to modern depression, most recently in Jennifer Radden's
Moody Minds Distempered. Whilst debates on the nature ofmadness and melancholy
remain peripheral to the primary focus of this thesis, there will be some discussion of
early modern discourses on melancholy in this chapter and further in Chapter 7 in the
discussion ofHamlet.
As with modern cognitive theory, and concepts of the mind, studies of the body
demonstrate a range of responses and theories about what comprises it, which is
reflected by what is included in its study. As regards the body, historian Caroline
Walker Bynum complains, that it has become 'no topic or, perhaps almost all topics'
(2). Similar to philosophers of the mind, Bynum protests that authors from various
disciplines speak 'with great assurance of what "the body" is and yet display little
1 Burton's book has been referenced according to his own system: partition, section, member and
subsection.
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awareness of each others' conversations - conversations in which totally diverse
assumptions and definitions figure' (3). This is apparent even just within literary
criticism on the early modern period by the number of works evidently operating
according to different beliefs about the nature of the body, yet discussion in works on
the early modern body also echoes some of the general concerns raised in Chapter 2.
Influential recent works on early modern notions of embodiment include
Thomas Laqueur's Making Sex and the essays edited by David Hillman and Carla
Mazzio in The Body in Parts which both explore the involvement of sociocultural
discourses in early modern conceptions of body parts. Martin Kemp and Marina
Wallace's Spectacular Bodies, a publication based on an art exhibition at the
Hayward Gallery on the history of human anatomy, considers the entwined relation
of anatomical, artistic, philosophical and theological concepts of the early modern
body. This is a topic that was explored in more detail by Jonathan Sawday's The
Body Emblazoned, which considers the relation of concepts of 'anatomization' to
wider cultural and literary discourses, and in particular to the contemporary
fascination with 'particularization' that made the Renaissance a 'culture of
dissection' (2). Thus, recent critical works have explored sociocultural discourses
effect on concepts of the body and have brought into play medical and anatomical
treatises as aids to understanding early modern concepts of the body and the subject.
This thesis similarly calls on medical and psychological works from the early
modern period in tackling the question of the contemporary understanding of the
body's role in matters of cognition and subjectivity.
A work that has influenced this thesis and that ignited wider interest in the
relation of the humoural body to the emotions in early modern accounts is The Early
Modern Passions, co-edited by Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-
Wilson. In the introduction they propose to describe the ways in which 'critical
questions we ask about emotion' are 'scripted by normative attitudes' (13) Mary
Floyd-Wilson with Garrett A. Sullivan have since expanded the scope of this theme,
recently editing a volume on Embodiment and Environment in Early Modern
England, which explores emerging views on the relation of early modern bodies to
their environmental context. The various authors represent this relation as involving
a distributed network of coeffective factors, a system of correspondences and
analogies, a system ofexchange, or a system of counteraction (4-6). The focus in this
thesis lies primarily upon notions of distribution, yet arguably these are all persisting
paradigms, as is the additional notion of a system of lack and rupture, now associated
with psychoanalytical accounts. These paradigms are arguably a reflection of our
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pattern making brain (as are binary and spectrum models) with part of the difficulty
being to keep opposing models and paradigms in mind simultaneously.
New historicism's 'belief in the social constructedness of everything', Bruce
Smith contends, led to the replacement in literary criticism of studies of 'the
universal humanist subject' by studies of'the early modem body' (20-21). The focus
in such criticism by implication is to disregard the body itself in favour of pursuing
the sociohistorical constructions of it. The ability of the physical body to become
transparent in this way, I think suggests that like other tools-in-use the body need not
itself become a point of focus (provided it works) because of its natural tendency to
act as an invisible extension of the mind and subject; thus socioconstructivist notions
are in fact enabled by this propensity of the human mind to allow subject and mind
tools to vanish from conscious view. Yet, Catherine Gallagher along with the central
proponent of new historicism, Stephen Greenblatt, do acknowledge the function of
the body in Practising New Historicism, albeit only as 'a kind of "spoiler", always
baffling or exceeding the ways in which it is represented' (15); thus echoing
psychoanalytical accounts, rather than an EM view of the body as an ongoing
participant in cognitive processes.
A description of 'the corporeal turn' in early modern studies by Keir Elam,
which includes references to the works of Paster and Sawday, similarly connects
recent critical concern with embodiment to the idea of a 'pre-semantic bodiliness''
that is replaced, reduced and constructed latterly through language; this links Elam's
understanding of critical debate on the body to the psychoanalytical and postmodern
theories discussed in Chapter 2 (142). Bodiliness both in current cognitive science
and in various early modern theories plays a more dynamic and ongoing role, and is
not reducible to only a 'priority of the somatic over the semantic' as Elam describes
it (142). A comparison here that helps to unpack the overall problem with this
approach is the research by David McNeill on gesture. As discussed in Chapter 1,
McNeill argues that gesture is an ongoing player in human communication rather
than just an initial evolutionary or developmental step that then allows language to
develop. Bodiliness does not just act as a pre-semantic form of being but infuses
being a human subject and interacting with other human subjects. Conceptual
hypotheses are not only formed in relation to their own histories, but also in relation
to the structures of the body, mind and world. In fact, rather than Elam's restrictive
analysis, Gail Kern Paster brings the real physical leakiness of early modern
women's bodies into play in her account of The Body Embarrassed, whilst Jonathan
Sawday argues that '"embodiment" as much as "selfhood" may itself be subject to
history, which is as much a product of culture as it might be of nature' ('Self 48).
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Replacing the 'might' with an 'is' is sufficient to capture the view put forward in this
thesis.
Dympna Callaghan argues that literary criticism's recent interest in the body
'as viscera' is in danger of a 'reification' of 'the brute facticity of matter' that is not
in the interest of 'our political commitment to literature' (68-71). Callaghan's
statement in fact reflects the much more wide-ranging dislike in literary criticism of
acknowledging that things, such as the body and the world, have an independent
existence. For instance, Callaghan objects to 'the profoundly erroneous belief that
matter has a life of its own' (69). To attempt to deny that matter has a life of its own,
I think holds more danger ofmaking literary criticism untenable by placing it not so
much on shaky as non-existent ground, than it offers a suitable means of defending
its importance.
Similar objections to recent critical interest in embodiment are raised by Carla
Mazzio in 'Two Responses to "Shakespeare and Embodiment'". Mazzio suggests
that this era is undergoing the culmination of a long process of re-enchantment with
materiality, a trend she associates with the marginalisation of literary studies in
institutions and the domination of science as the locus for truth claims (Strier and
Mazzio 18). This objection could aptly be extended to the realm of technology and
technological disciplines given the important role they play in institutions and in our
lives. In fact, the way our bodies, technologies and the world works, are a source of
fascination and anxiety in every age, and whilst critical discourses increasingly take
notice of biological and technological contributions to human subjectivity in this
period of scientific and technological advances, this is not necessarily negative.
Besides, as we have seen, influential thinkers from the neurosciences, such as
Ramachandran and Damasio, are returning this interest, by turning to the humanities
for more understanding of the emerging complexities of the human subject.
Richard Strier's viewpoint in this co-produced discourse is likewise negative
about interest in early modern scientific texts:
I see no reason to think that the history of medicine or of theories of physiology gets
one closer to the experience of the persons in the past than the history of ideas does. I
am inclined, in fact, to think that it gets one less close to the experience of persons,
though closer to one sphere of discourse. (Strier and Mazzio 17)
To reverse Strier's argument, an understanding of the history of ideas which does not
include knowledge of contemporary physiological and scientific beliefs, which do
not just exist as theories, but are actively operative in people's understandings of
experiences, shrinks critical view of their experience, culture and literary
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representations. Besides, it is not just a question of trying to understand more fully
early modern perceptions, but also of understanding how both recent and historical
beliefs illuminate each other and contribute to our understanding of the shifting and
persisting patterns creative of and produced by human nature. Thus critical theories,
like the discourses they reflect on, develop in relation to the individuals and
environments in which they exist and replicate, and therefore as much wariness is
necessary in approaching modern critical norms, as in approaching early modern
ones.
Outwardness and Inwardness
Burckhardt's much rehearsed nineteenth century claim for Renaissance
individualism was that a more self-conscious and objective view of one's subjectivity
was achieved, with Dante's exquisite Vita Nuova held up as marking the boundary
between the Middle Ages and modern times because: 'Here subjective feeling has a
full objective truth and greatness...Here the human spirit took a mighty step toward
the consciousness of its own secret life' (229). Since then, new historicist critics,
such as Jean Howard, have accused such claims of being anachronistic projections,
asserting that it was not until the eighteenth century that 'interiority and self-
presence' began (15). Whilst Burckhardt's particular description does suggest a
product of an age closer to his own, in its faith in the reliability of introspection, the
'interiority and self-presence' described by Howard can be traced to much earlier
periods. Katherine Eisaman Maus warns about the homogenisation of a cultural
concept, such as subjectivity, which operates in different periods:
'Subjectivity' is often treated casually as a unified or coherent concept when in fact it
is a loose and varied collection of assumptions, intuitions and practices that do not all
logically entail one another and need not appear together at the same cultural
moment. (29)
Therefore the concept of subjectivity does not necessarily entail an autonomous,
executive or unified self. In the early modern period the relationships between
inwardness and outwardness and the nature of the human subject were variously
celebrated, acknowledged and fretted over.
Interiority and self-consciousness are neither anachronistic conceptions, nor
were they something entirely new in the early modern period; they were linked into a
religious tradition that was aware of, and was concerned with explaining, the secret
life of the mind and the enigma of oneself. The limitedness of human self-knowledge
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involved the notion of man as a decentred and synecdochal subject, because he was
both a creation and extension of God. St Augustine was a seminal influence on the
concept of the inability of the mind to encompass itself: 'If the mind is not to be
fathomed even by itself that is because it is the image of God' (qtd. in Gilson 215).
Montaigne in his analysis of human reason, quotes a later Doctor of the Church: '"I
know by myself," says Saint Bernard, "how incomprehensible God is, since I cannot
understand the parts of my own being'" ('Apology' 493). Robert Burton describes
the paradox that although we understand all things through the soul, we cannot
understand it itself (1.1.2.5). The emphasis in many medieval and early modern texts
upon a lack of self-knowledge, which arises from our divine but fallen nature,
portrays a vertical reflexivity, which is only clearly achieved when the blessed attain
paradise, and as Dante renders it, like mirrors shine back God's light at him (.Divine
canto 29, lines 142-5). Within the medieval culture that both preceded and continued
to participate in early modern ideas, the subject was often figured as desiring of a
self-knowledge that was endlessly deferred and only achieved beyond the temporal
world, because of the composite nature ofman.
Jonathan Dollimore insightfully remarks that even current theories about
decentring, especially evident in psychoanalytical and postmodern accounts of the
subject, are not subversions but continuations, dating back to the Christian Fall
narrative, in which 'transgressive desire haunted by death' brought the subject into
being {Death 91). Dollimore explains the crisis of subjectivity as an originative force
which has animated rather than undermined Western European civilization:
...individualism was from the beginning energized by an inner dynamic of loss,
conflict, doubt, absence and lack which feeds into our culture's obsession with control,
its sense that the identity of everything, from self to nation is under centrifugal and
potentially disintegrative pressures which have to be rigorously controlled. ('Death'
254)
Thus, the anxiety, alienation and sense of lack manifest in the accounts discussed in
Chapter 2, are traceable back to Christian narratives of subjectivity, marking
different contextual expressions of a permanent theme. Yet whilst this is a revealing
connection, it is important not to simply conflate psychoanalytical and postmodern
with early modern accounts.
Throughout the Renaissance a prevalent model for self-understanding
continued to be the church-backed Thomistic account of the human soul (Michael,
'Renaissance' 168). This presented self-knowledge as achieved firstly, within the
self and secondly without it. The concept of the importance of self-knowledge since
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'the higher the nature, the more interior the act of generation' was combined with the
paradox that the human mind in this life 'can only understand itselfwhen brought to
act by species [immaterial forms] abstracted from things sensed' (Summa 139;
Aquinas 218). Reflexivity in the medieval period related primarily to knowledge of
God and was directed ultimately to the next life; whilst, in the early modern period
the ever-increasing emphasis on the practical and moral utility of reflexivity within
this world allowed secular and empirical concerns an increased predominance. This
was accompanied by an escalating anxiety about the reliability of the human senses
and mind, and the problematics for this life of first-person self-knowledge, and that
offered by another person or tool.
Concepts of self-knowledge describing the body's role variously emphasized
notions of a constraining and fragile bodily container and as providing a means of
epistemological access. Accounts of the body's role were influenced by the pervasive
Platonic notion of universal forms imprinted in human minds, understanding of
which is filtered through sensory impressions (Phaedrus 249b-c). Francis Bacon in
The Advancement ofLearning flatters James VI thus:
... your Maiestie were the best instance to make a man of Platoes opinion, that all
knowledge is but remembrance, and that the minde of man by nature knoweth all
things, and hath but her owne natiue and originall notions (which by the strangenesse
and darkenesse of this Tabernacle of the bodie are sequestered) againe reuiued and
restored. (3)
Also evident here are biblical influences: 'Tabernacle', literally a tent, is a term used
for a portable temple or church, for Christ's body, for the dwelling of God, and for
the human body (Coote; Wilson, Christian). This suggests the sanctity of the body,
as well as its enclosing and transitory nature. The 'strangenesse and darkenesse' of
the material body and of the human mind whilst it remains within that body are
emphasized, in contrast with the potentially enlightened mind. Yet, even here the
notions of the mind and body are not clearly polarized because of their
interdependence in this life.
Entitled with the Socratic injunction 'Know Thyself, Sir John Davies' didactic
poem Nosce Teipsum (1599), examines contemporary debates on the popular theme
of self-knowledge in verse form. Davies presents man's mind as capable of
independent self-reflection, but argues that since the Fall the vision in 'the waterie
glasse' of his mind is damaged, which instils self-hatred and can lead man to rely
instead on his error-choked senses (5). The interdependence of mind (or soul) and
matter is less fraught in Helkiah Crooke's Mikrokosmographia (1615), in which 'the
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image of the diuine nature' is described as 'most liuely imprinted in his soule and in
his body, and in the substance & qualities of them both' (2). The body's significance
for Crooke comprises the human as scientific and religious object and as living
knowing subject. Crooke describes the fallen soul as a table, that is now only faintly
inscribed with 'The Lawe of Nature'; it is no longer capable of moving from
universal to particular notions, but is dependent on the 'induction of particulars', so
through 'hauing gotten knowledge lfom without himselfe' man arrives at merely
approximate notions of universals (36). Crooke's highlighting of the vital role of
gathering knowledge from the material world is not surprising since he was the royal
physician, and he wrote the encyclopaedic Mikrokosmographia, a masterful account
of the human body, as a defence of the need for interest to be taken in anatomy, not
only for medical, but also for theological, philosophical and self-knowledge (12).
What is indirectly evident in all these accounts is that a fine balance was
necessary in accounts of the body's role, since one extreme appears to question
God's wisdom in placing man's soul in corruptible earthly material, whilst the other
extreme places in question the immortality of the soul without its material body
given its reliance on it. The careful steering necessary between these heretical Scylla
and Charybdis, is apparent in Crooke's swerving between presenting the body as a
constraining prison and as performer of the soul's diverse faculties:
For the Soule, albe it when shee is free from the prison of the Bodye can see without
an Eye, heare without an Eare and by her owne simple act discourse without the help
of spirits; yet so long as she is immured within these wals of clay shee cannot
contemplate the speculations of Externall things without an Externall medium; and
therefore Nature (by which I vnderstand the wisedome of the eternall Creator) framed
the body of many Organicall parts whereby and wherein the Soule might exercise her
Diuine administrations, produce and exhibit the powers and efficacies of her manifold
Faculties. (428)
As earlier in his book where he directly tackles the question of why God made man
from sublunary elementary matter, Crooke suggests that it is necessary for there to be
an affinity between the sensory medium and the external world; hence physiological
structures involved in human cognitive processes have been created in relation to the
world's structures (6). Another concept that had become an early modern
commonplace, which derived from Neoplatonism, is implicit in the above quote and
is also stated explicitly earlier in the text: 'the Soule of man Is wholly in the whole,
and wholly in euery particular part' (4). Early modern man's soul was imagined to
be: 'incorporeall and diffusiue, quickning, sustaining, gouerning and moouing the
whole body, and euery part thereof, euen as God supporteth and ruleth the whole
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world, being by a diffirsiue nature, or rather infinite omni-presence, at all times, in
euery place' (2). Thus the soul is analogous to the diffusion of God's presence in the
world. The topos also appears in Davies' versification of contemporary debates on
the nature of the soul: 'Some say, she is all in all, and all in partd Some say, she is
not containd, but all containes' (11). This topos, which Davies later confirms, is of
the soul as the multiply distributed and expressed force behind human existence and
cognition; not as 'a pilot in his Ship' but 'all in part diffus'd' (39).
It is evident that whilst models of subjectivity and cognition are relative to the
periods in which they operate, with metaphysical notions mediating conceptions of
human embodiment and extendedness in early modern models, there are nevertheless
a number of similarities with current distributed cognitive models. The early modern
body was understood as a mode of access to, as well as a limiter of, human
knowledge and knowledge was gathered from a world with which the subject shared
physical properties, properties that were made in relation to and out of the world.
Whilst in these accounts the sensory information seems to operate just as input that is
then rationally processed, rather than as part of cognition, the following sections
make apparent that both body and world were generally understood to dynamically
participate in human cognitive processes. Also noteworthy is that the soul is
portrayed as distributed within the body, rather than as head bound. In addition,
psychoanalytical and postmodern models in metamorphosed forms continue earlier
Christian concern over the synecdochal and decentred nature ofman.
The Immortal Soul
Despite recent discoveries much uncertainty over the nature of the mind remains,
especially in areas where the study of the mind has absorbed into it questions once
directed towards the soul, such as the mystery of consciousness and qualia. These
can be connected to philosophical debates concerning the immortality of the soul that
were sparked by the Lateran Council of 1513, when Pope Leo X proclaimed that
some people 'have even had the audacity to assert that the soul dies along with the
body and that the opposite view is based on faith alone', and so he 'expressly
enjoined Christian philosophers to refute their arguments and use all their powers to
establish the truth' (Descartes, Philosophical 2: 4). The radical decision to allow
philosophers to produce arguments to defend belief in the immortality of the soul
newly opened up Church doctrine and theology to infiltration by other forms of
knowledge. Michael and Michael explain that the church was influenced in this
decision both by Ficino's arguments for the soul's immortality, and by the revival of
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interest in Averroist Aristotelianism and the Greek commentators, Alexander of
Aphrodisias and Thermistius, who questioned Aristotle's commitment to the
personal immortality of the soul (31-32).
Yet, Pietro Pomponazzi's On the Immortality of the Soul (1516), written three
years after the Lateran Council, controversially argues that 'no natural reasons can be
brought forth proving that the soul is immortal' (377). He adds in his Apologia that
the soul is material because it is dependent on the body, and mortal because it is
extended and divisible (Randall 276; Michael and Michael 37-38). The soul as
mortal he claims does not undermine but is a greater argument for virtue ('On the
Immortality' 375). Pomponazzi argues that since no mental act occurs without the
body, the intellect must cease along with the vegetative and sensitive soul: the human
soul is a form 'beginning and ceasing with the body' as the intellect 'knows always
with matter, since it knows with phantasms, with succession, with time, with
discursiveness, with obscurity' (321-22). On a scale of degrees the human soul is 'the
highest and most perfect of the material forms' (321); hence the idea of a 'double
truth' was necessary, to split religious faith from rational truth. This debate
concerning the soul is a foreshadowing of current philosophical debates concerning
qualia, such as de Sousa's insistence that subjective experience is not transcendent,
as discussed in Chapter 1. Pomponazzi's theory implied that the religious version of
the immaterial intellective soul would be too passive and impersonal, or that there
may be no independent immaterial soul and hence no immortality after all;
Pomponazzi's ambivalent dying words were that he would go 'where all mortals go'
(Copenhaver and Schmitt 110). Thus, whilst Pomponazzi employs the hierarchical
scale from matter to the non-material, his theory demonstrates an influential early
modern rationale for belief in a materially based intellective soul. Then, as now,
there are major thinkers who question the possibility or desirability of the personal
soul's or qualia's independence from materiality, even with the danger of accusations
of heresy around in the sixteenth century to perpetuate the dogma of individual
transcendent immortality.
The apparent threats of lack of individuality and of biological input as
enmeshed in our moral and rational processing became understood as endangering
religious claims concerning man as an image of God with a personal immortal soul.
This was diversely responded to in theories which proposed both that humans and
their cognitive processes could rationally only be understood as corporeal worldly
creations, and conversely later by Descartes' theories which in the defence of
personal immortality of the soul attempted to depict the human mind as incorporeal
and to drastically distinguish humans from other species (Descartes, Philosophical 2:
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4). These concerns about the mind (and soul), once based on Christian doctrine, have
metamorphosed into discussions about neurobiology, qualia and social
constructivism in this more secular age.
Soul: The Three Degrees
Christians and Westerners who still believe in 'a soul', generally conceive of it as
unitary, yet using a schema that dates back to Aristotle via Aquinas (Lewis 161),
early modern discourses commonly represent the soul as consisting of three faculties:
'intellectual, sensitiue, and vegetatiue' (Crooke 2). Robert Burton comments on
wider contemporary debates, such as Piccolomini and Zabarella's discussions on
whether the soul consisted of three distinct souls or one soul with three faculties, and
Campanella's adoption of the Paracelsian belief in four souls, before he concludes
like Crooke that: 'The common division of the soul is into three principal faculties -
vegetal, sensitive, and rational, which make three distinct kinds of living creatures:
vegetal plants, sensible beasts, rational men' (1.1.2.5). The three levels on which the
soul operated and how they actively participated in human cognitive processes and
subjectivity is considered in this section, through considering in detail Coeffeteau's
model of the three faculties.
In the preface to A Table ofHuman Passions, published in translation in 1621,
the French bishop Nicolas Coeffeteau provides an elegant account of mainstream
contemporary ideas about the soul. He explains that the soul is the form of all living
things, with the more noble forms containing the perfection of the lesser, therefore:
It followes that there beeing three degrees of Soules; that is to say, that which gives
life, which is the lesse perfect; that which giues sense-, which is the second ranke, and
the Reasonable which is the noblest of all; this Reasonable soule which is peculiar
onely to Man, containes all the powers and perfections of the other, and can effect as
much as all the rest together. By reason whereofman hath a Vegetatiue soule, which is
common with plants; he hath the sensitiue, which he hath common with bruit heasts;
But he alone is in possession of the Reasonable soule, whereby he hath nothing
common with the rest of the Creatures, (sigs. A8v-A9r)
Typically, on the bottom rung of this ontological and epistemological ladder, the
vegetative soul is a material life-giving and digestive force within plants, animals,
and man. One step up, is the sensitive soul shared by man with animals, relating to
the faculties of feeling and sense. Lastly, the rational soul of the intellect is what
distinguishes man from the rest of creation, due to the ability of the mind to reflect
upon itself; as Donne describes it: 'The difference between the Reason of man, and
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the Instinct of the beast is this, That the beast does but know, but the man knows that
he knows' (Sermons 8: 225). Yet, Baldesar Castiglione in The Book of the Courtier,
which first appeared in English translation in 1561, tends to the idealistic in his
description of the various epistemological levels, as he excludes mention of a
vegetative soul, severing a connection and hiking humans up a step to share in the
penultimate rung of the angels:
Now in the human soul there are three faculties by which we understand or perceive
things...the senses desire things through sensual appetite or the kind of appetite which
we share with the animals; reason desires things through rational choice, which is,
strictly speaking, proper to man; and intellect, which links man to the angels, desires
things through pure will. (325)
Notably, as is often the case, Castiglione's portrayal of the perceptual and
understanding faculties and of the corresponding appetitive faculties of each of the
three levels is of interdependent forces.
In spite of their variations, these models all view the soul as essentially multiple.
This has interesting parallels with current cognitive theories. One recent parallel to
this model of the tripartite soul is Dennett's taxonomy of intentional stances,
discussed in Chapter 1, in which creatures are placed on an ontological and
epistemological ladder according to the perceived extent of their intellectual and
evolutionary development. In addition, Dennett's paradigm shares in the idea that the
higher stances encompass the abilities of the lower and that humans are special on
account of their ability to think about their own thinking. Moreover it shares with
several of the early modern models the emphasis on moving towards knowledge via
the external world, as according to Dennett, humans use inner models informed by
constructs in their outer environment {Kind ofMinds, 112-34). The paradigm of an
ontological and epistemological ladder has itself evolved.
Another conventional early modern conceptualization of the workings of the
soul, which accompanied the tripartite paradigm, is of the operations within the
subject as structurally analogous to the monarchical body politic or commonwealth.
This hierarchical theory appears an antecedent to the illusion of a reason-led
executive subjectivity, as described by the cognitive scientific accounts in Chapter 1.
The human body and mind are presented as microcosm of the kingdom's hierarchical
model, and of the megacosmic structure of God, a model which serves to validate
monarchy, as natural and divine. This sleight of hand is a trick that would be
recognised by Derrida or Butler, in which the model of the original (the body) is
created from the cultural copy (the realm) and is situated as prior to that which it then
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serves to validate by naturalising the copy. In fact the closer one looks at early
modern versions of this allegorical kingdom model, the less it upholds any sense of
man as a contained, centralized or straightforwardly hierarchical entity.
As evidence of this and as a more thorough depiction of the roles of the three
faculties of the soul, it is worth considering Coeffeteau's model in more detail. It
begins by describing the vegetative soul, which immediately overturns the top-down
model by calling the natural appetite 'the Queene of all the rest'; the other appetites
refer all their actions to her command in accordance with natural law, and her basic
powers are guided not by the 'Indiuidue' but by 'vniuersall Nature' (sigs. A9v, AlOr-
AlOv). Next, the sensitive soul is described as a faculty that knows, desires and
moves (sig. A11 v). It has two sorts of'Knowingpowers': the exterior and the interior
(sigs. A12r-a2r). The exterior five senses gather information through their affinity to
matter, transmitting the qualities to the common sense, which compares and judges
them, and presents them as either healthful or harmful to the imagination. The image
of things are then engraved into the imagination so that knowledge of them may
remain after they have vanished away (sig. alv). The information is also presented to
the memory, which although primarily a 'Store-house and Treasury' yet 'for that she
doth continually represent vnto the Common sence the formes which are consigned
vnto her, she may well bee sayd also to helpe to Knowledge' (sigs. alv-a2r). Memory
is understood as an active participant in cognition; as is also evident in medieval and
current neuroscientific models, a parallel recently noted by Mary Carruthers and
neurobiologist Yudin Dudai (Carruthers and Dudai 567).
The sensitive soul also has two primary appetitive powers, the irascible (angry)
and concupiscible (desiring) passions; these move via the sinews, muscles and
ligaments, are 'dispersed ouer all the members of the Creature', and serve as an
instrument 'to that part of the blood which for the great subtiiity and purenes thereof
hath gotten the name of Spirit' (sigs. a2v-a3v); thus, spirit in early modern models is
the material blood and air distributed throughout the body, and the emotive powers
are likewise dispersed by it. Last of all, the reasonable soul has two powers,
understanding, which receives forms from the imagination so abstracted as to be
universal, and the will, or intellectual appetite, which is also named 'Queene' but
which is blind and dependent on other agencies for information and guidance (sigs.
a3v-a6v).
A potential traitor to the will in the subject's microcosmic realm is a
conventional culprit in antique guise, the 'Sensitive Appetite', temperamental ruler
over the passions:
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Queene of the powers of the soule she ordaines what they shall imbrace, & what they
shal fly as it pleseth her whereunto the Sensitiue Appetite yeelding a prompt obedience
to execute her command from the which it neuer straies, so long as it containes it selfe
within the bounds and order prescrib'd by Nature (sig. a6v)
Coeffeteau points out that man not only does not have command over the agents of
the vegetative soul, guided by natural law, nor does he necessarily have it over those
of the sensitive soul, our animal instincts, other than by a resolution of his will (sigs.
a4v-a5r). Instead 'oftentimes hee ouerthrows and peruerts this order, either by bad
education, or by custome, or the organs being vnsound, or for that his will hath bad
inclination' (sig. a7r). This dynamic is also evident in the versions of this allegorical
model in Pierre Charron's Of Wisdome (c.1606) and Thomas Wright's The Passions
of the Mind in General (1601) (71-74; 95-96). Indeed, Wright suggests that rather
than any straightforward opposition between reason and the passions that 'reason,
once being entered into league with passions and sense, becometh a better friend to
sensuality than the passions were before' (96).
Therefore, even though this early modern allegorical model initially seems
oppositional and centralised, there is a complex division of the self into a mass of
internal agents, who operate through a coalition of quasi-independent animal and
natural processes, and on which reason is dependent. In addition, these agents do not
share unified purposes, connections with, or perspectives on the world since they
operate on different levels of an epistemological and ontological hierarchy. The
assumption of a centralised controller with which the kingdom model appears to
begin is resisted by the recognition of the multiplicity and dispersed nature of the
mind, and in Coeffeteau's version by nature as well as humans' blind will being
figured as queen. A conflation of the rational soul with the mind is problematised by
this early modern model, which resists such a reductive construction of its distributed
cognitive processes. The human subject appears threatened, as well as aided, by the
quasi-autonomous agencies of the vegetative and sensitive souls; as humans are
infiltrated by and dependent on the natural and animal instincts. As in
psychoanalytical models, humans are presented as fissured creatures in their very
being and knowing. Yet, the next section explores how this distributed human nature
could be positively viewed as connecting humans to the world and the stars.
Humoural Humans
Flowing through the vessels of every living organism the humours linked together
early modern minds, bodies and world. The humours, etymologically and literally
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fluids, engendered species, and national and individual natures, as well as producing
transitory behavioural or emotional inclinations. They were part of a holistic system
that encompassed all of sublunary creation. From their Western origins in ancient
Greece they travelled down via Galen and Islamic medicine, and continued to
influence medical and philosophical theories throughout the Middle Ages and into
the seventeenth century; a historical journey capably followed by Noga Arikha in her
recent book Passions and Tempers. Their origins are also traced by Richard Gregory
in Mind in Science who describes how Empedocles movement from single substance
accounts of the world to a theory of the 4 elements of earth, air, fire and water in 5
BC, was soon after followed by Hippocrates notion of the 4 humours of the body and
Aristotle's notion of 4 properties comprising the elements (28-33).
According to humoural theory blood, yellow and black bile, and phlegm make
up an organism, and their properties relate to the four elements ofwhich the world is
composed: 'Choler [yellow bile] in temper the most hot and raging, resembles fire.
Blood hot and moyst, resembles the ayre. Flegme cold & moyst, resembles the water.
Melancholy [black bile], cold and dry, is fitly compared vnto earth' (Crooke 7).
Arikha gives a table of the way each humoural category corresponds to character
types, organs, seasons, times of day and life, a tutelary planet, a set of astrological
signs, musical modes, colours and tastes (11), which whilst only suggestive of the
complete system of correspondences, is sufficient to indicate how it worked:
Humour: blood yellow bile black bile phlegm
Character: sanguine choleric melancholic phlegmatic
Organ: heart spleen liver brain
Property: hot & wet hot & dry cold & dry cold & wet
Element: air fire earth water
Season: spring summer autumn winter
Time of day: morning midday afternoon evening
Time of life: childhood youth maturity old age
Tutelary planet: Jupiter Mars Saturn Moon
Astrological sign: Gemini Virgo Scorpio Pisces
Taurus Leo Saggitarius Aquarius
Aries Cancer Libra Capricorn
Musical Mode: Lydian Phrygian Mixolydian Dorian
Colour: red yellow black white
Taste: sweet bitter sour salty
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Thus the elements, properties and humours operate as an organising principle for
knowing the world, one's self, and their integrated nature.
In Shakespeare's time 'humour' referred to various processes, including those
now commonly classed as 'mental' or 'physical'; the word demonstrates an
epistemological flexibility, which reflects early modern belief in ontological fluidity.
A humour is an underlying mental and physical disposition: 'The black oppressing
humour' of melancholy, which causes sadness and heaviness of mind, is
accompanied by symptomatic diseases that are treatable with allopathic cures {LLL
1.1.233; Bullokar 'Melancholy', 'Hemorrhodes'). A humour is a temporary state of
mind or a mood: 'See what humour he is in' (Wiv. 2.3.79). A humour is a passing
inclination: 'let it be as humours and conceits shall govern' (MV 3.5.69). The over
generous potential of the word to signify, thus verging on meaninglessness, is
comically played on by Nim in Shakespeare's Merry Wives who applies the word
ubiquitously, and as malleably as it makes humans: 'I thank thee for that humour'; 'I
will run no base humour. Here take the humour-letter' (1.3.53, 1.3.67-8). This
flexibility, so that a single word could describe a variety of mechanisms, is also
reflected by the current need for and production of new terms and of fluid lexical
constructions: such as neuroethics, psychophysiology, cognitive artifacts,
biotechnology and geminoid. Recognition of cognitive embodiment, embeddedness
and extendedness is implicitly and explicitly operative in the way that language was
and is developed.
Along with a number of scholars, Paster suggests that our interpretations of
humoural descriptions have sometimes erred towards thinking figurative what was
meant as literal and Laqueur insists 'the metaphorical and the corporeal are so bound
up with one another, that the difference between the two is really one of emphasis
rather than kind' (Humoring 11-2; 109). Similarly, Maus describes it as difficult to
know when the habits of mind reflected in a bodily analogy intend an analogical or a
literal statement of fact (196). In creative descriptions of what something is Tike',
historian Laura Gowing argues, Tike' seems to imply a stronger relation than it does
now for us (21). Another historian, Ulinka Rublack, provides a specific instance,
concerning the now figural phrase 'hard hearted': it was believed that witches could
not cry because their hearts had hardened, and they were thus incapable of being e-
motion-ally moved (7). The major opposition to Galenic humoural theories came
from Paracelsus, but as Michael Schoenfeldt points out even 'he retains a significant
amount of Galenic theory in his elaborate theories of correspondence and influence'
(Bodies 3).
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Robert Burton provides a contemporary definition of a humour as 'a liquid or
fluent part of the body', which 'is either innate or born with us, or adventitious and
acquisite' (1.1.2.1). In Ben Jonson's social satire Every Man out of his Humour the
character Asper lectures that a humour is 'a quality of aire or water' with the
properties of 'moisture, and fluxure', so that it is something 'wanting power to
containe it selfe' (Ind. 89, 91, 97). Thus the substances of which humans were
composed were understood to be fluid, dispersive and unruly. The humours
unceasing motion and incontinency is again remarked on in Asper's explanation of
the operation ofhumours in humans:
So, in euery humane body
The choller, melancholy, flegme and bloud,
By reason that they flow continually
In some one part, and are not continent,
Receiue the name of humours. (Ind. 98-102).
Asper then describes how these formative substances in humans have power over the
subject's general disposition through the domination of a particular humour:
As when some one peculiar quality
Doth so possesse a man that it doth draw
All his affects, his spirits, and his powers,
In their confluctions, all to rurme one way,
This may be truly said to be a Humour. (Ind. 105-109)
The domination of a particular humour could have positive or negative consequences,
depending on the degree and the attendant circumstances. Bacon, who closely
observed the inclinations of his own humours, describes the equivocal aspects of the
choleric character type: 'Ambition is like Choier; Which is an Humour, that maketh
Men Actiue, Earnest, Full of Alacricitie, and Stirring, if it be not stopped. But if it be
stopped, and cannot have his Way, it becometh Adust, and thereby Maligne and
Venomous' ('Of Ambition,' Essays 154). Depending on the internal balance, the
environmental and sociocultural conditions, and the attitude taken, perceptions and
experiences of humours could vary widely: the phlegmatic could vary between easy
compliancy or passive lethargy; the melancholic between studiousness, gloominess
or frenzy; and the sanguine between warm-hearted or lustful. The ideal 'complexion'
is an equilibrium of the humours, and although normally one humour predominates,
significant imbalances result in mental and physical illnesses. The various
combinations of humours simultaneously construct and constrict the moral, mental
and physical character of a subject.
96
A subject's humours were easily affected by changes such as bodily
temperature (from which the term 'temperament' derives), food and drink imbibed,
and the surrounding environment. In terms of diet, importance was placed not only
on types of food, but also on quality, quantities and preparation. Cooking was
perceived as a cultural and alchemical process relating to the wider social body,
whilst the purification of food and expelling of waste by the body were conversely
figured as occurring in a metaphorical kitchen (Lee 250-52; Crooke 13; Spenser
2.9.28-32). In Thomas Tomkis' play Lingua Appetite boasts cooking is a 'most
desired and honorable art', but eating itself retained an ambiguous status, with John
Davies of Hereford in the margins of 'Humours Heauen on Earth' scorning that
'Taste' is 'the sense wherein Men-beasts do most delight' (sig. Dlv; 6). Schoenfeldt
describes early modern self-fashioning as emerging through attempts to control
bodily ingestion and excretion, whilst Maus suggests anxiety was caused by an ideal
of the body as an intact sanctuary, which women's and men's bodies violation by
ingestion and discharge makes 'a form of masquerade' ('Fables' 243; 194). This
ideal is reflected in the fact that 'Sobrietie' included not only temperance in alcoholic
but also gastronomic intake (Rogers sig. B8r), and is due to the fact that lack of
moderation affected not only the body, but also the soul: 'We ought to be carefull to
liue soberly, since the temperance or intemperance of the body extendeth to the helpe
or maintenance, or to the hurt or trouble of the Soule' (Nixon 54). Diet was one of
the means the early modern subject could employ in attempts to control the flow
between itself and the world and to thereby shape its subjectivity, yet as Maus
implies the flow itself undermined the sense ofborders between subject and world.
Robert Burton links diets to humoural temperaments which are created by their
particular national environments (1.2.2.3). This emphasis possibly derives from the
translation of Lemnius' Touchstone of the Complexions in 1576, which stressed the
relation of the characters of individuals and nations to their temperaments and
complexions. Raphael Holinshed in the first volume of his compendious historical
chronicle on the Description and Historie of England links the particular dietary
requirements of the English to the geographical environment's effect on their
temperament (165). This belief was dramatically represented at the time, as Bullough
comments: 'The presentation of national types was popular on the stage in the late
nineties...It accompanies the growing interest in "humours" which he [Shakespeare]
shared and which is embodied in Nym' (2:11). Mary Floyd-Wilson coined the term
'geohumoralism' to describe the way in which ethnic dispositions were thought to
relate to the physical and environmental disposition of the homeland, although the
disposition was also fluid and impressionable by travel and civilising effects
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('English Mettle' 133). For this reason Burton advises 'a transmigration of nations'
every six hundred years 'to amend and purify their blood, as we alter seed upon our
land' (1.2.1.6). Thus environment, as well as diet, fundamentally shapes the subject.
Moreover, Montaigne beautifully describes humans as coevolving in relation to
the geographical landscape and meteorological airs around us:
We feel palpably by experience that the form of our being depends on the air, climate
and the soil where we are born - not only the complexion, the stature, the constitution
and countenance, but also the faculties of the soul ('Apology' 526).
As in the extended mind theory 'geohumoralism' implies that there are no fixed
boundaries between the outer realms and inner functions in the early modern
humoural subject. Montaigne makes apparent this affects every aspect of the human
being: the perceptual and cognitive faculties of the soul operate in relation to their
embeddedness in the surrounding environment as well as to their embodiment in the
individual subject. Crooke describes bodies as: 'Transpirable and Trans-fluxible'
(175): the world and the subject are breathed and flow in and out of one another. This
transpirability and transfluxibility produces inconsistencies and imbalances in
humans: 'That man whom you thought so adventurous yesterday, do not think it
strange to find him just as cowardly today: either anger, or necessity, or company, or
wine, or the sound of a trumpet, had put his heart in his belly' (Montaigne, 'Of the
Inconsistency' 293). This leads to issues concerning agency and lack of autonomy of
the human subject which are discussed in later chapters.
One particularly noted humoural imbalance was melancholy, with references to
it suddenly proliferating after the 1580s. As Vieda Skultans argues this is due to its
appeal in an age of increased education and thwarted ambition, with melancholy the
prevailing mood amongst writers suffering deficient sources of patronage; it may
also have been an elite fashion brought back from Italy by aristocratic travellers (19-
22). The view that the world was nearing its end and that it was an especially
dissolute age (see for example Davies ofHereford's 'Triumph of Death'), combined
with shifting standards and the uprooting of long-held beliefs also provided a
conducive backdrop, leading to Robert Burton's claim of a global epidemic: 'all of
the world is melancholy' ('Democritus,' Anatomy 120). The layers of complexity
involved in humoural theories generally are made evident by Burton's anatomisation
of the multiple potential causes of melancholy. The first causes were God and
supernatural powers for which the only cure was prayer (1.2.1.1-3). Next the
universal natural causes, the heavens, planets and stars, whose influences could be
resisted (1.2.1.4). Then the congenital or inward particular natural causes, such as are
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inherited or occur through the drying and cooling of the spirits with age (1.2.1.5-6).
Lastly the outward and adventitious natural causes, 'the six non-naturals', which
Burton describes as 'the principal causes of this disease': diet, retention and
evacuation, air, exercise, sleeping and waking, and perturbations of the mind
(1.2.2.1). Burton explains that both the humours of the body and the passions and
perturbations of the mind were a cause ofmelancholy because:
as the body works upon the mind by his bad humours, troubling the spirits, sending
gross fumes into the brain, and so...disturbing the soul, and all the faculties of it...so,
on the other side, the mind most effectually works upon the body, producing by his
passions and perturbations miraculous alterations, as melancholy, despair, cruel
diseases and sometimes even death itself (1.2.3.1)
Thus the passions and the humours operated on each other reciprocally and
reproductively. The Anatomy suggests that the system of humours involves all
aspects of the human being and creation; like EM it is an inclusive system which
acknowledges the widespread and reciprocal participation of multiple factors in
making up a human being.
Like all humours melancholy could take diverse forms, the first chapter of
Timothy Bright's A Treatise of Melancholie (1586) is entitled 'How diverslie the
word melancholie is taken' and the length of Burton's encyclopaedic and self-
analytical volume suggests its particularly protean nature (1). The rich mix of shared
consistencies and particular divergences between melancholic types and individuals
is coolly captured by the dry wit of Jaques in Shakespeare's As You Like It:
I have neither the scholar's melancholy, which is emulation, nor the musician's, which
is fantastical, nor the courtier's, which is proud, nor the soldier's, which is ambitious,
nor the lawyer's, which is politic, nor the lady's, which is nice, nor the lover's, which
is all these; but it is a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples,
extracted from many objects, and, indeed, the sundry contemplation of my travels,
which, by often rumination, wraps me in a most humorous sadness. (4.1.10-18)
Jaques claims for himself a melancholy which is uniquely composed from his
surroundings and his contemplation of previous experiences, which in turn fashions,
informs and envelops his current experience and subjectivity, mediating his self-
knowledge and his knowledge of the world. Like any humour, albeit more frequently
than the others, melancholy could be mentally and physically unbalancing. For whilst
it was normal for a humour to predominate in individuals, 'by becoming excessive,
overly heated, or dangerously viscous, these humoural fluids brought about disorder
and even madness' (Radden 5). The fashionable interest in melancholy demonstrates
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especially clearly an early modern understanding of the manifold causes of human
attributes and conditions, and the role of humours in cognitive and bodily processes.
Humoural theories also participated in early modern views of sex. In Making
Sex Thomas Laqueur depicts this period as having a one-sex Galenic anatomical
model, in which a woman's genitalia are the internalised version of the man's (8, 81-
85). This seems to be confirmed by Crooke who describes how the locational
difference of the genitalia was understood to be caused by the coldness of women:
'heat abounding in men thrusts them foorth of the body, whereas in women they
remaine within, because their dull and sluggish heate is not sufficient to thrust them
out' (Crooke 202). Gail Kern Paster contends that the more significant sexual
disparity is the thermal differential that is indirectly indicated by the anatomical
variation, as this implied fundamental limits on the emotional range and individuality
of women due to the correlation made between temperatures and emotions
(.Humoring 118). In fact, Crooke advanced beyond Laqueur's and Paster's models, as
he rebuts the Galenic structural analogies, which 'many men do esteeme very absurd',
although he still retains the thermal differential (271). In fact, although the Galenic
one-sex model was reiterated by 'almost every medical writer of the sixteenth and
seventeenth century' and provided a 'framework for medical discoveries, anatomical
teaching and popular medicine', Laura Gowing notes that it 'was never the only way
of understanding the body', as this remained an open topic of debate and
metaphorical play in popular culture (18-20). Fissell makes a similar argument from
her research on childbearing guides: 'Discussions of female bodies were important
sites for re-imagining and re-negotiating not just the bodies themselves but the social
and cultural worlds in which bodies were constituted' (433).
The jest book England's Merry Jester plays on fear of 'the slippery world' we
live in, with recurring themes of women letting open their sexual 'uoor' or urinary
'flood-gate' inappropriately (60, 61, 92-93). Both Gowing and Paster detect a fear of
women's penetrability and permeability, as relating to women's menstruation,
vaginal discharges, waters breaking, breast feeding and urinary incontinence, the
latter often caused by primitive obstetrical techniques (22; Body 45). Still, there is a
biological variation, underlying the misogynistic sociocultural constructs that
accounts in part for this belief. These weak and leaky vessels, at once shameful and
sexual, were therefore portrayed as in need of control by men. Yet, in fact, this
portrayal of women was fuelled and tempered by the fact that men were also
perceived as made up by the flow and discharge of fluids: 'all early modern bodies
were leaky: the humours flowing around the body, determined health and
temperament, and men were far from immune to concerns about bodily fluids
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leaking' (Gowing 22). Bacon describes the fluidity and pliability of 'mens watry and
soft natures' (Advancement 107). Thus, now as then, human nature's fluidity and
permeability can be creative of anxiety, although in the early modern period it is
understood in terms of humourality with concerns projected onto women as a means
of displacement.
Thus, humoural theories realised that the mind not only moved the body, but
that the body also moved the mind. Whilst belief in the humoural system has eroded,
Arikha argues for the humours continuing usefulness into the twenty-first century:
'Humours, and their contemporary equivalents, act as a bridge between the theories
we devise and the mental functions that enable us to devise these theories — but
without filling in the gap' (304). This is a similar standpoint to my own view as to
the continuity of our reliance on explanatory structures that are approximate, but
nevertheless participate in the nature of the world and the subject. Arikha also briefly
suggests that:
If, as Damasio and others like Edelman have established, the body is represented in
the brain and particularly in the somatosensory cortex, then it is quite plausible to read
bodily types in mental terms - and vice versa - as the humoralists did (288-89).
WTiilst in agreement with Arikha's sentiments here, Damasio's contribution does not
so much concern the establishment of the representation of the body in the brain
(which was established much earlier); his work argues for the fundamental role of the
body state and emotions in reasoning and our humanity. This topic is discussed in the
following section, along with the body states' and passions' relation to the spirits and
to attitudes to mutability.
Passions, Spirits and Mutable Matter
The dynamic intermingling of the humours with the passions entwined the brain and
body's processes linking matter to morals. Like Burton, Francis Bacon describes the
humours and other operations of the body affecting the mind and the passions and
the mind affecting the body (Advancement 94-95). Bacon gives examples of the
effect that imagination has upon the body and vice versa of the effect that fasting has
upon the mind in order to demonstrate how the humours respond to the passions and
how in turn the passions respond to the effects of humours (95). Bacon's account
acknowledges both the coeffective nature of the body and mind and he concludes
that therefore attempts to understand either of them must engage with both (95).
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The passions, as mentioned earlier, are antecedents of modern emotions, and
although understood to operate by different mechanisms, they were still understood
in relation to embodiment, reason, and being human. The term 'passions,' was one
of several terms circulating: 'perturbations' tended to be associated with troublesome
emotions, whilst 'affections' were often specifically associated with love and liking.
Books on the passions were popular during this period, often moving between
physiological and moral issues, with particular emphases reflecting whether they
were authored by physicians or theologians. Rolf Soellner and William Newbold
discover two main models of the passions circulating around the turn of the sixteenth
century. The most frequent model was of four primary passions; although the names
vary, the essential scheme is: grief (present negative), fear (future negative), pleasure
(present positive) and hope (future positive) (Soellner 552, 559; Newbold 38). This is
derived from Ciceronian and Stoic models, in which emotions that are 'disturbances
of the mind' are violently contrary to nature and reason. The other model, especially
prevalent in Catholic accounts, is based on Aquinas' model in his Summa Theologia
of eleven species of passions, six in the concupiscible and five in the irascible
appetite (Soellner 550; Newbold 38-39). Aquinas was influenced by the more
positive Aristotelian model of right circumstantial emotional balance. There were
also commonly held to be 'a swarme of others, which...take their beginning, and
spring from these' (Coeffeteau 36). In both types of account the intent is the pursuit
of virtue and the oft repeated catch phrase is 'Nosce Teipsum': know thyself.
A central topic of debate was the role of rational control versus the expression
of one's desires. Greenblatt's opinion that in the early modern period the self was
understood to be 'most visible, most expressive, perhaps most interesting at moments
in which the moral will has ceded place to the desires' is opposed by Schoenfeldt's
contrary opinion that it is rather through the 'control and monitoring of a self always
in flux' that it is defined {Learning 136; Bodies 17; see also Hampton 275). These
critical controversies arguably reflect the divergent early modern opinions circulating
during this period. Conflict between reason and the passions was allegorically
conceived of in terms of civil and religious strife, which were perceived as
macrocosmic reflections of the workings ofman: 'in regard of the vice, disorder, and
iniustice that is in these passions, we may compare man to a Commonweale'
(Charron 71). In his chivalric epic The Faerie Queene, first published between 1590
and 1609, Spenser figuratively describes passion as a 'stubborne steede' in need of
restraint (4.6.33); a description comparable with Freud's depiction of the ego and the
id as rider and horse: 'Thus in relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who
has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse' ('Ego' 636). The irascible and
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concupiscible passions are personified as Pyrochles (Gk.: 'one of fiery disposition')
and Cymochles (Gk: 'one who fluctuates'), the Saracen sons of Aerates (Gk.:
'without control') (2.4.41). In this schema victory over the passions is a feat
allegorically compared with a Christian victory over Islam and anagogically with
Christ's victory over death (2.8.53). Another traditional motif that retained popularity
was Logos (reason) as steering Psyche's ship through a turbulent sea blown by the
tempestuous winds of the passions (Davies ofHereford, 'Humours' 28; Lemnius 2-3).
Gowland comments that the increased humanist preoccupation with the
passions and melancholy served 'as outlets for anxieties' shaped or provoked by
social, political and religious conflicts (119). Turmoil in the world was understood in
relation to turmoil in man and therefore addressing the original source in man with
simple oppositional binaries of reason and the passions was a means to achieve a
sense of control over actions and fates in turbulent times. On similar territory Paster
argues that the perceived threat of the passions results in the 'quest for the self-
sameness and manly constancy prized by humanists' (22). This quest foreshadows
more recent attempts to disregard human neurophysiology or to promote perceptions
ofhumans as autonomous subjects.
In fact, the unruly passions ability to act as a threat is due to the fact that reason,
like the body on which it relies, was seen as 'stretchable, pliable, and adaptable to all
biases and all measures' (Montaigne 'Apology' 516). The mind and reason are not
reliably stable reflective mediums against which embodied experience can be
measured, but implicated and entangled in it. Laura Gowing describes the early
modern interrelation ofbody and mind:
The body's boundaries were imagined differently. Mental and physical subjectivity
were entwined and emotional experiences made themselves manifest through the body.
The flows of the body.. .were interwoven with those of the emotions.. .(2)
Similarly Rublack insists that 'subjectivity was profoundly experienced as
interrelated with the physical' (13). This is exemplified in Coeffeteau's description
of the passions as a parallel to the sinews: 'Passions are in the soule, as the sinnews
in the body; for as by meanes of sinnewes we extend [o]r bend the members so by
the operations of Passions, wee carry our selues to good or euill' (75). Moreover, the
soul, the body and the world are fundamentally interconnected: 'the soul may be
shaped into all other varieties of forms and molds to itself the feelings of the body
and all other accidents. (Montaigne 'That the Taste' 46). Soul, mind, and body were
understood as analogous and implicated in one another.
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Early modern belief that embodied and interactive flows of humours and
passions shape cognition and subjectivity shares with Damasio an understanding that
body states and the emotions are linked into the cognitive processes of the subject. A
claim made by Damasio, regarding the inextricably human nature of experiencing
emotions, was also a common early modern emphasis, as those without passion are
described as either a stone or God (Burton 1.2.3.1; Coeffeteau 51-76). A crisis of
subjectivity can be caused not only by a human subject's unruly agencies but also by
a lack of human feeling. While the early modern emphasis is often on passions
tendency to disrupt reason and enchain it in sensual and worldly ends, conversely in
Damasio's account it guides reason towards long term goods, and to social and moral
virtues. Yet, early modern perceptions sometimes shared in such positive views.
Montaigne asserts that 'the finest actions of the soul proceed from and need that
impulsion of the passions' ('Apology' 518). Passions were also associated with
Christ and the Judaeo-Christian tradition of strong emotion (Nixon 71). Besides,
popular books on the passions, equivalents of modern self-help psychology books,
rely on the audience's belief that learning about their passions will teach them about
human nature and so lead them to virtue. This belief in the positive role of the
passions has implications for literature. Early modern rhetorical models'
commonplace of the Ciceronian affective triad 'teach', 'please', 'move' is dependent
on the ability of the passions to move the listener or reader to virtue; Wright's fifth
book on the means to move passions, therefore includes several chapters focused on
rhetoric. Brian Vickers recently described how 'poets and dramatists had to appeal to
their audience's emotions and were duly evaluated as having done so adequately or
not' (16). In fact, Damasio mentions Shakespeare's insights into the human mind,
and this section demonstrates the intellectual background from which these emerged
(.Descartes' 129-31; Feeling 38-9, 287-9).
Bacon advises investigation of 'the Seates, and Domiciles which the seuerall
faculties of the minde, doe take and occupate in the Organs of the Bodie'
(.Advancement 95). Following Plato he places understanding in the brain, animosity
in the heart and concupiscence in the liver; thus, he clearly identifies these cognitive
and emotive powers as the distributed agents of the mind dispersed within the body
(96). The passions were also transported around the body by the spirits, as mentioned
earlier, and the spirits linked body to soul (Burton 1.1.2.2). Spirits weave together the
material and immaterial since their substance is the most soul-like of materials as
well as her conveyor: 'A subtle and thinne body alwayes mooueable, engendred of
blood and vapour, and the vehicle or carriage of the Faculties of the soule' (Crooke
174; see also Donne, 'The Ecstasy' 61-64). Crooke offers a vivid analogy for the
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relationship of the invisible spirits to the body: 'they are like the winde which
whiskes about in euery corner and turns the heauy saile of a Wind-mill' (824). Again
reflecting the lexical flexibility of terms 'spirit' was used to refer to vital life energy,
'The expense of spirit' ('Sonnet 79' 1); intellectual power, 'some shallow spirit of
judgement' (1H6 2.4.16); sensory perception, 'The eye itself/ That most pure spirit of
sense' (Tro. 1.1.60); and the soul, 'Heaven give your spirits comfort' (MM4.2.73).
The natural spirits providing nourishment rise from blood in the liver, are
refined into the vital spirits of the heart, which provide heat, and upon entering the
brain they are further refined into the animal spirits, which are then retransmitted to
the body by the nerves which are 'Membranes wherein the Braine itself is inuested'
(Crooke 824). Thus the basic forces of heat and digestion are linked into and
composed from similar substances to those which perform cognitive processes and
the brain extends its domain into the body via the nervous system. Yet, the spirits,
passions, and humours did not necessarily use specific channels to traverse the body,
since as Crooke explains 'in a mans body there are many secret and vnknowne
waies' (252). Nor were they confined to the body. Air, one of the six non-naturals
was operative on the openness of the body, and especially so on the affiliated spirits
(252). Consequently the 'formes of the Imagination' can be 'insculped or engrauen in
the aery spirites' and vice versa, since 'the aer is full of formes...so our spirits which
are aery doe easily admit all species or formes of things' (312). The spirits are on a
continuum, from the natural most material and bloody ones to the almost immaterial
airy animal spirits, with the relationship between the air and the spirits a system in
which shared properties result in the flux of species in and out of the transpirable
body and mind.
Described in these texts is a system in which brain, body and world blow
through, and flow leakily and violently into one another. Paster explains that our
failure to recognise the different character of an emotional experience in early
modern texts is connected to our failure 'to recognise how the porous and volatile
humoral body, with its faulty borders and penetrable stuff, interacts differently with
the world than the "static, solid" modern bodily container' {Humoring 23). Like EM,
these early modern models for the body and emotions emphasise the fluidity and
malleability of humans to cognitive experience. Lemnius, for example, offers this
image:
...the mindes and bodyes of men be in a maner as it were yong Sproutes & trees,
which being artificially handled...may like soft waxe, or as tractable and moyst claye,
be fashioned, framed and made applyable to learne any knowledge, and vertue, any
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ciuilitye: and by artificiall instruction bee trayned to conceyue Artes and behauiour
both comely and commendable. (Lemius 3-4)
This suggests the potential for the cultural shaping of human beings, as well as the
innately fluid physical and mental properties which enable this. Coeffeteau's
translator praises his patron that his 'disposition to all goodnesse is in nature most
sweete, most flexible' and invites him to 'vouchsafe eare a little to artificiall and
experimenc't aduices, that may rectifie, accomplish and establish you' (sig. A4r).
Human minds and bodies were understood to be particularly pliable and adaptable, as
further explored in the penultimate section of this chapter, with comment on one's
versatility or flexibility a form of flattery.
Yet, the mutability of the subject was understood both as a glory and an anxiety.
Dollimore argues that it is in particular during expansionist eras that mutability is
perceived in terms of 'radical psychic insecurity', with anxiety and alienation in
effect the stuff of the subject's creation {Death 92). As evidence of a heightened
early modern sense of this, he quotes William Drummond's observation that the
'Body is but a Mass of discording humours...which though agreeing for a trace of
time, yet can never be made uniform' (91). This insecurity was driven by
consciousness that man was made from matter that was not only mutable, but was
also therefore necessarily subject to decay. Drawing on classical sources, Crooke
reaffirms the powerful commonplace of the necessary corruptibility of sublunary
elemental matter: 'That all things vnder the Moone...all thinges I say contayned
within the Elements are subiect to corruption and dissolution' (199; see also Davies
ofHereford'Civile' 185).
Spenser offers a richly subtle account of the nature and value of human
mutability. The 'Mutabilitie Cantos', latterly appended to The Faerie Queene,
concern a trial to settle the extent of the rule of Mutability, who pretends to be
sovereign over men and Gods. Mutability's argument includes her power over water,
air, fire, and the Earth (7.25.1-3). Nor does she allow man's mind to elude her realm
of influence: 'Ne doe their bodies only flit and fly:/ But eeke their minds (which they
immortal call)/ Still change and vary thoughts, as new occasions fall' (7.19.7-9).
Nature points out that despite, or rather because of, all things incessant change, self-
extending and self-creating motion rather than disorder is at work:
They are not changed from their first estate;
But by their change their being doe dilate:
And turning themselves at length againe,
Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate:
Then ouer them Change doth not rule and raigne;
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But they raigne ouer change, and doe their states maintaine. (7.58.4-9)
Nature describes living entities that universally 'dilate' suggesting both openness and
extendedness as natural to the properties of things. It is part of their autopoietical
nature to reach beyond their initial sphere, and this enables them to turn back on
themselves, in order to work towards their fuller realization and in fact preserve their
natural condition. This echoes the epistemological topoi which emphasise the need
for humans in this life to extend their minds through their senses into the world,
thereby enabling themselves to achieve knowledge. This culminating passage to The
Faerie Queene suggests that in fact this particular human drive reflects a universal
aspect of all of creation. Clark's theory that humans are natural-born cyborgs, also
suggests extendedness is a principal evident in other life forms, using the example of
the heavy tuna fish who uses the wave flows to aid its movements through the water
(Mindware 143), and the social and ecological offloading of even basic life forms is
also the focus of the works of J. Scott Turner, mentioned in Chapter 1. Spenser's
understanding of this is of course enfolded by Christian beliefs. The eighth and final
brief canto concedes that Mutability rules all except the Heavens, but continues that
it shall soon by cut down by Time's sickle, after which there shall be no more change
but the hoped for steadfast Eternity with God.
Crooke similarly offers an elegant explanation of the divine purpose of
elemental mutability, and makes it a parallel to the immortality of the soul. Although
man is 'a compound creature', this is tempered by the fact that 'the matter of all
things is eternall', because the 'dissolution of created things is but a resolution of one
thing into another', through a perpetuity not ofparticular things but of the elementary
parts of nature (198) Human's elemental matter directly and indirectly participates in
and is reformed into similar and new forms of matter. Furthermore fruits, trees,
plants and all living creatures 'conteine in it a power to frame a new all parts of the
bodie from whence it yssued' (198):
For so euery indiuiduum extending it selfe as it were, in the procreation of another like
vnto it selfe, growth young againe and becommeth after a sort eternall. The father
liueth in the sonne, and dyeth not as long as his expresse and liuing Image stands vpon
the earth. (200)
Early modern concepts of the mind and of the subject are permeated by notions of
their extended nature, both by means of their soul and through their body. Similarly
foresightful insights in Shakespearean imagery, have led a journal on clinical
genetics to suggest they form a prehistory to genetical theories (Berg 165-70). The
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prescience of this insight, shared by early modern thought, also stretches to
alternative memetic forms of extension, such as the use of words as a form of
immortality or of extended cognition, as discussed in later chapters. These optimistic
versions turn things on their head: rather than mutability leading to death and
corruption, it results in the subject's extendibility through time, via body and soul, in
sustained, renewed and metamorphosed forms. Despite early modern concerns over
human materiality, these theories incorporate evidence about the role of the world,
body and mind in cognitive processes, and share with EM interest in the role these
factors play in enabling the very flexibility, hybridity and extendibility that make us
human subjects.
Microcosms and Hybrids
The early modern period involved a renewed exploration of humanity's roles,
functions and capabilities. The human subject was understood to have an extended
mind, with its capacities enabled as well as limited by embodiment and their intimate
relation to the earthly world. Helkiah Crooke again captures the optimistic angle on
this in his powerful model of the self and its intimate relation to the world and to
God:
SEeing then that Man is a Litle world, and containes in himselfe the seeds of all those
things which are contained in the most spacious and ample bosom of this whole
Vniuerse, Starres, Meteors, Mettals, Minerals, Vegetables, Animals, and Spirits;
whosoeuer dooth well know himselfe, knoweth allthings, seeing in himselfe he hath
the resemblances and representations of all things. First, he shall know God, because
hee is fashioned and framed according to his Image...; he shall know also the Angels,
because hee hath vnderstanding as they haue; he shall know the brute Beasts, because
he hath the faculties of sence and appetite common with them; he groweth as the
plants do, hee hath being and existence as stones haue, and in a word, he is the rule
and square of all bodies. (12)
This model not only involves analogies, but also qualities of existence and
experience that a man alone holds in common with all other created forms. Crooke is
not just describing a system of similarity, but of shared kinds of faculties. He
constructs humans as potential participants of all levels of being and knowing in the
world, and even of the Angels and God, through the properties of man's body, mind
and soul. In this model the influence is apparent of two seminal texts of the Italian
Renaissance, which this section will explore: the first by Marsilio Ficino and the
other by his friend Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.
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Neoplatonic ideas contributed to the topos of man as 'a little world', however
seldom are they as unmuddiedly celebratory as in Crooke's account. The reason is
made evident by Marsilio Ficino's widely influential treatise Five Questions
Concerning the Mind (1477) that set forth this topos. Ficino's concept of motion
directed by and to an end that harmonises with its origin (as later in Freud, 'Beyond'
612-13) was accompanied by a belief that the human intellect 'extended' more
widely and perfectly than its body, and 'to things diverse and opposite' that often
oppose the inclination of the body (204-5). Whilst 'sense', the 'beast in us', can
achieve its desired end, reason, which is peculiar to man and causes his 'deliberation
and versatility', means that the 'man in us' cannot reach his end in this life; therefore
man leads a vacillating and distressed existence torn between these contrary goals
(206-8). Man's intellect means that unlike other creatures his ends lie not only in this
world, but also in the next, and this causes conflict; the fractured subject, as with
psychological models, is caused by tensions between different aspects of the subject.
Ficino's model also contains elements that prefigure the cognitive models described
by Wheeler that seek to separate mind from nature, as mentioned in Chapter 1.
Humans are 'outside the order of nature' and thus 'live and suffer contrary to the
order of nature', miserable both due to the infirmity of the body and the anxiety of
the mind until he attains his own body made everlasting in the next life (209-12).
Thus, in Ficino's model, both body and mind extend, with the emphasis on the
earthly body's inability to extend as widely as the human mind.
Following in poetic prose both the implications and the emotional peaks and
troughs of Ficino's work, Donne disrupts the tautology of man as world in
'Meditation 4: the Physician is sent for' (Devotions 19-21). He inverts the world and
man's scales to demonstrate the comparison's insufficiency: 'It is too little to call
Man a little World'. Analogies are conjured and simultaneously ruptured: were
man's parts 'extended' he would be the world and the world a map, his veins rivers,
his sinews mines, his muscles hills, and his bones quarries (19). Sawday comments
on the early seventeenth century drawing of comparisons between anatomical and
geographical exploration: 'The body was territory, an (as yet) undiscovered country,
a location which demanded from its explorers skills which seemed analogous to
those displayed by the heroic voyagers across the terrestrial globe' (Body 23). This
appeared in lyrical conceits, Sawday explains, such as Donne's addressing of the
female body as 'my America, my new found land' ('Elegy 2: To His Mistress Going
to Bed' 27). Poetically realised here is what Valerie Traub also comments on as the
use of 'similar tropes of exploration and discovery' by anatomies and travel
narratives which 'share a common imperative to chart, catalogue and colonize the
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body' (197). The general wide-ranging associations of bodily features are reflected
by Florio's translation in his dictionary of the Italian 'Vena', as: 'the natural
disposition, instinct or veine of a man. A pulse or an arterie. Also a veine of the earth.
Also a veine or stile ofwriting or speaking.' Thus Florio moves from dispositional to
geological to corporeal to cultural realms without any sense of incongruity.
Yet, it is the ultimate failure of the analogy between the world and man that
receives the emphasis in Donne's 'Meditation 4': since whilst man contains a
relation to everything in the world, he also contains 'many pieces, ofwhich the whol
world hath no representation' (19). Whilst man's thoughts are 'creatures' of infinite
span which 'comprehend all', he their 'Creator' is trapped within the prison of his
sick body. Thoughts as extended cognitive processes that can escape the confines of
the body are juxtaposed with a human subject who remains body-bound: this is the
'Inexplicable mistery' of human nature for Donne: the extended mind placed in a
limited corruptible body (20). Since humans are without the instinct of animals to
heal ourselves, and conversely consume ourselves with self-destructive thoughts, we
must send for the physician (20). This destabilizes man's supposed superiority:
Call back therefore thy Meditations again, and bring it downe; whats become of mans
great extent & proportion, when himselfe shrinkes himselfe, and consumes himselfe to
a handful of dust; whats become of his soaring thoughts, when himselfe brings
himselfe to the ignorance, to the thoughtlessnesse of the Gravel (20-21)
Our extended minds must be recalled to acknowledge our human bodies and mortal
state; for this embodied state shrinks the mind too, circulating thoughts in a self-
consuming torment that reaches not to the heavens but to inanimate dust.
Kristeller notes the concepts of man's exalted place in the universe and of his
powerlessness, arc not only contrary but complementary, and so well grounded in
human experience as to be permanent features, with the emphasis on one or the other
dependent 'on the mood of the period or even of an individual thinker or writer'
(Kristeller 180). They are often remarked on together, as Davies comments: 'I know
my selfe a Man, / Which is a proud and yet a wretched thing', and Burton's opening
subsection, where he describes man as 'a little world', is entitled: 'Man's Excellency,
Fall, Miseries, Infirmities' (Nosce 8; 1.1.1.1). In his elegiac poem 'An Anatomy of
the World' (1611) Donne describes the mind as well as the body as shrunken:
And as our bodies, so our minds are cramped:
'Tis shrinking, not close weaving, that hath thus
In mind and body both bedwarfed us' (152-154).
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Donne's use of the topos here again evokes the wretchedness implicit in man's
comparison with the world. Then his satirical employment of 'the little world' topos,
in 'Holy Sonnet 15' similarly makes explicit that it is both elemental and spiritual
aspects ofman that are worldly, sinful and thus fallen and mortal:
I am a little world made cunningly
Of elements, and an angelic sprite;
But black sin hath betrayed to endless night
My world's both parts, and, oh, both parts must die. (1-4)
As in these extracts, Richard Strier shows that for Luther it is not just the flesh that is
fallen but 'the body and soul, including our reason' (29). This contributes to Strier's
wider argument that the idea that Western tradition has always valued order, reason,
self-control and decorum is a distortion of intellectual history (42). Emphasis on
human degeneracy, especially amongst Protestant Reformers, reacted against
exaggerated humanistic praise. Underlying either polarised positivism or pessimism,
or any of the degrees spanning or paradoxically combining these extremes, the
dominant tendency was towards a reinvigorated interest in the embodied, embedded
and extended nature of the human being.
The man-as-microcosmos model Bacon argues is true to the extent that humans
are the most diversely composed due to the greater variability of humans' bodies and
lives in comparison with animals:
Adde hereunto that Beasts haue a more simple order of life, and lesse change of
Affections to worke vppon their bodies, whereas man in his Mansion, sleepe, exercise,
passions, hath infinit variations; and it cannot be denied, but that the bodie of Man of
all other things, is of the most compounded Masse. {Advancement 96-97)
This analogy does not include the soul as Bacon describes it as conversely 'the
simplest of substances', but this apparent disjunction is undermined by the fact that
whilst it resides in the body the soul 'enjoys no rest' as the 'variable composition of
mans bodie hath made it as an Instrument easie to distemper' (97). Montaigne uses
the topos chiefly to ridicule philosophers' attempts to anatomise man: 'Truly they
had good reason therefore to call it the little world, so many pieces and facets have
they used to plaster it and build it' ('Apology' 487). The early modern microcosm-
macrocosm topos implies resemblance, duality and reflection. Yet, notions of
reflection and duality are impeded by the fact that a subject's perceptions are rooted
in humoural human's distributed nature, which is formed from and by the mind, body
and world flowing into each other. Nevertheless, there are also evident tensions
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between understandings of the mind as extended through the material and mortal
body, and its potential to extend imaginatively beyond the body, prefiguring its
future abilities to transcend the mundane world.
Close friend to Ficino as he was, Pico della Mirandola's syncretistic 'Oration
on the Dignity ofMan', written around 1486, whilst also seeking for a more personal
concept of human nature compatible with the tenets of the Christian faith and his
humanist philosophy, put the emphasis instead on human's uniquely 'indeterminate
nature', reinforcing the parallels between humanity and hybridity that earlier
classical and medieval theories had explored (224). Pico firmly situates human
metamorphoses within the Christian schema by retelling the creation myth,
describing that as all the powers were already allotted by God, man alone was given
no fixed properties and the capacity to participate in the properties of all other things.
Pico repeats Aquinas' belief that according to free will, man from his central position
may degenerate down the ladder of souls to the bestial or ascend upwards to the
higher forms, but in Pico, there is increased emphasis on human transformability and
on the extent of our freedom in creating ourselves. God states:
We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal or immortal, so that
with freedom of choice and with honour, as though the maker and molder of thyself,
thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. (225)
Man is described by Pico as a 'chameleon', whose 'mutability of character' and
'self-transforming nature' was symbolized by 'Proteus' and by Hebrews' and
Pythagorean accounts of metamorphoses (225-6). He also approvingly quotes the
Chaldeans' saying that 'Man is a being of varied, manifold, and inconstant nature.'
(227) Evident here is a parallel awareness of human subjectivity to EM in terms of a
shared understanding of human hybridity, multiplicity and mutability, but as
interpreted within a Christian schema. The injunction 'Know Thyself Pico explains
'encourages us to the investigation of all nature, of which the nature ofman is both
the connecting link and, so to speak, the "mixed bowl'" (235). Thus, self-knowledge
is also intimately interrelated to knowledge of the natural world by Pico.
Davies makes evident the wider acceptance of these views, as in Nosce
Teipsum he imagines the Ovidian mythical tales of human transformations as
literalisations of man's tripartite nature and his ability to rise and descend into other
forms:
And these three powers three sorts ofmen do make;
For some like plants their veines do onely fill;
And some like beasts their senses pleasure take;
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And some like Angels do Contemplate still.
Therefore the fables turnd some men to flowers,
And others did with brutish formes inuest,
And did of others make Celestiall powers,
Like Angels, which still trauell, yet still rest. (53)
Davies here exhibits the fruits of humanism too, with this awareness of the ways in
which shared underlying beliefs can be expressed differently by different cultures.
Meanwhile, Crooke also describes the wonder that man 'can suddenly (Proteus-like)
transform himselfe into any particular thing' (3). Thus, the metamorphoses ofwhich
man is capable are understood as his fundamental nature.
The artworks of Pieter Brueghel the Elder and his followers such as Pieter van
der Heyden figure the psychological fantasies borne by notions of the protean and
hybrid body, with dreamlike fantasies of deformed and disjointed bodies (Milne 117).
In their depictions of the nightmarish undertow associated with hybrid and
fragmented subjects, these artworks prefigure the Lacanian mirror stage, in which the
assumption of identity is plagued by fantasies of disjointed limbs ('Mirror' 4). Phillip
Stubbes' The Anatomie ofAbuses (1583) make protean changeability a curse rather
than a wonder of humanity, and describes women as the most culpably mutable:
'Proteus that Monster could neuer chaunge him self into so many fourmes & shapes
as these women doo, belike they haue made an obligation with hel and are at
agreement with the deuil.' (sig. F5r) Phobic literary forms also appear in the works
ofDavies ofHereford, who describes an alternative scale ofgluttony, upon which the
need is to eat lest the eaters otherwise fall to slime, and who justifies the plague as
made necessary by man's 'ill-directing Wit', which has led man, who should be
horizon between angels and beasts, instead to be horizon between beasts and fiends
('Humours' 6; 'Triumph' 245).
Yet it is without intended satire or paradox that examples of animal
characteristics were used to shore up explanations of human nature. Emily Michael
describes 'the traditionally recognised commonality between human and animal
sense experience and imagination' that was connected with 'corporeal sense
cognition' (172). Crooke describes how in mankind 'you shall finde manie that haue
the stomacke of an Estrich; Others, that haue the heart of a Lyon; Some are of the
temper of a Dogge, many of a Hog, and an infinite number of as dull and blockish a
temper as an Asse' (5). Coeffeteau proves that the irascible and concupscible powers
are separable in humans by describing how there are animals which have desires but
no choler, such as sheep, pigeons and turtles (9). Erica Fudge in her book Perceiving
Animals describes that early modern anthropocentric ism nevertheless results in
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destroying the category of 'human' as well as blurring animal with human nature: 'if
anthropocentricism - placing the human and human vision at the centre - leads...to
anthropomorphism - seeing the world in our own image - and anthropomorphism
allows for the animalisation of humans then anthropocentrism paradoxically destroys
anthropos as a category' (7-8). Since this was not just an anthropocentric, but also an
androcentric culture, a woman's place on the ontological ladder, is portrayed below
men but above animals by Rogers, who in A Paterne of a Passionate Minde (1580)
describes that 'Idlenes maketh of men women, ofwomen beasts, of beasts monsters'
(sig. A5v). Mark Breitenberg describes anxious masculinity in the early modern
period as arising from sex based assumptions about power, privilege, sexual desire
and the body (1). This sliding scale all the more vividly accounts for the anxiety of
men that they may slip into an indolent effeminacy and thence degenerate to
bestiality.
More positively, and as in EM accounts, the particular hybridity of humans is
described by Crooke as having a material cause: 'For the matter of mans body, it is
soft, pliable and temperate, readie to follow the Workeman in euery thing, and to
euery purpose; for man is the moystest and most sanguine of all Creatures...' (5).
This plasticity particularly applies to the nature of the human brain, which Crooke
describes as 'white, soft and very moist' (507) Moistness and softness of the brain,
which is especially evident in the brains of children allows 'a facility of learning',
because the brain is 'of such a substance as is fit to receiue the impressions of other
things' (455). Fluman reasoning is also described as enabled by 'the amplitude or
largenesse of the braine and of the ventricles and the plenty of the spirits' and by 'the
Temper of the marrowy substance and of the spirites' (507). To demonstrate
anatomy's theological significance, Helkiah Crooke invites the reader on a tour of
the wondrous brain with its 'Labyrinthaean Mazes and web of the small arteries, the
admirable trainings of the Veines, the draining furrowes and watercourses, the liuing
ebullitions and springings vp of the sinnewes' (15). Many are the terms used to
describe the parts of the brain that suggest fluidity, leakiness and complexity:
'Canales or pipes', 'rillets', 'perforated manifold like a Siue', 'holes or passages',
and 'winding meanders' (445-46, 449, 457). Crooke also describes the brain, as both
involving areas of specialisation and involving promiscuous sharing between regions,
as also believed by the current neuroscientific studies explored in Chapter 1:
...the braine is the seate of all the Animall faculties as well Sensatiue as
Principall...The whole Schoole of the Arabians hath imagined certaine mansions in
the braine, and assigneth to euery particular faculty a particular seate...We answere,
that we thinke all the principall faculties are contained in the whole braine, but we do
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not deny but that one faculty is more manifest in one ventricle then it is in another...
(504, 506)
Early modern conjectures about the brain, had a considerably less well developed
scientific basis than those which support EM, but nevertheless there is evidence of
comparable understandings of the brain's operations as distributed, fluid and plastic;
and, then as now, this was connected to discussions about the variability and agency
of the human subject. The early modern brain and body are described as being
impressionable, pliable and fluid (with potentially positive or negative effects);
further evidence that early modern human subjects were conceived of as physically
poised for symbiotic and transformative relationships with the world. Thus, these
discourses provide particular early modern instances of the recognition of the
universal constant ofhuman adaptability and extendibility.
Conclusions
This chapter demonstrates an earlier awareness ofways in which subjectivity and the
mind can be understood as multiple, mutable and extended. Even in those models
which emphasise humans' potential for reason-centred cognition there emerges
evidence that the ensouled body necessarily relies on forms of physical cognition,
and this led to some controversial theories. Generally, the soul was understood to be
dispersed over the body and to perform both cognitive and bodily functions on
multiple levels via a mass of quasi-autonomous agents, which operate not only in
accordance with the conscious will, but are also motivated by the animal instincts
and nature. Humoural theories about the interactive and reciprocal relations between
brain, body and world make clear the transpirable and transfluxible nature of the
human subject, with beliefs that whilst humans are determined by inherited and
environmental factors, they can also fundamentally alter their given natures. The
passions, whilst being seen as a potential source of shipwrecking the subject, were
also a means of guiding reason to long term goods and virtue and were interlinked to
humoural body states. Physical mutability was understood both in phobic terms and
also as a parallel to the immortal soul, in terms of matter's reformation into other
forms, and human and other species extendibility through physical and mental
offspring. Ficino's notions of the mind and to a lesser extent the body as extended,
and Pico's concept of the hybridity and universality ofman, were seminal influences
on early modern notions of human subjects.
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The early modern subject is portrayed as composed of the same properties in
the brain and body, as exist in other people, objects, and all of creation, although
humans' particularly moist and pliable physical form contributed to humans'
adaptability and rationality. Evidence from early modern texts and the recent
attention by literary and historical critics to the central role that humoural discourses
play in the perceptions and experiences that the early modern subject has of itself and
of the world suggest fertile correlations can be made with the recent discoveries in
the cognitive sciences as to the mind's distributed and fluid nature and of the
operations of the emotions and the body in cognitive processes. Early modern texts
present a wide range of evidence that neurological and physiological structures were
understood to participate in cognition, and that cognition operated through a
combination of conscious and non-conscious processes, willed and autonomous
subsystems, and plastic and hardwired processes. As in current EM the 'control-
sharing coalition of processes' that were thought to make up the early modern subject
provide an interactive basis through which the subject dynamically extends itself into
the world and through which the world is incorporated into the subject (Clark,
Natural-Born 138). However, unlike current EM, the soul (and mind) is portrayed as
capable of intellective flights portrayed as a God-like extendedness that forefigures
the capabilities of the immortal soul. This chapter demonstrates that interesting
correlations and disjunctions are evident with extended mind ideas; these invite us to
question assumptions we might make about the meaning of early modern
terminologies and beliefs and to consider the historicity of ideas about the mind and
subject as embodied, embedded and extended.
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4
Early Modern Language and Memory Forms
The modern researcher's desk, cluttered with leaves of paper and writing implements,
overflowing with opened books piled on top of one another, had arrived. (7)
Neil Rhodes and Jonathan Sawday accurately conjure a vision of the desk before me
strewn with mounds of paper and gaping books; only the addition of my laptop is
necessary to transform the early modern version into my present. This chapter
explores early modern parallels to modern notions of extended minds and subjects
through an exploration of early modern discourses about forms of language and
memory, which make evident an especially marked consciousness, concern and
celebration over humans' permeability and extendedness. Early modem attitudes to
language were based on, and extensions of, attitudes towards being human, with the
ambivalent opinion of the printed, written, and spoken word reflecting ambivalent
views about the nature of the human subject. As language is a fundamental factor in
human cognitive processes and subjectivity, ambivalence about language is often an
extension of ambivalence about human subjectivity. Nevertheless, there was often a
further ambivalence about whether language supplemented cognitive processes
through its similarity to, or difference from, psychophysiological processes.
The opening section examines attitudes to language in the early modern period
and beliefs about its effect on cognition and subjectivity, via an exploration into
increasing literacy, residual orality, and the impact of the printing press. The next
section follows with a discussion of attitudes to language in various literary texts and
in early modern rhetorical manuals. The fmal section begins with a discussion based
on the underused resource of character writings, which frequently depict subjects as
being book-like or as composed of language, and then goes on to explore concept of
texts as extensions of the mind and of the subject.
A Cognitive Fossil Trail
A central aspect of Andy Clark's position is that current apprehension about
technological hybrids is unfounded, because such intimate technological relations
have always been an essential aspect of humanity. He demonstrates this through
describing the verbal and textual 'fossil trail':
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We see some of the cognitive 'fossil trail' of the cyborg trait in the historical
procession of potent cognitive technologies that begins with speech and counting,
morphs first into written text and numerals, then into early printing...They constitute,
I want to say, a cascade of 'mindware upgrades': cognitive upheavals in which the
effective architecture of the human mind is altered and transformed. {Natural-Born 4)
One pathway on this trail is the history of the book, an area of research that has long
been considering the effect on culture, subjects and cognition of the technological
changes from orality to literacy and from manuscripts to printing. The two most
seminal examples of the extensive literature on these transitions are H. J. Chaytor's
From Script to Print, and M. T. Clanchy's follow up From Memory to Written
Record, which both consider the effect on medieval literature of scribal methods.
Similarly to the philosophers discussed in Chapter 1 who conceived of language as a
'mind tool', Clanchy comments that 'literacy in itself is primarily a technology' (7).
However, unlike them, Clanchy does not consider literacy as just a particularly
powerful mind tool but as the only one: 'Literacy is unique among technologies in
penetrating and structuring the intellect itself (185). Following Clanchy, Walter
Ong's Orality and Literacy unreservedly argues for the need to reappraise the effects
upon humans of the technology ofwriting:
Many of the features we have taken for granted in thought and expression in literature,
philosophy and science, and even in oral discourse among literates, are not directly
native to human existence as such but have come into being because of the resources
which the technology of writing makes available to human consciousness. (1)
Recent critical works have increasingly emphasized the lingering co-existence of
manuscript alongside print and the malleability and appropriability of printed texts.
There has also been a greater focus on the early modern period in collected volumes
of essays, such as: The Transmission of Culture in Early Modern Europe edited by
Grafton and Blair, which explores how cultural transmission involves accretion and
revision rather than replication; and The Renaissance Computer edited by Rhodes
and Sawday, which examines the new methods of information storage and retrieval
that followed the spread of the printing press and draws comparisons with the current
digital transformation of technology. The widening interest in the materiality of texts
has led to an understanding of the content of a book as inseparable from its
production, circulation and reception; for instance, Margaret Spufford's Small Books
and Pleasant Histories, discusses the spread of literacy and types of cheap print
available, whilst other works pay attention even to the making of the paper and ink
(de Grazia and Stallybrass 280-82). The intention here is not to comprehensively
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cover the issues raised in the extensive literature on the history of the book; instead
this chapter concentrates on a few significant ways in which modern and early
modern perceptions of language and memory forms interlink with conceptions of
subjects and ofminds, in line with the central concerns of this thesis.
Arguably, trends in language media interact with changing perceptions of
subjectivity and the mind. Rhodes and Sawday describe the printing press as 'an
entirely new social entity' that began 'to refashion the mental world of Europeans'
through the transmission of old knowledge which then facilitated the creation of a
new philosophy (6, 7). They explain that print culture 'tended to produce a concept
of the text as a relatively fixed and stable entity', pointing out how our new digital
media is reversing this trend by allowing for more interactive play and creative
hypertext (11-12). Our current technological revolution has helped us realise the
effects of technological interactions upon the understanding and operating of the
mind and subject. The gradual trend towards increasing fixity of text bloomed into
the growth of ideas about the fixed nature of the subject that came to dominate
enlightenment and post-enlightenment ideologies, whilst the current trend in our
media can be linked with an increasing awareness of the interactivity, multiplicity
and mutability of cognitive processes and subjectivity.1
Available tools not only affect perceptions of cognitive abilities and
subjectivity, but also radically affect their nature. Yet such views have been
questioned: critics have commented that the revolution in astronomy occurred before
the discovery of the telescope and that William Harvey's scientific advances took
place before serviceable microscopes were available. A response to these critics is
offered by Elizabeth Eisenstein who points out in her influential work The Printing
Revolution in Early Modern Europe that the technical literature upon which these
inventions depended had already undergone the drastic changes that enabled the new
steps to be taken (256-57). Eisenstein argues that changes produced by printing had a
profound effect on the learned professions and on 'cerebral activities' (261), both for
natural philosophers (now modern scientists) and biblical scholars:
Intellectual and spiritual life, far from remaining unaffected, was profoundly
transformed by the multiplication of new tools for duplicating books in fifteenth-
century Europe. The communications shift altered the way Western Christians viewed
their sacred book and the natural world. It made the words of God appear more
multiform and his handiwork more uniform. (275)
1 See N. Katherine Hayles' books for further discussion of this topic.
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On the one hand, the spread of vernacular bibles had a divisive effect that fragmented
the Word of God into many different versions and disjointed the Body of the Church
and Western Christendom along religious, sociological and geographic lines.
Negativity over books and papers, as associated with theological controversies, is
indicated in Spenser's Faerie Queene in which 'Errour' is described as vomiting
them, and the hypocrite 'Archimago', master of the false image and representative of
Catholicism, has a book hanging by his belt (1.1.20; 1.1.29). On the other hand,
printing allowed more accuracy, through the comparing and correcting of scientific
accounts and images, such as charts, tables, diagrams, and maps, and, where there
was doubt, a new empirical system of referring to the world itself (Eisenstein 38).
The spread of the book contributed to divisions between intellectual and spiritual
perceptions of the world and of books themselves.
The early modern relation to the textual reflects its more general exploratory
interest as to how the material world could be utilised as a means toward both a
theological and a secular understanding of the mind, the subject and the world; but
simultaneously it created a split between these methods of understanding. This
reflects the movement seen within early modern literary studies, as the hermeneutics
of the medieval period had shifted from the interpretation of scriptural authorities to
the interpretation of classical and then of contemporary texts: in all areas of thought
ever increasing authority was being given to the secular realm (Minnis 373-94).
Although as Eisenstein notes, new discoveries and learning still continued to be
related to God via the evidence of the Bible, they were also increasingly related to
his creations, the world, and to humans, and in turn to man-made books and creations.
An instance of this combining of divine and worldly concepts is given in Bacon. He
compares the circumnavigation of the earth by man in his own age to that of 'the
heavenly Bodies' above, and global exploration into uncharted territories to
contemporary intellectual discoveries of the age:
But to circle the Earth, as the heavenly Bodies doe, was not done, nor enterprised, till
these later times: In respect of the many memorable voyages after the maner of heaven,
about the globe of the earth...And this Proficience in Nauigation, and discoveries,
may plant also an expectation of the furder proficience, and augmentation of all
Scyences, because it may seeme they are ordained by God...to meete in one Age.
(Advancement 71)
Such correspondences are interactive strands that continue to connect up what will
later come to appear as uncrossable divides, between the movements of the heavenly
and the secular realms, and the movements of the body and the mind.
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Aural-oral and visual-literate cultures also involve different bodily senses of the
self. Ong comments that the aural world view of man at the centre of the harmonic
cosmos, contrasts with the analytic and dissecting tendencies of sight (70-73). Books
make perceptions of language more material, and allow for the development of
reading and thinking techniques such as backward scanning and skimming (98).
Thus, increasing textuality, Ong argues, results in the development of new forms of
cognition and transformed human subjectivity: 'Writing introduces division and
alienation, but a higher unity as well. It intensifies the sense of self and fosters more
conscious interaction between persons' (175). The materiality of books is reflected in
the early modern period by the comparison of texts to physical bodies. The word
'syntax' exposes this connection as it originally referred to any systemic arrangement
of parts, including those of the body (Garber 34-35). Meanwhile, the anatomical
blazon through poetic praise dissects and anatomises female body parts, such as the
eye or the hair. Nancy Vickers describes that the strange fashion for domestic
blazons that were then staged as a moral corrective, suggests both a drawing of
comparisons and of contrast between body and house parts (3-4). Vickers also claims
that blazons 'stage a radical fragmentation of the body' in contrast to anatomical
treatises' attempts at 'recuperation of corporal wholeness' (8). Yet, the concept of the
body in parts poetically instituted in anatomical blazons, operated on the logic of the
soul being 'all in every part' discussed earlier, suggesting a more nuanced relation
between these types of texts than the straightforwardly oppositional.
Recent interest in the materiality of texts has also led to work on related topics
such as marginalia, which suggest that printing need not directly lead to fixity of
meaning. William H. Sherman's Used Books makes apparent the cognitive work
being done by the common Renaissance practice of readers marking books. Marking
books was a means not only of 'attending to words' but also of 'thinking about their
arguments', with the mental connotation 'to mark' developing out of the physical
practice (3). Sherman highlights continuities across the manuscript-print divide, with
the retaining of visual and organizational features from the manuscript tradition and
through bookreaders' transformative techniques, with the use of rubrication, curly
brackets, decorations of foliage, faces in profile, and the pointing hand continuing
into the seventeenth century (7-8). In addition to annotation, since readers could also
physically alter books when they were bound or rebound, this invited the addition of
blank pages for personalized indexes and tables, the rearranging of sections, and
even the recombination of sections with other texts (9). These practices Sherman
argues demonstrate that readers were not immediately rendered passive recipients by
print technology, but instead were 'active and appropriative' participants, who
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challenged 'the integrity of the entire printed book' (9). This suggests that despite the
gradual spread of potentially more fixed and stable texts, they were not treated as
closed systems, but still remained viewed as open to interactions with its readers for
centuries after Johann Gutenberg's development of print technology in the mid-
fifteenth century.
An instantly recognizable reason for such an active reading practice lies in
another aspect of this cognitive fossil trail: early modern information overload.
Modern academics' wonder and anxiety about the proliferation of publications in
'the information age' is paralleled by early modern scholars' reaction to the growing
number of books available due to print technology. Technological advances which
enabled the production of an ever increasing number of books required that scholars
adapt their ways of working in order to deal with the expanding amount of
information at their disposal through the development of a number of different
sorting methods and memory aids. In order to cope with the increasing number of
texts some early modern scholars advised the intensive reading of a select canon,
whereas Francis Bacon advised different kinds of reading for different kinds of
books:
Some books are to bee tasted, others to bee swallowed, and some few to bee chewed
and digested: That is, some bookes are to be read only in partes; others to be read, but
cursorily, and some few to be read wholly and with diligence and attention. ('Of
Studies,' Essays 251).
Instruction how to imitate other authors arms the poet with 'tooles and instrumentes'
claims Roger Ascham in The Scholemaster (1570) (48). But Ascham, like Bacon,
insists on the need to read as many texts as possible, and then follow, in every
separate kind of learning, 'ehoselic a few, and chieflie some one' (56). The styles and
matter of other authors are conceived of as mind tools that can be appropriated by
another as an aid to their own creation.
Like Sherman, Ann Blair and Daniel Rosenberg describe how glossing,
personal additions to indexes, abbreviations and symbols, literal cut and pasting, and
notetaking by paraphrasing or by commonplaces were used in order to organise the
ever increasing information available. The universal bibliography and book review
were also added in the sixteenth century to the thirteenth century creation of the
florilegium, encyclopaedic compilations, and alphabetical index (Rosenberg 1-10;
Blair 11-28). Thus, offloading information via visual and organizational modes
enabled readers to deal with the increasing cognitive load. Evidenced here is the
apparently recursive loop whereby early modern technological and organizational
122
measures developed in order to cope with the advances in technology which had
increased the number of texts available. Nevertheless, these technological advances
progressively served to extend the amount of information which minds and memories
could remember through offloading it in increasingly structured external systems.
Therefore it is in fact a spiralling system whereby cognitive roles are altered by
previous developments and this in turn entails further technological and cognitive
developments.
Commonplace-books, consisting of series of quotes ordered by readers under
headings, were particularly popular in the sixteenth century. These in effect were an
extension of the active type of reading practice described by Sherman, Blair and
Rosenberg, and likewise communicate early modern attitudes to conceptions of
language, mind and subjectivity. Ann Moss describes how through the influence of
Erasmus' De Copia commonplace-books had become part of humanist school
education, and were used by schoolboys and adults alike 'for making sense of the
books they read, for assimilating the written culture transmitted to them, and for
possessing the means of production in their turn' (421). Moss argues that
commonplace-books reflected a contemporary view in which the performance of
fragmentation was compatible with the structuring of thought and culture (430).
Multiplicity could be viewed in terms of a greater unity and extendibility, as the
commonplace-book reflects a belief in making a single body from many strands,
which contained further generative potentialities (431). Thus commonplace-books
operated as an external cognitive artefact for storing, evaluating and generating
information, and this example of early modern fragmentation did not necessarily
involve psychoanalytical or postmodern notions of lack and rupture, but could be
understood as a means of organising a vast array of wide-ranging and
counterbalanced units of information in a productive open ended system.
Moss translates a revealing image from Justus Lispius' Politico on the
effectiveneness of commonplace-books:
The spider's web [textus] is no whit the better because it spins it from its own entrails
[and remember that the spider is a dangerous species]; and my text no whit the worse
because, as does the bee, I gather its components from other authors' flowers, (qtd. in
Moss 424)
Lispius' comment recalls Clark's comparison of humans' biologically proper use of
language to spiders' use of a web ('Magic Words' 182). His further metaphor of the
bee which gathers honey from a multiplicity of flowers specifically describes the
socially distributed nature of production involved in his text. Moss describes this as a
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popular metaphor for commonplace-book production, but it was also used as a form
of flattery for writers in general (424). Francis Meres in Palladis Tamia (1598), itself
composed chiefly of translated classical quotations and exempla, lists Shakespeare as
one of the best contemporary English writers, describing that 'the sweete wittie soule
of Ouid hues in mellifluous and hony-tongued Shakespeare'(623). Meanwhile,
Francis Bacon criticizes the scholastics' lack of wider reading and dependence on
'the vnequall mirrour of their owne minds' (Advancement 25).
Indeed many influential early modern books such as Montaigne's Essays
similarly compile authorities' quotes under headings, then interfusing and developing
these along with their own views, and continuing to revise and add material even
after publication. Ben Jonson's Timber; Or Discoveries, also essentially a
commonplace book, expresses views through selective borrowing; Jonson describes
it as 'made upon men and matter: as they have flowed out of his daily readings; or
had their reflux to his peculiar notion of the times' (373). This captures a sense of the
reciprocity involved, of flux and reflux. It also forefigures Clark's metaphor of
mangrove forests: in the flux of existence, roots of perceptions and beliefs act as
trapping mechanisms creating a solid basis for further thinking about the subject and
the world. Commonplace books act as an early modern attempt to develop structures
that validate or interrogate the place of the human in the world by appropriating the
timber of textual matter and men as their basis.
Commonplace-books also stand in for memory, suggesting an easy fluidity
between biological and textual forms and between one individual's memory and
another's. Lipsius' Politico, in the translation by William Jones, describes history as
memory in print and applauds 'historie, which is no other thing, then the soule and
life ofmemory.. .For in her, as in a glasse, thou mayest, adorne and frame thy life by
the vertues of other men5 (14). History is described as superior to individual
experience since she safely 'extendeth her bounds further' (14). Again there is
evident a charting of contrasts and comparisons between individual and social, and
biological and textual means of production and forms ofmemory and mind. Rhodes
and Sawday comment that 'the seemingly limitless world of production, distribution,
and retrieval spawned by print technology' led to the emergence of a new model of
the human mind, and suggest the 'House of Alma' section in Spenser's Faerie
Queene as an example (9). 'The House of Alma' represents the body as a castle and
the head as a turret with three chief rooms that house the faculties of imagination,
judgement and memory. In this 'mind model' the old and frail Eumnestes (Gk.: good
memory) requires the aid of a young assistant Anamnestes (Gk.: reminder) as they
labour ceaselessly in their ramshackle library in which (2.9.58):
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.. .all was hangd about with rolles,
And old records from auncient times deriu'd,
Some made in books, some in long parchment scrolles,
That were all worme-eaten, and full of canker holes. (2.9.57)
Rhodes and Sawday, suggest that the perpetual activity of the librarians in the
dilapidated library, where records are Tost' or 'laid amiss', is an image of the
imperfect human mind (9); although it is perhaps worth adding that it is rather an
image of one faculty of the human mind, since there are in addition the imagination,
judgement and the unexplained 'diverse roomes and diverse stages' in the turret
(2.9.47). The textual was not only a means of describing the memory, but was also
understood as playing a supplementary cognitive role, whilst historical narratives of
the lives of other men were also understood to supplement individual experience.
A similar depiction of memory as a flawed component of fallen man's mind,
which again implies the memory's need for supplementation by cognitive artefacts,
is given in Thomas Tomkis' play Lingua. Anamnestes complains that his master
Memory, 'a Rawbond Skelton\ is every hour calling for him because he has 'growne
so old and forgetfull' (E3v). The leitmotif of 'the book of memory' actually dates
back to the Middle Ages as described in Curtius (328-47). Many examples are to be
found in Shakespeare, such as in 1Henry VI: 'I'll note you in my book ofmemory'
(2.4.101); with suggestions that the memory may be altered, in 2 Henry VI: 'Blotting
your name from books of memory' (1.1.96); or that it may not be altered by will
alone, as Hamlet unsuccessfully insists: 'Yea, from the table of my memory/ I'll
wipe away all trivial fond records,/ All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past,/
That youth and observation copied there' (1.5.98-101). Troublingly, as Montaigne
comments, you do not necessarily get to choose what remains and what leaks away:
For memory sets before us not what we choose, but what it pleases. Indeed there is
nothing that imprints a thing so vividly on our memory as the desire to forget it: a
good way to give our mind something to guard and to impress it on her, is to solicit
her to lose it. ('Apology' 443)
Again, the early modern insight into the quasi-independent functioning of aspects of
our own minds is apparent, along with a conception of the mind's flawed nature.
Recently Daniel Dennett described how humans attempt to assist memory by
means of technology:
We build elaborate systems of mnemonic association - pointers, labels, chutes and
ladders, hooks and chains. We refine our resources by incessant rehearsal and
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tinkering, turning our brains (and all the associated peripheral gear we acquire) into a
huge structured network of competences. (Kinds 201).
Mnemotechnics is an ancient discipline and the study of memory has long been
concerned with the potential effects of technology upon culture, subjects and
cognition. Renaissance humanism, as well as contributing to modern textual
scholarship and the development of printing, encouraged the adoption of mnemonic
techniques employed by classical rhetoric. The still standard reference book in this
area is Francis Yates' The Art ofMemory that revealed the way in which knowledge
is structured for and by the mnemonic arts used to store it. From Greek antiquity into
the early modern period, architectural spaces were associatively used to visualise
knowledge, by attaching a sequence of information to a sequence of places or
features within a building or memory theatre, so that you could then recall the
information by visualising the architecture (2-3). Memory systems operated
according to a special system of classification; Bacon describes them as a type of
'constitutive instance' that aids recall by ordering through the use of 'places' (New
142). The belief that the art ofmemory was a prerequisite for The Arte ofRhetorique
(1553) is confirmed, for example, by Thomas Wilson's inclusion of a long section on
the mnemonic arts: 'THey that wyll remember manye thynges and rehearse them
together out of hande: muste learne to haue places, and digest Images in them
accordingly' (114). Thus the memory arts could be simply a practical means of
supplementing the memory.
Yet Neoplatonists, and to a more extreme extent followers of Hermes
Trismegistus, believed memory systems operated analogically and offered the key to
all knowledge by means of uncovering the underlying connections of all things: the
infinite unity beyond all diversity (129-59). In Giordano Bruno's use of the memory
arts in the late sixteenth century, he was conscious of his intellectual debt to the tools
of the external world: 'we realize that we can complete no action of any kind
befitting our nature without certain shapes and figures conceived from sensible
objects through the external senses, then gathered and ordered internally' (qtd. in
Copenhaver and Schmitt 292). Evidently Bruno believed that human cognitive
capacities necessarily only reach their full natural potential through the
internalisation of external forms and models, as does Dennett. Ong in his review of
Yates emphasises that since the memory spaces are conceived as something the
individual is inside of or looking into 'the space and its contents are felt in one way
or another as an extension of oneself (257). This suggests that mnemotechnics make
use of the plasticity of concepts of mind and subjectivity, which enable humans to
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adopt external or internalised organisational structures to supplement biological
modes of organising information, ironically in order to enable us to fix and stabilise
the mind.
A reanalysis of memory arts is used by John Sutton to demonstrate the
applicability of EM to this period. He convincingly argues of such systems that:
'They are cognitive even though they are not, in a straightforwardly ancestral way,
natural and biological; and they are extended even though they are not literally
external' ('Spongy' 26). Evelyn Tribble in her paper on memorisation in the Globe
also demonstrates that methods of distributed cognition were used to train novices
and that plots (scenario instructions) acted like two dimensional maps to get actors
into the right places and so trigger the correct lines. Therefore Tribble argues that
there has previously been a misunderstanding of the playing system due to the view
ofmemorisation as individual rather than collaborative ('Distributing' 151).
Another paper by Tribble follows the transition from the sensory modalities
and mass-centred worship of Catholicism to Protestantism's emphasis on recall, and
sermon and book-centred worship. This called for the utilisation of cognitive artifacts
and scaffolding, which took the form of infirastructural changes, motivational
injunctions, and pedagogical methods. Preachers' insistence that external tables,
illustrations and doctrines should also be imprinted in the mind to act as memory aids,
Tribble argues, demonstrates that: 'Determining whether such tables are internal or
external cognitive artifacts is impossible; what this example shows is precisely the
permeability of such boundaries within a distributed model of cognition'('"To Ease')
The mnemonic work of the sermon was distributed between the preacher, who was to
use headings and subdivisions to ease recall, and his congregation, who in turn would
use these later to recreate the chain of reasoning ("'To Ease'). Yet, shared memory
technology is continuous rather than a new departure; it was already common in
medieval sermons. For example, this trope of the chain was in use as a medieval
border illustration of a manuscript, with the depiction of fish (symbolising
Christians) that form a chain drawn by memory hooks (Carruthers 332).
These three papers add further density to a picture of early modern memory
systems as potentially textually and socially extended. Mnemonic systems make
evident that what we often conceive of as the products of exclusively internal mental
processes, in fact take place through the use of cognitive tools. They demonstrate that
such cognitive tools are not necessarily wholly external, but may also be a form of
stored knowledge or a method of storing that is internalised. Lastly, the external and
internal, or the natural and artificial, are shown at times to be so mutually interwoven
as to be indistinguishable from each other.
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Thus, the printing press, increasing literacy and the spread of cheaper texts led
to new models of the subject, the mind and the memory, and changed the way in
which subjects thought, acted and interacted, though literate culture was built on an
underlay, and interwoven with, aural-oral traditions. Notions of language were
interrelated to notions of the body and to the corporeal experience of different forms
of language. Early modern concern with information overload and deficiency of
memory are countered by more positive accounts of textual artefacts as
supplementary cognitive resources. Whilst other texts in comparing cognitive
artefacts do not necessarily make an issue of their biological, technological,
individual or social form, but are mainly concerned with their relative advantages for
human minds and subjects.
Text, tongue and hand
The generall end therefore of all the booke is to fashion a gentleman or noble person
in virtuous and gentle discipline. (15)
Spenser in this letter expounding the intention of The Faerie Queene 'to fashion a
gentleman' makes apparent early modern belief in the power of the book to shape a
person. This section focuses on language's power to shape the subject, and also
examines anxieties associated with language technologies. Rhetoric was believed to
assist, enhance and extend the capacities of the mind. However, concerns about
rupture between the tongue and the heart, the said and the felt, contributed to
contemporary interest in gestures as a reference guide to the mind and the man who
used them. Language was perceived as fundamentally human. On the one hand, this
led to depictions of it as an essential supplementary resource, or even as a new
perceptual modality, a sixth sense. On the other hand, concerns about being human
were projected onto forms of language, and this section begins with a brief
consideration of the continuity evident in concerns about new technologies.
Concerns about linguistic technologies can be traced back to Plato's Phaedrus,
in which Socrates tells an allegorical story about the relation of the written to the
spoken word. The Egyptian inventor Theuth offers to king Thamus the invention of
writing, which he claims will improve both intelligence and memory (274e). Thamus
responds that writing has a number of pernicious flaws: it will cause forgetfulness as
users rely on external signs instead of internal resources; it will only be able to store
what is known not to transmit learning authoritatively; it will be passed on to
unsuitable recipients; it will be incapable of defending itself as it requires its 'parent'
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to do so (the writing-as-child topos); and it is sterile and does not have the productive
capacities of dialectic (275a-277a). The existence of similar early modern concerns
about books to those voiced by Plato about writing is evident in Francis Bacon's
attempts to dismiss them. For example, Bacon argues that criticism of commonplace
books as causing lack of retentiveness and sloth of memory is misplaced, as their
partialness allows a concentrated transmission of ideas (Advancement 119). Derrida
in his consideration of Plato's allegory, comments that its concept of writing as a
Pharmakon, meaning 'poison' and 'cure', could suggest that writing is both a threat
to the spoken word and a beneficial means to transmit it {Dissemination 75).
Ambiguity in the early modern period to perception of printed texts also employed
this double conception of textual matter as poison and cure, even in terms of their
practical distribution. George Wither in his comparison of good and bad stationers'
shops, compares them to apothecaries, and places much of the responsibility in their
hands for delivery of the 'drug' to only the appropriate partakers:
And, seeing the State intrusteth him with the disposing of those Bookes, which may
both profitt & hurt, as they are applyed, (like a discreet Apothecary in selling
poysnous druggs) he obserues by whom, & to what purpose, such bookes are likely to
be bought vp, before he will deliuer them out of his hands. {Schollers 117)
Wither employs the notion that books' pharmaceutical-type application can advance
or endanger the state's interests, with books' potent ambi-valence requiring that
stationers oversee their distribution. Such wariness over the distribution of textual
knowledge highlights early modern recognition of its powerful shaping of the mind
and man.
Greenblatt persuasively argues that the use by Protestants of the Bible, which
led to the shifting of authority from the church to the book, also carried over to belief
in secular texts' ability to carry out 'a coup in the very heart of the individual' {Self-
Fashioning 119-20). Greenblatt conceives of such fashioning relations as involving
'identity as achieved at the intersection of an absolute authority and a demonic
Other' (76). Anxiety about texts' bypassing the safeguard of transmission via a
guiding authority is certainly evident. Monitoring of texts and discourse through
other means than stationers was in place, particularly through religious, political and
literary censorship with stringent punishments, including imprisonment,
dismemberment and execution. Ironically, the allegorical description of a slanderous
poet whose tongue was nailed to a post in The Faerie Queen, symbolized a fate that
threatened Spenser himself later for having insulted James VI's Catholic mother, by
presenting her thinly veiled as the heretic Duessa (hypocrite) in this same epic poem
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(5.9.25). Thus, the early modern state was concerned with safeguarding against the
potent dangers of mind- and subject-shaping texts.
Ambivalence about printing can be allied to a continuing ambivalence about
speech in the early modern period, and even about thoughts composed of language.
In the Christian schema Jesus and the Bible as the living and written word of God
and man as God's image is juxtaposed by the Tower of Babel and the Fall. Arguably,
this paradigm ofWestern thought remains the same without God in the equation: the
formativity and potency of language is contrasted with its lacks and impotency, for
example, in the Lacanian concept of language discussed in Chapter 2. These are
diverse flowerings of continuing shoots of thought, once evident in classical,
medieval and early modern views now present in modern manifestations. The
supposed flaws of technologies were seen, when taken back to the root, as a result of
our own human 'flaw'; yet conversely human superiority was also held to be
achieved and made evident by these same technologies. Chapter 3 explored evidence
of ambivalence concerning human dignity and wretchedness in relation to
psychophysiology, and this is also evident in attitudes to language, as the following
description by Donne demonstrates:
Yea words which are our subtillest and delicatest outward creatures, being composed
of thoughts and breath, are so muddie, so thick, that our thoughts themselves are so,
because (except at the first rising) they are ever leavened with passions and affections
{Letters 110)
Words and cognition whilst judged as high up the epistemological scale due to their
relative immateriality are nevertheless troublingly embodied. Colin Burrow
imaginatively describes the above quote from Donne as suggesting that, 'Thought
was for him a bubble of spirit which almost instantly lost itself in a mire of flesh' (5).
Donne's view of cognition metamorphosed into language sees it as a momentary
original distinction that is muddied, with the literally inspirational suffocatingly
impaired by human psychophysiology.
However, a variety of models existed on this theme. Early modern
understanding of the nature of language can be considered in terms of a form of
extended subjectivity or extended cognition; it need not involve Greenblatt's concept
of 'identity as achieved at the intersection of an absolute authority and a demonic
Other' {Self-Fashioning 76). For example, as in The New Organon, Bacon argues in
the Advancement of Learning that humans need tools to aid their cognition. The
cause for the limitedness and uncertainty of human knowledge is not just attributable
to the senses, but generally to the intellectual powers' weakness (111). Bacon states
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that he explains this to stir us up to seek help from tools, giving the illustration that
'no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect
circle by steadinesse of hand, which may bee easily done by helpe of a Ruler or
Compasse' (111). Although words can also cause error because they only reflect the
current notions of things, holding only contingent truths, Bacon argues that words are
necessary tools, which enable us to recover knowledge, and that writing, as a
supplement to memory, enables the retaining of knowledge (110-11; 119). Thus, in
Bacon's account, language is a fundamental mind tool that supplements human's
biological cognitive processes.
The notion of language as constitutive of humanity through both its
supplementary relation to and complementary disparity from human biological
processes is a theme taken up in early modern accounts of rhetoric. In the preface to
The Arte ofRhetorique (1553), Thomas Wilson describes that after the Fall, along
with the corruption of the flesh, man's reason and purpose was lost and he became
bestial and disordered: 'Longe it was ere that man knewe himselfe, beinge destitute
of Gods grace, so that al thinges waxed sauage, the earth vntilled, societye neglected,
Goddes will not knowen, man againste manne, one agaynste another, and all
agaynste order' (sig. A3r). But God's gift of speech restored man's humanity and
brought civilization, social fellowship and technological skills. Thus 'ofwilde, sober:
of cruel, gentle: of foles, wise: and of beastes, men. Suche force hath the tongue, and
such is the power of eloquence and reason' (sig. A3v). Although men are in many
things weak by nature they surpass all other creatures due to their having speech and
reason; thus Wilson allies these two aspects as unique to man and as what enables
man's superiority (sig. A3v). In the first book, Wilson goes on to remark that rhetoric
is an artificial skill (that is, made by art) which delights, teaches and persuades
human's heavy wits and flesh overwhelmed by humours, and which are
consequentially especially in need of such delight (sig. alr-a2v). Thus, Wilson
argues for language as a supplement that in effect enables our fundamental humanity,
and rhetoric as a complementary and elevating cognitive artefact.
George Puttenham's The Arte of English Poesie (1589) similarly argues that
language and poets brought human civilization; however his account is more
nuanced, and even seemingly paradoxical in places (3-7). As he negotiates the place
of the art of rhetoric in relation to the world and man his concern moves between,
and combines, aesthetics and ethics. Figures can involve an abuse of speech through
their doubleness, yet Puttenham distinguishes between a poet who is a dissembling
courtier and an honest one who instead uses art to aid nature (250-53). The art of
rhetoric is diversely described as a surmounter and alterer of nature, a bare imitator
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of it, and as contrary to nature. Also, although language is only a little less natural
than sensory acts, whilst the senses capabilities are naturally enabled, language
requires exercise and iteration; hence there is implied the need for rhetorical guides,
such as his own (253-155). The arts can relieve the natural as does the spectacle the
eye; it is a prosthetic to the understanding. This is another example of understanding
rhetoric as a cognitive tool, with a visual parallel, to which it is compared and from
which it is distinguished (256). He stakes out a place for the 'maker or poet' who 'is
to play many parts', he is like the craftsman, carpenter and painter, but with the
addition of inventiveness and imagination, is most like 'the cunning gardiner that
vsing nature as a coadiutor, furders her conclusions' and 'many times makes her to
effectes more absolute and straunge'(257). A mixture of diverse views then is voiced
by writers in relation to language: involving notions of physiological involvement; as
enabling human social and technological redemption; both supplementing and
complementing human nature; and as a prosthetic enhancement of human cognitive
abilities.
Language is also described as that which allows the mind to be mediated. Mark
Robson points out the anti-platonic impulse of much rhetorical thought, which moves
from idea to physical manifestation: 'movement from mind to mind demands a
mediating force' that to work 'must take on material perceptible form' (33). This is
captured, as Robson comments, in Jonson's description of language as a mirror of the
mind and subject:
Language most shows a man: speak that I may see thee. It springs out of the most
retired, and inmost parts of us, and is the image of the parent of it, the mind. No glass
renders a man's form, or likeness, so true as his speech. (Timber 435)
Implied here is the paradox that language makes the mind visible by acting as a
transparent glass through which to see the mind, and moreover, that language is an
image of the mind, the closeness of its relation to the mind being compared with
one's image in a mirror and one's biological offspring; the latter of which figurally
used implies a stronger resemblance than our notion of 'likeness' today - as with
corporeal 'metaphors'. Essentially it implies language is an extension of the mind, in
a similar way that Crooke describes a child as an extension of his parent (200); this is
discussed further in the next section.
Consequent negative views towards those unable to speak are explored in
Jonathan Ree's philosophical history of deafness I See a Voice. Ree describes the
plight of the deaf from the sixteenth century on, who were often perceived as
unreasonable and even subhuman due to their inability to speak. Conversely,
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although sign language had not yet been invented, the use of gestures for
communication was seen as overcoming the curse of Babel, as is claimed in a
prefatory poem in John Bulwer's Chirologia: 'Chirologie redeemes from Babels
doome, And is the universall Idiome' (sig. a2v; see also sig. B4r). Another prefatory
poem comments on the commonplace of hypocritical division between heart and
tongue (feelings and words) finding instead in gesture 'the truest copie of the Minde'
(sig. alv). Various of these poems remark that in setting out the science of gesture,
Bulwer is following Bacon who had pointed out that gestures and picture are also
used for communication, with the only necessity being that the medium used 'is
capable of sufficient differences' (sigs. a2v-a4v; Advancement 120). One of the other
poems dedicated to Bulwer combines various conceits into a description (odd to
modern 'ears') of the book as a hand which 'speakes/ Fresh from the Presses wombe'
(sig. a4r). Bulwer claims the gesturing hand expresses 'the silent agitations of the
minde', 'presents the signifyingfaculties of the soule' and is 'another Tongue, which
we may justly call the Spokesman of the Body' (sig. Blr- Blv). More than this, its
competency to express the motives and affections of the mind makes it 'a ready
Midwife' which 'takes oftentimes the thoughts from the forestalled Tongue' so that
'our conceptions are display'd and utter'd in the very moment of a thought' (sig.
B2v). Evident here is the notion of gestures as involved in transparently
communicating thoughts and as a more reliable and immediate agent than speech;
with the notion of it acting as midwife suggesting the intimacy of its relation to the
delivery and distribution of thought. Gesture is seen as especially in tune with the
emotional and appetitive functions, and as representative of bodily agencies. Whilst
this does not go as far as modern claims by McNeill and Meadows as to gesture's
cognitive role of gesture, this is an early instance of an awareness of it as a operating
alongside speech, and providing a further means of reading the mind of the gesturing
human being.
Another of the dedicatory poems in Bulwer suggests that the hand's speech has
more of a right to be called a sense than 'Lingua' (language or literally the tongue)
who 'did in vain pretend' (sig. a2r). This is very likely a reference to the ideas
pursued in Tomkis' play Lingua, which is set inside the representational domain of
man-as-microcosm, with the acted play literally bodying forth the human faculties.
Lingua appears personified as a stereotypical unruly woman on stage, 'Lady Tongue',
is self-evidently not praise. As Benedict disparagingly says of the forthright Beatrice
in Much Ado About Nothing: 'I cannot endure my Lady Tongue' (2.1.239). Paster
comments that as with the perceived excessive production ofbodily fluids by women,
their verbal fluency was also marked as lacking in self-control (Body 25). Lingua
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prefigures psychoanalytic and postmodern accounts making evident concerns about
the fragmentation and multiplicity of the processes operating in the subject. The
play's delivery is ironically itself mediated by language, and whilst Lingua is
explicitly the disruptive force, the enactment of discord between the other faculties
reveals that conflicting perspectives are endemic in man-as-microcosm. Lingua's
complaint that Common Sense is led astray by the senses' misinformation, is also
indicative of a more general mistrust in the human senses: 'Hee beares the rule, hee's
iudge but iudgeth still,/ As hee's informed by your false euidence' (A3v). Tomkis'
play relates not only to attitudes to the tongue as a body member, but also reflects
general attitudes to speech and subjectivity.
Also apparent in Lingua are the displacement of phallic associations onto the
tongue and an anxiety about symbolic representations later expressed in Lacanian
accounts. Carla Mazzio explains that the tongue was seen as threatening bodily
integrity through its movement in and out of the body, and through its extending of
the linguistic and material boundaries of the subject (53-57) Concerns over its self-
willed nature (as with the penis) carried over to its figural personifications as an
unruly member, which is made symbolic of the chaos of sentience and signification
in man (59, 68-9). Mazzio also suggests that the fashionable wearing of hoods and
jewellery shaped like tongues and the interpretation of types of lettering as literally
representing tongue shapes represent an 'aggressive orality' in response to the
unsettling 'movement of representation away from the body' (69-70). The midwife
Jane Sharp later innovatively combined resistance to language's phallic associations
with an insistence on the physiological origins of textuality, as Caroline Bicks
comments, through her assertion of the resemblance between a woman's orifice and
a Greek letter Theta, as if it were based on it, and so reversing the authority ofwords
over things, and men over women's bodies (Bicks 21).
Carpenter in '"My Lady Tongue'" traces a privileging of speech back to the
medieval memory artist, Ramon Lull, who saw speech as crucial, because it shared
concepts between faculties, such as the imagination and memory, and between
humans (5). This concept of fracturing and interconnecting both within and between
subjects, demonstrates a fluidity of boundaries both intrasubjectively and
intersubjectively, that is comparable to extended mind conceptions of subjectivity.
Speech as a god-given social tool operative within the world of the subject is asserted
by Lingua to the queen Psyche:
Her Citties would dissolue, traffique would decay, friendshippes be broken, were not
my speech the knot, Mercury, and Mastique, to binde, defende, and glewe them
together (sig. F3r)
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In the sixteenth century ambivalence towards language is described by Carpenter as
being fuelled by humanists' assertion of the primacy of the spoken word in daily life
combined with a continuing focus on language's limits. In Lingua there is tellingly
no resolution offered to traditional debates, as it plays with 'the conflicting notions of
language that it tosses about for the pleasure of its audience' (Carpenter 12).
Furthermore, Lingua theatricalises Clark's later proposal that language is akin
to the human race having learned a new perceptual modality, since the central
conceit of the play is speech demanding recognition as one of the five, or rather six,
senses. That speech could be considered equivalent to a sixth sense, indicates early
modern realisation of the profound extent to which language is fundamentally part of
the human make up. Albeit that Lingua is awarded recognition only as a feminine
sense, as Common Sense announces:
...all women for your sake shall have six Senses, that is seeing, hearing, tasting,
smelling, touching, and the last and feminine sense, the sense of speaking, (sig. I4r)
Whether it is as a corrective supplement to the other senses, or else of speech as
continuing or exacerbating the other senses' flaws, there is a complex awareness of
the fundamental humanness of language in both its lacks and in its formativity. In a
more wary way than in extended mind ideas then, spoken language is depicted here
as an extension of human cognition and subjectivity.
Early modern ambivalence about language was symptomatic of ambivalence
about human nature, with the projection of anxieties, as well as praise, onto humans'
most fundamental mind tool. Language was understood as occurring within an
embodied being, and in some accounts it appears dominated by this embodiment. Yet
interest in gesture as a communicative medium asserts its embodied nature as proof
of its unaffected sincerity. Meanwhile rhetorical works argue that language both
supplements and complements biological capacities and thereby dramatically forms
human nature. Finally, the play Lingua encapsulates the early modern understanding
of language, incorporating both prefigurings ofpsychoanalytical concerns, as well as
EM notions of language as a new perceptual modality.
Character and Conception forms
Nature hath given us certain Elements, and all Bodies are compos'd of them; and Art
hath given us a certain Alphabet of Letters, and all words are composed of them
(Donne, Sermons 9: 173)
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In Donne's sermon a parallel is drawn between nature's composition ofman from the
elements and man's artful composition of words from letters. This section explores
the use of perceptions of language to construct representations of the human subject
and mind, and vice versa. Gallagher and Greenblatt explain that the 'linguistic turn in
the social sciences and humanistic disciplines' has heightened the appeal of
'conceiving of cultures as texts' (8). This linguistic turn also contributed to the
postmodern concepts of the self as a text; Dennett comments on his surprise at
discovering that his idea of 'the self as a construct of narrative already existed in
deconstructionist accounts of literary theory (Consciousness 410-11). As discussed
earlier Dennett and Clark, and Lacan and Butler, all in various ways describe the
narrative construction of'the self. Unlike the psychoanalytic accounts, but similar to
Clark, early modern notions draw on a system in which literary constructs of people
are often viewed as a continuation of, as well as a disjunction to, their physiological
materiality. This section will explore a few early modern instances of the paradigms
of the self and of the mind as text, focusing first of all on the genre of Character
Writings, then considering the collaborative nature of the conception and delivery of
plays, and finally exploring a wider range of literary textual evidence, which express
the idea of self and of the mind as texts.
Character Writings were fashionable and witty collections of short essays on
places, people and trades. They were purportedly intended to reform character by the
study of examples, often of superlative ideal or admonitory characters, in an ethical
tradition that links back to the Greek philosopher Theophrastus' Characters.
Character writings of types of people tend to be generalised depictions, stereotypes
that nevertheless would have affected how people perceived and imagined others and
themselves. These writings participate in the concept of people as having been
imprinted with a character and therefore tend to explicitly applaud inwardness and a
disengaged model of subjectivity:
He is a Happy Man that hath learned to read himself, more than all books, and hath so
taken out this lesson that he can never forget it; that knows the world and cares not for
it. (Hall, Characters 119)
In this self-refexive construction, the happy man is divided into two positions, a book
and a reader of it. Although the world is to be dismissed it must also be known. A
feminine example praised for inwardness by Thomas Overbury, describes 'A Good
Woman' as: 'She is much within, and frames outward things to her mind, not her
mind to them' (32). Again tacitly acknowledged is the importance of the external, as
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well as its potential to structure our minds. Striving to be independent from the world
is in part a symptom of the extent to which it was understood to affect character; the
fundamental role of the humours, passions, spirits, elements and souls in forming the
disposition necessarily destabilize the line wishfully drawn between inward and
outwardness.
Overbury in his collection, Characters, defines 'character' as being of an
'infinitive mood', suggesting it is a primary form that can be declined. He states that
a character is like a letter (as A, B) that leaves a strong seal on our memories and that
it is 'to engrave'. It is also described as signifying an Egyptian hieroglyph, as it is an
emblem containing much in little; a variously coloured picture heightened by one
shadowing; and a musical close ofmany strings (94). Overbury's examples ofwhat a
character is suggest that humans have an underlying disposition that can be variously
expressed according to other factors. This was not incompatible with humoural views
since the humours were thought not only to affect the character through later external
influences, but to have already contributed to dispositional formation through the
character's sex, parents, and native land. Therefore, the idea that a subject is in some
way predisposed or has a particular tendency of character, does not contradict early
modern notions of the subject as humoural, plastic and extended. Character traits are
also variously associated with external factors, such as appearance, behaviour, place,
occupation, or habit. So, for example, a tinker's character is described as being
formed by his constant travels: 'A Tinker is a movable, for he hath no abiding place;
by his motion he gathers heat, thence his choleric nature' (54).
There are many early modern examples of the phenomenon of book-people.
John Earle's shopkeeper in Mierocosmography gives away his unwanted words with
his unneeded wares and is the abstract personification of his shop: 'His shop is his
well stuft book, and himself the title-page of it, or index' (182). This suggests
continuity between what he does and what he is. In Johnson's Cynthia's Revels, the
patched-up Amorphus is another transparent self-publicist:
He that is with him, is AMORPHVS, a trauailer, one so made out of the mixture and
shreds of formes, that himselfe is truly deform d... hee is the very mint of complement,
all his behauiours are printed, his face is another volume of essayes... (2.3.85-90)
This description is echoed in Joseph Hall's description 'Of the Vainglorious' in his
Characters of Virtues and Vices:
All his humour rises up into the froth of ostentation, which if it once settle fall down
into a narrow room. If the excess be in the understanding part, all his wit is in print;
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the press hath left his head empty, yea, not only what he had, but what he could
borrow without leave. (134)
These examples demonstrate a distrust of the kind of assertive bombast and
demonstrativeness that are sometimes seen to be encouraged by twentieth and
twenty-first century western individualism. Although both 'good' and 'bad' types of
people are described as being characters and as being like letters that can be read by
themselves, the easy-to-read and overtly expressive are described as vacuous and
loud-mouthed .
A wider conception of humans as literary creations underlies this whole genre.
Apart from demonstrating wariness about display in people's behaviour and in the
appropriating of others' ideas, the use of this comparison of humans with books
locks into an equal wariness about self-display in print and of writers' borrowing of
ideas. A critic 'converses much in fragments', his phrases are 'a miscellany of old
words', and he 'makes books sell dearer, whilst he swells them into folios with his
comments' (Earle 184-85). Urbanisation, social mobility and courtlife resulted in
subjects being propelled into new situations with different rankings, with theatrical
witticisms a means of making an impression in the competitive world of the upper-
classes; accordingly Thomas Dekker sardonically advises the intellectually vacant
new courtier when at the playhouse to 'hoord vp the finest play-scraps you can get,
vppon which your leane wit may most sauourly feede for want of other stuffe' (Guls
30). The early modem cosmological system tends to make use of functional
analogies, and Dekker draws on the parallels between physical and cognitive
incorporation. Dekker invokes other figures, such as Bacchus: 'Fatten thou my
braines that I may feede others' and his reader is advised to 'haue most deuouring
stomaches' and need only 'boyle my Instructions in his brainepan' (Guls 4, 3-4).
Linguistic borrowing and rhetorical imitation formed a topic of playful debate in
early modem discourses: with those who were supportive of its prosthetic benefits
countered by a mocking of the artifice of literary borrowers. Donald Lupton,
although an attender of plays for pleasure (83), comments that early modern
playwrights habitually borrow plots, characters and rhetorical styles from the
ancients or contemporaries, and accuses them of vain and cunning deceitfiilness:
'They are as crafty with an old play, as Bauds with olde faces; the one puts on a new
fresh colour, the other a new face and Name' (79-80). This depiction of a play
personified, also again demonstrates the perceived humanness of language or of texts.
The fluidity around issues of authorship relate to the traditionally less textually
fixed genre of playwriting. Shakespeare (and his co-authors) are shown, in particular
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by Geoffrey Bullough's three volumes on the multiple diverse sources drawn on in
Shakespeare's works, to have participated in the considerable creativity involved in
this practice of borrowing and imitating. Jeffrey Masten has written of the numerous
types of collaboration involved in Renaissance theatrical production: over half of the
plays produced included the writing of more than one man; there were frequent
revisions ofplay texts over time; and as working documents they underwent revision,
cutting, rearranging and augmenting by book-holders, copyists, and other writers,
were elaborated and improvised by actors, and music and songs were often latterly
attached (14). Masten also adds to this the capitalist collaboration of shareholders in
the enterprise, and the participation of the paying and applauding audience to which
Renaissance dramatic texts often appeal: 'Do but you hold out/ Your helping hands'
(14-15; TNK 'Prologue' 25-26). Plays are 'a communication between actors and
audience' Masten suggests (16); indeed, these flattering appeals to the audience
imply a form of distributed creativity as bringing the play into being. Furthermore,
Henry V famously calls on the need that the audience apply their minds to that set
before them if the play is to succeed: 'Piece out our imperfections with your
thoughts...For 'tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings' (1.1.23, 1.1.28).
Plays stage an early modern understanding of various forms of the extended mind
and subject in their very creation, production and performance.
Yet, the collaborative norm did not mean that there was not the possibility of a
writer being accused of being an intellectual thief: Shakespeare was famously
accused by Robert Greene of being 'an vpstart Crow, beautified with our feathers'
(sig. Flv). 'Plagiary', only appears in lexicographical books from the 1650s on, but
again reflects a transferability between concepts used for people and for texts, as it is
defined by Edward Phillips as 'he that steals people out of one Countrey, and sells
them into another; also a stealer of other mens works, or writings'. Diachronic forms
of collaborative thinking occur over century long time spans, and the Renaissance is
renowned for the birth of new ideas that arose from attempts to syncretise Christian,
Islamic, Jewish, medieval, and classical texts. Joseph Flail in the 'Premonition' of his
Characters of Vices and Virtues presents the argument for using the scaffolding of
antiquity, both to build on their subject matter and for old styles to be wrought anew
(103-4). This access to collective wisdom is listed by Clark, as one of the
fundamental ways in which language has a fundamental effect on human
consciousness; every generation is indebted to and shaped by the inheritance of
complex structures of knowledge ('Magic' 171-2).
The notion of book-people was also connected with the close relationship in
early modern thinking between being physically and mentally 'pregnant' or
139
'conceiving' and then producing biological or cognitive offspring. In Troilus and
Cressida Ulysses appeals to Nestor: 'I have a young/ Conception in my brain; be you
my time/ To bring it to some shape' (Tro. 1.3.307-309). The idea of bringing the
conception 'to some shape' echoes early modern language used to describe the
transition of the foetus from matter to form, which Gowing describes as occurring
around the first trimester stage when the child became 'quick' (121). It also suggests
a notion of intersubjective cognitive intercourse as operative in producing thoughts.
A later example in the play presents the quasi-independent status and potential
unruliness of the cognitive offspring: 'My thoughts were like unbridled children,
grown/ Too headstrong for their mother' (3.2.111-2). Gordon Williams' glossary of
sexual terms notes a number of ambiguous examples of'conception' and 'conceive'
whilst Maus spends a chapter discussing numerous types of comparisons between
women's bodies and the creative imagination (78; 182-209). That the mind may be
impregnated like a mother's womb was physiologically naturalized by accounts
reporting the similarity between the matter protecting the womb and the brain. In
Joannes de Vigo's 1543 medical dictionary the 'Pericranium' is described Tyke the
skynne wherwith a chylde is wrapped, in the moothers woumbe'. Yet, the conceit
could also work the other way: a popular jest book describes the tale of a woman
who has failed to conceive. At first unable to say the reason out of modesty she
attempts to write it down, but it is observed she is unable to do so because there is
'no Ink in her Pen', to which she responds they have found out the reason without
her needing to write it; hence, the cause is her impotent husband figured by the
inkless pen (J.S. 69-70). Thus, the figuring of brain as womb and of producing
thoughts or writing as cognitively equivalent to producing a child infiltrated diverse
spheres' modes ofunderstanding these activities.
A related conceit employed in authorial prefaces, letters, or other references to
works was to describe the text in terms of a physical conception and child. Echoing
the earlier discussion here on collaboration, Beaumont in a 'Dedicatory Epistle' to
The Knight of the Burning Pestle stretches the conceit to include both his own role
and the theatrical production of his work. He describes the 'unfortunate child' as
being too hastily 'begot and bom' by the company, resulting in its initial rejection by
the audience, despite its mark of irony 'which showed it was no offspring of any
vulgar brain' (51). Montaigne in his essay 'Of the affection of fathers' refers to both
books and children as 'our other self and regards the mental offspring as superior:
'For what we engender by the soul, the children of our mind, of our heart and ability
are produced by a nobler part than the body and are more our own' (353).
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In a later essay, Montaigne not only suggests that the books he produces are an
extension of himself and an extension of his mind; there is a two-way movement,
back and forth, between that construction of the book by him and his construction by
the book:
In modelling this figure upon myself, I have had to fashion and compose myself so
often to bring myself out that the model itself has to some extent grown firm and taken
shape...I have no more made my book than my book has made me - a book
consubstantial with its author, concerned with my own self, an integral part of my
life... ('OfGiving' 612)
Donne employs a slightly less explicit two-way production occurring between the
author and his book in his dedicatory epistle to Devotions. He describes himself as
having had three births: his natural birth into the world, his supernatural birth into the
ministry, and finally his preternatural birth in recovering from sickness and re¬
entering this life. This last birth he describes as also having made him a father as
from it his book is produced at the same time as it produces him: 'In this last Birth, /
my selfe am borne a Father: This Child ofmine, this Booke, comes into the world,
from mee, and with mee' (3). Thus, in both these examples from Montaigne and
Donne, the mind through being objectified for itself on the written page produces the
subject which in turn produces the book; demonstrating that through the use of
objects as part of our mind we not only may extend our mind onto the space of the
page, but also extend the capacity of our mind to build thoughts upon thoughts that
lead to the higher reasoning faculties, which in turn improves the book, and so on
and on in spiralling developmental cycles through the aid of these cognitive artefacts.
That the mind or subject may be encapsulated by a textual distillation and further that
this distillation of the mind will in turn teach the mind that created it, creates a
circularity of created and creation between the object and the subject which places
their duality in question, as it is suggested that objects create subjects as much as
they are created. To replay the opening quote from Clark: '... this intellectual
product owes a lot to those repeated loops out into the environment' (Mindware 142).
Following Clanchy and forefiguring Clark, the social anthropologist, Jack
Goody in the late 1980s described how: 'When a map or book intervene between the
object and subject, we are dealing with 'mind' out there as well as with mind inside'
(255). The early modern period shows clear evidence of participating in the notion of
the subject and the mind as extendable beyond the head and body boundaries. This
concept included not only the fashioning of the subject or the mind through
interaction with one's own text; a text was also valued for its potential ability to
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generate mental offspring through others, as implied by Beaumont. Ficino beautifully
describes this collaborative cognition in the introduction to his own work on the
nature of the mind:
...by means of mind, we shall ourselves have the power of creating mind...I may
perhaps have created, in a night's work, a mind of this kind, by means of mind; and
this mind I would now introduce among you in order that you yourselves...may at
some time bring forth an offspring... (194)
Mind produces mind in succession; whilst this appears more a case of the
reproducing rather the extended mind, it needs to be considered in light of early
modern views of reproduction as an extension of the individual (itself a reflection of
the perpetuity of the soul) as Crooke says: 'For so euery indiuiduum extending it
selfe as it were, in the procreation of another like vnto it selfe' (200). Again the
reciprocal flows between individual and social, and between textual and biological
cognitive artefacts are celebrated. The fertile and multiply realizable early modern
extended mind operates over biological, individual, social and textual domains.
The character writings discussed suggested the types of comparisons made in
representations of book-people from which emerge a number of themes connected
with early modern textuality's relation to subjectivity and cognition. The idea of
book-people or 'characters' play on the extent to which the printed word is involved
in our make up. The borrowed or outlandish wisdom of many of those described as
book-like, represents wariness about self-display and loquacity, and this reflects a
more general wariness about human literary collaboration and publication.
Nevertheless this is also connected with more positive notions of textual and
theatrical production as fertile extensions of the human mind and subject.
Conclusions
This chapter has argued that diverse views existed of the potential relation of
gestural, spoken, written and printed language to human cognition and subjectivity.
Positive, negative and ambivalent beliefs about language as a special human
cognitive tool circulated through the period. These beliefs were concerned with how
forms of language shape knowledge of oneself and the world, and enable
communication within and without the subject. The particular mix of mnemonic and
linguistic technologies available in the early modern period, reflect and assist in
understanding the particular beliefs circulating at that time, whilst over a wider
chronological panorama there is evidence that ambivalences about language reflect
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longer term structures that relate to our experience and our interpretations of being
human. Twenty-first century anxieties about memory and language are evident in
(and long before) the early modern period.
Applying EM to early modern practices can open up a new understanding of
them: certain theories of language in the early modern period emphasise that whilst
language can operate through various different, and more or less natural mediums, it
is necessary for human subjectivity; yet simultaneously circulating is the notion that
forms of language function like, and therefore should be treated as, cognitive
processes. Memory theatres are included in this first type and suggest early modern
recognition of the importance of distinctions between mind tools, whilst discussions
of the relative benefits of cognitive resources often place importance not so much on
the particular forms as on the functional advantages. The overall implication is that
there exist long-standing continuities in terms of the use of cognitive tools, although
perceptions of cognition and subjectivity can also be related to particular
sociocultural environments and the available cognitive tools, such as gestural,
pictorial, spoken, written, printed or digital languages, or the particular mix of these
media, which are operative in them. Moreover, concepts of the text as in itself mind
and as creative of the mind and the subject make clear the resonance of EM with
early modern beliefs; the use of language involves a two-way relationship between
the shaper ofwords and the words' shaping of the shaper. The extension of the mind
through language is an easier imaginative leap for the early modern thinker used to
notions of parallels between biological and mental conception and offspring, and the
eternity of the soul reflected in the perpetual shape-shifting ofmaterial forms, than it
has perhaps become for us today.
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Early Modern Intrasubjectivity and Intersubjectivity
This chapter begins by exploring the notion that a subject was composed ofmultiple
agencies, and the consequent uncanniness of the self as well as the world. This is
followed by an exploration of various forms of sharing of agency or identity between
multiple subjects, through love, friendship, service and nationhood. There is evident
both the need of and a tension about the extent to which our cognitive processes
involve other subjects, just as there is a tension about the extent to which multiple
agents operate internally in our cognitive processes. Writers suggest the delicate
balance that is required between internal self-reflection and external social
interaction. The next brief section discusses various modern critical models of early
modern subjectivity, in order to consider their relation to the position taken in this
thesis, and to succinctly evoke an image of the early modern subject which appears
through this perspective. In the following section there is discussion of a number of
issues concerning the early modern subject, including: the practice of inferring
mental states from behaviour, body and clothes; theatre's arousing fascination with
and anxieties about the composite nature of the subject; the diversity of perception
and phenomenological experience; and phenomenological experience as occurring in
a multiple and extended subject. Finally the last section considers the nature of the
mirror, as a technological instrument and literary conceit for exploring and
explaining subjectivity and cognition. Mirroring by a tool or another subject became
understood in terms of one another. Extended subjectivity and reflexivity, was part of
a continuing literary tradition and of a human mode of operation, that the mirror was
understood in relation to and that the mirror-motifwas used to represent. The mirror
crystallises many of the issues raised by these chapters through its relation to early
modern models ofperception, the mind and the subject.
One in Many and Many in One
.. .the whole human race can be compared to one whole single man. But in one human
individual there are multiple and divers members' (Pomponazzi 351)
This section focuses on the proposal that a multiplicity of agents can be understood
as operating within a single human being, and conversely that collectives of human
beings can act as a single agent; these linked concepts have recently been proposed
145
by philosopher Carol Rovane (208). The metaphysical given of the separateness and
singularity of a person has equally been questioned by Judith Butler as discussed in
Chapter 2. This section aims to demonstrate a historical precedent, with evidence that
these are ideas with which early modern discourses diversely experimented. With
similar import to Pomponazzi in the opening quote Montaigne stated: 'Let the people
be one to you, and let the one be a people to you' ('Of Solitude' 221). This indicates
that helpful comparisons can be made both with Clark's concept of 'soft selves', the
coalition of cognitive agents within, and with Kosslyn's 'social prosthetic systems',
in which other people functions as an extension of individual cognitive processes and
subjectivity.
In any consideration of the multiplicity and uncanniness of oneself, the essays
of Montaigne are especially salient. In 'Of the inconsistency of our actions'
Montaigne challenges the notion of the stable self:
I give my soul now one face, now another, according to which direction I turn it. If I
speak of myself in different ways, that is because I look at myself in different
ways...All contradictions may be found in me by some twist and in some fashion...and
whoever studies himself really attentively finds in himself, yes, even in his judgement,
this gyration and discord. (293-4)
As in extended mind theory our selves are constantly being modified by ongoing
events and subjectivity is a polyphonic experience.
We are all patchwork, and so shapeless and diverse in composition that each bit, each
moment, plays its own game. And there is as much difference between us and
ourselves as between ourselves and others. (296)
Montaigne's human subject is multiply fractured with heterogenous agents operating
according to their own direction, to the extent that different parts and different
occasions of the self, are as strange to ourselves as to others. Similarly Donne in his
'First Meditation', describes man as 'Variable, and therefore miserable' since we can
not even tell whether we are ill as 'one hand asks the other by the pulse, and our eye
asks our own urine, how we do' (.Devotions 7). This problem of divided cognition of
the self is still under discussion, as Nagel evidences in 'Subjective and Objective'
where he similarly describes how the examining part may itself come under
examination and be found uncertainly reliable:
He examines himself and his interaction with the world, using a specially selected part
of himself for the purpose. That part may subsequently be scrutinized in turn, and
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there may be no end to the process. But obviously the selection of trustworthy
subparts presents a problem. (208)
Nagel also comments that the fragmentation and variability of the self could lead to
becoming 'less certain that there is anything very important that we are one of (164).
Similarly the flux of feelings that man is subject to leads Montaigne to remark that
'we are wrong to try to compose a continuous body out of all this succession of
feelings' ('OfCato' 211).
The idea ofmultiplicity and quasi-autonomous agencies leads to concerns over
human vulnerability to external and internal triggers:
We do not go; we are carried away, like floating objects, now gently, now violently,
according as the water is angry or calm...Every day a new fancy, and our humours
shift with the shifts in the weather... ('Of the Inconsistency' 291)
This idea of humans as like flotsam and jetsam results in anxiety about human free
will. Literary texts explore such anxiety by highlighting tensions between inward
agency and intentions and outward actions and roles. In Webster's Duchess ofMalfi,
for example, the Duchess laments that the world is a 'tedious theatre' for she must
'play a part in't 'gainst my will' (4.1.83-84). Later Bosola, caught in a cycle of
accident, laments: 'We are merely the stars' tennis-balls, struck and bandied/ Which
way please them' (5.4.53-54). External influences such as the stars' effect on the
humours of the body and the elements of the world troublingly placed in question
human autonomy. Both within and without there are circumstances and processes
that shape the subject.
The multiplicity that operates intrasubjectively in a subject also leads to an
opacity and uncanniness of the subject to itself. A profound awareness of this
enduring structure, which is fundamentally entwined with our experience of being
human, is evident in the early modern period. Implicitly in opposition to such a view,
Kirsten Poole argues that Freud's notion of the uncanny does not hold true for the
early modern period. Poole argues that whilst from the nineteenth century on there
was a friction between the shape-shifting psyche and a modern world in which time,
space and matter were fixed by physics, instead, the humoural body found a parallel
in a 'mutable, fungible, porous' world shared with demonic agents:
Putting the humoral body in this demonic world, by contrast, we might perceive a lack
of friction as the logic of the humoral is strikingly akin to the logic of the demonic.
The demonic world can be perceived as the fluidity of the humoral world writ large.
(99)
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However, although the world and the body were understood, as Poole suggests, as
analogous structures, instead it can be argued that since the subject and the world
were both shape-shifters, it resulted in an expanding of the realm of the uncanny,
rather than a disappearance of it.
In the early modern period, uncanniness was acknowledged as operative both
within and without the subject. An example is found in John Webster's The White
Devil, in the scene in which Francisco, steeling himself to revenge the murder of his
sister Isabella, conjures her picture in his mind. A stage direction requires Isabella's
ghost to enter, although Francisco believes the figure that he sees is caused by the
strength of his imagination:
Thought, as a subtle juggler, makes us deem
Things supernatural, which have cause
Common as sickness. 'Tis my melancholy. (4.1.107-9)
Whilst Francisco decides that the vision is produced by his melancholic humour, the
appearance of Isabella's visible figure on stage creates uncertainty over whether it is
in fact supernatural. The ultimate effect is doubly uncanny, due to the uncertainty as
to whether the vision is produced by an outer or inner source. Both the world and
oneselfwere familiar and strange.
Early modern interconnections with other subjects were also understood in
relation to the humourality of the mind and body. Montaigne offers the injunction
both to turn outward: 'the soul, once stirred and set in motion, is lost in itself unless
we give it something to grasp; and we must always give it an object to aim at and act
on', and to turn inward: 'We have a soul which can be turned upon itself and keep
itself company, it has the means to attack and to defend, to receive and give ('How
the Soul' 16; 'Of Solitude' 215). Yet, the reason for the latter need for introspection
is because of our fundamental intersubjectivity: 'Among our customary actions there
is not one in a thousand that concerns ourselves' (215). Montaigne believed that
people, like the soul and body, were only separated by a 'narrow seam', so that one
person's imagination could therefore act on another person ('Of the Power' 90).
Belief in 'affective contagion' is compared by Rowe with current terms such as mass
hysteria, and buzz, or word of mouth, but she concludes it was then a more
enveloping feature ofeveryday life (176). Such pervasiveness was a cause of concern,
and as we have seen creates an anxiety about the lack of agency that is implied: 'Our
mind moves only on faith, being bound and constrained by the whim of others'
fancies' (Montaigne 'Of the Education'134). Modern challenges to proprietary
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models are echoed by Katharine Rowe, who in reference to early modern subjects
claims: 'A humoral inner life poses serious challenges to proprietary models of
cognition' (180). This challenge to proprietary models came not just from internal
multiplicity, but also from the permeability of the subject to the world and other
subjects.
As in Stephen Kosslyn's theory, discussed in Chapter 1, other people's minds
can also positively act as cognitive aids and as part of the cognitive process.
Montaigne speaks of the way in which company can draw more from him than he
can find in himself alone, and that sometimes when he has lost the point of what he
was saying, that a stranger may discover it before he could; his mind is potentially
more transparent to another than himself ('Of Prompt' 31-2). Beliefs about other
subjects functioning as cognitive aids are part of a wider view of the world as a
cognitive tool and a means of extended subjectivity. Montaigne explains: 'This great
world...is the mirror in which we must look at to recognize ourselves from the
proper angle. In short I want it to be the book ofmy student' ('Of the Education'141).
Montaigne's models of extended reflexivity appeal not only to the system of
cosmological analogies between microcosm and macrocosm, but also to collective
notions of subjectivity.
The individual was defined as a member of overlapping collectives: Latin
Christendom, the Body of the Church, as well as human society. Stubbes in his faux-
Platonic dialogue, The Anatomie ofAbuses (1583), observes that: 'common reason
aduertiseth vs, that wee are not borne for our selues onelie...Our Countrey
challengeth a part of our byrth, our brethren and frendes require an other parte, and
our parentes ...doe vendicate a third parte' (sigs. B4r-v). Donne (famously) set out
his belief in the collective and interdependent nature of humanity in his 'Seventeenth
Meditation': 'All mankinde is of one Author, and is one volume...No Man is an Iland,
intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine'
(.Devotions 86-7). In the works of Bacon, the injunction of the Delphic Oracle to
'know thyself ('nosce teipsum') Kiernan notes was a colloquial rebuke, 'A Nosce
Teipsum', was 'a chiding' or a 'disgrace' (290). This example of how socialised and
externalised self-knowledge was suggests common acceptance (not necessarily
consciously) of the concept of extended reflexivity. Through concepts of the world as
subject and inversely of the subject as world a profound sense of their interrelation
arose, with subjectivity perceived as collectively operative, through an extended
social prosthetic system, which the rest of this section considers in relation to love,
family, friendship and nation.
149
Nowhere can the pleasure in social prosthetic systems be felt more strongly
than in the realm of love: 'that falls like sleep on lovers and combines/ The soft, and
sweetest minds/ In equal knots' (Jonson 'Epode' 50). Platonic and Ficinian beliefs
led to the commonplace of love as involving the exchange of souls, with figurations
of all types of love employing the idea of the beloved and the lover as becoming one
individual: Donne describes his heterosexual match as 'we two being one' ('The
Canonization' 24); Montaigne describes La Boetie as 'the one who is not another
man: he is myself('Of Friendship'172); Celia tells Rosalind 'thou and I am one'
(AYL 1.3.91); in Philaster, the King calls his daughter 'you, my self (3.2.38); and in
Shakespeare's 'Sonnet 116' love is (famously) described as 'the marriage of true
minds' (1). These descriptions suggest early modern people naturally conceived of
subjectivity and the mind as socially extended and operative beyond head or skin
boundaries.
Permeability between subjects is likened to that between body and mind, and
the celebration of a unity between two people can be comparable to that between
soul and body. Donne writes of how a unity between two disembodied souls is
thwarted in 'The Ecstasy', while physical unity can free their imprisoned soul
through the senses. He begins by imagining that he and his beloved have travelled
out along their eye beams and become a new singular soul made up of atoms. Of
bearing here is Screech's definition of ecstasy: 'In erotic mania souls are exchanged
between the two lovers, who therefore live in a permanent state of ecstasy,
permanently, that is, 'outside' themselves and 'in' the beloved' (29). But, Donne
points out that this spiritual meeting has been enabled by their bodies bringing their
souls together just as their souls must descend to the affections and faculties in order
to be freed:
So must pure lovers' souls descend
T' affections, and to faculties,
Which sense may reach and apprehend,
Else a great prince in prison lies. (65-68)
Their love will be 'revealed' by this physical 'book', the body. He continues to
conflate the spiritual and physical, mentioning in closing that the lovers' physical
union will be little different to 'this dialogue of one' spoken by their joint soul (70,
72, 74). Here we find not only the conflation of two subjects in one, but as Colin
Burrow describes, Donne's recurring theme of'accommodations between the carnal
and the intellectual', between the body and the soul and the interlinking spirits,
which combine into 'That subtle knot, which makes us man' (5; 'The Ecstasy' 64).
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Yet, this permeability, involving a dissolving into one that removed critical distance,
could instead lead to a negative view of love, and it is described by Bacon as a
'Syren' and a 'Fury' that 'doth much mischiefe' ('OfLove,' Essays 39).
A lack of examination, or consciousness, of national customs or about habitual
routines is also seen as problematic in a world of extended cognition and reflexivity.
Montaigne describes how we imagine as morally right what are actually inherited
notions, as we confuse local customs with the natural laws of conscience and reason
('Of Custom'100). Whereas animals are guided by natural laws, human laws and
customs are relative. Therefore Montaigne reminds the reader of the need to question
national and personal prerogatives and assumptions, as well as our supposed
superiority to animals and tribal societies ('Apology' 521-32). Wider travel and
reading in the early modern period, as earlier quoted from Bacon, widenened
knowledge of historical and geographical variations, creating greater awareness that
physical and mental dispositions were altered by diet, climate, company, habits, and
customs. Bacon's warning against unexamined living is grave for the individual but
graver for a social group: 'But if the force of Custome Simple and Separate, be
Great; the Force of Custome Copulate, and Conioyned, & Collegiate, is far greater'
('Of Custome,' Essays, 165). This emphasis comes from an awareness of the extent
to which cognition is constructed by embodiment, embeddedness and extendedness,
which entails the realisation that the subject is constituted by and co-dependent on
the other.
Social interchange was understood as necessary in order to exist as human
subject, with those who have an aversion towards society compared to a 'Savage
Beast' ('Of Friendship,' Essays 107-118). Therefore, Bacon recommends a balanced
division between self-love and society ('Of Wisedome,'Essays 97). Furthermore,
human interdependence was understood as a psychological and physiological
requirement, with friendship preventing the unhealthy blockage of the heart by
allowing the discharge of emotions, via discourse for instance. In a sermon on the
abuses of speech, The Taming of the Tongue (1619), Thomas Adams concedes 'Oh
necessary tongue! How many hearts would have burst, if thou hadst not given them
vent!' (145) Adams continues that the tongue enables discourse not only with other
people, but also with God (146). Deborah Shuger comments that the classical
tradition ofmoral character as expressed through rhetorical praxis, was supplemented
by the use of religious discourse of the closet between the subject and God, the
'soliloquy' that enacts the voice of the soul (63-78); thus there were two ethical
frames operative, with a religious form of subject extension supplementing the
worldly one.
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Social relations also drew on St. Paul's image of the body politic (1 Cor 12:20-
21), as is evident in 'A Letter sent by the Maydens of London' (1567). Their joint
letter responds to a pamphlet making aspersions that 'handmaydens and servants'
have too much liberty. Their joint response calls on their mistresses to defend them
and so secure their continued service, comparing their matrons and mistresses need
of them to their need of the instruments of the body:
'For as there are divers and sundry membres in the body, the least whereof the body may not
well want or spare...Even so are we to you (good Mistresses) such as stande you in more
steade, than some of the membres stande the body in...' (Anon sig. A4r).
Thus, the servants compare themselves to body parts, in their claim to operate as
vital supplementary extensions of other human subjects.
Overall, there was an awareness of, a pleasure in, and a tension about human
interdependence. Social interaction was understood as vital as an emotional outlet,
and for reasoning and self-knowledge, but with a balance necessary, other than in
friendships and love, as solipsism or extroversion were both perceived as dangers. A
pervasively familiar way of perceiving subjectivity in the early modern period, sees
multiple subjects within and social prosthetic systems without; these were correlative
to a general understanding of the interactive relation of mind and body, and of
cognition and subjectivity as extended into the world (and beyond).
Composite Subjects
The evidence examined so far in these three chapters on the early modern subject has
explored the humourally, spiritually and socially extended nature of the early modern
mind and subject. This brief section discusses various critical models of the early
modern subject, in order to consider their relation to the position taken in this thesis,
basing the argument both on evidence explored in these chapters, and looking ahead
to the Shakespearean material in the concluding chapters.
Current literary theory has noted that representations of the self from the
Renaissance place in doubt the 'very possibility of a "self' in the paradigmatic
Enlightenment sense - an autonomous individual testing rules imposed from without
against a sensibility nourished from within' (Coleman 3). Instead, the idea of the self
is 'articulated within a broader picture of social ties' (6). This social basis for secular
notions of the self is also implied by Timothy J. Reiss' assertion that there was no
secular tradition for the idea that a private self-reflexive subject could think, act and
exist in isolation; Reiss emphasizes the role of Jesuits' educational institutions in
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spreading this theological idea of the self (17). With reference to the Oxford English
Dictionary Sawday points out the formative prefix 'self-' only appears around the
mid-sixteenth century; he emphasises that instead of modern notions of possessive
individualism the word 'self at this time is negatively anchored in theological
notions of the 'inability to govern the self and 'the unregenerate individual, in thrall
to the flesh' ('Self 29-30, 30). These critical models of the self together build up a
picture of a self split between social articulation and inwardness associated with the
relation to God.
Donne confirms and adds another layer to this: he juxtaposes a negative
worldly selfwith a reborn Christian self in his 'Second Prayer' as he thanks God who
has 'clothd me with thy selfe, by stripping me of my selfe' (Devotions 13). This
metaphor of a physical stripping and regeneration also suggests that the inwardness
of the theological self was understood as corporeal. Maus proposes that the bodily
interior shared in the mystery of inwardness due to the corporeal way in which
inwardness was conceived (195). Spenser's portrayal of the allegorical journey of the
knights into the 'House of Alma' is described by Sawday as a journey into the
'uncanny' of the pre-Cartesian body and mind; it is a journey through which the
knights discover the 'other' that exists in the human subject's 'own deepest recesses'
{Body 170). Montaigne similarly describes himself as containing 'a back shop'
within which the soul can keep itself company ('Of Solitude' 214). Other buildings
used as structures constitutive of human subjectivity, that have already been
mentioned in this thesis included a prison, a house, a kingdom, and a world, which
have been figured as peopled and are external spaces relocated within. These various
models of the early modern self relate to a complex amalgam of scientific, social,
theological, and literary concepts; this is compatible with this thesis' inclusive view
that the early modern subject resists being distinguished from its biological,
sociocultural, cosmological and theological matrix.
A different angle is suggested by Richard Hillman who protests that cultural
materialist and new historicist critics posit a seventeenth century subject whose
inwardness is imagined as 'a sort of sanctuary where the true subject enclosed within
the prison of interiority, would find its salvation' (6). Instead of this 'mystery of
interior presence' Hillman claims that there is evidence in this period of belief in a
Lacanian 'unconscious without depth' so that in early modern plays 'the experience
of self-absence amounts to the only essential subjectivity' (15). In my view, whilst
self-absence is experienced by early modern subjects, with a sense of fissure and
uncanniness that parallels psychoanalytical models, this is not 'the only essential
subjectivity' and in fact even accounts for the mystery of interior presence. For it is a
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self-absence created by a distance that is in fact underlaid by a relation: the distance,
and the unique relation, between man and God, which was believed creative of the
fractured composite nature of the human subject. Early modern inwardness involves
a sense ofpresence, autonomy and the promise of salvation as well as a sense of self-
absence, which are both accounted for by man's relation to God. Experience of self-
absence could be alleviated by recognition of forms of human extendedness. Early
modern models of the subject describe humans as potentially resurrected with minds'
that will no longer be mortally cramped but freely intellectively extended, shining
reflexively back at God. This sense of the subject is supplemented by, as well as
contrasted with, models in which the mortal subject extends instead primarily
through the body, the world and other subjects. This form of extension is itself
mitigated by the fact that the body, the world and other subjects are all creations of
God, as well as separated from him by their elemental mutability and the chasm-like
gulf created by the Fall.
The reason for the experience of Lacanian self-absence which appears in
certain characters in Shakespeare's plays can result from failure to recognise the
composite nature of the subject in this life and a striving for autonomy. This striving
for inward autonomy can be driven by a sense of lack in world(l)y forms of
extendedness; as evident in Richard II and Hamlet, examples discussed in Chapter 7.
It is experienced by an early modern subject who fails to accept his chameleon and
composite nature and strives after a stable inwardness that in the early modern
Christian schema is believed achievable, albeit only in death. Conversely, within
Shakespeare's comedies, there are characters who accept as their 'self their human
multiplicity, provisionality, opacity, discontinuities and extendedness, while
attempting to maintain an equilibrious disposition, but that do not restrict this self to
only one fixed course, amidst the winds and tempests of existence that fundamentally
affect their temperament, complexion and cognitive processes. They do not simply
rely on either worldly or inner forms of extendedness, and therefore do not undergo
this type of trauma. Benedict in Much Ado About Nothing, for example, happily
admits his necessary inconsistency, changing in the same scene from a
disparagement of those who once scorned love and now are in it to a living example
of the same; as he later concludes: 'For man is a giddy thing and this is my
conclusion.'(2.3; 5.4.104-5).
The early modern subject is thus a thing at once as familiar and strange to itself
as the world of which it is part and which is part of it. As Montaigne stoically
suggests: 'All in all, he is a man' ('Of the Inequality' 233); or as Hamlet even more
emphatically puts it: 'A was a man, take him for all in all'; a human subject is a
154
protean composite of all in existence, a mean between the corporeal and incorporeal,
and subject to the constant inconstancy of Fortune (1.2.187). Thus, Joseph Hall
describes the character of a wise man as: 'His purposes are neither so variable as may
argue inconstancy, nor obstinately unchangeable, but framed according to his after-
wits, or the strength of new occasions' (106). The subject exists in real time and is
dynamically interacting with the world in a two-way relationship. His purposes are
shaped by the hindsight offered by previous experience and by current circumstance.
It is not a static ideal model for it participates experientially in the variabilities of the
world and of the subject: it is a subject in flux seeking a balance of inward and
outward orientation in a world in flux.
'By Rivers Fountains'
Every man in this age has not a soul of crystal, for all men to read their actions
through; men's heart and faces are so far asunder, that they hold no intelligence.
(1.1.247-50)
In Philaster, a play by Beaumont and Fletcher, a lord of the court discusses the
extreme hypocrisy and veiling of inner feeling within the current times. Not only
does one man not know what another truly thinks or feels, but a subject is also
fractured, with the outer representation of the face ignorant of the inner feeling of the
heart. In this next section, the discussion focuses on such concerns regarding the
reading of minds. Despite the acknowledged unreliability of understanding
individuals through external appearance, words, and behaviour, the stress on such
interpretation was intensified by the heightened sense of potential disjunction
between 'seeming' and 'being', contributed to by the civil, political and religious
upheavals. This leads into a discussion of the way in which the theatre aroused and
played on concerns about mind-reading and the multiple and mutable nature of the
subject. This section concludes with an elaboration of early modern philosophical
views of the issues: Raleigh and Montaigne discuss the diversity of and limitations
on perceptions, phenomenological experience and heterophenomenological
suppositions. Also apparent is the early modern notion of phenomenological
experience as experienced by a multiple and mutable subject, rather than a fixed
subject, which relates to de Sousa's viewpoint discussed in Chapter 1.
The fundamental categories of'outside' versus 'inside' were in common use in
the early modern period, primarily, as Maus has established, in reference to a much
contested distinction between 'seeming' and 'being' (5). Despite the persistence of
the mystery of humans to one another, Maus emphasises its particular pertinence in
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the Renaissance due to the repeated religious upheavals, as well as the manner of
court procedures, rhetorical anatomisation, wider print audiences, and the social
urbanisation of court life (14-16). Patrick Coleman similarly describes changing
relationships between the self and the community, as caused by the interrelated
developments of: the spread of print culture; the need for independent premises by
which to legitimise authority in the wake of the Reformation and various civil and
confessional wars; and the development of civil society with new standards of
'politeness', disciplining behaviour and concealing private feelings (4-5). 'An
Epitome of Good Manners', which forms the last dozen pages of T.G.'s The Rich
Cabinet advises that 'to frame our selues conformable to societie, wee must liue in
such a fashion, that we may please others' (sig. Y7v). The very existence of such
manuals listing etiquette and possible indiscretions reflect increasing self and social
consciousness.
The sociocultural changes demanded not only that a wider span of the
population develop the ability to infer what was going on in another's mind from
external signals (especially what superiors or equals were thinking), but also that
one develop a greater degree of self-control, self-consciousness and self-knowledge.
City authorities took 'increasingly more powers to police the behaviour of their
citizens', whilst 'new codes of civility and self-control induced individuals to police
their own behaviour' (Milne 3). Character writings, popular courtesy pamphlets and
advice books on manners, as well as books on rhetoric and the passions all attended
to educating the early modern subject in the civil and social behaviour expected. The
early modern focus on inferring what people were thinking involves
phenomenological issues: the abiding problem ofwhat can and cannot be known by a
third-person mind about first-person experience and intentionality. Thomas Wright
deploys an ecological comparison in advising the use of 'natural conjectures and
probabilities' to fathom the causes of a fellow human's behaviour:
For that we cannot enter into a man's heart, and view the passions or inclinations
which there reside and lie hidden, therefore, as Philosophers by effects find out causes,
by properties essences, by rivers fountains, by boughs and flowers the core and roots,
even so we must trace out passions and inclinations by some effects and external
operations. (165)
This comparison of reading a man's disposition from external signs with how a
philosopher might come to understand the hidden essences of the geographical world
from their external properties, reflects the Tittle world' topos, and an assumption that
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these mystifying wonders are connected with and so deducible from visible
externals; a method of interpretation described as not certainly reliable yet necessary.
Keen debates about inner and outer inform physiognomic reflection. In
Castiglione's The Book of the Courtier the discussion of the relation of outer to inner
is tellingly left unconcluded, although more biased towards their affinity since this is
argued to follow the manner of God's work (330-331). Wilson in The Arte of
Rhetorique appeals to the authority of Cicero, who called gesture the speech of the
body which must agree to the mind as speech to the matter (116). Bacon suggests a
physiognomical study that includes the reading of gestures and expressions to
uncover dissimulation:
For the Lyneaments of the bodie doe disclose the disposition and inclination of the
minde in generall; but the Motions of the countenance and parts, doe not only so, but
do further disclose the present humour and state of the mind & will. (Advancement 94).
Expressions and gestures reveal the subject's current cognitive processes, and
through them another's mind can potentially be read. The art of physiognomy is thus
an inversion of the exposition of dreams:
The first is PHYSIOGNOMIE, which discouereth the disposition of the mind, by the
Lyneaments of the bodie. The second is the EXPOSITION OF NATVRALL
DREAMES, which discouereth the state of the bodie, by the imaginations of the
minde. (94)
Intimacy of body and mind mean the body's revealed properties can be used to
understand the mind and vice versa. Gestures are now understood to act as a
'material carrier' for the working out of ideas, and the early modern notion of
reading another's mind through their gestures and physiognomy is linked to
capacities now understood as enabled in part by mirror neurons. Recent work by Paul
Ekman, who has developed practical methods for reading emotions in facial
expressions, also follows up Bacon's interest in mind-reading via physiognomy.
Whilst Machiavelli had advised princes on how to gull their people in The
Black Prince, on a far wider ranging scale we find descriptions of conmen taking
advantage of the influx of gullible countryfolk to the anonymity of towns, and a
growing number of poor and homeless (Kastan 115). Lupton tells of the acts of
enclosure that contributed to the immense growth of London over a relatively short
period, which he describes as a 'Country-mans Laborinth, he can find many things in
it, but many times looseth himselfe' (4). Thomas Harman lists 23 main types of
vagabonds and there is also considerable evidence from proclamations against rogues,
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vagabonds, and masterless men that the numbers of poor had risen and that criminal
activity against the nai've and unconnected was rife. Such deception worked in both
directions: John Awdelay in The Fraternity ofVacabonds, describes one particularly
wily type, 'the courtesy man', who by pretending to be a gentleman would flatter any
well-dressed citizen he met on the streets and tell him a sorry tale, such as his coming
from the wars, bereft of master or money, and then request charity from him (sigs.
A3v-A4v). Not only in terms of the religious upheavals, and courtly manners, but
also for everyday safety, the inferring of another's mind had become an increasingly
important ability in the early modern period.
Clothes, as an extension of the body, were like gestures understood as an
important means of reading a man. Thus, clothes and the body or skin are frequently
described in terms of equivalence. Crooke describes the skin as 'an vnseamed
garment couering the whole bodie' (72). Erasmus in his influential book ofmanners
for children De Civilitate Morum Puerilium describes that:
It is fully or suffciently sayd of the body, now of apparayle somewhat bycause
apparayle is the forme and fassion of the bodye: And of this apparayle we maye
coniecture the habyte and apparayle of the inwarde mynde (sig. B3r).
Davies in his 'Humours' versified this into advice:
The Habit sheweth how the heart is bent:
For, still the Heart the Habit doth prescribe:
And no extemall signes can more bewray
The inwardest Affects then garments may. (Davies 'Humours' 2)
Stubbes spends a considerable part of The Anatomie ofAbuses complaining against
fashions that either reveal vice or conceal estate and condition. Stubbes pays a literal
minded attention to every detail, such as the 'monstrous dublettes' that are a
supposed sign of 'gourmandice, gluttony and such like' (sig. E2r). Ben Jonson
satirises his contemporaries lust for clothes, as a displaced sexual fetish: 'an officer
there did make most solemn love,/ To every petticoat he brushed, and glove' ('XLII
An Elegy' 53-54). Clothes revealed the mind and were man-made replications of the
body, both fashioning and being fashioned by the human subject wearing them.
David Scott Kastan argues that recent critical attention to the issues of gender
crossdressing has obfuscated concern relating to transgressive class-crossdressing,
evident in the numerous legal attempts to regulate dress in Tudor England (104).
Theatre was understood as threatening because actors' changing identity with a
change of garments reveals 'the arbitrary and artificial nature of social being',
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placing in question the traditional hierarchical culture of status (106). Moreover,
Stallybrass and Jones have established the vital role of early modern clothing as
social and physical shaper of subjects, constructing subjects through their external
buttressing, reflected for example, in the way in which portraiture focuses not on
portraying an inner self but on the material scaffolding such as props and clothing
signifying status and gender (1-14). Gowing describes the ways in which clothes,
then expensive items, were worn day in and day out and came to be seen as an
extension of the body and of the subject:
Early modern bodies were mostly kept well clothed, covered in layers of inner and
outer garments that were worn so long they were likely to become part of both the
visible self, and inner subjectivity. (34)
In stories of sex and rape she argues that clothes stood in for 'a bodily boundary, as
metaphor for the body itself, as a marker and evidence, and as a narrative focus'
(106). Early modern views of clothes as subjective artefacts and conversely of the
body as clothing, is echoed by the extended mind theory's view that objects may be
experienced as body and the body may be experienced as objects or tools. Dennett
describes clothes as 'part of the extended phenotype of Homo Sapiens'
(Consciousness 416). Early modern subjectivity is conceived of not just in terms of a
mind-body coupling, but as a mind-body-scaffolding coalition.
Not only in its use of costumes, but as a genre, theatre plays on the extended,
transformative and multiple nature of human subjectivity. In this atmosphere of
reform and uncertainty theatre aroused aggressive opposition, as it explored and
played upon these very anxieties. Major disputes over the theatre were sparked when
Stephen Gosson attacked it in The Schoole ofAbuse (1579) leading to a number of
pro- and anti-theatrical treatises in the following decades, although such accusations
had already been heard from pulpits. In 1577 the preacher Thomas White had used a
collapsing syllogism to assert that 'the cause of plagues is sinne, if you looke to it
well: and the cause of sinne are playes: therefore the cause of plagues are playes'
(47). By extension, theatrical players are often described as liminal and
heteronomous creatures. Lupton describes how: 'A player often changes, now he acts
a Monarch, tomorrow a Beggar: now a Souldier, next a Taylor...he seldome speaks
his own minde, or in his own name' (Lupton 81). Besides, there was anxiety about
players' mobile status in society as they moved between the lowest and highest
spheres (Kastan 108-9). Stubbes conflates them with 'roagues and vacabounds'
arguing that 'such as trauaile the Cuntries, with playes & enterludes, making an
occupation of it...ought so to be punished' (sig. Mlv; see also Lupton 81). On the
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other hand, accusations that 'to let your boys wear the attire of virgins' was
equivalent to the depravity of Sodom and Gomorrah, are ridiculed by Thomas
Heywood in An Apologyfor Actors (1612). Heywood points out that as the scriptures
are not always to be expounded to the letter, this being what has led to the
'Sacramentall Controuersie', so everyone knows players' intents are only of
representation (sigs. C3r-v). Thus the issue of representation goes to the heart of the
Protestant-Catholic dispute dominating the Reformation, concerning whether the
transubstantiality of the Eucharist was literal or symbolic.
Yet both anti- and pro-theatricalists' claims rest on the ability of dramatic
representation to carry out a moral coup in the heart and mind not only of the actor
but also of the spectator. Heywood describes how theatre 'hath power to new mold
the harts of the spectators and fashion them to the shape of any noble and notable
attempt' (sig. B4r). Viewing theatrical spectacles is understood in terms of an
emulatory activity, which morally alters and cognitively shapes the spectator.
Heywood emphasises the superior power of moving live theatre over static visual
images or aural descriptions alone, as the tangible enactment of the theatrical
spectacle creates a dynamic and transformative force that can 'make an Alexander'
(sigs. B3v-B4r). Theatre dynamically enables access to an 'as if world, revealing
other subjects and minds.
This is a view also indirectly supported by the aggression theatre inspired.
Humans' propensity to extend into bodies and into the world creates anxiety and this
anxiety a desire to close the literal and figurative doors, to shut out epistemologically
that which ontologically will remain an interdependent connaturality. Desire to
protect the self through pre-emptive closure is evidenced in Gosson's advice to
women at the end of his pamphlet: 'The best counsel that I can giue you, is to keepe
home...Close vp your eyes, stoppe your eares, tye vp your tongues' (sigs. F4r-v).
Sara Gorman suggests that gender or class crossdressing is part of a wider 'theatrical
revelling in social anxiety' (291). The centrality of the transitional to early modern
identity, Gorman argues is made evident in the fascination aroused by: pubescent
boys playing women, the effects of dress; the series of transformations staged; the
invisibility or liminality of certain types of identity, such as virginity (6, 20). Thus,
early modern awareness and exploration of the human mind and subject's permeable
mutability also emerges then in attitudes to theatrical spectacles.
Inferring another's mind could also be understood to involve attempting to
occupy their phenomenological position, with the extent of accuracy in direct
inversion to the extent of differences. In Sceptick Walter Raleigh begins by
describing how animal perceptions must vary, and how therefore one species' minds
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must be unknowable to another species, including humans, who do not necessarily
have a greater insight, despite our higher placing on the epistemological ladder:
These great differences cannot but cause a divers and contrary temperament, and
qualitie in those creatures, and consequently, a great diversity in their phantasie and
conceit; so that they apprehend one and the same object, yet they must do it after a
divers manner. (124)
After suggesting this plurality of phenomenological norms, with dogs for instance
noted as having a greater sense of smell than humans, Raleigh then goes on to
conjecture that due to the various shapes, temperatures, and dominant humours of
humans there must therefore exist diversity in their perceptions and imaginations;
consequently they 'may tell how these things seem to them good, or bad; but what
they are in their own Nature they cannot tell' (135). Thus, whilst 'seeming' is
discernible 'being' is not. This suggests a blurring between the characteristics of the
subject and the object is inevitable, with a projection of one's own qualities onto the
object, which results in an epistemological gap.
Bacon is also keen to point out the epistemological blurring between subjective
faculties and objective qualities by the human mind, suggesting it creates a mirror¬
like distortion:
.. .just as an uneven mirror alters the rays of things from their proper shape and figure,
so also the mind, when it is affected by things through the senses, does not faithfully
preserve them, but inserts and mingles its own nature with the nature of things as it
forms and devises its own notions. (Bacon, New 19)
The diversity of cognitive faculties is seen as creative of phenomenonological
diversity amongst humans. Maus similarly describes: 'each individual, necessarily
limited to the evidence of his own senses, cannot know whether the perceptions of
others correlate with his own' (7) Montaigne mockingly describes our reliance on
referring all else to our own qualities due to lack of sufficient imagination: 'each
relates the qualities of all other things to its own qualities. Which indeed we can
extend or shorten, but that is all; for beyond that our imagination cannot go' (482).
This is similar to Nagel's more recent suggestion that our understanding may be
limited by our imagination since it is based on our experience (169).
Raleigh proposes that we may attempt to duplicate another's perception of
something through, for example, the manual manipulation of the eye into a long slit,
so as to gain an impression of how the world may look to a cat (125). But Nagel's
later scepticism ridicules the idea that by strapping on a pair of wings he will know
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what it is like for a bat to be a bat; he will only know what it is like for him to behave
as a bat behaves (169). Underlying Raleigh's greater confidence in the possibility of
imitated perception is perhaps a retained belief in shared humourality and a
cosmological system composed of functional analogies. However, like Nagel,
Montaigne cynically derides the possibility of man achieving an alternative
perspective. Quoting Augustine, he ridicules humanity's pretensions,: 'In truth it is
not God, whom they cannot conceive, conceiving themselves in his stead, not him
but themselves whom they compare, not with him, but with themselves' (481).
Humans' approximate conceptions relate to their own properties and essences rather
than to any divine truth.
On the other hand, the potential for a vertiginous proliferation of different
perceptions and experiences in the subject means that it occupies a multiplicity of
positions, and implies that some of these may be closer to another than to oneself in a
different state or according to a different cognitive faculty. Raleigh points out that
variability of perception need not be between one creature and another, but may be
between a man with a cold and the same man without it, since his sense of smell will
vary accordingly (127) Raleigh continues that there are also discrepancies between
information from different senses about an object, therefore conjecturing that objects
may have other qualities that we are unable to discern, because we lack the
instruments to do so (136, 138). We are not then the same in ourselves at all times,
but changing from one moment to the next and from one perceptual faculty to
another. This concern with the divisions and discrepancies in the subject is also
apparent in Montaigne, who expresses doubts about variations between the cognitive
faculties, and about first-person experience as well as third-person inferences:
They must not tell me: "It is true, for you see it and feel it so." They must tell me
whether what I think I feel, I therefore actually do feel; and if I feel it, let them next
tell me why I feel it, and how, and what I feel. (492)
Belief in the uniqueness of phenomenological experience does not necessitate a
centralised monolithic subject, as has been shown in Roland de Sousa's work. In the
case of Montaigne and the early modern subject generally, phenomenological
experience does not only vary with conditions in the experiencing subject, but occurs
in a multiple and mutable subject. Besides, the opinions of Raleigh, Montaigne and
Bacon reflect the emergence of increasingly empirical minded scepticism in early
modern thinking.
This section has explored the kinds of evidence on which mind-reading might
be based, and the means by which it might occur or be hindered. Clothes like body
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gestures and facial expressions were held as revealing the mind. As in current
theories, although in terms of collective concepts rather than on a neuroscientific
basis, the plasticity of the body image of the early modern subject enabled the body's
supplementation, replication and transformation by non-biological resources, such as
clothes. Humans' hybrid and composite nature was played on by the form and the
matter of theatrical spectacles. The mutability and multiplicity of perception itself
determined the relationship between the mind reading and the mind read.
Consequently, questioning of the reliability of both first-person and third-person
phenomenology was a particularly pertinent issue in Shakespearean England, and, as
will be discussed in the following chapters, is a recurrent theme explored from
numerous angles in Shakespeare's own works. The turbulent times, the
acknowledged multiplicity and mutability of the subject, its opacity to itself as well
as to others, all fuelled this interest. This lies behind the increasing fascination with
mirrors and mirroring, and the role of reflection, both internal and external in
understanding subjectivity.
Early Modern Mirrors
I dare speak it to myself, for it is not vainglory for a man and his glass to confer in his
own chamber. (Cym. 4.1.5)
...it is our basic human nature to annex, exploit and incorporate nonbiological stuff
deep into our mental profiles. (Clark, Natural-Born 198)
The physical properties of a mirror relate to the figurative properties of a metaphor,
which is based on notions of transfer: an image of the beholder is transferred onto a
reflection, which is at once analogous to and yet different from the observing self,
playing with the co-existence of similitude and dissimilitude, and the mutual
formation of each other by the original and the image. The complexity of the mirror
as a literary motif arises from the obviously liminal space which it inhabits, being
neither entirely subject nor entirely object: the mirror is potentially revelatory of the
interior world of the self and yet conversely figures the objectified self within the
external world, whilst exposing the negotiability and permeability of the boundary
between them. For this reason, the physical properties of the mirror have led to its
figurative employment to explicate the functioning of the human mind and the
construction of subjectivity. The early modern period's interest in the relation of
third-person reflections to those offered by the panoply ofmirrors within the subject,
and increasing belief in the partial nature of both types of reflection, also heightened
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the contemporary interest in mirrors. This section considers the technological and
literary forms of the mirror in the early modern period and begins exploring how
these connect to theories of perception, cognition and subjectivity, leading in to the
fuller consideration in Chapters 6 and 7 of how Shakespeare's use of the motif of the
mirror illuminates aspects of early modern beliefs about embodiment, embeddedness
and extendedness.
A boy in Tomkis' play Lingua sets the various cognitive faculty-characters a
riddle:
That's nothing of it selfe, yet euery way,
As like a Man, as a thing, like may bee,
And yet so vnlike, as cleane contrary... (sig. G1 v)
The answer is a woman, given her contrariness and that she is nothing of herself
claims Phantastes, resonating the general misogynistic tone; but his page Heuresis
corrects him with the answer 'tis a mans face in a looking Glasse' (sig. G2r). The
'biologically extraordinary' reflection of one's own face is revealed in a mirror,
'which though hidden from its owner it is open to public view, for the secrets of
one's mind to be read by all and sundry' (Gregory 'Shaving' 95). In this way, mirrors
heighten awareness of oneself as embodied object and gazing subject, with
consequently more conscious interaction between subjects. The mirror enables a
reflexive relation to subjectivity by means of a tool instead of through social
mirroring or meditative reflection. Evident from the Biami Tribe's introduction to
mirrors, is that they quickly become transparent in use, with the tribe quickly
adapting to using mirrors as practical tools for the application of their own tribal
make up instead of helping one another as before (Prendergrast 368-369). The
collective and iniercorporeai sense of the self arising from practical social mirroring
is supplemented by the mirror, which allows an independent means of making -
oneself-up, through a cycle of preening and gazing at the mirror-image, which
simultaneously enhances a concrete conception of oneself as a subject. Clark's
description of artists' sketchbook-use is a helpful comparison for considering how
the mirror creatively operates as a subject- and mind-tool: 'the iterated process of
externalizing and re-perceiving turns out to be integral to the process' (Natural-Born
77).
Objects collate and prompt different experiences of moments in time, and
therefore resist tendencies towards either localization or universalization, as Jonathan
Gil Harris has argued (Untimely Matter 3-4). Mirrors nowadays though they come in
all shapes and sizes tend to be of a fairly uniform quality and give a bright and clear
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reflection; in the early modern period, however, the gradual spread of new types of
mirror technology resulted in diverse forms and shapes of mirrors co-existing. From
the mid-sixteenth century, Melchior-Bonnet describes that 'mirrors could be had at
any price and quality' (23). Small convex mirrors, familiar to us from medieval and
early modern art (such as Van Eyck's The Arnolfini Portrait or Parmigianino's Self-
Portrait), were made of a thick glass with a greenish tint that had been blown into
globes, lined with a heavy lead tain, and then subdivided. These were distorting on
account of their shape, which compressed and reduced the reflection, and on account
of the thickness and irregularities of the glass and the darkness and unevenness of the
lead backing. Therefore even into the early seventeenth century some of the elite
preferred to keep using metal speculums of gold, silver, steel or bronze, or less
commonly mirrors of polished black obsidian or jet. During the sixteenth century flat
clear shining glasses with lighter and brighter quicksilver and tin-tains were
gradually becoming more available in England, though they were not produced there
until after 1624. These new crystal mirrors were enabled by Flemish mirror makers'
development of a quicksilver and tin alloy, which was later combined with the
Venetian glass industry's ingenious production of a transparent flat clear thin glass,
cristallo. These were to gradually revolutionise both the number of mirrors in
circulation and the way that mirrors were used. (Melchior-Bonnet 9-69; Prendergrast
1-27; Kalas 519-42).
The new glass mirrors were very popular with the elite and were light enough
that small mirrors were worn like jewellery, tied round the waist by women and worn
by men in their hats. The puritanical Stubbes describes 'Loking glasses' as the
'deuils spectacles to allure vs to pride, & consequently to distraction for euer' and
derides women who 'must haue their looking glasses caryed with them whersoeuer
they go' (sig. Glv). Castiglione advises the courtier that he develop a 'meticulous
regard' for his 'personal appearance', whilst satirising those who carry this to excess
'carrying a mirror in the fold of one's cap and a comb in one's sleeve, and walking
through the streets always followed by a page with a brush and sponge' (68) In
Jonson's Cynthia's Revels (1599) Amorphus, having warned that the face is an index
of the mind, instructs his companion to 'place your mirrour in your hat', but to
compose his face by him, juxtaposing the technological with the social means and
making the former just decoration and the latter a practical tool (2.3.67-68). Yet the
increasing urbanisation, social mobility, and centralised courtlife, which heightened
concern over personal appearance, as Sabine Melchior-Bonnet notes, increased the
practical use ofmirrors, as tools equipped to combat this concern:
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Situated at the crossroads of nature and culture, it educated the eye and assisted in
relaying lessons in civility. From a glance in the mirror flowed not only a taste for
ornament and an attention to social display and hierarchy, but also a new geography of
the body, which made visible previously unfamiliar images (one's back and profile)
and stirred up sensations of modesty and self-consciousness. (1)
Mirrorware was therefore becoming necessary as a practical tool as well as an
aesthetic accessory, but potentially produced a circular dynamic in which these
portable mirrors led to more frequent reappraisals and therefore more self-
consciousness or vanity.
In The Faerie Queene, Spenser describes current courtesy as a forgery,
fashioned to please passers-by, who 'see not perfect things but in a glas', applying St.
Paul's notions of 'through a glass darkly' here to social purblindness. He then goes
on to describe virtue's seat as 'deepe within the mynd' and 'not in outward shows,
but inward thoughts defynd' (6.7.5), which seems to present the mind as only inward
in contrast with the tenebrific social glass of outward courtesy. However, in the
following stanzas, Spenser describes virtue as disseminated from Queen Elizabeth
'In whose pure minde, as in a mirrhour sheene/ It showes, and with her brightness
doth enflame / The eyes of all' (6.7.6). His own book and the court are imbued with
virtue by extension from her, and with the courtesies she has engendered then
returned as tribute to her by the ladies and gentlemen of her court (6.7.7). The social
world is permeated by the mind and virtue of the queen. Earlier in the volume,
Spenser conversely explores the inherent multiplicity of Queen Elizabeth,
personifying her various qualities in the various characters and inviting her to view
herself in them as in a mirror (3. Proem. 5). Thus exploration of the doubleness, or
multiplicity, of a subject is also invited by the mirror, or a series ofmirrors.
Mirrors were still relatively uncommon for ordinary people: those who were
not part of the elite or of their entourage of servants, and who were not actors, artists
or artisans seeking patronage at court. To this general lack of mirrors in ordinary
homes Laura Gowing connects a more social and embedded subjectivity:
Seventeenth century bodies existed in a different conceptual world, where subjectivity
was a more collective affair, a matter of belonging and embeddedness. After all, there
were almost no mirrors in ordinary houses, and to study your reflection could suggest
vanity and a sinful preoccupation with earthly things. (5)
Philippa Kelly has explored to what extent mirrors were available outside of urban
and court circles by examining regional inventories: in one rural parish in the early
seventeenth century she discovered that whilst only three of the wealthier members
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of town had bequeathed mirrors, their value would not have set them above general
affordability, and therefore she deduces that they were not seen as necessary (5).
Kelly, like Melchior-Bonnet, suggests that the central role of the mirror was for the
personal grooming of society life. Therefore, despite the ease with which mirrors can
be assimilated by small communities, during the early modern period social
mirroring would have continued to play a more dominant role in perceptions of
mirrors as objects, due to their relative novelty and the partialness of more
widespread mirror use.
Mirrors were just one type of glass product affected by the technological
advances in the glassmaking industry, and these other products affected perceptions
ofmirrors. The development of the industry resulted in new or improved magnifying
glasses, spectacles and glass windows, and it assisted in the development of
telescopes and microscopes, along with the continuing production of hour glasses
vials, and urinal glasses (Haden 788-90; Mason 208-9; Rundus 124-25). Forms of
glass were thus associated with both spatial and temporal states and processes. Bacon
includes the manufacture of glass as one of the protean manipulations of art that
'reveal the ultimate strivings and struggles ofmatter' and the way bodies 'shift into
various other shapes' (Bacon New 227, 228). Perspective glasses and mirrors were
used in art and various types of these 'perspectives' became newly fashionable as a
form of visual entertainment, due to contemporary fascination with visual illusions
and the nature of perception (Miller 56-57). Reginald Scot gives an inventory of the
multiplicity of types of glasses around in the late sixteenth century:
But the wondrous devices, and miraculous sights, and conceits made and contained in
glasse, doe far exceed all other; whereto the art perspective is very necessary. For it
sheweth the illusions of them, whose experiments be seen in divers sorts of glasses;
.. .for you may have glasses so made, as what image or favour soever you print in your
imagination, you shall thinke you see the same therein. Others are so framed, as
therein one may see what others doe in places far distant...others, where one image
shall seem to be one hundred...There be glasses also wherein one man may see
another mans image, and not his own... (222-223)
Scot's comments indicate how mirrors were not only used for scientific observations
but also for magic. Theodore Ziolkowski relates the mirror's association with magic
to its inherent mysteriousness: it can see what's happening behind the viewer's back,
it doubles everything, and it contains in itself an inverted world (162). Mirrors were
also supposedly used to foretell the future; the scryer John Dee used an Aztec black
obsidian stone mirror to contact divine spirits believing that the stone would provide
the key to the underlying unity of the world:
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...from things visible, to consider of things invisible: from things bodily, to conceive
of things spirituall: from things transitory, and momentary, to mediate of things
permanent: by things mortall (visible and invisible) to have some perseverance of
immortality... (sig. Kir)
The visible, bodily, transitory and mortal were understood as a means of grasping the
invisible, spiritual, permanent and immortal; concrete reflected abstract. Thus the
development of different types of mirrors, the widespread distribution of glass
products, and the beliefs circulating in the early modern period further added to the
potential of the mirror to work as a fertile and polysemous literary motif.
Mirror images proliferated in literature from the sixteenth century. Herbert
Grabes, who attempted to produce a 'historical metaphorics' for the period from the
thirteenth to seventeenth century, demonstrates the centrality of the mirror-image in
Medieval and Renaissance titles and texts (5). Vernacular and secular mirror-titles
and motifs dominated in the sixteenth century, with an apex in literary mirror use
between 1550 and 1650, with books, tracts and pamphlets widely using mirror-titles
and the conceits ofElizabethan writers generating new forms ofmirror metaphors (7-
15). The use of mirror-titles for books reflects the fact that both mirrors and books
provide forms of extended subjectivity and reflexivity, creating a space for
reflections upon the images. Grabes relates contemporary use of the encyclopaedic
mirror-title to the fact that until the seventeenth century mirrors were often convex:
'reflection and reduction, (re)presentation and compression formed here a double
analogy between mirror and book' (43). The encapsulation of knowledge in a book
particularly relates to the qualities of the convex glass, since like an eye it
compresses that it reflects. Thus, both technological developments and sociocultural
context fuelled the literary deployment ofmirror-motifs.
The varying materials and qualities of different types of mirrors due to the
technological shifts were used by some writers for literary effect. Rayna Kalas
describes how Gascoigne in his verse satire The Steele Glas, along with various other
writers, distinguished between the religious connotations of the earlier reflective
tools which required effort to see clearly in (like St. Paul's dark glass), and the vanity
of the fashionable new glass baubles. Therefore Kalas contends that the metaphor of
the mirror is 'calibrated to material changes in the physical object' (536). Whilst this
is true, it is worth remembering that although Gascoigne took this opportunity to
divest negative connotations onto the new mirrors, and to productively create a
contrast between the two types, nevertheless, both positive and negative connotations
had long been associated with mirrors and mirroring in general. As Kalas herself
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points out other writers instead adopted the new crystal glasses' brilliance and clarity
to signify positive attributes, with Stephen Batman, for example, entitling his book of
moral emblems A Christall Glasse ofChristian Reformation (536).
In certain cases a moral distinction is made by Spenser in The Faerie Queene
between those who vainly look and those who are glasses. Lucifera is described as
having in her hand 'a mirrhour bright' in which she often viewed herself and 'in her
selfe-lou'd semblance tooke delight' (1.4.10). Instead Una is a mirror of virtue in
which 'God himselfe vewing that mirrhour rare,/ Stood long amazd', and similarly
Fidelia has a 'Christall face' (with a pun on Christ-all) and Belphoebe is a 'glorious
mirrhour of celestiall grace' (1.6.15; 1.10.12; 2.3.25). There are two possible
exceptions, since Britomart and Elizabeth I are both described as looking in glasses.
Britomart looks in the 'round and hollow shaped' glass but since it is similar 'to the
world it selfe', and magically reflects her future husband Arthegall, this does not
entirely undermine Spenser's general moral distinction between looking and being a
glass (3.2.19; 273). Through her 'mirror stage' Britomart literally takes on 'the
armour of an alien identity', as Kathryn Schwarz points out in her Lacanian reading
ofBritomart's mirror (273). The invitation for Elizabeth I to view herself in a mirror
by Spenser refers not to a literal glass, as she is invited to view herself in two of the
characters of Spenser's book, as in a mirror, which personify Elizabeth's various
virtuous characteristics.
The first appearance of the word 'mirror' is given by the Oxford English
Dictionary as occurring in John of Garland's 'Dictionarius' (ca. 1225). In the early
modern period 'mirror' seems to have been often linked to positive models of
conduct, while 'glass' was associated with moral satires and political tracts (Grabes
8-11). Shakespeare, however, seems to use the terms interchangeably. Salisbury the
'mirror of all martial men' and Hippolyta the 'dear glass of ladies' are equally ideal
models (1H6 1.6.52; TNK 1.1.90). Shakespeare seems, however, to favour 'glass',
perhaps because of its richer ambiguities, as it could slip between meaning mirror,
or any of other glass product, and between signifying opaque reflectiveness and
transparent penetrability. This slippage made it particularly ripe for literary conceits
playing on philosophical debates about the opacity or penetrability of oneself and
other subjects. Both mirror and glass motifs easily blur the boundaries between literal
and figurative uses: suggestive of this is the Oxford English Dictionary's entitling of
their first section for the noun 'mirror': 'Literally (or with obvious metaphor)'.
Notably, the OED dates the first verb form of 'to mirror' as 1820, when in fact in
Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida a passive verb form of mirror is used: 'For
speculation turns not to itself/ Till it hath travelled and is mirrored there/ Where it
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may see itself (3.3.104-6). This suggests an addition is needed to this entry in the
OED.
Mirrors were especially associated with visual perception in the early modern
period. The eye was thought to function in two ways, both receiving and transmitting
visual information. The lens was thought of as a glass-like screen and named
'Chrystalline' (Crooke 530; H5 2.4.45). In Lingua Visus, the sight, lyrically
compares herself with the mirror, describing the eyes as her 'two mansion houses'
where she sits guarding the entrance of the 'species of things corporealf through her
'walls transparent of pure Christaline' which act as 'the soules mirrour and the
bodies guide' (sig G2v). Donne in the The Canonization' captures the eyes ability to
encompass a world:
Who did the whole world's soul extract, and drove
Into the glasses of your eyes
(So made such mirrors, and such spies,
That they did all to you epitomize)' (40-43).
Moreover, he evokes the poignant contemporary sense of the two-way nature of the
eyes, at once transparent glass and reflective mirrors.
The eye-mirror-motif was also useful as an analogy for cognition because
visual perception demonstrates the way in which an external material form can be
translated into an internal immaterial image. This analogy was reinforced by
depictions of being and knowing as forms of light. Bacon figured them as different
forms of the same phenomenon: 'for the truth of being, and the truth of knowing are
one, differing no more than the direct beame, and the beame reflected' (Advancement
26); similarly the self-knowledge advised by the Delphic oracle is described by
Bacon in terms of a reflective beam: 'Radius Reflexus, whereby Man beholdeth and
contemplateth himselfe' {Advancement 93). Bacon uses the vision-mind analogy to
stress that learned men need to be able to view things in detail as well as in general:
'he that cannot contract the sight of his minde, as well as disperse and dilate it,
wanteth a great facultie' {Advancement 19). The concept of the 'mind's eye' was a
commonplace, as was the comparison of a king to an 'eye' to convey his supposed
omniscience (Grabes 83-88). For example in Hamlet, the mention of the metonymy
'our eye' for the royal presence is soon followed by a reference to 'my mind's eye',
correlating the political and physical body (1.2.116, 1.2.184). A more general linking
of vision with subjectivity springs from a Derridean play on the difference between
the written and spoken forms of language: 'Eye' sounds like 'I' (and also 'ay').
Shakespeare's verbal playfulness combined with his interest in subjectivity and its
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relation to perception variously exploits such ambiguity in his works. Richard II,
asked if he will resign the crown, equivocally and invertedly states: 'Ay, No. No,
ay'; spoken aloud this can be heard as meaning: 'Yes, No. No, yes' or as 'I know no
I', amongst other possibilities - only decided when he adds 'For I must nothing be'
(4.1.191). These interlinking strands of the subject, the mirror and the visual and
cognitive processes encourage early modern conceits' use of the term to knit together
the pattern of the human being.
Religious and philosophical traditions use the mirror-motif to figure meditative
contemplation: this powerfully participates in early modern perceptions of mirrors.
The mirror has an introspective potential, which relates to the Augustinian or
Socratic traditions of self-knowledge, wisdom and prudence; in negative guise it
appears as our inheritance of fallen man's hubris or of Narcissus' self-love, vanity
and pride (Grabes 153-160). Davies' Nosce Teipsum, exchanging the words 'mind'
and 'soul' throughout as equivalents, is particularly motivated by introspective
preoccupations. Rejecting the notion that the soul is dependent on material functions,
Davies claims the soul 'by a Mirror true/ Of her owne forme may take perfect sight'
through 'reflecting thought' (9). Her imaginative capabilities are described as
autonomously capable of mental time travel, Pegasus-like flight and imaginative
figuring of the world; yet ironically these extended emulatory circuits are described
in terms of physical instruments, for example, 'sees without eyes' (13, 14). This
claim to the independence of reflective thought Davies' approach to the question of
the relation between immortal soul and mortal body. Sense, he argues, is 'but a
power, which she [the soul] extends', and the senses, like glasses, do not know what
they receive (19, 20). However, in describing visual perception, Crooke argues that
although a glass also receives sensible forms without material substance, whilst the
glass does not perceive, the eye does because of the soul in it (652-3, 657, 669). This
suggests early modern variation on the question of whether visual perception occurs
in the eye as well as the passive reception of images. Yet Davies also describes the
eyes as 'Mirrors' which soul-like take the world into their embrace, and conversely
the understanding is described as 'the pupil of the Soules clear eye', which by
looking 'in the mirrour of the phantasie' abstracts the sense information into wisdom
(42, 49, 50). Visual perception was therefore a popular means for expressing the
nature of the mind regardless of whether it was itself understood to be cognitive.
Viewing oneself in 'Deaths mirror' is described as a remedy for those who have not
before examined their soul; but humans must be immortal, Davies argues, as 'those
glasses which materiall bee' only see material things, whereas when 'our minds we
mirrours make' we can partake of the immaterial (63, 85). Thus, Davies reflects the
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Neoplatonic dimension of the mind mirror-motif, which is at the same time
permeated by conceits gathered from physiological perceptions as well as by notions
of cognitive extension.
In the early modern period the association of the glass with subjectivity was
contributed to by a medical theory. This theory identified a supposed delusion of
melancholy as 'the glass-man' who believed himself made of fragile and transparent
glass (MacDonald 154; Speak 195-8; Walkington 71-72). In Lingua Tactus pretends
that he is suffering from the glass-man delusion, unable to move for fear of shattering,
and Olfactus diagnoses him as suffering from the dry heat of melancholy (sigs. B3v-
B4v). Shading himself from the light Tactus is able to see through his own fingers
and his breast like a window through which he perceives his heart (sig. B4r). Donne
transforms this bawdy to high conceit, combining it with eye-mirror metaphors in 'A
Valediction: ofmy Name in the Window'. Here the poet identifies himself with his
name engraved on a glass window gazed at by his beloved: "Tis much that glass
should be/ As all confessing and through-shine as I' (7-8); this figures the anxious
and yet desired nature of his self-revelation in making himself thus transparent. In
'The Broken Heart' it is a glass-heart that Donne describes, shattered by rejection so
that as broken glasses can only reflect a hundred lesser faces, so can he now only
ever experience lesser affections. In a letter of 1621, James Howell mockingly
describes a 'Urinal Man' in Venice, but goes on to describe how visiting a factory to
see glass made (48), produced more reverent associations in his mind of the 'glassy
sea' of Revelations (4.6, 15.2). Howell describes the way the furnaces
transubstantiated 'dark Dust and Sand into such a specious clear body as Crystall',
as the 'Universall-fire, which shall happen at the day of judgement, may by its
violent ardour uitrifie and turn to one lump of Crystall, the whole body of the
Earth'(48). Thus the mirror's capacities lend it to the portrayal of the transformation
of resurrection, as well as to death.
Literary critics have variously noted the relation between the early modern
mirror metaphor and cognitive processes, technology, and subjectivity; although the
focus tends to be directed at one or other of these connections, or at a one-way
relation, rather than at their closely interwoven fabric. Elaine Whitaker makes a
strong argument for the effect of technological change upon the use and tenor of a
metaphor: 'Just as thought is dependent on the properties of language, so it is
dependent on objects furnished by technology' (113). Her point regarding the
relationship of thought to technology is important but suggests a one-way
dependency rather than a dynamic relationship. In the early modern period these
concepts might better be reconsidered in relation to evidence of the brain, the body
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and the world as reciprocally interactive upon each other in a spiralling
developmental relationship. Whitaker also attributes perceptive distortions only to
the mirror, rather than realising the role of visual and cognitive processes therein,
claiming that it has always been the case that 'Irregularities in the image reside in the
imperfections of the mirror. The viewer's ability to see the image represented is
presumed' (114). Were early modern writers to assume such trust in the viewer the
mirror would be a vastly less interesting metaphor. The ambiguity about whether or
not that which is perceived lies in the perceiver or in the mirror-image is creative of
uncertainty and dramatic tension. In the tradition of medieval morality dramas a
sinner may not initially realise that the darkened reflection he sees in a mirror is
caused by his own flaws (Carpenter, 'Masks' 12). As explored in the following
chapters, Shakespeare's use of mirror-motifs takes this theme further by exploring
not only perceptions of the self and the outside world against one another but also
first-person versus third-person perspectives. The early modern subject could turn to
the world-as-mirror, to the mirror-as-world, and to the counter-reflection offered by
the multiple reflections of different aspects of the subject by the mirroring of the
mind within or without the biological being.
Early modern dramas, like earlier morality dramas, also drew attention to their
own mirror-like capacities in providing their spectators with an extended form of
reflexivity. In Tomkis' Lingua Anamnestes describes 'my Lord Comaedus and
Tragedus', as his 'fellowes' who 'Both vice detect, and vertue beautifie:/ By being
deaths mirrour, and lifes looking glasse' (4.2). John Taylor in tribute to Heywood's
An Apology for Actors offers this early modern commonplace of play as ethical
mirror:
A Play's a briefe Epitome of time,
Where man my see his vertue or his crime
Layd open, either to their vices shame,
Or to their vertues memorable fame.
A Play's a true transparant Christall mirror, (sig. a3v)
Davies of Hereford describes the players as imitating Fortune's inconstancy 'by
acting all mens parts' and 'Shewing the vices of the time'. The players operate as
mirror-images performing an act of extended reflexivity to the spectators: Fortune
'made them Mirrors, by their acting Arts,/ Wherin men saw their faults, thogh ne'r so
small' ('Civile' 208). Considering the role that mirror neurons play in enabling
humans to experience others' actions, the intuition as to the forceful nature ofplayers
acting of parts is now scientifically supported. Finally, given Stubbes railing against
the negative influence ofmost plays, it is ironic that the commendatory poems which
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preface his volume place him in competition rather than opposition, by making
similar claims to those of the pro-theatricalists: A.D. recites that The Anatomie is a
'glasse' in which to behold vice and I. F. also commends the book 'Wherein, as in a
Mirrour pure/ Thou mayest behold and see,/ The vices of the World displayed
/Apparent to thy eye' (sigs. Alr-v). Thus, plays, players, and books are mirrors and
operate as types of extended reflexivity for their partakers.
History, which as we saw in Chapter 4 was compared with biological memory,
is also described by Thomas Beard as 'the mistresse and looking-glasse ofmans life:
insomuch as under the person of another man it teacheth and instructeth all those that
apply their mindes unto it, to governe and carry themselves vertuously and honestly
in this life' (sig. air). Beard combines the idea of text and memory as performing
similar functions with the idea that a subject's self-knowledge can be reached
through the moral example of other human subjects, as if they are the subject's
mirror. Donne's emphasis is on living mirrors, as he suggests that any other living
thing will show you as clear a reflection of God as your own reflection in a looking-
glass: 'There is not so poore a creature but may be thy glasse to see God in. The great
flat glasse that can be made, cannot represent anything greater then it is' (,Sermons 8:
224). He explains that in this world 'whatsoever hath any being, is by that very being,
a glasse in which we see God, who is the roote and fountaine of all being' (224).
Early modern reflexivity is interwoven with the modes of understanding
biological, sociocultural and technological processes and beliefs. The concrete or
assumed known are used in order to better analyze or imagine the abstract and
unknown, and to explore their potential relations to each other. The multiplicity of
commonplace applications of the mirror as a literary motif, result in each use casting
different shades upon its range of meanings, with a rich and complex play of
reflections.
Conclusions
These three chapters on the early modern mind and subject make evident a surprising
number of resemblances to current notions concerning the extended mind hypothesis
that were discussed in Chapter 1. Early modern discourses about the humoural brain
and body share with the recent advances in neurobiological research the belief that
significant contributions are made to cognition and subjectivity by non-conscious
processes, willed and autonomous subsystems, the emotions and body states, and the
brain and body's plasticity. This adds to evidence for the historicity of concepts of
cognition and subjectivity as embodied. In addition, this humoural basis was
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recognised as being affected by inherited traits, by geographical, sociocultural and
technological contexts. The considerable porousness and mutability of the human
subject and mind was understood to dynamically incorporate and extend itself via
objects, people, language and environments. This adds to evidence of the historicity
of concepts of cognition and subjectivity as embedded and extended. The early
modern humoural subject is a being whose cognitive processes were understood as
distributed within its brain, its body, and its environmental, sociocultural and
technological world.
Concepts of cognition and subjectivity as embodied, embedded and extended
were circulating in the early modern period, alongside and entangled with various
types of disembodied and centralised models, which have also been considered here.
Clearly in terms of notions of the humours, spirits and souls, early modern theories
of cognition and subjectivity operate according to very different mechanisms than
those now harnessed by current extended mind theories. Yet this does not contradict
the idea that longer term continuities exist in terms of an ongoing fascination and
anxiety about the hybridity and extended nature of the human subject and mind;
although, in some respects, the early modern equivalents of these concepts seem to
have involved more non-conscious acceptance than they do in modern times.
Continuities reflect aspects of a concept that remain viable in relation to the contexts
within which they operate, whilst variations in the manifest forms of these concepts
reflect the variety of coevolving structures in play at that moment. Early modern
concepts about the diverse mix of factors involved in cognition and subjectivity
make evident a complex, pragmatic and imaginative understandings of the subject in




These last two chapters explore the bearing of modern and early modern ideas about
embodiment, embeddedness and extendedness on the literary, through an exploration
of how they are revealed and exploited imaginatively in Shakespeare's works.
Shakespeare is representative of early modern writers in that he is influenced by both
contemporary and classical literary traditions and material, and his works abound
with literary explorations of early modern constructions of cognition and subjectivity.
The properties and literary tradition of the mirror naturally lend it to the
representation ofcognition and subjectivity and at this time, when new and improved
mirrors were beginning to become more widespread, mirror-motifs in early modern
discourses are especially prolific and polyvalent. These chapters tackle the relation
between forms of social, technological and self-reflexive mirroring, exploring this
earlier vision of self-self and self-other relations as variously fluid or opaque, which
invokes familiar concerns about first-person versus third-person access to our own
and others' subjective cognitive experiences.
Chapter 5 gathers evidence of the diverse ways in which women and men are
figured as natural-born mirrors; primarily examining the themes in terms of
humourality, femininity, love and reproduction. The first section focuses on mirror-
motifs in the play Measure for Measure, which are explored by means of comparison
with early modern literary and juridical theories, notions of the mortal humoural
subject, and concepts of imitation. The following section goes on to consider
depictions of women and offspring as mirrors, and early modern attempts to
reconstruct social definitions by re-employing conventional mirror-motifs. The final
section examines mirror-motifs in several works, including Richard III, 'Sonnet 22'
and 'Sonnet 24', which invite discussion of early modern notions of mutual gazing,
love's blurring of subject boundaries, and the relation of love to self-love.
Reflecting Images: Mortal and Divine
Early modern understanding of the relationship between the divine and mortal, art
and nature, and an original and an image is explored in this section. First the
discussion focuses on the portrayal of imitation in 'Sonnet 53', before considering its
relation to a mirror-motif portraying the operation ofjustice in Measure for Measure.
Further insight into this mirror-motif is offered by comparison with a mirror-motif in
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Macbeth figuring physical multiplication, and another in King Lear that in contrast
figures cessation. These are then set against a second mirror-mot if from Measure for
Measure that questions aspirations of the humoural subject to a God-like objectivity,
firmly situating man in his corporeal body and mortal world. These motifs make
evident an early modern perception of human cognitive processes as distributed over
the humoural subject and the world, with both positive and negative consequences.
In Shakespeare's 'Sonnet 53' a living human is positioned in the place of
classical figures of beauty. Jonathan Bate describes how Shakespeare inverts the
early modern motif whereby one's beloved is described as an imitation of a classical
archetype by claiming instead that 'classical figures are imitations of his own
beloved' (89):
Describe Adonis, and the counterfeit
Is poorly imitated after you.
On Helen's cheek all art of beauty set,
And you in Grecian tires are painted new. (5-8)
Whilst, as Bate goes on to argue, concern is expressed by Shakespeare in various
sonnets, such as 'Sonnet 59', about the impossibility of true literary originality, this
is tempered by making imitation metamorphic and by exposing the original as
dependent upon its reiteration (91-92; see also Williamson 145). Continuing debates
about the nature of representation in human culture provide a modern parallel.
Butler describes Irigaray's concept of critically miming mimesis as a citation or
imitation that repeats the origin in order to displace it as origin: 'This is citation, not
as enslavement or simple reiteration of the original, but as an insubordination that
appears to take place within the very terms of the original, and which calls into
question the power of origination' {Bodies 45). Butler has emphasized the image's
re-creation of the 'original' (91), but the relationship can also involve two-way
directionality between origin and image, or as in 'Sonnet 53' between literary
precedent and descendent. This dynamic holds further implications for a reading of
two ofMeasure for Measure's mirror-motifs.
Measure for Measure's courtroom mirror-motifs compare the relationship
between divine and human justice using several notions of originals and images. The
first mirror-motif is described as having the power to read the unborn future,
reflecting belief that mirrors could provide supernatural cognitive abilities. Angelo,
acting deputy to the Duke of Vienna, has taken up juridical duties and the
reformation of the law, and consequently has sentenced Claudio to death for
prenuptial fornication with his fiancee. Angelo insists on the punishment's necessity,
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depicting the awakened law looking in a prophetic mirror where it sees the future
infringements that would otherwise result:
The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept.
Those many had not dared to do that evil
If the first that did th' edict infringe
Had answered for his deed. Now 'tis awake,
Takes note of what is done, and, like a prophet,
Looks in a glass that shows what future evils,
Either raw, or by remissness new conceived
And so in progress to be hatched and born,
Are now to have no successive degrees,
But ere they live, to end. (2.2.92-101)
Angelo presents a mirror that shows reproducing evils that the law can pre-emptively
prevent by admonitory punishment. A contemporary equivalent of this view can be
observed in William Baldwin's description of the operation of early modern legal
precedent and his aim in writing Mirour for Magistrates'. 'For here, as in a mirror or
loking glasse you shal se if any vice be found, how the like hath ben punished in
other heretofore, wherby admonished, I trust it will bee a good occasion to moue
men to ye soner amendment' (sig. iiir). Montaigne critiques this concept of legal
justice, a logic of condemning to correct others, not the accused, and he remarks on
the arbitrariness of the laws of different countries and times, which only 'take their
authority from possession and usage', so that 'it is dangerous to trace them back to
their birth.' ('Of the Art' 854; 'Apology' 534). This aligns with Butler's modern
depiction of laws as conventions that have 'no other legitimating authority than the
echo-chain of their own reinvocation' {Bodies 107). Butler describes laws operating
in terms of citation: the judge 'reinvokes the law, and, in that reinvocation,
reconstitutes the law' {Bodies 107) As in Measure for Measure the law is depicted as
part of a signifying chain that must be enacted in order to retain its authority,
although it is also constrained by the precedents.
The mirror-motifs use of corporeal terminology indicates the use of bodily
processes to understand cognitive, behavioural, and juridical ones. Angelo figurally
evokes a susceptible penetrability and reproductivity parallel to the processes that
occur in an impregnated female body. Evils would be 'conceived', 'hatched' and
'born', with 'hatched' suggesting their bestial nature. Instead the law through an
abortive measure will prevent the reproduction of future generations of evils.
Angelo's statement would have seemed reasonable to many spectators in an early
modern audience since it represents both conceptual norms and their legal system's
logic. Its plausibility is only explicitly thrown open to question later in the play. Yet
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given the relatively high incidence of prenuptial fornication in the early modern
period some audience members may have sympathised with Claudio's predicament.
In Spufford's description of twopenny chapbooks she comments that numerous
heroines agree to sexual intercourse in return for the promise of marriage, and that
this reflects ambivalence towards real incidents of pre-marital intercourse, with
ecclesiastical courts often accepting as mitigation a private agreement to marry (167).
Shakespeare imaginatively figures a contemporary issue through means of the play.
Maus describes that English courts required both 'an overt act' and 'a guilty
mind' to prove guilt in a state trial; the proof of a guilty mind was to be accessed by
the judge's or juror's resort to their own inwardness, as within one's own heart the
verdict would be found (113). Claudio's sister, Isabella, similarly appeals to Angelo
to look inward in making his judgement:
Go to your bosom;
Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know
That's like my brother's fault. If it confess
A natural guiltiness, such as is his,
Let it not sound a thought upon your tongue
Against my brother's life. (2.2.139-44)
Significantly, this indicates belief in a potential sharing between humans, as another
may be accessed through one's own inwardness, and that the sharing between one's
own faculties may only be partial, with the need to actively search out knowledge of
oneself. This shared humanity, our 'natural guiltiness', also suggests a concern over
the extent to which judges and jury are potentially implicated in crimes they judge
and so of the limited and problematic nature of the justice wielded. It sets up a
distinction between humans' limited, embodied, subjective and contextual vision and
God's transcendent omniscience. Rogers distinguishes between four types of justice:
celestial, natural, civil, and judicial (C2v). Concern over shortfall is evident in
Breton's definition of an 'Unworthy Judge' who follows the words rather than the
matter of justice: 'He is more moral than divine in the nature of policy, and more
judicious than just in the carriage of his conceit' {Good 221).
Angelo, the unworthy judge of Measure for Measure, himself undermines his
depiction of the law objectively looking in a mirror that enables a God-like
omniscience. In Act 2 Scene 4 he attempts to seduce Isabella in exchange for
granting her plea, with the weakness of the actual wielder and his claim revealed by
his dark mirroring of Claudio's crime. Humans share not only inwardness but a flaw,
yet as implied in Isabella's appeal, condemnation tends to involve forgetting our
relation to those we condemn. Butler comments that with the failure 'to own one's
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limitations', we lose the chance to experience the 'kind of reflection that takes place
when judgements are suspended': a self-knowledge of our own opacity and humanity
('Giving 45-46). His seduction attempt undermines Angelo's insistence that he is
administering an impersonal system. In fact, Isabella points out that those in
authority are particularly susceptible to using it to conceal their own sins:
Because authority, though it errs like others,
Hath yet a kind of medicine in itself
That skins the vice o'th'top. (2.4.137-39)
Through a commonplace corporeal comparison, moral vice is figured as a sore, with
authority the mask under which it festers. Angelo's claim to wield a transcendental
authority is a skin-deep cover up of the 'natural guiltiness' of embodied and embedded
human authority. Aspirations to impermeable containment are shown as contributing
not to claims of divine authority but to human immorality.
Montaigne provides a further early modern parallel. He describes judicial
'vicious violence' as having more to do with the judge than the fault ('Of the Art'
861). Failure to recognise one's own limitations involves a problematic projection of
one's own subjectivity onto the judged. Extending our trail further back, Montaigne
quotes from Plato: '"If I find a thing unsound, is it not because I myself am unsound?
Am I not myself at fault? May not my admonition be turned around against me?"
(861). This admonitory mirror then is not prophetic and didactic in the way originally
represented by Angelo, but instead invokes a mirror that reflects one's own sins back
at the viewer. This finds a parallel in Grabes' description of a play by Lewis Wager
in which Mary Magdalen sees her own sins in Law's mirror (129). Moreover, the
mirror-motif illuminates, and is illuminated by, the biblical passage from which
Shakespeare took the title: 'Ivdge not, that ye be not judged.. .and with what measure
ye mete, it shall be measured to you againe' (Matthew 7.2). The act of judging in
Measure for Measure itself performs judgement on the judge. Mirror-motifs visually
demonstrate a two-way relationship between the creation of the original by the image
and the image by the original. The mirror of the law is shown by Angelo's hypocrisy
as operating humbly through the upholder of it, as a form of extended reflexivity.
In Macbeth and King Lear as in Measure for Measure the characters' and
audiences' expectations are actively invoked then overturned. In Macbeth the mirror-
motif again combines prophesy and procreation; the similarity of structure used is
symptomatic of the way in which general processes are conceived of in relation to
understanding of the body. The Witches show Macbeth a vision of eight kings
(representing kings from his time to the Elizabethan present) and then reflected in a
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glass held by the eighth king many more kings (belonging to the Elizabethan future);
but Macbeth's expectations are frustrated, as rather than the glass reflecting his
biological replicas, Banquo's offspring are reflected (4.1.126-39). Whilst Angelo
uses the mirror-motif to figure the perpetuation of criminal acts through the ages,
here it figures a subject's perpetuation via biological offspring.
The mirror-motif can signal not only forms of multiplication, but also of
cessation, both indirectly and directly. In earlier versions of The Tragedy of King
Lear Cordelia lives to succeed Lear, but in Shakespeare's version the confounding of
expectation is referred to by the same mirror-motif that reveals Cordelia's death:
LEAR Lend me a looking-glass.
If that her breath will mist or stain the stone,
Why, then she lives.
KENT Is this the promised end?
EDGAR Or image of that horror?
ALBANY Fall and cease. (5.3.235-38)
The failure of the stone-mirror in Lear's hand to mist with her breath is anticipated in
Lear's accusation that those watching are emotionless 'men of stones' (5.3.231).
Implied by the term 'the promised end' is a divine Judgement Day, but it is neither
the end promised to characters hoping for a just world, nor is it the end promised an
audience expecting a happy ending. Instead that this end is 'an image' of 'that
horror' implies that her unjust death is a prefiguring of the catastrophes attendant on
the world's end (in Christian belief). A moment later, Lear's mistakes that Cordelia
stirs, momentarily raising hopes only to further heighten the plummeting sensation of
irredeemable tragedy.
A fluidity of subjectivity suggested by a playing system in which players
sometimes occupied several roles also lends texts added resonances. Allan Shickman
suggests that a mirror carried by Lear's Fool might have been employed here as a
prop, and that since the Fool would have been played by the same boy-actor that
plays Cordelia, as his truth-telling double he has one final truth to tell through the
mirror: 'the mirror would become in the hand of the expiring king a symbol of the
ultimate truth of death and of the ultimate self-knowledge' ('The Fool's' 86). The
mistless glass offers a silent closing truth by the absence of breath; this is a visual
parallel to Hamlet's anticipation of death: 'the rest is silence.' (5.2.300). The
connection between life as breath and a mirror as death is evident in Pericles: 'For
death remembered should be like a mirror/ Who tells us life's but breath, to trust it
error' (.Pericles Scene 1, 88-89). Breath is life in humoural ontology which as
Kuriyama describes, entwines the means of communication and of life (340). The
182
power of the mirror-motif is its ability to multiply represent the transience of breath,
spoken words and life and the emptiness, death and silence that follow; enabling
through figural images more complex representations and understanding of the
nature of being an embodied human subject.
An image of man's embodied and mortal state is called upon in Measure for
Measure by Isabella, who mocks Angelo's lack of self-knowledge and protests
against his ostentatious use ofpower:
But man, proud man,
Dressed in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence, like an angry ape
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As makes the angels weep, who, with our spleens,
Would all themselves laugh mortal. (2.2.120-26)
In describing man's essence as 'glassy' the biblical notion of prelapsarian man as the
image of God is evoked (Gen. 1.26-7), but it is juxtaposed with a depiction of
delusionary self-exaltation stemming from pride, the cause of the Fall; the subject as
'theodroid' is brought into play only in order to establish man's distance from God.
The description of man as 'dressed' and that he 'plays' suggest the performative
nature of the misperceived self-image; ironically as declaimed in a play on a stage.
The cliche of clothes making the man is variously endorsed and played on in early
modern discourses, as we saw in the previous chapter. Brachiano in Webster's The
White Devil scornfully describe his brother-in-law thus: 'all his reverend wit/ Lies in
his wardrobe; he's a discreet fellow/ When he's made up in his robes of state'
(2.1.184-6). A farcical parallel occurs in Tomkis' Lingua, where Tactus clothed in
Robe and Coronet declares his very blood and complexion 'transform'd' to the
'temper of a King', sighing 'O for a looking glasse' (sig. B3r). Montaigne links
sartorial and literary aping, mocking those who imagine in copying someone's robes
or words you have the body or matter; as does Angelo acting as the Judge ('Of the
Education'155).
At the same time, the ape-metaphor, as Curtius explains, was traditionally used
to describe servile imitation; for example, Holofemes in Love's Labour's Lost, who
in judging of a sonnet bursting with commonplaces mocks that 'Imitari is nothing. So
doth the hound his master, the ape his keeper, the tired horse his rider' (538-540;
4.2.117-8). Man descends to bestial mimicry through the very act of vainly
imagining he has God-like authority. Shakespeare offers a satiric inversion of a
familiar Elizabethan entertainment of apes mimicking man, with his figuring of a
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judge publically put on divine trial, become man as ape, a rung down the ontological
ladder, whilst thinking himself a God in his wielding ofjustice.
The distinction between animals and man was being called into question by
sceptics. Montaigne, in mock of the medieval and humanist view that man's
superiority was indicated by his face being distinctively raised up to the stars, points
out: 'What animals do not have their face up high up and in front, and do not look
straight forward like ourselves, and do not discover...as much of heaven and earth as
man?' ('Apology' 433). The distinction of humans as uniquely special is eroded by
humans being set next to our nearest mammalian neighbours, displaying a
subjectivity that differs only in co-opting external structures of dress and authority.
This conjures Clark's conception that humans do not differ so much from animals
other than through their ability to co-opt external structures, and like Clark these
early modern contentions lead to the same ironic conclusion that it is through this
ability to co-opt these structures that we hallucinate an authoritative and fixed self
(.Mindware 176-81). The indictment that Angelo is 'Most ignorant of what he's most
assured' emphasises a lack of self-knowledge as the operative dynamic.
Grabes points out that 'essence' had also come to mean 'the material nature' of
something and so 'glassy essence' indicates mortal frailty as well as spiritual
weakness (219). This is especially the case if it is considered in light of the
contemporary melancholic glass-men phenomenon. Mention of the spleen, a seat of
the passions, and so ofman's anger, conveys again the embodied humoural nature of
human cognitive processes, as does mention of the laughter the angels lack. Human
physicality is also indicated by reference to his authority as 'brief contrasted with
the immortality of merciful angels, again recasting human glassiness as a brittle
creatural frailty caught in a self-serving illusion. Measure for Measure suggests that
an understanding of subjectivity as embodied, embedded and extended reveals the
illusoriness of our aspirations to a fixed and stable, or God-like, subjectivity.
The narcissistic circularity of the subject invoking its own image, is here
represented by Angelo who whilst imagining himself as Law personified is shown by
Isabella to play a less exalted part in a more complex and flawed human world.
Isabella recasts Angelo as the subjective mirror he is holding up, rather than the
objective Law he vaingloriously imagines, by mimicking his mimetic motif. Angelo
fails to objectively recognise man's microscopic potency and duration in universal
terms. Perhaps an implication is also that to aspire to the equivalent of the angels'
viewpoint whilst retaining knowledge of one's own mortal humourality, is necessary
to maintain realism about oneself and one's actions. A Midsummer Night's Dream's
description of a poet's two-way view encapsulates this: 'The poet's eye, in a fine
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frenzy rolling,/ Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven' (5.1.12-13).
The mirror-motifs in this section make evident the blurring of boundaries between
the objective and subjective, outside and inside, past and future, human and animal,
and the mind and the world.
Glass Women
I thought upon the complement which a Gentleman put upon a Lady in England, who
having five or six comly Daughters, said, He never saw in his life, such a dainty
Cupboard of Crystall-Glasses; the complement proceeds it seems from a saying they
have here, That the first handsom Woman that ever was made, was made of Venice-
Glasse, which implies Beuty, but brittlenes withall (46)
James Howell in his letter of 1621 from Venice writes of how upon seeing 'so many
sorts of curious Glasses made here' he was reminded of their conventional
association with women. Howell also relates it having become a female creation
myth; this relates to the biblical version ofman as made of dust and therefore as frail
(Gen. 2.7; Ps. 103.14). Howell observes glass is made through transmutation of'Dust
and Sand' into 'such a diaphanous pellucid dainty body as you see a Crystal-Glasse
is' (46). In this model, women alone receive the ambivalent compliment of a glass¬
like beauty and fragility; this reflects women's frequent association with glasses.
This section begins with discussion of conventional mirror-motifs of feminine vanity
and of mirror-motifs' associations with sexual reproduction and biological offspring.
It then considers Shakespeare's depiction of women's attempts to refashion the
frames constraining their subjectivity.
Feminine vanity was a theme variously engaged with by Shakespeare. In
Love's Labour's Lost, the King's sonnet to the Princess begs that she love him and
not herself as reflected in the tears he sheds for love of her: 'But do not love thyself;
then thou wilt keep/ My tears for glasses, and still make me weep' (4.3.34-35). The
indicated irony is that he, out of love, may furnish her with a means of narcissistic
self-reflection. In A Midsummer Night's Dream there is a deliberate ambiguity as to
whether Helena has been misled in her self-estimation by her mirror or her own eyes,
when she realises her love is unrequited: 'What wicked and dissembling glass of
mine/ Made me compare with Hermia's sphery eyne!' (2.2.104-5). 'A Very Woman'
is described by Overbury thus: 'She thinks she is fair though many times her opinion
goes alone, and she loves her glass' (33). Ben Jonson describes his 'Epistle. To
Katherine, Lady Aubrey' as
Yourself but told unto yourself, and see
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In my character, what your features be,
You will not from the paper slightly pass:
No lady, but, at some time, loves her glass. (23-26)
As in Spenser's invitation to Elizabeth I, mentioned in Chapter 5, the commonplace
of women's vanity is harnessed with the text proffered as the true mirror of herself,
which he invites her to admire. The association of mirrors with items of vanity is
suggested by its being listed along with trinkets and baubles in The Winter's Tale by
Autolycus, a man who disdains honesty (4.4.585-88). Similarly, Tomkis has Tactus
joke that 'there is such doing with their looking-glasses...a Ship is sooner rigd by
farre, then a Gentlewoman made ready' {Lingua sig. I2v). By contrast the modest
Perdita in The Winter's Tale remarks that dressed up in finery she would 'swoon, I
think,/ To show myself a glass' (4.4.12-13). In a riddle the Fool in King Lear
obliquely compares Lear's vanity to that of a woman: 'for there was never yet fair
woman but she made mouths in a glass' (3.2.34-35). Remembering the ending in
King Lear in which a fair woman fails to make mouths in a glass, this is poignantly
echoed in the tragedy of death's mistless looking glass.
This literary tradition is influenced by Ovid, Petrarca and biblical scripture.
Marlowe's translation of Ovid's 'Liber Secundus: Elegia 17' laments Corinna's
vanity reproduced in her false-glass: 'But by her glasse disdainefull pride she
learnes,/ Nor she her selfe but first trim'd up discernes (9-10). Petrarca's 'Sonnet 45'
describes the mirror as his rival for Laura's affections as he has been replaced in her
heart by her own image, whilst in 'Sonnet 46' the mirror is blamed instead of Laura.
Meanwhile, Donne draws on the association in Exodus 38.8 of women with mirrors
and vanity, in order to indicate both humanity's general vanity and its potential for
purification:
Moses made the laver in the Tabernacle, of the looking glasses ofwomen: Scarce can
you imagine a vainer thing (except you will except the vaine lookers on, in that action)
then the looking-glasses of women; and yet Moses brought the looking-glasses of
women to a religious use, to shew them that came in, the spots of dirt, which they had
taken by the way, that they might wash themselves cleane before they passed any
further. {Sermons 8: 224)
The idea of women as narcissistically supplemented by mirrors, or by suitors acting
as mirrors, descends from classical and Christian traditions. Mirror-motifs connected
with maintaining personal appearance or love demonstrate a tendency to associate
negative aspects with women in the form of vanity and narcissism, with the
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displacement onto women of anxieties about the mutability and malleability of the
subject.
Yet, in Shakespeare's 'Sonnet 3' the beloved is advised to: 'Look in thy glass,
and tell the face thou viewest/ Now is the time that face should form another', as the
lover attempts to harness the beloved's narcissism, to turn him from technological to
a biological mirror-image, by reminding the beloved that he is his 'mother's glass', a
visual echo in a chain ofmirrors, that only persists through repetition (1-2, 9). Rene
Graziani's study of the numbering of the sonnets, explains that the number two was
understood as female and three as male, which combined to form the production of a
foetus in 'Sonnet 5' (80). The foetal allusion to man as flow constricted by a glass¬
like body of womb: 'A liquid prisoner pent in walls of glass' conjures the diagrams
in medical texts of babies in the womb depicted as if in glass urinals (10; Raynalde
sigs. K9r-K10v). Mirror-motifs fertilely allude to a woman's encompassing womb
and the fragility of a woman's hymen, and so to her reproductive capacity and
virginity or chastity. Bosola in Webster's The Duchess ofMalfi, voices suspicions of
the Duchesses' pregnancy as: 'There was a young waiting-woman had a monstrous
desire to see the glass-house... And it was only to know what strange instrument it
was should swell up a glass to the fashion of a woman's belly.' (2.2.5-10). Whilst the
Cardinal simultaneously deploys misogynistic mirror-motifs concerning women's
mutability, with the need of the technological assistance of a glass telescope, before
an unchanging woman be found:
Sooth, generally for women;
A man might strive to make glass malleable,
Ere he should make them fixed ...
We had need to go borrow that fantastic glass
Invented by Galileo the Florentine
To view another spacious world i' th' moon,
And look to find a constant woman there. (2.4.13-19)
Permeability and inconstancy are repeatedly conjoined as feminine glass-like
qualities.
In The Rape of Lucrece Lucretius poignantly captures in the image of his
daughter as a 'broken glass', her rape, subsequent suicide and the mirror-image of his
youth now shattered:
Poor broken glass, I often did behold
In thy sweet semblance my old age new born;
But now that fair fresh mirror, dim and old,
Shows me a bare-boned death by time outworn.
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O, from thy cheeks my image thou hast torn,
And shivered all the beauty ofmy glass,
That I no more can see what I once was. (1758-64)
Montaigne's essay 'Of the Resemblance of Children to Fathers' describes this
wondrous chain of resemblances: 'What a prodigy it is that the drop of a seed from
which we are produced bears in itself the impressions not only of the bodily form but
of the thoughts and inclinations of our fathers!' (701). When the mother is depicted
as contributing to the formation of the child it is more frequently in negative terms:
I have bewept a worthy husband's death,
And lived with looking on his images.
But now two mirrors of his princely semblance
Are cracked in pieces by malignant death,
And I for comfort have but one false glass,
That grieves me when I see my shame in him. (R3 2.2.49-54)
Richard's mother laments the death of her two sons in terms of losing accurate
images of their father, whilst now she has only Richard's 'false glass', a motif that
suggests not only his lack of similarity to his father, but also his untrustworthy nature,
and deformity, for which she holds herself accountable (this is the only example in
Shakespeare that suggests any distinction between a mirror as positive and a glass as
negative). Misogyny operated through mirror-motifs that suggest failure of the child
to resemble the father was caused by the mother: 'Thy mother's son! Like enough,
and thy father's shadow. So the son of the female is the shadow of the male - it is
often so indeed - but not of the father's substance' (2H4 3.2.120-122). The
association of glasses with women reflects attempts to purge the fragile and opaque
mutability of the humoural subject, through the displacement of concerns onto the
female sex and gender.
However, though early modern anxiety about extended subjectivity is displaced
onto women, it is also reformed by them. Mary Wroth's Paraphilia to Amphilanthus
provides an instance penned by a contemporary woman, and is the first known
sonnet sequence by an English woman writer. The sequence addresses a male
beloved inverting the convention of male lover-poet and female beloved-muse.
'Sonnet 46' describes how in a well the female lover sees: 'Myself a living glass as
well as she,/ For love to see himself in truly placed' (13-14). This description evokes
the lover's third-person relation to herself, enabled by the glass, looked in not out of
self-admiration but to imagine what he sees when he looks at her, and so involves her
taking up the male position of gazer, as the female poet does in writing. Yet it also
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reinstates the women-as-glass motif, with this gesture of situating herself as feminine
glass seeming an act of atonement.
In Measure for Measure a questioning ofmisogynistic assumptions is enacted
by Isabella, who throughout the play retains a liminal stance. Critical division over
whether Isabella represents a repressed saintly femininity or a hollow reed for the
voice of the writer, elides her attempt to reform conventional gender roles; Lawrence
Sargant Hall argues that Isabella is the voice of the playwright, whereas Maus
suggests that Isabella's 'stringent version of the ascetic project is...a repression-into-
unconsciousness' (157-8; 165-66). Yet, Isabella disruptively counter-reflects
Angelo's misogyny:
ANGELO Nay, women are frail too.
ISABELLA Ay, as the glasses where they view themselves,
Which are as easy broke as they make forms.
Women? Help, heaven! Men their creation mar
In profiting by them. Nay, call us ten times frail,
For we are as soft as our complexions are,
And credulous to false prints. (2.4.124-29)
There is a conjoining here of various conventional mirror metaphors: fragility, lovers,
productivity, and mutability. Isabella agrees with Angelo to women being frail, in
order to refer it to men's breaking ofwomen's hymens to 'profit' through biological
increase, with the implication that inadequate children would be the fault of the man
since women are dispositional^ susceptible to the 'false prints' of the men. In
addition, this can be interpreted as suggesting that women are frail as a reflection of
the men in which they view themselves, with women misled by men's flattery.
Isabella's argument twice lays the blame for the nature of women on men. Women
mirror the flaws of the men in which they are represented to themselves, with both
men and women as glass-like, suggesting the susceptibility of subjectivity to
construction through the internalisation of external cultural forms. Finally, women's
credulity to 'false prints' also suggests women's gullible susceptibility to the types of
puritanical aspersions printed against women and the misogynistic slander accepted
and perpetuated by women. Pamela Allen Brown describes women's roles in
policing the neighbourhood that 'shaped and weighed one's identity, creating
narratives that determined one's reputation' (37). The implication that gender may be
constructed through the adoption of external models which are internalised and
conceived of as natural, darkly echoes extended mind ideas' concept of the human
ability to internalise external models. Yet, Isabella's critical miming of early modern
misogynist stereotypes also follows a structure of subversion described by Butler, in
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which the feminine 'is that which is produced through displacement and which
returns as the possibility of a reverse-displacement' (Bodies 45).
The inherent instability of the mirror as motif made it ripe both for its
application to women and for the reformation of these stereotypes. In The Two Noble
Kinsmen the Second Queen appeals to Hippolyta, once an Amazonian queen and
soldier, as 'a dear glass of ladies' calling on her to use feminine wiles to manipulate
her husband Theseus, since she argues the feminine power of speech give Hippolyta
more power over him than he has over her or than she had through adopting a
masculine war against him (1.1.89-90). It is Hippolyta's sister Emilia, who responds
to the Three Queens' prayers that on their behalf she beg pity of Theseus 'in a
woman's key', but she redescribes her actions in a language which suggests it as a
means of force rather than a humble entreaty:
Being a natural sister of our sex,
Your sorrow beats so ardently upon me
That it shall make a counter-reflect 'gainst
My brother's heart, and warm it to some pity,
Though it were made of stone... (1.1.125-9)
The predisposition of the female sex to be affected by another's emotions is argued
by Emilia in her citing of her gender relation to the Queens as the cause of her
heterophenomenological affinity. Thus whilst carefully fashioning her empathy as
belonging to an emotionally impressionable feminine nature, and her behaviour as
fuelled by that feminine virtue, her image of counter-reflecting, like a mirror,
suggests an intensification of the forcefiilness of the request, as when the sun's heat
and light is intensified by reflection. The concept of the subjective viewpoint of
another being internalised by a subject is extended further here as it is shown as
thence being externalised upon another subject. Again made evident is the way in
which preconceptions of women could be reformed in order to serve different ends.
Chaucer figured the 'regne of the Femenye' as overcome by Hippolyta's marriage to
Theseus, with the passions figurally overcome by reason ('The Knight's Tale' 866);
Shakespeare shows through the feminine that the passions are never overcome and
are a vital component ofhuman fellow feeling.
The final example of Shakespeare's depiction of feminine critical mirroring of
gender stereotypes involves the identical twins of Twelfth Night. Viola and Sebastian
separated by shipwreck think each other dead, and Viola dressed as a man is in
amazement when she sees her brother again:
He named Sebastian. I my brother know
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Yet living in my glass. Even such and so
In favour was my brother, and he went
Still in this fashion, colour, ornament,
For him I imitate. (3.4.344-48)
Viola's identical appearance plays with issues of individuality and biological,
cultural and technological doubling, as well as the stereotype of the female as
sexually an inversion of the man, as a mirror-image is an inversion of reality. His
mirror-image appears in her mirror ironically through her imitation of him, assisted
by the cultural attire of a man. Then seeing her physical double, she recognises him
not as himself, but as the replica of her mirror-image, in a continuing series of
regresses in which the mirror-image has become substantial and the twins shadows.
The original appears to exist only through its reiteration by an image. John Lee
proposes that Shakespeare uses twins 'to offer epistemological problems', to provide
a 'sceptical presentation of human reason', and to explore the reciprocality involved
between art and nature (327): 'Shakespeare views the world of nurture and the world
ofnature as shaping one another, and so art - dramatic and literary art - as being not
only able to copy or re-present, but also to produce' (329). Underlying this mirror
play appears the outline of Shakespeare's concept of sociocultural and biological,
and artistic and natural forces as reciprocally constructive.
Historical displacements onto women, onto other nationalities, onto the
emotions, and onto the body are attempted as a means of purging and shoring up the
leaky walls of human subjectivity. Whilst in Shakespeare's works female characters'
attempts to reform misogynistic mirror-motifs involve the inversion of conventions
through reworkings of the material, rather than outright rejections of negative
stereotypes; such a move was perhaps beyond the imaginable within the constraints
ofearly modern sociocultural beliefs.
Looking Glasses of Love
The dynamics of love involves visual perception and physicality, and it can be
closely related to narcissistic self-love. Beginning with a brief examination of the
narcissism explicit in Shakespeare's 'Sonnet 22', this section then considers Thomas
Nagel's depiction of the visual and bodily arousal and self-awareness that occurs
through love or sexual desire. It is a story in which he tellingly uses a mirror, which
picks up on themes of social mirroring and of narcissistic elements in love, as well as
the heightening of self-awareness through being in love or looking in a mirror. This
leads into a discussion of the role of visual perception in early modern love and of
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the portrayal in 'Sonnet 24' of a visual and physical love, which emerges from early
modern beliefs about vision and souls. The discussion draws to a close with an
analysis ofRichard III and early modern views on narcissism and rejection of love.
The theme of self-love in love haunts early modern depictions of romantic
love, and nowhere more evocatively than in Shakespeare's 'Sonnet 22':
My glass shall not persuade me I am old
So long as youth and thou are of one date;
But when in thee time's furrows I behold,
Then look I death my days should expiate.
For all that beauty that doth cover thee
Is but the seemly raiment ofmy heart,
Which in thy breast doth live, as thine in me;
How can I then be elder than thou art? (1-8)
The lover does not identify with his actual mirror-image because of his identification
with his beloved. The use of another person and a mirror are set against one another,
technological and social supplements to the subject are juxtaposed as means of self-
knowledge, with reflection by the form of the beloved presented as the true glass to
the lover's phenomenological experience. The lover adopts the beloved young man's
qualities of youth and beauty, which are imagined his own through his projective
subjectification of the young man. The social glass is favoured to the technological
equivalent, but as Varela, Thompson and Rosch suggest people who are self-
interested, rather than other-interested, engage in 'self-referential relationships with
the other' (247). The touching reciprocity of the transposition of their hearts (9-12),
is undercut by the closing couplet's injunction: 'Presume not on thy heart when mine
is slain;/ Thou gav'st me thine not to give back again. (13-14). A contributory factor
to such identification of oneself with another was the fluidity of intersubjective
boundaries, but also relates more generally to the potential effect of being in love on
a lover.
The significant role played by mirroring in love and desire is a topic on which
Nagel has insights to offer. Following Sartre's definition of that which is sought by
sexual desire as 'double reciprocal incarnation', he describes the heightened
perception of both the sexual object and of oneself. Appropriating Shakespeare's
famous lovers, Nagel imagines the beginning of an attraction within a mirrored
room: Romeo noticing Juliet in the mirror is in 'the sexual grip' of his body; Juliet's
bodily presence is intensified by sensing Romeo in the mirror, and Romeo tracing
her gaze through the mirror realizes it is directed at him which 'gives him a sense of
his embodiment not only through his own reaction, but also through the eyes and
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reactions of another'; Juliet senses now that he senses her and then he senses that she
senses that he senses her with escalating arousal accompanying each stage. Thus,
both an enhanced sense of the other's and of our own embodiment are produced by
desire. This 'proliferation of levels of mutual awareness' is for Nagel an example of
'the complexity that typifies human interactions' (46). This exchange may be
contributed to by the mirror neuron system, adding a neurophysiological basis for the
sensation of vibrant interactive mirroring in love, and for the intimacy of the
exchange in 'Sonnet 22'.
'Mutual reflexivity' is my term to describe this two-way extended reflexivity.
In cases of reciprocal love you see yourself in the lover's eyes and so experience his
desire for you, which increases your desire and so on; and if mirror neurons play a
part (as the descriptions here seem to intuit), then at the same time as your own
experience of desire is firing off neurons, they are also firing through observation of
the other's desire. This would create a double mirroring effect of seemingly infinite
regress. Understanding of 'mutual reflexivity' and of self-love in love dates back to
Plato's depiction of a lover looking at their beloved as they would look into a mirror:
the beloved looking into the eyes of the lover 'fails to appreciate that he is seeing
himself in his lover as in a mirror. He has contracted counter-love as a reflection of
his lover's love' (255d-e). The dynamic role of visual perception in love has also
recently been connected by Ramachandran to the close wiring of vision and the
emotions ('Marco Polo'). In medieval and early modern writing on love a
combination of extramissive and intromissive theories were used: extramission
describing the process by which visual or light rays are emitted by the eyes of the
lover, and conversely intromission describing the process whereby atoms or light
rays are transmitted from the lover to the eye of the beloved. Thus, in 'The Ecstasy'
we find Donne's description of the lover's eyes united by gazing as their hands are
by holding:
Our hands were firmly cemented
With a fast balm, which thence did spring;
Our eye-beams twisted, and did thread
Our eyes, upon one double string' (5-8)
Material physicality and reflective visuality are counterparts in this exchange of
love. A. Mark Smith describes that visual penetration was understood to cause an
impression on the imagination and the memory, through a process analogous to
engraving with its time-span and clearness dependent on the intensity or repetition
of the impression (58-66). This describes perception, and by extension cognition,
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as occurring through a psychophyisiological impressionability. Due to its impact
in Love's Labour's Lost Boyet has to verbalise the symptoms of love detectable in
Navarre to the Princess, as Navarre has lost the power of speech or action.
Navarre's heart is described as imprinted with her image, which has entered
through the eyes where her image is glassed (3.1.235-36). Again the narcissism
and possessiveness of love is implied, with her 'form' described as 'his'.
Nevertheless, Navarre 'enchanted with gazes' experiences a synaesthetic reaction:
'To feel only looking', like Nagel's hypothetical couple (3.1.240, 3.1.246).
A mirroring process meticulously figured in 'Sonnet 24', develops the
representation of reciprocity through the play of eyes on one other:
Mine eye hath played the painter, and hath steeled
Thy beauty's form in table ofmy heart.
My body is the frame wherein 'tis held,
And perspective it is best painter's art;
For through the painter must you see his skill
To find where your true image pictured lies,
Which in my bosom's shop is hanging still,
That hath his windows glazed with thine eyes.
Now see what good turns eyes for eyes have done:
Mine eyes have drawn thy shape, and thine for me
Are windows to my breast, wherethrough the sun
Delights to peep, to gaze therein on thee
Yet eyes this cunning want to grace their art:
They draw but what they see, know not the heart. (1-14)
A running conceit of requiring another's eyes in which to truly perceive oneself,
begins with a subject being figured as reliant upon another person in order to truly
perceive himself; a presentation of a third-person perspective as more accurate than a
first-person perspective, Wilson describes the eyes as two-way mirrors 'not geuen to
man onely to se, but also to shewe, and set forth the meanyng of his mynde' {Arte
116). For this reason the deflowered Hero, in George Chapman's continuation of
Marlowe's Hero andLeander, is in anguish that her shame shall show:
For as a glasse is an inanimate eie,
And outwarde formes imbraceth inwardlie
So is the eye an animate glass that showes
In-formes without us. (464-65)
This was not only a literary conceit, as Crooke remarks that 'by the eyes as by a
window, you may looke euen into the secret corners of the Soule...the eyes are the
mirror or Looking-glasse of the Soule' (8-9). Robert Baldwin in his study of mutual
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gazing as an amatory motif in the early modern period, demonstrates that the theme
of reciprocal gazing was commonplace in Elizabethan poetry, and that it was linked
to the tradition of spiritual gazing, with an entwining of 'the sacramental and the
sensuous, the sacred and the profane' by both traditions (38-43). Yet, the lack of
distinctness between one person and another in the play ofmutual reflections leads to
concerns that love is but an extended form of narcissism, as explicitly worked out in
Shakespeare's sonnets and implied generically by the monologic sonnet form itself.
The young man in 'Sonnet 24' is shown as dependent on the speaker in order
to possess an understanding of his own disposition. The reference to 'perspective'
could mean to 'see through' as Helen Vendler points out, as well as suggesting the
ability to view things in perspective via a necessary distance (142). This picks up on
the early modern artistic use of perspective in art, with the explicit sense that the
beloved is shown accurately; yet since perspective was also associated with visual
tricks, there is an oblique implication that the reflected image is viewed flatteringly
'awry'. While a mirror is not referred to directly the suggestion is of a series of
reflections, and the eyes are described as being 'glazed', both in terms of
transparency and reflectiveness, with the passions the cause of this glazing. The
implication of 'true image' in addition to 'beauty's form' initially suggests that
inward qualities as well as physical image are imaged and corporealised by the lover.
However the couplet's conclusion that the eyes lack the ability to portray the heart,
suggests the reflection is in fact just an outward delineation of the visible; a reading
supported by the description of the eyes' role in 'Sonnet 46', 'mine eyes' due is thy
outward part'(13). The lover's complaint in the closing couplet indirectly places in
question the implied reciprocity and the accuracy of a third-person perspective (13).
As in 'Sonnet 22' suggestions of two-way interdependency are implied, then
collapsed. The stress in 'Sonnet 24' is on the lover's contribution to the beloved, who
is shown in need of the lover, reversing the actual dependency of the lover on the
beloved to provide him access to the qualities he lacks. In both sonnets the lover
while striving to construct an image of romantic reciprocal love, finds himself
trapped within various asymmetric constructions through his projective
subjectification or projective objectification of the beloved; 'projective
subjectification' is my own term, used to describe the effect of projecting one's
subjectivity onto another subject or object, whilst 'projective objectification' is used
to describe the failure to acknowledge another's subjectivity. The lover becomes the
conveyor of a narcissistic transaction, as obliquely signalled by the use of 'bosom's
shop' in 'Sonnet 24'. This reflects the use of trading terminology in the early modern
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economy of love. The phenomenological perspective that another subject can offer
the subject is shown to be as potentially problematic as our own.
In Richard III Richard discusses his perspective of himself with himself in two
soliloquies that inversely mirror each other. In the first passage Richard explains why
his physical deformity causes him to reject both love and self-love:
But I, that am not shaped for sportive tricks
Nor made to court an amorous looking-glass,
I that am rudely stamped and want love's majesty
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph,
I that am curtailed of this fair proportion,
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature,
Deformed, unfinished, sent before my time
Into this breathing world scarce half made up -
And that so lamely and unfashionable
That dogs bark at me as I halt by them -
Why, I in this weak piping time of peace
Have no delight to pass away the time,
Unless to spy my shadow in the sun
And descant on mine own deformity. (1.1.14-27)
Richard in comparing himself to his frolicking brother, King Edward, collates his
problem in one phrase: he 'wants love's majesty'. Unlike his brother he has neither
love nor the majesty of a king. That he has been 'half made up' and is
'unfashionable' suggests the body's sartorial equivalence, whilst 'stamped' suggests
counterfeiting terminology; both commonplace analogies between technological and
natural processes suggestive of the habitual analogies made between these. The
soliloquy concludes with the ambiguous statement that his deformity, unsuited to the
serene backdrop of peace restored, leaves him 'determined' to be a villain, through
courtly fashion's concern with appearances. In Webster's The White Devil Francisco
laments: 'That's the misery of peace. Only outsides are then respected' (5.1.117-18).
Richard's announcement to himself that he will take up the role of villain suggests
both his social isolation and the double nature of his use of the word 'determined'. In
similarly ambiguous terms, Bacon discusses to what extent a deformed person's
appearance relates to inner state, implying there is accordance, but that this is not
innate. Instead it is caused by the deformed person's wish to take revenge on nature
and to turn back on society its 'scorn':
Deformed Persons are commonly euen with Nature: For as Nature hath done ill by
them; So doe they by Nature...First as in their own Defence, as being exposed to
Scorn; But in Processe of Time, by a Generall Habit. ('OfDeformity,' Essays 179)
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It is the biological form combined with sociocultural customs which constrain each
other and doubly constrain Richard, placing into question the extent of individual
self-determination, played out between these constraints.
The 'amorous looking-glass' also contains a double meaning. It can be
understood as the literal object associated with a lover's desire to make oneself
beautiful for the beloved. The rejected Julia in The Two Gentlemen of Verona
discards her glass along with any care for her appearance: 'she did neglect her
looking-glass,/ And threw her sun-expelling mask away' (4.4.144-145). Or it can be
understood figuratively as designating one who acts as a mirror. This suggests the
coexistence of an indeterminate interchangeability between object, a real mirror, and
subject, the beloved. It also leaves the phrase open to suggest both the possibility of
a mutual amatory gazing or, as on Richard's disapproving tongue is more likely, a
form of extended narcissism: the word 'struts' and the 'wanton' ambling nymph
deride the vanity of courtly love. Leontes in The Winter's Tale needlessly consumed
with jealousy describes his wife and friend with an evident disgust 'as making
practised smiles/ As in a looking-glass' (1.2.118-19).
This latter interpretation is added to and juxtaposed with Richard's later
soliloquy in which amazement and mockery of the ease at which he's won Lady
Anne, especially after killing her husband and her father-in-law, seemingly causes
him to revise his earlier subjective perspective of himself:
Upon my life she finds, although I cannot,
Myself to be a marv'lous proper man.
I'll be at charges for a looking-glass
And entertain a score or two of tailors
To study fashions to adorn my body.
Since I am crept in favour with myself,
Shine out, fair sun, till I have bought a glass,
That I may see my shadow as I pass. (1.2.240-5, 1.2.249-50)
Richard has been cast suddenly into an amatory relation, yet remains in soliloquy and
pretends to desire its visual equivalent, a looking glass, to confirm his re-evaluation,
and to compare with the looking-glass of Anne in which he has found himself 'a
marv'lous proper man'. This confirms Maus' comment that Richard's attempts to
constitute himself and exclude the 'relational' modes with which he finds himself
'unwillingly entangled' since Renaissance theatre repeatedly presents 'the
impossibility of separating them' (53). In Richard III, the power of the mirror, like
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words, is that it traverses the boundaries between offering a social and a self-
referential relationship, so figuring the entanglement of these modes.
This scene also inversely mirrors Richard II. The deposed Richard II wishes
himself 'a mockery king of snow,/ Standing before the sun ofBolingbroke' (4.1.250-
51). Richard III having treacherously obtained power invites the sun, figuratively
himself, to shine, so he may admire himself. Before he would but spy his shadow by
it, but now he has become a shadow of himself through seeing himself reflected like
the sun in her eyes, rather than a shadow through his deformity barring him from
mutual reflection. In King John, Louis the Dauphin seeing himself reflected in
Blanche's eyes, proclaims to his father, the king, that he sees:
The shadow ofmyself formed in her eye;
Which, being but the shadow of your son,
Becomes a sun and makes your son a shadow.
I do protest I never loved myself
Till now enfixed I beheld myself
Drawn in the flattering table of her eye. (2.1.499-504)
The 'flattering' quality of love and mirrors resurfaces here, as Louis sees himself no
longer as the 'shadow' of his father, his father's 'son' having become a 'sun' in the
brightness of her eyes and the 'son' a shadow of his own reflection. However, in
Richard III his supposed transformation is a satire of the true metamorphosis of love;
his self-loathing and narcissistic self-love, are opposite sides of the same egoistic and
existential dis-ease. The potential of an empathetic reciprocity is mediated, or
constrained, by the make-up of the subjects involved: Richard's psychophysiology in
combination with his sociocultural context, results in his reaction to love: to scorn.
Yet, Izaak Walton's similar verdict is that 'love is a flattering mischief (18),
and Overbury describes 'An Amorist' as 'translated out of a man into folly; his
imagination is the glass of lust, and himself the traitor to his own discretion' (38).
Meanwhile, Bacon elaborates on the relation of love to narcissism, surprisingly
finding the former the more reprehensible:
For whereas it hath beene well said, that the Arch-flatterer, with whom all the petty
Flatterers haue Intelligence, is a Mans Selfe; Certainly, the Louer is more. For there
was neuer Proud Man, thought so absurdly well of himselfe, as the Louer doth of the
Person loued: And therefore, it was well said; That it is impossible to loue and to be
wise. ('Of Love,' Essays 40)
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The lover, as potentially more of flatterer than oneself, is a theme raised in As You
Like It, where Rosalind attempts to correct Silvius' over-estimation of Phoebe and
Phoebe's vanity fuelled by his fawning adoration of her:
'Tis such fools as you
That makes the world full of ill-favoured children.
'Tis not her glass but you that flatters her,
And out of you she sees herselfmore proper
Than any of her lineaments can show her. (3.5.53-57)
The lover is her flattering glass, in whose words and eyes her form is drawn better
than it is in actuality, verbal and social forms of reflection contrasted to the accuracy
of the technological instrument.
Within Shakespeare's mirror-motifs the lover and the beloved are revealed as
particularly susceptible to perceptual illusions and therefore are particularly
unreliable heterophenomenological guides. Love tends to be figured as blurring the
boundaries between one subject and other, which makes the lover incapable of a
distanced and critical reflection on the beloved. Although, the incapacity to return
love, as in Richard Ill's case, is what makes him appear a monster, rather than his
physical deformity. Still, narcissism, misogyny, an economic logic, and a potentially
problematic lack of critical distance, are repeatedly shown as undercutting the
possibility of one of the highest forms of extended subjectivity possible: the mutual
reflexivity of love.
Conclusions
Shakespeare provides a myriad of diversely angled mirrors which display early
modern culture's multiple and ambiguous perspectives, rather than a straightforward
mirroring of any one aspect of, or attitude to, the human subject and the world.
Nevertheless, the mirror-motifs explored in this chapter focus on issues of
humourality, social permeability, and the distance of human natural-born mirrors
from God. Issues pertaining to liminality and permeability pervade this chapter, with
humans between man and beast, and women between man and beast; whilst
conversely lovers conjoin one to another. Liminality and permeability, presented
through mirror-motifs, illuminate early modern understandings of human
extendibility, hybridity and heteronomy, making evident the anxiety and fascination
they aroused. Conventional mirror-motifs used to describe women show that women
act as a displacement for, and so highlight, wider anxieties about human nature's
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humoural materiality. Yet, Shakespeare's use of mirror-motifs inverts and
metamorphoses inherited concepts and images of existing literary and dramatic
traditions, reforming conventional frames by inviting the reader or spectator to enter
into the imaginative worlds set before them, to react to and interact with a complex
variety of roles and perspectives on the human subject and the world.
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Shakespeare: Perspectives and Words of Glass
For the mind ofMan is farre from the Nature of a cleare and equall glasse, wherein the
beames of things should reflect according to their true incidence; Nay, it is rather like
an inchanted glasse, full of superstition and Imposture... (Bacon, Advancement 116)
Issues concerning to what extent subjective experience is reliable or stable, and to
what extent subjective experience can or cannot be shared with, or inferred by other
people, and the relation of perception and language to mirrors are explored in this
chapter through an analysis of Shakespeare's mirror-motifs. The chapter begins by
focusing on various forms of extended subjectivity in Richard II and Richard's
attempted clinging to a contained and solipsistic view of subjectivity. Hamlef s
opening scenes echo this view but as the play develops the power of mirrors that
fashion people and ofwords that act like mirrors are revealed. The following section
explores early modern concepts of social prosthetic systems primarily in Julius
Caesar and Troilus and Criseyde. A final section explores a number of these themes
in 'Sonnet 77'. Shakespeare's works display a fascination with the multiple factors
that contribute to what is perceived and experienced by a subject, and between what
is perceived and experienced by different subjects and by the same subject within
different states and contexts.
Shakespeare's mirror-motifs reflect an early modern understanding of vision
and language as tools of revelation and distortion. Joel Fineman's Shakespeare's
Perjured Eye claims that Shakespeare invented 'a new poetic subjectivity' and that
this involved a movement to 'linguistic heterogeneity' from 'homogenous visuality'
(1,18):
Shakespeare substitutes for this ideal and this idealizing characterization of visionary
language...a different account that characterizes language as something corruptingly
linguistic rather than something ideally specular, as something duplicitiously verbal as
opposed to something singly visual. (15)
To demonstrate this shift Fineman makes a contrast between the subject of the
possessed eye/1 of the 'young man sonnet sequence, and the subject of the perjured
eye/ I of the dark lady sequence; paradoxically, given his argument, both use the
motifof the eye. In fact, both vision and language were understood as potentially
unreliable.
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In the early seventeenth century Galileo was exploring the errors and limits of
human vision, as well as of the other senses. Galileo's work implied that nature is
organised according to independent laws, to which humans do not have privileged
access, with the subsequent need to subject appearances to the scrutiny (Piccolino
and Wade 1320-21). Bacon in the opening quote uses a mirror-motif and perceptual
terms to explain the inaccuracies of our mental images. Relating back to the authority
ofPlato and his visual allegory of the shadows in the Cave, Bacon concludes:
So in like manner, although our persons liue in the view ofHeauen, yet our spirites are
included in the Caues of our owne complexions and Customes: which minister vnto vs
infinite Errours and vaine opinions, if they bee not recalled to examination.
{Advancement 117)
In the next section Bacon compares as a parallel the 'false appearances, that are
imposed vpon vs by words' {Advancement 117). As discussed in earlier chapters, the
shifting amalgam of psychophysiological, sociocultural and technological factors
was understood to contribute to the subject's experience of different worlds. During
this period, in addition to the continuation of a medieval focus on the relation of
human to divine perspective, there was a new shift in emphasis to the issue of
appearance and reality in relation to multiple subjective perspectives, and the
exploration of what can and cannot be inferred by a third-person mind about first-
person experience, which were explored through increasingly extended conceits.
Uneven Mirrors
The human understanding is like an uneven mirror receiving rays from things and
merging its own nature with the nature of things, which thus distorts and corrupts it.
(Bacon New 41)
Richard II demonstrates the potential unreliability of the mind; it exposes the fact
that the instruments used to make and measure judgements, whether faculties of the
brain, the body, other people, language or a mirror, may prove unreliable.
The effect of the passions on the cognitive processes is figured through the use
of a perspective glass, a perspective picture, and visual perception. The Queen
describing that she senses further sorrow to come, but unable to discern a tangible
reason, labours without immediate object:
Some unborn sorrow, ripe in fortune's womb,
Is coming towards me; and my inward soul
At nothing trembles. (2.2.10-12)
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Bushy, a favourite of her husband's, attempts to console her pregnant 'heavy
nothing' (2.2.32), with a complex conceit intended to demonstrate the perceptual
distortions ofgrief:
Each substance of a grief hath twenty shadows
Which shows like grief itself but is not so.
For sorrow's eye, glazed with blinding tears,
Divides one thing entire to many objects -
Like perspectives, which, rightly gazed upon,
Show nothing but confusion; eyed awry,
Distinguish form. So your sweet majesty,
Looking awry upon your lord's departure,
Finds shapes of griefmore than himself to wail,
Which, looked on as it is, is naught but shadows
Ofwhat it is not. (2.2.14-24)
Introspective perception is explained through comparison with visual perception
Bushy begins by describing the way in which one grief appears like many, because
sorrow 'glazed' the 'eye', describing the passions' power over perception;
Montaigne comments on the overwhelming effect of passing humours and passions:
'Either the melancholic humour grips me, or the choleric; and at this moment sadness
predominates in me by its own private authority, at that moment good cheer'
('Apology' 517). Firstly, Bushy describes grief as a perspective glass that multiplies
one into many, causing the appearance of imaginary causes in addition to the real
cause. Secondly, he describes it as an anamorphic perspective picture, which when
viewed at an angle makes apparent a form out of what looked at head on is only a
blur, like the skull in Holbein's The Ambassadors portrait. Thus, sorrow's effects are
illustrated through a comparison with optical illusions; as in the previous chapters
this suggests the use of knowledge about corporeality to understand cognitive
processes, and is an indicator of the epistemological blurring between categories that
reflect an ontological blurring as its basis.
Allan Shickman suggests both the perspectival tricks described could refer to a
perspective picture with horizontal pleats which gazed at from below would reveal
one picture, whilst another picture would be revealed by means of a mirror hanging
above it ('Perspective' 226). Yet, more convincing is Charles Forker's suggestion
that the fact that the first of Bushy's examples would yield false images, whilst the
second would reveal a true image through looking 'awry', reflects 'the play's
complex symbolism ofmirrors that paradoxically reveal both truth and falsity' (490).
Further, the use of perspective tricks to figure cognitive processes indicates the
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potential unreliability of a human subject's perspective, as well as the uncertainty
over whether or not our perspective at any time is or is not reliable and the lack of
stable means to measure it against.
Effects of looking 'awry', of perceiving things through the passions, were a
topic of concern: how could you know if what you perceived was accurate? In
Marlowe's Edward II, Gurney remarks on the self-perpetuating effect of the passions
on grief: 'Your passions make your dolours increase' (5.3.15). In Henry V, the king's
desire for Kate makes him see the cities he is conquering 'perspectively' as if he
were her breaching her maidenhood: 'the cities turned into a maid - for they are all
girdled with maiden walls that war hath never entered'(5.2.295-7). In Webster's The
White Devil Flamineo tries to convince Camillo of the foolishness of his jealousy, by
arguing that like 'spectacles fashion'd with such perspective art', jealousy makes
things appear that are not (2.1.101-2). In fact, Camillo's jealousy is well founded.
Similarly in Richard II the Queen's emotional premonition is proved correct when
Green enters immediately after with news of Bolingbroke's armed arrival (and the
audience already knew from Act 2 Scene 1 that her fears were justifiable). In early
modern humoural theories the 'affections [passions] and the higher cognitive
processes - judgement, memory imagination - mutually inform each other' (Rowe
172). So arguably as in Damasio's demonstration of the vital role of emotions in
reasoning and social inference, one reading suggested here is awareness that the
passions can play an accurate supplementary role, as well as a potentially distorting
role, in cognitive processing.
Since this is a play that explores questions of monarchical authority, this
scene can be viewed in relation to early modern concepts of the subject as the realm.
The political context against which this play was produced, as Maus succinctly
describes, involved both 'an old-fashioned aristocratic esteem for inherited status and
a new emphasis on the intellectual and practical accomplishments demanded by the
recently centralized Tudor bureaucracy' (58). On the one hand, Richard's disregard
of the deathbed premonitions of his trusty counsellor John of Gaunt, ranked lower on
the political hierarchical scale, contrasts with the Queen's heeding of her passions,
which are ranked lower on the epistemological hierarchical scale than reason..
Controversially this suggests that theories which regard emotions (counsellors) as
negligible to reason (kings) are flawed. On the other hand, a monarch's susceptibility
to influence by inferiors was a familiar source of concern, and in Richard II an
excuse for an uprising, with the monarchical identity negated by its pliability: 'The
King is not himself, but basely led/ By flatterers' (2.1.42-3). Thus, the question of the
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reliability of cognitive processes and of their means of supplementation extend into
the social and political realm.
Equality ofmen, and other worldly creations, outside of placing by fortune was
being questioned. Donne preaching at St. Paul's made a strong argument for the
equality and affinity of God's creations: 'That a flower that lives but a day, is an
abridgement of that King, that lives out his threescore and ten years' (Sermons 4:
128). Montaigne pointed out that a great president had as much need to stoop from
his throne to his toilet as did an artisan: shared human physicality placed in question
the mystique of rulership ('Of Repentance' 745). In Webster's The White Devil,
Francisco, disdains that he should kowtow to the Duke:
I shall never flatter him: I have studied man too much to do that. What difference is
between the Duke and I? No more than between two bricks; all made of one clay.
Only't may be one is plac'd on the top of the turret, the other in the bottom of a well,
by mere chance. If I were placed as high as the Duke, I should stick as fast; make as
fair a show; and bear out weather equally. (5.1.105-11)
In addition, the political theology that the born and anointed King or Queen had a
'political body' as well as a 'natural body', as used by Elizabeth to claim that though
she was a woman she had 'the heart and stomach of a king', was being
simultaneously invoked and eroded, on account of civil and religious strife and
disrupted succession lines (1). Meanwhile, contrary views about the nature of
monarchical role were circulating. Erasmus, following the mirror-for-princes genre
advised on the monarch's need for education and counsel, since a ruler who learnt by
experience may cause great suffering, and he pointedly insisted that a ruler should
'prefer to be a just man than to be an unjust prince' (Education 19-20). Machiavelli,
critiquing this genre and satirising humanist pieties, also advised a prince to educate
himself, but it was contrarily in how to appear just and be unjust for the sake of
success: 'a ruler especially a new ruler, cannot always act in ways that are considered
to be good because in order to maintain his power, he is often forced to act
treacherously' (62). Yet, despite their diverse ends, these works by their existence
put forward the need of a ruler for extended support systems of advisors and advice
manuals.
After relinquishing crown and sceptre to Bolingbroke, Richard remarks that his
sight (like the Queen's) is blurred by grief, although he can still make out the traitors
around him (4.1.238-39). Then reversing the movement of Bushy's conceit from
inward to outward and from one to many, Richard turning his eyes on himself
reflexively and introspectively, discovers himself a traitor too, as his natural body
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has undone his political one: 'For I have given here my soul's consent/ T'undeck the
pompous body of a king' (4.1.239-40). Spurning to look at a page of accusations, he
despairingly demands a mirror, retorting that:
I'll read enough
When I do see the very book indeed
Where all my sins are writ, and that's myself. (4.1.263-65)
The subject as readable through a book-like mirror-image, plays on material,
linguistic and spiritual analogies. The book-metaphor tempers Richard's refusal to
acknowledge the written accusations; it is his subjects' judgement he rejects. Instead
Richard seeks a higher form ofjudgement solipsistically through the reflection of his
mirror-image. This recalls the employment of physiognomy as a means of
understanding the mind, which involves the idea that the internal is connected with
and deducible from the external. Additionally, it recalls Crooke's celebration of
dissection as a means to self-knowledge through anatomy, such self-knowledge in
turn entailing knowledge of all creation: 'whosoeuer dooth well know himselfe,
knoweth allthings'(12). The mirror acts as an objective instrument by which Richard
may independently anatomise himself, through the self-knowledge afforded by his
face.
Richard seeks mimetic accord between his psychological fracturing and the
mirror-image, expecting his facial expression and appearance to mark his emotional
turmoil, but instead the glass reflects an unmarked physical appearance:
No deeper wrinkles yet? Hath sorrow struck
So many blows upon this face of mine
And made no deeper wounds? O flatt'ring glass,
Like to my followers in prosperity,
Thou dost beguile me! (4.1.67-71)
The lack of accord between inward and outward, he compares to the misleading
guidance of followers, who were a proverbial 'flatt'ring glass'. Attempts to find
external validation, through other people or the objective instrument, are rejected as
false; knotting together social and physical tools as unreliable, and increasing his
reliance on introspection. The failure of visual and social means to provide Richard
with validation implies a view of subjective consciousness as inexpressible and
impenetrable to others. Yet Richard's sense of himself has changed, and he therefore
cannot identify with the face which appears the same as before he was dethroned: if
he does not feel the same how can he appear the same? This concern with the
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division between his subjective experience and perception do not cause him to doubt
his inward perspective, only outward and external ones. Richard's egoism prevents
consideration of this possibility; the same flaw that has caused his fall marks his
reaction to it.
'A brittle glory shineth in this face./ As brittle as the glory is the face!'
(4.1.277-78) Richard's lines as he prepares to smash the glass Richard Barbieri
suggests were influenced by some lines by Donne (58-60); yet, surely the mirror's
general association with the transience and precariousness of worldly fortune and
human embodiment make this too much of a commonplace for any definite
connection to be made. For example, Justus Lipsius (quoting Pliny) ridicules self-
exaltation given the precariousness of worldly fortune: 'Fortune is made of glasse,
who when it shineth brightest, is soonest broken'(179). Richard's speech climaxes
nonverbally: '[He shatters the glass]' (4.1.288). His electrifying act of breaking the
mirror resonates shock. Richard's earlier statement that 'I must nothing be' is
cathartically enacted: delivering the Queen's 'heavy nothing', with the shattering into
fragments of the mirror representing Bushy's intended conceit rendered awry as the
Queen's prophetic perspectival vision is brought to life, with the splitting of one into
many (4.1.191).
The animistic association of the mirror-image with the person reflected creates
a premonition that prefigures his later death, as Richard adopts the shattered mirror
again as a true representation. Richard's momentary identification with the shattered
glass, marked by his movement from 'this face' to 'the face' to 'my face', and his
caution that the glass is a warning to the 'silent king', applicable either, or both, to
Bolingbroke and to his past mirrored self, is shattered by Bolingbroke's realist
response to Richard's melodrama: 'The shadow of your sorrow hath destroyed/ The
shadow of your face' (4.1.282-83). This polysemantically layered statement implies
that his act, the shadow of sorrow, has only destroyed his mirror-image, his face's
shadow, suggesting an impotency in Richard's act. It also refers to the topos of a
deposed king as a sun become shadow, which also appears in Marlowe's Edward II,
as the vainglorious Edward in prison reflects: 'But what are kings, when regiment is
gone,/ But perfect shadowes in a sunshine day?' (5.1.27-28).
Richard then disassociates himself from the glass and even the very words he
speaks:
'Tis very true: my grief lies all within,
And these external manner of laments
Are merely shadows to the unseen grief
That swells with silence in the tortured soul. (4.1.285-88)
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Thus Richard has rejected whole and fractured mirror-images, and social, and
linguistic means as all incapable of representing his inward experience. This
disavowal disturbs an early modern sense of connection between inner and outer,
rupturing the system of cosmological analogies, such as remarked on earlier in the
play by Richard: 'Uncle, even in the glasses of thine eyes/ I see thy grieved heart'
(1.3.201). Yet Richard's histrionic attempt to reframe himself through a literal mirror
or verbal expression fails him as his grief remains seemingly unseen and unheard.
The implication is that not only is there an unbridgeable chasm between one subject
and another, but also between internal and external and past and present aspects of a
subject, since he no longer recognises the visual image with which he previously
associated his subjectivity. Richard argues that he is what remains 'within' which is
what is omitted by the words, the glass and the fragments: 'my grief the difference
between original and image. The correlation between mental construction of a self
and the feeling of emotions as phenomenologically one's own relates Richard's
description to the concept of reliable first-person experience. His griefs alone remain
solely his possession: 'You may my glories and my state depose,/ But not my griefs;
still am I king of those' (4.1.182-83). That view can produce, as is evident here, an
anxiety about mirrors, physical expression, language, and other people as providers
of extended reflexivity and is accompanied by the belief that only internal processes
are constitutive of our subjectivity.
Yet Richard's poignant conclusion, depicting the inexpressibility of grief,
surprisingly switches from use of the possessive adjective 'my', to the definite
article: 'the unseen grief and 'the tortured soul'. This use of the definite article
suggests that despite the supposed undoing of his 'political body', the relation of
Richard to himself switches between first- and third-person, between private and
public, with his monarchical identification manifesting itself in public performance, a
splitting also evident in his self-accusation of treachery. Montaigne exposes the
tendency in early modern society to conflate the public and private subject, with
clothes, objects and public roles and behaviour replacing the subject:
We cannot distinguish the skin from the shirt. It is enough to make up our face,
without making up the heart. I see some who transform and transubstantiate
themselves into as many new shapes and new beings as they undertake jobs...an
emperor...should know how to find pleasure in himself apart, and to reveal himself
like any Jack or Peter, at least to himself. ('Of Husbanding' 941)
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Richard II reveals the extent to which this inner subjectivity ofRichard is framed by
his role as king; as described by Nagel and Montaigne, imagination may be limited
by experience, and Richard II's central experience is of acting and framing himself
as a king (169). Furthermore, his claim of subjective isolation is undermined by the
fact that as he casts around for reference points to capture his experience of grief, he
is assisted through social dialogue with Bolingbroke.
Human shaping of ideas by intersubjective discourse is reflected in the nature
of drama itself. Although played before a multiplicity of audiences in diverse places
and times, each containing a multiplicity of individuals, to the extent that all are
embodied human subjects, there exists a certain empathy enabled by shared
neurophysiological attributes, which ignites a spark of poignant recognition at
Richard's expression of experiencing apparently inexpressible grief. The
neuroscientific research considered in Chapter 1 suggests that that there is a greater
sharing between first- and third-person experience than previously recognised, which
further explains the moving power of visual and verbal theatrical enactments. An
audience is moved through their mind mirroring Richard's enactment of his
experience of grief, although each person's concept ofgrief is embedded in their own
idiosyncratic network of emotional memories. That this is a fundamentally human
experience is indicated metadramatically by the fact that it is not Richard II, but an
actor who is interpreting the grief described by the playwright and then transmitting
it to the audience. In this way human's shared psychophysiologies and porous
intersubjective boundaries contribute to the dramatic power of theatre upon
spectators.
Richard's social extendedness is also denoted by his emotionally entwined
relationship with his wife. In a parallel scene to the shattering of the mirror, there is a
moving portrayal of the division of Richard from another aspect of himself, a
connection which he spells out:
Doubly divorced! Bad men, you violate
A twofold marriage, 'twixt my crown and me
And then betwixt me and my married wife. (5.1.71-73)
Richard's equation of his kingship to his union with his wife, is followed by he and
his wife's return of their hearts to each other via a kiss. They have been transposed in
each others' breasts, but the Queen fears she will kill him from broken-hearted grief
at their parting. Emotions are figured as socially extended, suggesting a subjectivity
which stretches beyond skin boundaries; as in Kosslyn's concept of social prosthetic
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systems. Richard's final parting with the queen prefigures the silence of death: 'The
rest let Sorrow say' (5.2.102).
In the penultimate scene, Richard attempts to recreate the Tittle world' of
England in the Tittle world' of the prison. Richard addresses an imaginary
interlocutor, 'Now, sir', recalling Rumelhart's and his colleagues' contention that
externalising through talking to oneself, has the same effect as writing on paper: it
assists in the solving of difficult problems, but causes a blurring between 'external'
and 'internal' since 'we ourselves produce the external representation' (47). Thus
this and other dramatic soliloquies can also be interpreted as blurring
intrasubjectivity and intersubjectivity, in a verbal equivalent of the extended
reflexivity of mirror-images, at once transitive and reflexive. Richard peoples the cell
with his thoughts, as the pregnant 'swell' of grief in his soul (echoing the queen's)
bears offspring:
My brain I'll prove the female to my soul,
My soul the father, and these two beget
A generation of still-breeding thoughts
And these same thoughts people this little world
In humours like the people of this world. (5.5.6-10)
Humoural physiology, man-as-microcosm, intellectual compared with physical
conception, and a multiplicity of internal cognitive agents: these are all concepts
explored in this thesis that are evident in the above extract. The multiple cognitive
offspring of his brain are mirror-images of himself: 'Thus play I in one person many
people' (5.5.31). He solipsistically imagines a world populated by himself, which is
both the Queen's many in one, as well as the one into many of the shattered mirror,
and the relation of king to people. Yet, the type of extendedness Richard now craves
can only be attained through death. George Wither's echoing of Richard's lines in
describing his own picture as 'but the Shadow of a SHADE', makes clear the type of
extendedness sought by Richard:
For, ev'n our living Bodies, (though they seeme
To others more, or more in our esteeme)
Are but the shadowes of that Reall-being,
Which doth extend beyond the Fleshly-seeing;
And, cannot be discerned, till we rise
Immortall-Objects, for Immortall-eyes.
Our Everlasting-Substance lies unseene,
Behinde the Fouldings, of a Carnall-Screenz...(Collection sig. A4r)
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Richard, having lost his public role and separated from his wife, shrinks his concept
of himself to an inner self only indirectly observable by others. Tragically he only
wants to play king, and his Christ-like martyrdom releases a joyful exclamation on
his triumphant rise to the heavens:
Mount, mount, my soul; thy seat is up on high,
Whilst my gross flesh sinks downward, here to die. [He dies.] (5.5.111-12)
Richard's climactic ascension breaks down any idea of an early modern subject as
limited to a contained individual, yet, the only way to achieve the purity and
autonomy Richard seeks is outwith the embodied body and humours: through death.
The division of Richard's soul from his fleshy embodiment is all that can finally
accomplish his ambition for a proprietary consciousness and transcendence.
First- and third-person phenomenologies' reliability is questioned by Richard II,
suggesting particular forms of this issue that emerged from the early modern context.
This is a play which compares multiple forms of reflexivity: technological, social,
linguistic, biological, psychological. Richard's rejection of language, the
technological instrument of the mirror, and social mirroring in his claim to a
proprietary phenomenonological consciousness that is not communicatable through
any outward shows is brought into question by the framing of his thoughts through
discourse and by the dynamic of theatrical spectacle. Though Richard is
intersubjectively extended through his relation to his wife, and intrasubjectively
multiple by the mass of cognitive offspring he imagines peopling his microcosmical
frame, his death alone seems to bring the regal, fixed and monolithic subjectivity he
desires.
'Mark and Glass, Copy and Book'
He was indeed the glass
Wherein the noble youth did dress themselves
So that in speech, in gait,
In diet, in affections of delight,
In military rules, humours of blood,
He was the mark and glass, copy and book,
That fashioned others. (2H4 2.3.21-22, 2.3.28-32)
One of the earliest and most conventional types of metaphorical use of the mirror in
English is the ideal mirror; it functions as an image of how you should be, which by
contrast with how you are, didactically invites virtuous self-improvement (Grabes
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79-80). Hamlet's metamorphosis from courtly ideal into critical mirror is the primary
focus of this section. This begins with discussion of conventional courtly ideal
mirrors, followed by an exploration of Hamlet's rejection of the superficial shows
connected with such mirrors. Later, Hamlet's conversion to the potential usefulness
of 'outward shows' produces his transformation into a critical mirror. Several of the
mirror-motifs in Hamlet employ notions of the extended mind, extended subjectivity
or reflexivity as a means of understanding the processes at work in the human mind
and world.
Ideal mirrors were generally human subjects depicted as sharing a function
with a technological instrument. Reflecting class bias, the ideal mirror was
commonly used to describe royalty or nobility: thus, in various Shakespeare plays:
Henry the Fourth's 'wisdom was a mirror to the wisest', Salisbury is the 'mirror of
all martial men', and Buckingham is the 'mirror of all courtesy' (3H6 3.3.84; 1H6
1.6.52; H5 2.1.54). It is an inversion of the normal function of the mirror imitating
the subject; instead the viewer should imitate the mirror. Yet, this follows the
dynamic of customary courtly measures to improve appearance courtesy of the
feedback of a visual supplement, the mirror. As in Stephen Kosslyn's theory of social
prosthetic systems other people act as an extension of our subjectivity and mind
through providing a means of reflection, and supplementing the means through
which feelings, thoughts, words and actions are formed and analysed. In the opening
quote, the ideal mirror is described as having 'fashioned' others who would 'dress'
themselves by it, through outward and inward imitation; imitating ways of talking
and gesturing, their humours and affections. The listing together of 'glass' and
'book', reflects a recurrent epistemological slippage between these two technologies
as innovative providers of images for reflection, as in Richard II's comparison of his
mirror-image to a book (4.1.264).
Hamlet is a mirror, and his play and words are piercing weapons: this is the
profound paradox at the end of Hamlet. For in Act One Scene Two, Hamlet rejects
the truth of images, shows and words, emphasizing the unutterability of the grief that
lies within:
Seems, madam? Nay, it is. I know not 'seems'.
'Tis not alone my inky cloak, good-mother,
Nor customary suits of solemn black,
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
Nor the dejected haviour of the visage,
Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief,
That can denote me truly. These indeed 'seem',
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For they are actions that a man might play;
But I have that within which passes show,
These but the trappings and suits ofwoe. (1.2.76-86)
In the drive to find in Hamlet a 'modern subjectivity' the speech above is an oft
quoted fragment of text; yet whilst the tendency to project current psychological and
philosophical trends upon Hamlet has been well catalogued, perhaps more interesting
is Hamlet's capacity to absorb these variant readings (De Grazia section 1-22;
Bynum and Neve 289-304). Jones and Stallybrass, in their study of the constitutive
function of clothes in the early modern period, point out that even here Hamlet's
words are "Tis not alone my inky cloak' (3). Furthermore, whilst Hamlet comments
that external shows might be played hypocritically, he also says they 'can denote me
truly'. Hamlet's distrust of outward appearances, as with Richard II, initially
suggests the superiority of a first-person phenomenology, since beyond show and
incapable of being played or seeming, at the same time as these shows ability to
denote truly as well as falsely is acknowledged; this single extract demonstrating the
polyvalent potential of Shakespearean discourse and its invitation of variant
interpretations that touch on philosophical issues.
After the opening revelation by Hamlet's father's ghost that he was murdered
by Claudius, Hamlet assumes a madness, whose poignancy lies in the fact that it
cannot be certainly ascertained is as feigned as he protests. He rages against Ophelia,
who uses the commonplace ideal mirror-motif in contrasting his current state with
the past Hamlet:
O what a noble mind is here o'erthrown!
The courtier's, soldier's, scholar's eye, tongue, sword,
Th' expectancy and rose of the fair state,
The glass of fashion and the mould of form,
Th' observed of all observers, quite, quite, down! (3.1.149-153)
Ophelia describes the courtly ideal from which Hamlet has been metamorphosed by
grief and desire for revenge. Yet in the first half of the play Hamlet is 'unpregnant of
my cause' (2.2.545), in refuge and contrast to the ambitious corruption of the court in
its fetid fecundity: "Tis an unweeded garden/ That grows to seed; things rank and
gross in nature/ Possess it merely' (1.2.135-7). Yet is Hamlet really describing the
court or himself? Burton describes that the lack of exercise and solitariness of a
scholar, such as Hamlet, made him particularly susceptible to melancholy, for as
'fern grows in untilled grounds, and all manners of weeds, so do gross humours in an
idle body' (1.2.2.6). Hamlet's disenchantment with the gap between 'seeming' and
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'being' haunts and incapacitates him; particularly indicative is his dismissive retort
to the verbose Polonius' enquiry of what he reads: 'Words, words, words'. Lacan's
complaint that alienation from language leads to madness and simply thickens the
'Language barrier' is called to mind ('Function' 44-45). In word play with
Rosencratz and Guildenstern, the repartee plays on language's fertile indeterminacy
making it appear dangerously without fixed referent as well as flexibly polysemous
(2.2.220 ff).
Yet, near the end of the play, when Hamlet satirises a subsidiary of ideal
mirrors, his scorn is directed by a different impetus. Hamlet mirrors the courtier
Osric's praise of Laertes:
But, in the verity of extolment, I take him to be a soul of great article, and his infusion
of such dearth and rareness as, to make true diction of him, his semblable is his mirror,
and who else would trace him his umbrage, nothing more. (5.2.102.10-14)
This type of conceit occurs in Bacon, for example, where he refers to Elizabeth I, as
'a Prince, that if Plutarch were now aliue to write parallels, would trouble him I
thinke, to find for her a parallel amongst women' (Advancement 42-43). Kiernan
notes this is a hyperbole derived from North's translation of Plutarch's Lives: 'I
compare Epaminondas to himselfe' (North 241), but it had become a commonplace
flattery. Cox, for instance, in the prefatory material to John Davies of Hereford's
Humours Heaven on Earth (1605), proclaims: 'IN all thy Writings thou hast such a
Vaine,/ As but thy selfe thy selfe canst counterfet' (sig. A4r). The conceit that
someone was so superlative that they were inimitable, with no likeness other than
that in their mirror, suggests technological mirroring is superior to the social variety,
and it occupies a first-person phenomenological basis, which claims the impossibility
of a living parallel. Judith Butler offers a useful insight into the link made between
singularity and the claim to authenticity with which Richard II draws to a close and
that Hamlet pries open: 'The notion of singularity is very often bound up with
existential romanticism and with a claim of authenticity'(Gz'v/'i7g- 34). Hamlet's
insistence on the inexpressibility of Laertes' superior inimitability could seem a
continuation of his earlier phenomenological sentiments, were they not laced with
heavy irony. Thus, whilst Hamlet's disdain of courtly rhetoric remains the same, the
satirical nature of this comment makes evident that he is now calling into question
the authority of such claims that he began the play with for inimitable inwardness.
Hamlet's attitude to words and to mirrors is both transformed and cause of
transformations in the course of the play.
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Hamlet's rejection of being a living courtly mirror is linked to a wider
discontent with ideal mirror-motifs, which had become a subject for merriment, at
the same time as their genuinely laudatory application continued to be widespread. In
Beaumont's parody The Knight of the Burning Pestle (1613), Rafe's reading leads
him to reminisce nostalgically about the days of chivalry, when princesses would say
'"All-happy knight, the mirror of all such as follow arms'" (1.225-28). Zitner notes
contemporary enthusiasm 'for chronicle kings, fantasy princes and merchant
worthies; for adventure, marvel, pomp, slapstick, horror, and decent sentiment' (28).
Beaumont satirises these contemporary yearnings for the heroic with his mock-heroic
play. Rafe is inspired by his reading to turn knight and be the first grocer-errant, a la
Don Quixote; in fact, in an opening epistle Beaumont employs the book-child
metaphor to claim kinship with and precedence over this rival burlesque: 'Perhaps it
will be thought to be of the race of Don Quixote. We both may confidently swear it
is his elder brother above a year, and therefore may (by virtue of his birthright)
challenge the wall of him' (52). Thus, theatrical satirisations of conventional mirror-
motifs were emerging.
Furthermore, courtly mirrors were inextricably bound up with the vanities of
court life. In Henry V, whilst King Harry is lauded as 'the mirror of all Christian
kings' (2.Chorus.6), since the term 'glass-gazing' was in itself an insult (Lr. 2.2.15-
16), in his elegant show of unpretentious modesty he mentions along with the fact
that he 'cannot gasp out my eloquence' (at the very time of doing so) that he 'never
looks in his glass for love of anything he sees there' (5.2.139-45). Conversely, in The
Tempest Miranda's declaration that she does not know a women's face, 'Save from
my glass mine own', suggests not vanity, but innocence of the feminine wiles of
court life, which has preserved the otherworldliness Ferdinand admires (3.1.50).
Paster notes a readiness to 'alter body, mood and behaviour' was socially expected,
yet it is flatterers who Jonson describes that 'Laugh, when their patron laughes;
sweat, when he sweates;/ Be hot, and cold with him; change euery moode,/ Habit,
and garbe, as often as he varies' (Humoring 194; Sejanus 1.1.33-35). Those who
employ courtly mirrors are a source of ridicule, both despite and because of the
social necessity that the lower person in the hierarchy of any given company
becomes what is described in Timon ofAthens as a 'glass-faced flatterer' (1.1.59).
This also suggests that for most, adaptability in mirroring as well as being mirrored
was required in early modern urban and courtly society, along with a dose of tactful
discrimination. Recalling the letter by the maidservants discussed earlier, Earle
describes that a 'Serving Man' is 'one of the makings up of a gentleman as well as
his clothes, and somewhat in the same nature' and regards 'it a part of his duty to be
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like him' (191). Socially extended reflexivity and subjectivity was both in operation
and acknowledged, if not always approved of, in early modern society.
The town of Tarsus in Pericles epitomises the vain self-admiration produced by
the increasing emphasis on appearances in courtly and urban life: 'Whose men and
dames so jetted and adorned/ Like one another's glass to trim them by' (4.26-7)
Comically this redirects back at their urban and courtly audiences the scornful
comments made about the players of theatres: 'All their care is to be like Apes, to
immitate and expresse other mens actions in their own persons' (Lupton 82). James
Knowles suggests that whilst the 'ape/poet' metaphor works to distinguish between
ape and man, the performance of imitation involved in acting 'disconcertingly raises
the possibility that aping as an action, especially when staged, is actually and simply
being an ape'(143). The actor appears to threaten humanity's constitutive supremacy,
by its reflection of our inherent hybridity. The profound questions and tensions about
human liminality and heteronomy raised by mirrors and theatrical players are
because they both figure a representation of living forms, and are potentially
revelatory of the working of our interior and social worlds. The evident scorn of
aping-mirrors reflects anxiety over the extent to which not just actors, but human
subjects in society act as mirrors (which necessarily ape) and are therefore
manipulable, interchangeable and insubstantial. The potential for extended
subjectivity and reflexivity to become instead personal and socially extended forms
of narcissism, give added reasons for Hamlet's initial throwing down of the socially
reflexive role as the 'glass of fashion'.
The turning point in Hamlet is his re-enchantment with words and shows.
Struck by the ability of a player only 'in a fiction' to imitate emotions so faithfully
tears are in his eyes, his voice broken and 'his whole function suiting/ With forms to
his conceit', Hamlet remonstrates with himself for being a 'dull and muddy-mettled
rascal' in his delay seeking revenge (2.2.529, 2.2.533-34, 2.2.544). Paster points out
that 'mettle' was used to refer to metal and to a person's character, with 'the positive
implication of ardour or spirit', and could mean 'any kind of matter', especially
'earthy matter'; therefore Hamlet is describing himself 'as one whose cognitive
faculties are literally darkened (muddied) and slowed by the workings of the
melancholy humours' (Humoring 46-47). Besides, by depicting himself figurally as a
dull, muddy and so unreflective metal, he also evokes his failure to act as a corrective
mirror. Earle's description of the character of 'A Discontented Man' amounts to a
mirror-image ofHamlet:
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Is one that has fallen out with the world, and will be revenged on himself...He
considered not the nature of the world till he felt it, and all blows fall on him the
heavier, because they light not on his expectation. He has now foregone all but his
pride, and is yet vain-glorious in the ostentation of his melancholy. His composure of
himself is a studied carelessness, with his arms across, and a neglected hanging of his
head and cloak.. .He quarrels at the time and up-starts.. .His life is a perpetual satire,
and he is still girding the age's vanity...(150)
Thus, it is in fact through his humoural disposition that Hamlet's melancholic apathy,
his unmannerly rebuttal of society's vanities, and his urge to reveal to the world its
corruption emerges.
Yet startlingly Hamlet's muddiness, enflamed by the player's performance,
like the dust and sand Howell describes transubstantiated by the Venetian furnaces,
becomes a clear reflecting glass. 'About, my brain' he instructs himself, immediately
setting to work on his plan for a play (48; 2.2.565). In her study of melancholy,
Radden comments that Freud's intuition in 'Mourning and Melancholia' that the
melancholic had a keener eye for the truth is borne out by empirical studies (157; see
also Taylor and Brown 197). John Marston provides an early modern instance of this
belief as in The Scovrge of Villanie (1598) he calls on heartfelt melancholy to assist
him: 'Ingenuous Melancholy, I implore/ Thy graue assistance' (sig. B5r). Since this
descends from the classical tradition connecting melancholy with genius discussed
earlier (Screech 35), Hamlet's startling melancholic insights, despite and because of
his unbalanced nature, would make sense to an early modern audience at the same
time as raising the troubling question of the extent of the role of humours in
determining cognitive processes and human subjects. Hamlet's girding of the age's
vanity is both frustrated and contributed to by his melancholic disposition, which is
then elevated and impassioned by the moving capacities of the dramatic play into
action. The inspiration of the players marks Hamlet's realisation that although
courtiers use fictions to cover the truth, Hamlet can use the fiction of the play to
uncover a truth: words are a practical means to truth as well as to seeming.
Planning the presentation of a play, which reveals in fictional form Claudius'
murder of his father, Hamlet asserts 'I'll observe his looks/ I'll tent him to the quick'
(2.2.573-4); a 'tent' was a surgical instrument used to examine or cleanse a wound.
Paster comments on the 'purgative discourse' of the play (Humouring 55). Indeed,
Renaissance satire was commonly described as a scourge or scalpel to probe and
purge the patient as in Stubbes' Anatomy ofAbuses or Marston's Scourge of Villainy
(and also often as a mirror, as for example in Baldwin's Mirror for Magistrates).
Davies of Hereford versifies the need for the equivalent to piercing physical
wounding for moral remedy:
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Yee oft haue heard, that Sores quite mortified,
(If euer they be cured as they ought)
Must haue sharpe Corrasiues thereto appli'd,
Else one sore part may bring the whole to nought ('Humours' 29)
In A Defense Of Poesy, written in the 1580s, Philip Sidney describes the virtue of
tragedy as that it 'openeth the greatest wounds, and showeth forth the ulcers that are
covered with tissue; that maketh kings fear to be tyrants, and tyrants manifest their
tyrannical humours' (230); depicting figural violence as a necessary curative to strip
away the coverings of habit in a critical probing way. Troilus and Cressida uses a
similar metaphor that clarifies the meaning here, as Hector explains: 'modest doubt is
called/ The beacon of the wise, the tent that searches/ To th' bottom of the worst'
(2.2.14-16). As in Richard II, physical terminology is adopted to describe the
expositional effects of mirrors and words, which are here deployed to reveal vice and
'catch the conscience of the King' (2.2.582). Thomas Beard compares the
responsibility that players 'set aloft' have to present 'a glasse of vertue' with the
responsibility of a prince: 'Like Prince, like People; insomuch that every one desireth
to frame himselfe according to the humour of his superiour' (3). Hamlet practically
demonstrates and applies early modern belief that a play, a staged exposition of 'as
if, provokes the passions, assists the mind in making imaginative leaps, and exposes
to the viewer's his own nature and moral bearing.
Hamlet's direction to the players of The Mousetrap also uses physiological
analogies to convey their performance's purpose:
Suit the action to the word, the word to the action, with this special observance: that
you o'erstep not the modesty of nature. For anything so overdone is from the purpose
of playing, whose end, both at fu st and now, was and is to hold as 'twere the mirror up
to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and
body of the time his form and pressure. (3.2.14-22)
The emphasis on being 'natural' in Hamlet's directions to the players suggests that
the dramatic mirror Hamlet is holding up to the court, an inversion of the fashionable
glass, is intended to be seen as trustworthy. Walton claims his depiction of Donne to
be 'the Authors Picture in a natural dress, which ought to beget faith in what is
spoken' (Walton 11). In a similar manner, Overbury's describes 'An Excellent
Actor': 'He doth not strive to make nature monstrous; she is often seen in the same
scene with him, but neither on stilts or crutches...By his action he fortifies moral
precepts with examples' (83-84). Thus, Hamlet here employs early modern literary
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convention in which emphasis on naturalness, often tied to expressions concerning
the lack of artificial showiness, are made as guarantors of truthfulness and morality.
Moreover, Hamlet describes the play as a corporealisation of the sociocultural
era, a making of it graphic, sinewy, through its performance by players. His is an
image of theatre as possessing a gestural and linguistic dynamics that images the
personified society as a physical structure, an encompassing stage-as-world, and a
visual mirror akin to the aspirations of early modern anatomised images. In Every
Man out of his Humour Jonson contemporaneously uses a similar metaphor with
explicit anatomical references:
And to these courteous eyes oppose a mirrour
As large as is the stage, whereon we act:
Where they shall see the times deformitie
Anatomiz'd in euery nerue and sinew,
With constant courage, and contempt of fear. (Ind. 118-122)
Self-knowledge and knowledge of the world are produced through a corporeal-like
dissection of the world-as-man. Hamlet's play's intention is to produce a reaction, an
awareness and reflexive thoughts, to validate and interrogate the structure of the
society it reflects, through the double enactment of words and gestures. The
theatrical spectacle recalls McNeill's idea of language as 'imagery-language'
dialectic, the imagery provided by gestures embodying meaning through physical
enactment in co-expression with speech, powerfully doubling the message (92).
The dramatic performance catches the audience's conscience by creating a
reflective surface, placing the audience face to face with recognisable moral issues
placed within an imagined setting. Bernard Spivak points out the use of such
apologies as play prologues a generation before Hamlet, on which basis Spivak
argues that in Hamlet as in early morality dramas: 'To "catch the conscience" of the
audience is the professed aim, just as it is implicit in the very nature, of every
morality play' (104). What is significantly different though is that in Hamlet, this
takes place within the play itself rather than as an 'objective' prologue, with the
subjective holder up of this mirror, the melancholic Hamlet. Furthermore, I think
Shakespeare has pointedly worked into the play a defence of theatre and playwriters
by satirically inverting Gosson's influential rebuking of 'Poets in Theaters' who
'wounde the conscience' (14). Gosson continues that whilst cooks and painters
'extendeth' their arts only as far as the 'outwarde sense, which is common too vs
with bruite beasts', the dramatist is much more dangerous, as 'these by the priuie
entries of the eare, slip downe into the hart, & with gunshotte of affection gaule the
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minde, where reason and vertue should rule the roste' (14-15, 15). Figured on the
stage in Hamlet's play is the enactment of Claudius' murder of his brother by
pouring poison in the ears, with the play not the perpetuation but the uncovering of
poisonous vice: if it wounds it is to catch the conscience.
Hamlet sceptically transforms rather than throws down the mimetic potential of
drama, as Hamlet finally does his personal role as mirror. Hamlet's play provides
evidence of Claudius' guilt, through causing him to abruptly rise in protest, with
Hamlet almost gleeful to catch Claudius with 'false fire', corresponding to Claudius
use of guilt-concealing outward shows (3.2.244). Mary Crane suggests that in
Hamlet 'the only successful performative utterances are those that have behind them
not sincere intentions but rather power itself (150). However, against this is not only
Hamlet's use of the play, but his use of written words to cause Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern's deaths, suggesting the effectiveness of language by itself (albeit here
through the false appearance of having legitimising power). Similarly Jane Tylus in
an analysis of early modern European drama's move away from notions ofmirroring,
argues that in Hamlet the theatre's 'revelations are revealed as only gratuitous,
prurient and invasive rather than efficacious, effecting no narrative resolution' (270).
Yet, the power ofmirror-plays is shown not only by Claudius' inability to sit through
the play, but even more by that fact he is moved to attempt to confess his sins
privately. The irony is that Hamlet does not murder him for fear his confession will
take him directly to heaven, not realising it is unintentionally another of Claudius'
performances without substance: 'My words fly up, my thoughts remain below./
Words without thoughts never to heaven go' (3.3.97-98) Habit has transformed his
disposition, in the same way that the theatrical spectacle has moved him to attempt
prayer. This early modern belief dates back to Aristotle: 'It makes no small
difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth;
it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference' (2.1.1103b). Davies of
Hereford simply states 'Custome is another nature', whilst Rogers elaborates 'The
minde of a craftie man, by practise is hardened, euen as the hande of a worke-man by
great labour' ('Humours' 33; B5r; see also Bacon, 'OfNature' Essays 162). Thus the
parallel between physical and mental shaping through performativity is evoked.
Hamlet's personal presentation of a didactic mirror to his mother in her closet
re-enacts the holding up of a truthful mirror by a man himself awry. As Polonius,
remarks earlier in the play: 'How pregnant sometimes his replies are - a happiness
that often madness hits on, which reason and sanity could not so prosperously be
delivered of (2.2.207-9) Hamlet's stated purpose echoes his directions to the players,
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now directed at the blameworthy party, rather than the portraying players, whose
position he occupies, and at an individual soul rather than an entire age:
You go not till I set you up a glass
Where you may see the inmost part of you. (3.4.19-20)
Paster remarks that Hamlets' intention to 'speak daggers' and the Queen's comment
on his 'words like daggers' suggests a repetition of the play's purpose in the desire
for 'a psychological wounding...to purify a mother contaminated by sexuality'
(3.3.366; 3.4.85; Humoring 55) Through the presentation to her of pictures of
Hamlet's father and uncle Claudius, along with Hamlet's damning accusation of
lustful adultery, the Queen appears brought to repentance:
O Hamlet, speak no more!
Thou turn'st mine eyes into my very soul,
And there I see such black and grained spots
As will not leave their tinct. (3.4.78-81)
The Queen's reaction is an internalisation of the format presented to her by Hamlet's
proffered extended reflexivity, as she discovers within the vice by which her soul,
herself-as-mirror, is tainted and spotted.
This scene forcefully conjoins two related mirror conventions. The immediate
reading is that Gertrude's soul is tainted by vice, and she confesses to herself her
guilt: 'To my sick soul, as sin's true nature amiss is' (4.5.17). The morality tradition
of self-realisation through use of a mirror appears as late as Barnabe Barnes' revenge
tragedy, The Divils Charter of 1607 (Carpenter Masks 274). The Divils Charter
portrays Lucretia Borgia viewing her physical disfigurement by a poisonous lotion,
that soon effects her death along with her confession: 'Who painted my faire face
with these foule spots,/ You see them in my soule deformed blots' (sig. H2r).
Lucretia's death is visually and literally caused by her sin, her vanity, as the lotion is
presented to her as a beautifying potion. Yet, an additional reading is suggested. The
traditional description of the Virgin as a 'Mirroure without spot' implies virginity as
well as purity (Grabes 162). Paster's reading of this scene in Hamlet, as referencing
her sexual crime, is supported by the glass-womb topos, for the tainting and spotting
ofGertrude's glass also represents the sexual and corporeal nature of her sin. Though
unlike The Devil's Charter, in Hamlet Gertrude's contrition is produced through
Hamlet acting as mirror, rather than by an actual mirror, with his words visually
supplemented by pictures. This scene again makes a case for the potential of
language and images to transform subjects.
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Hamlet and his play act as critical moral mirrors, and are efficacious without
any other legitimising power than words, gestures and pictures. Significantly, they
act as a true mirror, despite and because of the melancholic and socially outcast
position of the wielder. Drama is shown as a subjective mirror that reflects back the
human subject and world, and like mirroring in the world it is a practical fiction with
the potential to tell a truth. Hamlet explores both notions of continuity and disparity
between theatrical spectacle and human world, with the spectacle reflecting a world
in which successful or just resolutions are not certain. Plays are depicted as extended
emulatory circuits that combine social mirroring mechanisms with the fluidly
intersubjective and intrasubjective nature of language and the medium of physical
gesture. Plays are shown as allowing us space to stand back and reflect on human life
as embodied and morally engaged spectators, and as freeing the imagination to
explore different perspectives, while simultaneously impassioning our minds. Rather
than the mutual exclusivity between seeming and being that seems initially suggested,
Hamlet presents a two-way interaction between the mind and subject's employment
of images, words and actions and their reflexive counter-shaping. As in the extended
mind theory, the mind and world are shown as reciprocally constitutive.
Reflecting Eyes, Voices Echoing
In the following pages our attention turns to a wider exploration in Shakespeare of
the relation of language to mirroring, examining scenes in several plays in which
references to visual reflections are deliberately employed by verbal echoers, and
which explore the relation of third-person mirrors to first-person accounts of oneself.
This leads into an investigation in Julius Caesar of how Cassius is transformed, who
begins by duplicitously offering himself as a mirror to Brutus, but ends as a true
mirror to him. Finally this part closes with a brief look at how a subject's words can
reflect back on oneself, rather than at the intended other, and how the body, as well
as words, plays a role in social mirroring.
Language, like mirrors, is one of the ways in which we make the invisible
visible, as both are cognitive props that allow us a means to reflect on ourselves.
Shakespeare reveals the intersubjective mirroring of words in discourse, using a
technique in which one character turns another's words against him, and in some
cases this is highlighted by use of the image of a mirror or reflective surface:
PETRUCCIO Why, here's no crab, and therefore look not sour.
KATHERINE There is, there is.
PETRUCCIO Then show it me.
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KATHERINE Had I a glass I would.
PETRUCCIO What, you mean my face?
KATHERINE Well aimed, of such a young one. (2.1.226-30)
In The Taming of the Shrew Kate mimics the subjective perspective of Petruccio
back at him revealing the lack of authority of his perspective over hers. Just as the
glass being figurally held up is not neutrally placed, so the biased position of the
signifying subject is signalled by the mirror-like rebounding of Petruccio's words
back at him. This highlights the potentially problematic lack of objectivity in
intersubjective forms of reflection, by one person of another and by one group
against another. This can be related to Greenblatt's discussion of the similarity of
rhetoric levelled by Catholics and Protestants against each other, as they attempted to
establish their own total authority, as shown in this quote about More and Tyndale:
For just as More charged that the Protestant had fashioned an unreal church out of
their own fevered imagination, Tyndale characteristically reverses the charge and
asserts that at the heart of the Catholic Church...here is nothing else than man's own
imagination idolatrously worshipped. (Renaissance 112)
Thus, reverse mirrorings of discourse, using as a weapon concerns over the human
tendency to self-project, were circulating in early modern religious conflicts.
Shakespeare explores such issues on the personal scale and with humour. As You
Like It has a similar scene of verbal mirroring in which upon Jaques' oblique insult
that he was looking for a fool when he found Orlando, Orlando responds that he's
drowned in the brook, where if he looks he'll find him; so, once again the reflecting
back of the words is highlighted by the visual figure, which demonstrates that the
subject is in fact describing themselves and not the addressed (3.2.261-265). Philip
Massinger in A New Way to Pay Old Debts (1633) later imitates this technique:
WELLBORN: Rogue what am I?
TAPWELL: Troth durst I trust you with a looking-glass,
To let you see your trim shape, you would quit me,
And take the name yourself. (1.1.6-8, 507)
Thus the glass proffers to rebound the image with the words, in these openly
antagonistic relations figuring of visual and use ofverbal reflexivity.
The more serious philosophical implications of visual and verbal reflexivity, in
terms of another person offering to act as an extension of the mind, are explored in
Troilus and Cressida:
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That no man is the lord of anything,
Though in and of him there be much consisting,
Till he communicate his parts to others.
Nor doth he of himself know them for aught
Till he behold them formed in th' applause
Where they're extended - who, like an arch reverb'rate
The voice again; or, like a gate of steel
Fronting the sun, receives and renders back
His figure and his heat. (3.3.110-118)
Bacon makes similar analogies between reflections by one's senses and by objects,
and notes the resemblance of the eye to the mirror and the ear to echoing places,
suggesting that these organs of sense are of a similar nature to bodies which give off
sensory reflections (New 144). Shakespeare's passage uses the analogy between
visual reflexivity and verbal echoing in order to offer an explanation of self-
knowledge as working via an extended reflexivity. The reflected beam of knowing is
described as operating intersubjectively, through the reflection of other subjects, and
this precedes the intrasubjective possession and understanding of oneself.
John Davies would have taken issue with this claim, since in Nosce Teispsum,
Davies questions whether the mind is like an eye that sees other things but not itself,
before conversely concluding that 'the minde can backward cast/ Vpon her selfe, her
vnderstanding light' (5). However this independent means of self-reflection is
undermined by the fact that the mind (or soul) is 'so corrupt, and so defac't/ As her
owne image doth her selfe affright' and instead tends to turn its gaze outwards (5).
This is hardly a reassuring image of self-reflexivity, although Davies argues that the
mind can correct misguiding sensory information, knowing that when sweet things
taste sour it is due to the tongue's false judgement; thus, Davies offers the mind as a
more reliable means of measurement than sensory faculties, although even in his
depiction the mind or soul is itself problematically damaged. Conversely Crooke
argues that it is precisely because the soul 'can no more be described by vs, then our
eye is able to see it selfe' that we should look instead to the body and so 'behold the
liuely Image of all this whole Vniuerse, which wee see with our eyes (as it were)
shadowed in a Glasse'; thus, for Crooke the human body becomes St. Paul's dark
glass (4).Whereas, Shakespeare in this passage explores the possibility of human
social reflexivity as the means by which humans can overcome the inability of the
mind to encompass itself. This follows most closely the original meaning of the
passage in Plato's Alcibiades in which the inability of the eye to see itself other than
in the mirroring pupil of another's eye is compared with the need that 'if the soul... is
to know itself, it must look at a soul' and there see itself reflected (133b).
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Another similar passage occurs in Julius Caesar, which in the context of the
play indicates the problematics of socially extended reflexivity. Cassius intent on
persuading Caesar's protege Brutus to participate in Caesar's assassination attempts
to convince him of the necessity of socially extended reflexivity:
CASS. Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?
BRU. No, Cassius, for the eye sees not itself
But by reflection, by some other things.
CASS. 'Tisjust;
And it is very much lamented, Brutus,
That you have no such mirrors as will turn
Your hidden worthiness into your eye,
That you might see your shadow
And since you know you cannot see yourself
So well as by reflection, I, your glass,
Will modestly discover to yourself
That of yourself which you yet know not of. (1.2.50-60, 1.2.69-72)
Cassius attempts to convince Brutus that another person must act as a mirror in order
to show you yourself truly through an extended reflexivity, as in Troilus and
Cressida and Richard II perception is used to speculate about introspection. The
limits of perception, the inability of the face and the eyes to see themselves other
than through the process of reflection, is used to suggest the limits of introspection,
of a parallel psychological inability of the subject to apprehend its own qualities,
without a form of socially extended reflexivity. The easy movement between
outward and inner, social and subjective, visual and psychological capacities seems a
habit of thought enabling rather than requiring a cognitive leap. Cassius proposes his
'extrospective' perspective as a necessary supplement to Brutus' introspection, also
suggesting the way in which through language our cognitive processes extend out
into the world and into other people.
However, the self-interest involved in Cassius' claim to be the bearer of
Brutus' true reflection, reveals an extrospective perspective to be problematically
situated in its own subjective perspective and motivated by ends that are not
necessarily transparent. As Bacon warns of T'll-be-your-mirror' offers: 'to be
'speculatiue into another man, to the end to know how to worke him, or winde him,
or gouerne him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and clouen, and not entire and
ingenuous' {Advancement 19). Cassius' attempts to lead Brutus ultimately fail, as
although he persuades Brutus to participate in the uprising, Brutus idealistically
convinces him not to kill Antony and to let him speak at Caesar's funeral where he
rouses the people against them. Instead, it is Cassius who is transformed from his
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much-cited statement of self-determination 'The fault, dear Brutus is not in our
stars,/ But in ourselves, that we are underlings', to the less-cited admission that
subjects are affected by the influences of the world and stars: 'Now I change my
mind,/ And partly credit things that do presage' (1.2.141-42, 5.1.77-78). By the tragic
end Cassius mirrors Brutus' words in conformity not in coercion:
BRUTUS For ever and for ever farewell, Cassius.
Ifwe do meet again, why, we shall smile.
If not, why then, this parting was well made.
CASSIUS For ever and for ever farewell, Brutus.
Ifwe do meet again, we'll smile indeed.
If not, 'tis true this parting was well made. (5.3.117-122)
Against his original Machiavellian intentions Cassius ironically becomes in intention
the 'true mirror' he claimed to be; more fitting than Bacon's warning by the end is
the proverb: 'The best mirrour is an old friend' (Herbert sig. B4r). Although
ironically Cassius' 'sight', as he acknowledges at the end was 'ever thick', and is a
corporeal equivalent to his limited insight and foresight (5.3.21). That this also brings
his downfall in the battle, as he mistakes victory for defeat, is more poignantly
wrought even than his assisted self-murder, with the sword that had killed Caesar
(5.3.44-45). In Julius Caesar, as in Hamlet and Richard II, the themes of first-person
and third-person perspectives are explored through mirror-motifs, with a
demonstration that whilst either one may prove trustworthy, so too may either one
also prove untrustworthy, and that this variable does not necessarily operate in
relation to the steadiness or intentions of the mirrorwielder. Neither a first-person nor
a third-person perspective is inherently reliable as a guide, nor are they even distinct,
since images of things and echoes ofwords resonate in our heads blurring boundaries
between others and ourselves. This recalls Andy Clark's intuition that boundaries
between outward and inward cognitive processes are no greater than those between
the various inner looping ones ('Memento's' 16).
In early modern society, as we have seen, an old friend or a lover can be
considered as an extension of oneself, rather than as a separate individual: 'his one
heart is so parted, that whilst he has some his friend hath all' (Hall 113). Conversely,
the self can be divided into multiple agents, and this is also explored through mirror-
motifs. In 2 Henry VI a straightforward antagonistic verbal mirroring with visual
mirror-motif occurs:
CLIFFORD: Why, what a brood of traitors have we here!
YORK: Look in a glass, and call thy image so.
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I am thy king, and thou a false-heart traitor. (5.1.139-141)
But there is also a scene in which it is against himself that the speaker's words strike:
Enough, sweet Suffolk, thou torment'st thyself,
And like these dread curses, like the sun 'gainst glass,
Or like an overcharged gun, recoil
And turn the force of them upon thyself. (3.2.331-334)
Queen Margaret describes Suffolk's own curses as ricocheted back at him by their
futility.
Humans are not only linguistically permeable; humoural receptivity means that
through another's' expressions and gestures, as well as through another's' words, a
subject's sense of self could be radically altered. In The Winter's Tale Polixenes on
meeting Leontes' servant Camillo realises instantly that his own state has altered:
Your changed complexions are to me a mirror
Which shows me mine changed, too; for I must be
A party in this alteration, finding
Myself thus altered with't. (1.2.381-84), 2894.
Camillo's face bears out Crooke's description that the 'eyes are the discouerers of the
mind, as the countenance is the Image of the same' (8-9). Marlowe used a similar
technique in Edward II, for the description of your fate as written on someone else's
face: 'These lookes of thine can harbour nought but death./ I see my tragedie written
in thy browes' (5.5.73-74). But here Shakespeare takes it further, with Polixenes
suggesting that his subjectivity is transformed by Camillo's alteration towards him,
as if he were a mirror in which he sees himself. Hampton explains that the term
'alteration' then signified both a physiological and a psychological shift, due to 'the
essential tie between the body and the temperament or psyche...the alteration of the
soul and the alteration of the body are mutually interactive and shape each other'
(273-74). Moreover, the seam between one person and another is shown to allow
dynamic interaction and penetration through the mind and the body of one subject
and another, as like the seam between the body and mind it is shown to be a
negotiable and porous boundary. Thus, Shakespeare employs mirror-motifs to
explore a number of different facets of socially extended reflexivity, fruitfully
employing the relation between linguistic and visual reflexivity to suggest the
supplementary as well as the problematic nature of third-person perspectives.
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Glass, dial and book
.. .Look how the father's face
Lives in his issue, even so, the race
Of Shakespeare's mind, and manners brightly shines
In his well-turned, and true-filed lines (65-68)
Ben Jonson's lines in 'To the Memory of My Beloved, the Author Mr William
Shakespeare' fittingly echo Shakespeare's own sonnets' description of the mind as
extended through the words that it leaves written on a page and the concept that this
is a parallel to the extension of a subject through their creation of biological offspring.
Within the 'young man' sequence of the sonnets a central theme explored is the
benefits and downfalls of a biological glass (a human offspring) versus a textual
imprinting of the subject, interweaving concerns about mortality and endurance, and
memory and forgetting. In this sequence the shortcomings of both the textual and
biological are repeatedly juxtaposed from oscillating perspectives, offering
fragmentary solutions that are overturned or undermined by the solutions of other
sonnets. Whereas a textual representation lacks direct physical evidence; a biological
glass would contain the qualities recreated in living form, yet since living therefore
transient unlike the potential immortality of the textual. This section discusses
Shakespeare's exploration of these themes in 'Sonnet 77'.
In 'Sonnet 77' the use of a text as a means to supplement the biological mind
through providing a preserved self-image, an extended reflexivity, is explored as the
young man is advised to commit his excess memories to his book.
Thy glass will show thee how thy beauties wear,
Thy dial how thy precious minutes waste,
The vacant leaves thy mind's imprint will bear,
And of this book this learning mayst thou taste:
The wrinkles which thy glass will truly show
Ofmouthed graves will give thee memory;
Thou by thy dial's shady stealth mayst know
Time's thievish progress to eternity;
Look what thy memory cannot contain
Commit to these waste blanks, and thou shalt find
Those children nursed, delivered from thy brain,
To take a new acquaintance of thy mind.
These offices so oft as thou wilt look
Shall profit thee and much enrich thy book. (1-14)
There is a comparison of three objects through whose use the young man may learn
about himself physically, temporally and intellectually. These external tools,
228
products of the sociocultural environment within which the young man is embedded,
provide various means whereby he may increase his knowledge about the world and
himself; by making that which would otherwise be invisible visible: his face, time
passing, and his thoughts. The opening couplet allots a line each to the glass and to
the dial respectively and these are both personified and use a positive active verb,
'show', whilst the young man's 'beauty' and 'minutes' will only 'wear' and 'waste';
both negative in meaning. In contrast in the following couplet allotted to the book, in
line 3 an active verb expressing a passive activity, 'will bear', is used of which the
'vacant leaves' are the subject , and then in line 4 an active verb depicts the young
man as the subject who will 'taste' the objectified 'learning'. A contrast is set up
between the passive position the young man occupies in relation to the revelations
made known to him by the glass and dial, and the active procreative position he may
occupy in relation to the revelations of the book. The initial impression then is that
the glass by showing the transience of his physical form and the dial the potential
squandering of time should move him to entrust himself to the more durable enactive
medium of the book.
The directions in 'Sonnet 103' that the beloved young man only requires his
mirror to reflect his beauty back at him initially seems entirely contrastive to 'Sonnet
77': 'Look in your glass and there appears a face/ That overgoes my blunt invention
quite' (6-7). The sonnet is an actualisation of that which he advises the young man to
do, but here the productive possibilities of writing are dismissed since rather than
sublimating his form, the poet's words instead 'mar the subject that before was well'
(10). The poet suggests that writing lacks the living vitality of the young man
presented to him by the mirror: 'And more, much more, than in my verse can sit/
Your own glass shows you when you look in it' (13-14). Yet, since the poem self-
evidently transcends the moment and is an immortalisation of both the young man's
and the poet's existence the ultimate irony of this sonnet is that this supposed self-
sufficiency of the young man and his living mirror-image is voiced to us hundreds of
years later within a sonnet by the poet.
This transience of time is conveyed in Sonnet 77, through an apparently
circular dynamic which moves the reader backwards and forwards both spatially over
the surface of the sonnet and temporally over the vector of human life. Lines 3 and 4
set up the following eight lines, as a list of the learning, which will arise from his
externalisation of himself onto the book. In this list a couplet is allotted both to the
dial and the glass and then a quartet to the book itself. This reflexiveness is sent
spiralling outwards by the closing couplet which cites the learning which he will take
from the 'book' in line 4, as in turn enriching the 'book'. By making lines 5-12
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dependent on the utilisation of the book the suggestion seems to be that this act is
necessary in order for the young man to truly perceive that which his glass and dial
have to teach him. The literal glass will teach him the local reality of the
diminishment of his beauty and the 'mouthed graves' of his wrinkles will
prophetically remind him of his mortality. On another level, the dial will teach him
the inexorable global reality of time's 'thievish progress to eternity'. Thus the young
man's particular transience is set up against universal everlastingness, whilst yet
being revealed as part of the same movement of time that transforms the world. The
'vacant leaves' and 'waste blanks' are set against the ominous 'mouthed graves' and
'minutes waste' as open spaces which may be used as fertile preservers of the past
and as a means of not only understanding but acting against the transience and
mortality which humans are subject to, but can to an extent evade through biological
and mental forms of extension.
This depiction of the book is linked to early modern 'conceptions' of the mind
as impregnable like a mother's womb, as discussed in Chapter 4. In this example
then the impregnated mind develops the conception into a word or action, which
suggests a movement outward from the internal conception to the external. In the
next stage, as evident in 'Sonnet 77', the written words' deliverance from his brain,
so that he may come to know them anew, as produced by him and yet requiring
reacquaintance, through their metaphorical embodiment, is an inverted mirror-image
of the first process as it begins the movement inward again, from the external to the
internal. It potentially begins the process full circle by ending with his new
conception which when added to the book will further 'enrich' the book and 'profit'
the writer (14). Writer and written reciprocally evolve through their dynamic and
interactive relation to one another. In 'Memory to My Beloved' Jonson similarly
describes the relationship between poet and work as a reciprocally constitutive
process. When a poet strikes the muses' anvil Jonson describes it is creative ofpoetry
and of the poet himself, the poet will 'turn the same (And himself with it) that he
thinks to frame' (61-62). Writer and writing are part of an ongoing cognitive process
that is mutually creative of the writing and the writer.
At issue in 'Sonnet 77' is not only the self-development offered by the book,
but its durability, in contrast to the limited and leaky forgetful biological memory:
'what thy memory cannot contain' (9). This is a sentiment we find envisaged by
Montaigne in reference to his own book: 'It may know a good many things that I no
longer know and hold from me what I have not retained and what, just like a stranger,
I should have to borrow from it if I came to need it' ('Of the Affection' 355). There
is a further suggestion of an equivalency and a contrast being made by Montaigne
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between cognitive processes stored in the biological memory or a book in his
comment that: 'For lack of a natural memory I make one of paper, and as some new
symptom occurs in my disease, I write it down' ('Of Experience' 1021). Awareness
of the leakiness and mutability of memory, of which the early modern period was
also aware, led to the perceived need of cognitive supplementation by non-biological
resources, such as a book. As Clark describes: 'Ours are (by nature) unusually plastic
and opportunistic brains whose biological proper functioning has always involved
the recruitment and exploitation of nonbiological props and scaffolds' (Natural-Born
86). A contrast can also be surmised between the textual imprinting and the
biological glass. Notably, in line 3 the use of 'will bear' echoes its earlier use in the
sonnet sequence to refer to a biological glass; 'His tender heir might bear his
memory' ('Sonnet 1' 4). Again in line 9, 'memory', appears to pick up this earlier
reference, reapplied here to suggest the supplementary role in extending the subject
that the book might play instead of a biological child.
The dial and the book function as metaphorical glasses, as like the literal glass
they are represented as allowing the young man access to an extended reflexivity.
Yet because they act as mirrors, the function of the objects as stable reflectors for
which they are valued is paradoxically put into question, due to the projective
subjectification by the viewer on the objects. Richard Gregory describes a similar
phenomenon in terms of literal mirrors: 'these illusions of mirrors are in us rather
than in the mirror' (207 Mirrors). And yet in fact it is the result of an interaction
between our biological cognitive processes and the particular structure of mirrors (or
the people, words or objects that act as mirrors) which causes the specific illusions
we undergo.
However, there is a further complication here in that the whole sonnet could
work as a self-address. The self-reliance and discovery through the written word that
the poet is presenting to the young man, could equally be spoken to himself, who
exhibits a yearning for self-understanding through the written text of the sonnets and
who in 'Sonnet 66' already sees reflected in his glass the wearing of his beauty. The
glass is being held up to him by the narcissistic poet whose aesthetic ideals lead him
to obsess over the young man's beauty and his potential as a procreative instrument.
Rae Langton in her paper on sexual solipsism discusses such a pathology of love: 'It
may view the body as an object of beauty, or it may view the body as an anonymous
instrument but, in either case, it ignores the person who is partly constituted by her
body' (161). Although the advice to the young man in 'Sonnet 77', halfway through
the 154 Sonnets, sees a movement onwards to a place where the poet sees the young
man occupying the poet's own position, rather than the poet usurping the young
231
man's, the fact the directions could be addressed to himself, signals the poet's
continuing self-referentiality and his projective objectification of the young man. So,
in addition to objects being treated as extensions of people, there is repeatedly
evident the reverse construction, whereby the young man is treated as an object, an
instrument, or a representation of abstract values. Helpful here is Langton's
description of the two phenomena of local solipsism: 'Someone may treat some
things as people...Someone may treat some people as things' (150). These can be
interlinking phenomena in general and here, with both the objectification of the
young man and the animation of inanimate objects, they result from the projection of
the poet and involve a blurring ofontological categories.
Clark and Chalmers suggest the hypothetical example of Otto and Inga who
both believe they know how to get to MOMA (Metropolitan Museum of Modern
Art). Yet Otto has Alzheimer's and therefore stores his knowledge in his notebook,
whilst Inga uses her biological memory, with the role the retrieved information plays
in guiding their behaviour having sufficient functional similarity to warrant treating
both Inga's memory and Otto's notebook as contributing to their long term store of
dispositional beliefs (226-30). Jack Goody earlier described literacy in terms that
similarly dispute the boundaries of the mind, suggesting it as a cognitive skill that
'contests the drawing of too sharp an internal-external boundary around the psyche,
separating what I can consult in my head from what I can consult in my diary' (219).
In 'Sonnet 77' the words are stored in the notebook as they would otherwise be
stored in the memory with a collapsing of differences between the recorded
memories and the young man's own thoughts, as the textual records will also appear
to mirror their growth and development. One way of interpreting this, would be that
as we mature and change, so the meaning of words open to us in correspondence to
our development, although in fact the same words appear on the page; in the same
way my interpretation of Shakespeare's words have changed through subsequent re-
readings, and hopefully on reading this, my perspective may add something to your
own reading. As the written records will both be printed and yet not remain stable
despite their fixed nature on the page, the difference between the two mediums is
diminished, as the notebook, like early modern descriptions of cognitive processes,
combines notions of being imprinted and as constantly changing. Yet, the mind as
limited and leaky in contrast to the textual representation as a durable supplement is
also foregrounded in 'Sonnet 77', evoking the two mediums' dissimilarity. Tension
is raised through a recurring movement between the two interpretations, as the
memory and notebook are depicted both as equivalent and as different.
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This evidence both of a collapsing of differences, and the placing of emphasis
on it, suggests the fluctuation between acceptance, celebration and anxiety around
the issue of these boundaries in the early modern period. 'Sonnet 122' follows up
themes in 'Sonnet 77', as here in response to the gift of a table (a notebook) the poet
simulates offence: 'Thy gift, thy tables, are within my brain/ Full charactered with
lasting memory' (1-2). Stallybrass, Chartier, Mowery, and Wolfe convincingly
demonstrate that the terms table and table-book refer to an erasable notebook; the
significance in 'Sonnet 122' is that the erasability of the table thus collapses 'the
antithetical technologies of writing tables and bodily inscription into each other'
since both bodily and technological resources are therefore impermanent (417). Yet,
the rest of the sonnet then reconstructs their differences more modestly. Writing
tables as a technology of both memory and erasure, as 'a materialisation of
forgetfulness', the authors suggest, illustrate a facet of early modern subjects'
shaping and being shaped by a structure of memory different from our own (410,
417-18).
Although in 'Sonnet 77' it is not clear whether the book referred to is erasable
or not, nor whether it is the same as referred to in 'Sonnet 122', apparent in it are an
initial constructing and collapsing of differences between external and internal
cognitive resources, which are again constructed, collapsed and tentatively
reconstructed in the later sonnet. Firstly, differences are constructed through the
contrast between the memory as a leaky and limited container, whilst the book is
represented as supplementing its deficiency (although that some books were erasable,
would affect interpretation of the book as a durable supplement). Secondly,
differences are collapsed, as the metaphors which describe the imprinting and
changing of the records stored correspond to conventional metaphors used for mental
processes, thus making the book appear analogous to the mind. The closing couplet
of'Sonnet 122', 'To keep an adjunct to remember thee/ Were to import forgetfulness
in me', laments this too human quality of forgetting, which it seems also extends to
our external resources in their potential mutability. Mary Carruthers' depiction of
mnemotechnics as understood to be necessary for thought, also reveals that memory
training was viewed as an ethical necessity formative of an individual's humanity: 'A
person without a memory, if such a thing could be, would be a person without moral
character and, in a basic sense, without humanity' {Book 14).
Our recognition of this anxiety about the reliability of memory and memory
tools suggests, that in respect of our subjectivity, memory continues to be viewed as
a vital component. The reassurance offered by 'Sonnet 77' in the form of the book as
a supplement of the young man's mind, has underlying it an anxiety about the
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stability of our memory and hence also our subjectivity; a forgetting, that like
mortality ends only in silent 'mouthed graves', haunts the sonnet. Yet, this is vitally
juxtaposed with a celebration of the book as a living image, with corporeal processes
used to understand cognitive and technological processes of reproduction. Thus, the
mutability of the textual and the biological forms, also represent the potential for
creative reproduction and through the distance of time 'a new acquaintance' with that
which was forgotten. Whilst technological resources and biological memory are
subject to change over time they continue to play dynamic roles in constructing our
subjectivity and contributing to our creative productivity.
Conclusions
The use of the mirror in Shakespeare's works, both as a stage prop and as a literary
motif, opens a view for us into early modern concepts about cognition and
subjectivity and enables the examination of their relation to current embodied,
embedded and extended mind ideas. This closing chapter again shows Shakespeare
adopting and transforming conventional mirror-motifs. The mirror-motifs provide
evidence that characters who attempt to situate their subjectivity entirely within, as a
transcendent, autonomous and centralised inwardness, are portrayed as failing to
take into account the fundamental role of forms of extendedness and the
intersubjective make up of their intrasubjectivity. Third-person perspectives, visual
perception and introspection are compared in terms of performing similar functions
and the body and passions are shown to be part of the loop of reason. Characters are
depicted as both intentionally and unintentionally acting as a subjective prop for
another character; either as a model for imitation or through providing a
supplementary perspective. The intentions of the subject holding up the mirror do not
necessarily affect the accuracy of the image they reflect, although like a character's
introspective reflections they are not certainly reliable either. Since both third-person
and first-person perspectives vary in reliability a combination of outward and inward
mirrors appears the only way forward for a human subject. The Shakespearean
character, like the early modern subject, is depicted as existing in a biological,
sociocultural, technological and spiritual universe, in which all factors are at once
variably divisible and dynamically in play.
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Epilogue
Thus, as a ponderous thing in water cast
Extendeth circles into infinites,
Still making that the greatest that is last,
Till the one hath drowned the other in our sights,
So in my brain; the strong impression
Of thy rich labours worlds of thoughts created,
Which thoughts being circumvolved in gyre-like motion
Were spent with wonder as they were dilated,
Till giddy with amazement I fell down
In a deep trance;...
.. .When, lo, to crown thy worth
I struggled with this passion that did drown
My abler faculties; and thus brake forth:
Palmer, thy Travails well become thy name,
And thou in them shalt live as long as fame. (Ben Jonson, 'To Thomas Palmer' 17-31)
Ben Jonson poetically evokes the extended mind in motion, propelled by the creative
labours of another, namely Thomas Palmer's emblem book. In Jonson's mind the
impact of Palmer's 'labours' (a word recalling childbirth) creates worlds, his mind
extending under their impetus until they escape his grasp; the myriad thoughts set
whirling, wave succeeds wave in succession, gaining force one over the other as his
amazement increases till entirely overwhelming him. Out of the depths, as Jonson
struggles to contain and so convey his passion, there wondrously emerges forth this
poem itself. The closing couplet reiterates another implicit meaning: the extended
subjectivity offered by the vital persistence of the written word. Thus, more
prosaically through the processes of reading, notetaking, rereading, organizing,
reorganizing, writing, drafting, and redrafting my thoughts flowing outwards from
the ponderous worlds of extended mind, critical, early modern and Shakespearean
texts, this thesis has emerged.
This thesis suggests rich possibilities for further literary studies utilising the
extended mind theory. It has explored the relation of a literary scholar's usual tools
(literary, psychoanalytical and cultural theories) to extended mind ideas. Extended
mind theory is interrogative of two key assumptions frequently made by these
theories: the significant extent of the role that sociocultural constructivism plays in
making up a human subject and the absolute contingency and relativism of human
subjects in different periods. EM suggests that power relations, social context and
relativism have vital contributions to make but are not the whole picture. The
extended mind hypothesis lends itself to a view of human subjects and worlds as
involving both changes and continuities. It is applicable to other times and places,
because of the continuing nature of human hybridity, at the same time as that
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hybridity intimately involves humans in dynamic and transformative relations with
their environmental, sociocultural and technological contexts.
Through the examination of literary and other cultural texts, this thesis has
explored the myriad ways in which concepts comparable with and contrastive to
current extended mind theories were evident in the early modern period and in
Shakespeare's use of the mirror as a visual and figurative resource. Both modern and
early modern forms of the paradigm share an understanding that humans'
neurological plasticity and permeable embodiment enable the co-opting of external
sociocultural, environmental and technological tools. The body, objects, language,
other people, and the context are described as extensions of the subject and its
cognitive processes. In the early modern period types of cognition relating to internal
reflection, and mental time and spatial travel are also thought of in terms of extension,
imagined as the human mind intellectively aspiring to God-like understanding. These
types of cognitive extensions are variously figured as complementary to, or as in
opposition to, extension through the body and world. The intricate relations between
modern and early modern theories play out through the use of the mirror-motif in
Shakespeare's works, which also reveals related concerns about the (un)reliability of
first-person and third-person perspectives, and the complex relationships between the
technological, biological and sociological forms of mirroring. Since such 'cognitive
hybridization' has arguably here been established as a historical and natural aspect of
the human subject, other possible future projects might consider how extended mind
ideas are evident in literature of other periods (Natural-Born 4).
Opening out our view for a closing wide angle shot, the background panorama
against which Clark's claim that humans are natural-born cyborgs is set is that we are
of the world; the world in which humans, as the most evolved creatures, are therefore
the most fundamentally entwined with our external technologies and surroundings.
This is the constant that underlies our adaptability to changing sociocultural
constructions, whilst at the same time this increasing plasticity is also part of a much
more slowly evolving movement within nature. Our psychophysiology also acts as a
constraint that confines as well as allows our perceptions and interpretations, both as
a species and on a more individual level. Meanwhile, the technologies and cultural
constructs to which we adapt, we also develop into more sophisticated forms, as they
interact with us in increasingly diverse hybridisations and as catalytic players in our
developmental and evolutionary drama. Ever evolving cultural constructs are
dynamically enmeshed with the ever evolving physical universe around us; both
mechanisms operate at diverse tempos, running over vast panoramas of time or
changing within the instant as they interactively coevolve. This has implications too
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for the literary world. In the vital persistence of texts despite the fleeting ever-
evolving meanings ofwords, early modern thinkers present their minds extended out
to us. In turn, I offer this to you.




Anon. 'A Letter sent by the Maydens of London.' London: Henry Binneman, 1567.
Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. 1925. Trans. David Ross. Rev. trans. J.L. Ackrill and J.O.
Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Ascham, Roger. The Scholemaster. London: John Daye, 1570.
Aquinas, Thomas. An Aquinas Reader. Ed. Mary T. Clark. London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1974.
. Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation. 1989. Ed. Timothy Mc Dermott. Texas:
Christian Classics, 1991.
Awdelay, John. The Fraternitye ofVacabondes. London: John Awdelay, 1575.
Bacon, Francis. Essays. 1937. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.
. The New Organon. Ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
. The OxfordFrancis Bacon IV: The Advancement ofLearning. Ed. Michael Kiernan.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.
Baldwin, William. The Last Part of the Mirour for Magistrates. London: Thomas Marsh,
1578.
Barnes, Barnabe. The Divils Charter. London: George Eld, 1607.
Bartholomaeus, Anglicus. Batman vppon Bartholome his Booke De Proprietatibus Rerum.
London: Thomas East, 1582.
Beard, Thomas. The Theatre ofGods Judgements. London, S. I and M. Hand, 1642.
Beaumont, Francis. The Knight of the Burning Pestle. Ed. Sheldon P. Zitner. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2004.
Beaumont, Francis and John Fletcher. Philaster or Love Lies a-Bleeding. Ed. Andrew Gurr.
London: Methuen, 1969.
The Bible, that is, the Holy Scriptures conteyned in the Olde andNewe Testament. London:
Deputies of Christopher Barker, 1590.
Breton, Nicholas. Characters upon Essays, Moral and Divine. Character Writings of the
Seventeenth Century. 1891. Ed. Henry Morley. Charleston: Bibliobazaar, 2006. 207-222.
. The Good and the Bad. Character Writings of the Seventeenth Century. 1891. Ed.
Henry Morley. Charleston: Bibliobazaar, 2006. 222-245.
Bright, Timothy. A Treatise ofMelancholy. London: Thomas Vautrolier, 1586
Bullokar, John. An English Expositor. London: John Legatt, 1616.
Bulwer, John. Chirologia. London: Thomas Harper, 1644.
Burton, Robert. The Anatomy ofMelancholy. Ed. Holbrook Jackson. New York: New York
Review Books, 2001.
Castiglioni, Baldesar. The Book of the Courtier. Trans. George Bull. London: Penguin's
Classics, 2003.
Chapman, George and Christopher Marlowe. Hero and Leander. The Complete Works of
Christopher Marlowe. 1973. Vol. 2. Ed. Fredson Bowers. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981. 423-516.
Charron, Pierre. OfWisdome. Trans. Samson Lennard. London: Eliot's Court Press, 1608.
Chaucer. 'The Knight's Tale.' The Riverside Chaucer. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008. 37-66.
239
Coeffeteau, F. N. A Table ofHumane Passions. Trans. Edward Grimeston. London: Nicholas
Okes, 1621.
Coote, Edmund. The English Schoole-master. London: Ralph Jackson and Robert Dexter,
1596.
Crooke, Flelkiah. Mikrokosmographia: A Description of the Body ofMan. London: William
Jaggard, 1615.
Dante, Alighieri. The Divine Comedy 3: Paradiso. Trans. John D. Sinclair. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1961.
Davies, John. Nosce Teipsum. London: Richard Field, 1599.
Davies of Hereford, John. 'The Ciuile Warres of Death and Fortune.' Humours Heauen on
Earth. London: A.I., 1605. 183-219.
. 'Humours Heauen on Earth.' Humours Heauen on Earth. London: A.I., 1605. 1-183.
. 'The Triumph ofDeath.' Humours Heauen on Earth. London: A.I., 1605. 220-248.
Dee, John. A True and Faithful Relation. London: D. Maxwell, 1659.
Dekker, Thomas. The Guls Horne-Booke. London: [Nicholas Oakes], 1609.
Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Donne, John. Devotions upon Emergent Occassions. Ed. Anthony Raspa. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987.
. Letters to Certain Persons ofHonour. London: J. Flesher, 1651.
. The Major Works. Ed. John Carey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
. The Sermons ofJohn Donne. Ed. Evelyn M. Simpson and George Potter. 10 vols.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.
Earle, John. Microcosmography. Character Writings of the Seventeenth Century. 1891. Ed.
Henry Morley. Charleston: Bibliobazaar, 2006. 143-206.
Elizabeth I. 'Queen Elizabeth's speech to the troops at Tilbury'. Women's Writing of the
Early Modern Period, 1588-1688: An Anthology. Ed. Stephanie Hodgson-Wright.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002. 1.
Erasmus, Desiderius. De Ciuilitate Morum Puerilium. A Lytle Booke of Good Maners for
Chyldren. Trans. Robert Whittington. London: John Wallye, 1554.
. The Education of a Christian Prince. Ed. Lisa Jardine. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
Ficino, Marsilio. Five Questions Concerning the Mind. Trans. Josephine L. Burroughs. The
Renaissance Philosophy ofMan. Ed. Ernest Cassirer and Paul Oskar Kristeller. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1948. 193-212.
Florio, John. A World ofWords. London: Edward Blount, 1598.
Greene, Robert. Greenes, Groats-worth of Witte, bought with a million of Repentance.
London: J. Wolfe and J. Danter, 1592.
G., T. The Rich Cabinet. London: J[ohn] B[eale], 1616.
Hall, Joseph. Characters of Virtues and Vices. Character Writings of the Seventeenth
Centwy. 1891. Ed. Henry Morley. Charleston: Bibliobazaar, 2006. 99-141.
Harman, Thomas. Caveatfor Commen Cursetors. London: Henry Middleton, 1573.
Herbert, George. Outlandish Proverbs, Selected by Mr. G.H. London: T. P[aine], 1640.
Heywood, Thomas. An Apologyfor Actors. London: Nicholas Okes, 1612.
Holinshed, Raphael. The First and Second Volumes of Chronicles. London: John Hooker,
1587.
Howell, James. Epistolce Ho-Eliance: Familiar Letters. London: W.H., 1560
240
Gosson, Stephen. The Schoole ofAbuse. London: T. Dawson, 1579.
Jonson, Ben. The Complete Poems. 1975. Ed. George Parfitt. Rev. ed. London: Penguin,
1996.
. Cynthia's Revels. Works: Complete Critical Edition. 1932. Vol. 4. Ed. C.H. Herford
and P. Simpson. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 1-184.
. Every Man out ofhis Humour. Works: Complete Critical Edition. 1927. Vol. 3. Ed.
C.H. Herford and P. Simpson. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 405-601.
. Sejanus His Fall. Works: Complete Critical Edition. 1932. Vol. 4. Ed. C.H. Herford
and P. Simpson. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 327-471.
. Timber; Or Discoveries. The Complete Poems. 1975. Ed. George Parfitt. Rev. ed.
London: Penguin, 1996. 373-458.
La Primaudaye, Pierre de. The French Academie. Trans. Thomas Bowes. London: John
Legat, 1618.
Lemnius, Levinus. The Touchstone of Complexions. Trans. Thomas Newton. London:
Thomas Marsh, 1576.
Lipsius, Justus. Sixe bookes ofpolitickes or ciuil doctrine. Trans. William Jones. London:
Richard Field, 1594.
Lupton, Donald. London and the Countrey Carbonadoed. London: Nicholas Okes, 1632.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price. Trans. Russell
Price. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Marlowe, Christopher. Edward II. The Complete Works ofChristopher Marlowe. 1973. Vol.
2. Ed. Fredson Bowers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 1-120.
. 'Liber Secundus: Elegia 17.' Ovid's Elegies. The Complete Works of Christopher
Marlowe. 1973. Vol. 2. Ed. Fredson Bowers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981.363.
. Tamburlaine: Part I. The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe. 1973. Vol. 1.
Ed. Fredson Bowers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 71-148.
Marston, John. The Scovrge ofVillanie. London: J[ames] R[oberts], 1598.
Massinger, Philip. A New Way to Pay Old Debts. Ed T.W. Craik. London: A. & C. Black,
1993.
Meres, Francis. Palladis Tamia. Wits Common Wealth: The Second Part. London: William
Stansby, 1634.
Montaigne, Michel de. The Complete Works. Trans. Donald M. Frame. London: Everyman's
Library, 2003.
Nixon, Anthony. The Dignitie ofMan. London: Edward Allde, 1612.
Overbury, Thomas. Characters. Character Writings of the Seventeenth Century. 1891. Ed.
Henry Morley. Charleston: Bibliobazaar, 2006. 32-98.
Petrarca, Francesco. 'Sonnet 45.' The Canzoniere. Vol. 1. Trans. Frederic J. Jones.
Leicester: Troubador Publishing, 2000. 55-57.
. 'Sonnet 46.' The Canzoniere. Vol. 1. Trans. Frederic J. Jones. Leicester: Troubador
Publishing, 2000. 56-57.
Phillips, Edward. The New World ofEnglish Words. London: E. Tyler, 1658.
Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni. Oration on the Dignity of Man. Trans. Elizabeth
Livermoore Forbes. The Renaissance Philosophy ofMan. Ed. Ernest Cassirer and Paul
Oskar Kristeller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. 223-54.
241
Plato. Alcibiades. Plato on Love: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades, with Selection
from Republic and Laws. Ed. C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006. 154-
207.
. Phaedrus. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
. Plato's Theatetus. Trans. Seth Bernadette. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986.
Plutarch. Sir Thomas North's Translation ofPlutarch's 'Lives': Selected Lives from the Lives
of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Ed. Paul Turner. 2 vols. Liverpool: Centaur Press,
1963.
Pomponazzi, Pietro. On the Immortality ofthe Soul. Trans. William Henry Hay II. Rev. John
Herman Randall. The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Ed. Ernest Cassirer and Paul
Oskar Kristeller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. 280-381.
Puttenham, George. The Arte ofEnglish Poesie. London: Richard Field, 1589.
Raynalde, Thomas. The Byrth ofMankynde. London: Richard Jugge, 1560.
Rogers, Thomas. A Paterne ofa Passionate Minde. London: Thomas East, 1580.
S., J. England's Merry Jester. London: J. Wilde, 1693.
Scot, Reginald. Scot's Discovery ofWitchcraft. London: R.C., 1651.
Shakespeare, William. The Collected Works ofShakespeare. London: Norton, 1997.
Sidney, Philip. A Defense of Poesy. The Major Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002. 212-250.
Spenser, Edmund. The Faerie Queene. Ed. Thomas P. Roche and C. Patrick O'Donnell.
London: Penguin, 1987.
Stubbes, Phillip. The Anatomie ofAbuses. London: Richard Jones, 1583.
Theophrastus. Characters of Theophrastus. Ed and trans. James Diggle. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Tomkis, Thomas. Lingua: or The Combat of The Tongue, and The Fiue Senses for
Superiority. London: G. Eld., 1607.
Vigo, Joannes de. The Most Excellent Workes ofChirurgerye. Trans. Bartholomew Traheron.
London: Edward Whitechurch, 1543.
Walkington, Thomas. The Optick Glasse ofHumors. London: John Windet, 1607.
Walton, Izaak. The Lives ofDr. John Donne, Sir Henry Wotton, Mr. Richard Hooker, Mr.
George Herbert. London: Thomas Newcomb, 1670.
Webster, John. The Duchess of Malfi. John Webster: Three Plays. Ed. D.C. Gunby. 1972.
Rpt. with minor revisions. London: Penguin Books, 1995. 167-292.
. The White Devil or Vittoria Corombona. John Webster: Three Plays. Ed. D.C.
Gunby. 1972. Rpt. with minor revisions. London: Penguin Books, 1995. 33-166.
White, Thomas. A Sermon Preached at Pawles Crosse on Sunday the thirde ofNouember
1577 in the Time of the Plague. London: Francis Coldock, 1578.
Wilson, Thomas. A Christian Dictionary. London: William Jaggard, 1612.
Wilson, Thomas. The Arte ofRhetorique. London: Richardus Graftonus, 1553.
Wither, George. A Collection ofEmblems. London: A[ugustine] M[athewes], 1635.
. The Schollers Purgatory. London: G. Wood, 1624.
Wright, Thomas. The Passions ofthe Mind in General. Ed. William Webster Newbold. New
York: Garland Publishing, 1986.
Wroth, Mary. 'Pamphilia to Amphilanthus.' Women's Writing of the Early Modern Period,




Adler, Hans and Sabine Gross. 'Adjusting the Frame: Comments on Cognitvism and
Literature.' Poetics Today 232 (Summer 2002): 195-220.
Agloti, Salvatore M., Paolo Cesari, Michela Romani and Cosimo Urgesi. 'Action
Anticipation and Motor Resonance in Elite Basketball Players.' Nature Neuroscience
11.9 (2008): 1109-16.
Anderson, Michael. 'The Massive Redeployment Hypothesis and the Functional Topography
of the Brain.' Philosophical Psychology 20.2 (2007): 143-74.
Arikha, Noga. Passions and Tempers: A History of the Humours. New York: HarperCollins,
2007.
Arnold, Matthew. 'Literature and Science.' The Complete Prose Works ofMatthew Arnold.
Vol 10. Ed. R.H. Super. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press, 1974. 53-73.
Baars, J. 'In the Theatre of Consciousness: Global Workspace Theory, a Rigorous Scientific
Theory of Consciousness.' Journal ofConsciousness Studies 4.4 (1997): 292-309.
Baldwin, Robert. 'Gates Pure and Shining and Serene: Mutual gazing as an Amatory Motif
in Western Literature.' Renaissance and Reformation 22 (1986): 22-48.
Barbieri, Richard E. 'John Donne and Richard II: An Influence?' Shakespeare Quarterly
26.1 (Winter 1975): 57-62.
Bate, Jonathan. Shakespeare and Ovid. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Bechara, Antoine, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel and Antonio Damasio. 'Deciding
Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy.' Science 275 (1997): 1293-
95.
Beecher, Donald. Rev. of Word vs. Image: Cognitive Hunger in Shakespeare's England, by
Ellen Spolsky. Renaissance Quarterly 60.4 (2007): 1477-79.
Berg, J.M. 'Shakespeare as a geneticist.' Clinical Genetics 59 (2001): 165-70.
Berti, A. and F. Frassinetti. 'When far becomes near: re-mapping of space by tool use'.
Journal ofCognitive Neuroscience 12 (2000): 415-20.
Bicks, Caroline. 'Stones like Women's Paps: Revising Gender in Jane Sharp's Midwives
Book.' The Journalfor Early Modern Cultural Studies 7.2 (2007): 1-27.
Blair, Ann. 'Reading Strategies for Coping with Information Overload.' Journal of the
History ofIdeas 64.1 (January 2003): 11-28.
Breitenberg, Mark. Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
Brown, Pamela Allen. Better a Shrew than a Sheep: Women, Drama and the Culture ofJest
in Early Modern England. New York: Cornell University, 2003.
Brown, Theodore M. 'Descartes, Dualism, and Psychosomatic Medicine.' The Anatomy of
Madness: Essays in the History ofPsychiatry. Vol. 1. Ed. W.F. Bynum, Roy Porter, and
Michael Shepherd. London: Tavistock Publications, 1985. 40-62.
Broks, Paul. 'The Ego Trip.' Guardian 6 May 2006: 27-28.
Bullough, Geoffrey, ed. Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare. 3 vols. London:
Routledge, 1957.
Burckhardt, Jacob. The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. Trans. S.G.C. Middlemore.
New York: Mentor, 1960.
Burrow, Colin. 'Recribations.' London Review ofBooks 5 Oct. 2006: 3-6.
243
Butler, C. Rev. of The Bard on the Brain: Understanding the Mind through the Art of
Shakespeare and the Science of Brain Imaging, by Paul M. Matthews and Jeffrey
McQuain. Journal ofNeurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry 75 (2004): 1085.
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter. New York: Routledge, 1993.
. Gender Trouble. 1990. New York: Routledge, 1999.
. Giving an Account ofOneself. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005.
. 'Giving an Account ofOneself.' Diacritics 31 (Winter 2001): 22-40.
. 'Imitation and Gender Insubordination.' Literary Theory: An Anthology. 1998. Ed.
Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000. 722-30.
Bynum, Caroline Walker. 'Why All the Fuss about the Body? A Medievalist's Perspective.'
Critical Enquiry 22.1 (Autumn 1995): 1-34.
Bynum, W.F. and Michael Neve. 'Hamlet on the Couch.' The Anatomy ofMadness: Essays
in the History ofPsychiatry. Vol.1. Ed. W.F. Bynum, Roy Porter, and Michael Shepherd.
London: Tavistock Publications, 1985. 289-304.
Callaghan, Dympna. 'Body problems.' Shakespeare Studies 29 (2001): 68-71.
Calvo-Merino, B., D.E. Glaser, J. Grezes, R.E. Passingham and P. Haggard. 'Action
Observation and Acquired Motor Skills: An fMRI Study with Expert Dancers.' Cerebral
Cortex 15.8 (2005): 1243-49.
Carpenter, Sarah. '"My Lady Tongue": Thomas Tomkis's Lingua.'' Medieval English
Theatre 24 (2002): 3-14.
. Masks and Masking in Medieval and Early Tudor England. Aldershot: Ashgate,
2002.
. 'Masks and Mirrors: Questions of Identity in Medieval Morality Drama.' Medieval
English Theatre 13 (1991): 7-17.
Carroll, Joseph. Evolution andLiterary Theory. Columbia: University ofMissouri, 1994.
Carroll, William C. 'Goodly Frame, Spotty Globe: Earth and Moon in Renaissance
Literature.' Earth, Moon and Planets 85-86 (2001): 5-23.
Carruthers, Mary. The Book of Memory. A Study ofMemory in Medieval Culture. 1990.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Carruthers, Mary and Yadin Dudai. 'The Janus Face of Mnemosyne.' Nature 31st March
2005:567.
Cassirer E., P.O, Kristeller & J.H. Randall, Jr., eds. The Renaissance Philosophy ofMan.
Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1948.
Chalmers, David. 'Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness.' Journal of Consciousness
Studies 2.3 (1995): 200-19.
Chaytor, H.J. From Script to Print: An Introduction to Medieval Literature. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1945.
Citri, Ami and Robert C. Malenka. 'Synaptic Plasticity: Multiple Forms, Functions, and
Mechanisms.' Neuropsychopharmacology 33 (2008): 18—41.
Clanchy, M.T. From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066-1307. 1979. 2nd ed.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
Clark, Andy. 'Artificial Intelligence and the Many Faces of Reason.' The Blackwell Guide to
Philosophy OfMind. Ed. Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield. Maiden: Blackwell: 2003.
. 'Author's Response.' Metascience 7 (1998): 95-103.
. Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1997.
244
. 'Cognitive Complexity and the Sensorimotor Frontier.' Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 80 (2006): 43-65.
. 'I am John's Brain.' Journal ofConsciousness Studies 2.2 (1995): 144-8
. 'Magic Words: How Language augments Human Computation.' Language and
Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Ed. Peter Carruthers and Jill Boucher. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 162-83.
. 'Memento's Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended.' Available at Andy Clark
Papers Available Online: 1-43. 20 July 2008.
<http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/publications.html>
. Mindware. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
. Natural-Born Cyborgs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
. 'Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied Mind?' Philosophy
andPhenomenological Research 76.1 (2008): 37-59
. 'Soft Selves and Ecological Control.' Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual
Volition and Social Context. Ed. Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid and G. Lynn
Stephens. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. 101-22.
. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008
. 'That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves.' Daniel
Dennett. Ed. Andrew Brook and Don Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002. 187-205.
. 'We Have Always Been...Cyborgs: Author's Response' Metascience 13 (2004):
169-81.
Clark, Andy and David Chalmers. 'The Extended Mind.' 1998. Reprinted in Supersizing the
Mirid: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension. By Andy Clark. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008. 220-32.
Clark, Andy and Jesse Prinz. 'Putting Concepts to Work: Some Thoughts for the Twentyfirst
Century.' Mind and Language 19.1 (February 2004): 57-69.
Clanchy, M.T. From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066-1307. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1979.
Coleman, Patrick. 'Life-writing and the Legitimation of the Modern Self.' Introduction.
Representations of the Selffrom the Renaisance to Romanticism. Ed. Patrick Coleman,
Jayne Lewis and Jill Kowalk. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 1-15.
Collini, Stefan. Introduction. The Two Cultures. Ed. Stefan Collini. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993. vii-lxxi.
Copenhaver, Brian P. and Charles B. Schmitt. Renaissance Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992.
Cowley, Stephen. 'Distributed Cognition: Biomechanics, Functions, and the Origins of
Talk.' Emergence of Communication and Language. Ed. Caroline Lyon, Christopher L.
Nehaniv, Angelo Cangelosi. London: Springer, 2007. 105-127.
Crane, Mary Thomas. Shakespeare's Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001.
Crane, Mary Thomas and Alan Richardson. 'Literary Studies and Cognitive Science: Toward
a New Interdisciplinarity.' Mosaic 32.2 (1999): 123-40.
Curtius, Ernst Robert. European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages. Trans. W. Trask.
New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1953.
245
Damasio, Antonio. 'Commentary on Emotions: Neuro-Psychoanalytic Views.' Neuro-
Psychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences
1.1 (1999): 38-9.
. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. 1994. Rev. ed. and new
preface. London: Vintage Books, 2006.
. The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness.
London: Vintage, 2000.
Damasio, Antonio, B.J. Everitt., and D. Bishop. 'The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the
Possible Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex [and Discussion].' Philosophical
Transactions: Biological Sciences 351 (1996): 1413-20.
Damasio, Hanna, Thomas Grabowski, Randall Frank, Albert Gabadura, and Antonio
Damasio. 'The Return of Phineas Gage: Clues about the Brain from the Skull of a
Famous Patient.' Science 264 (1994): 1102-1105.
Davis, Philip. Shakespeare Thinking. London: Continuum, 2007.
Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. 1976. 30th anniversary ed. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy
Press, 2006.
de Grazia, Margreta. 'Hamlet's Thoughts and Antics.' Early Modern Culture 2 (2001):
Sections 1-22. 1 May 2005. <http://eserver.org/emc/>.
de Grazia, Margreta and Peter Stallybrass. 'The Materiality of the Shakespearean Text.'
Shakespeare Quarterly 44.3 (1993): 255-83.
Dennett, Daniel C. Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998.
. Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin, 1991.
. Kinds ofMinds: The Origins ofConsciousness. London: Phoenix, 1997.
Derrida, Jacques. Dissemination. 1972. Trans. Barbara Johnson. London: Athlone Press,
2004.
. Of Grammatology. 1967. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1997.
. The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago:
Chicago University Press: 1987.
de Sousa, Ronald. 'Twelve Varieties of Subjectivity: Dividing in Hopes of Conquest.'
Ronald de Sousa's Homepage. 2002. 19 April 2006.
<http:www.chass.utoronto.ca/~sousa/subiectivity.html>.
Doerner, Klaus. Madmen and the Bourgeoise: A SocialHistory ofInsanity and Psychiatry.
Dollimore, Jonathan. 'Death and the Self.' Representing the Self: Histories from the
Renaissance to the Present. Ed. Roy Porter. London: Routledge, 1997. 249-61.
. Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture. 1998. New York: Routledge, 2001.
Eagleton, Terry. Literary Theory: An Introduction. 1983. London: Blackwell Publishers,
1996.
Eisenstein, Elizabeth L. The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Ekman, Paul. Emotions Revealed: Understanding Faces and Feelings. London: Phoenix,
2004.
Elam, Keir. '"In What Chapter of His Bosom?" Reading Shakespeare's Bodies.' Alternative
Shakespeares. Vol. 2. London: Routledge, 1996. 141-163.
Elias, Cynthia L. and Laura Berk. 'Self-regulation in young children: is there a role for
Sociodramatic Play?' Early Childhood Research Quarterly 17 (2002): 216-38
246
Ehrsson, H. Henrik. 'The Experimental Induction of Out-of-Body Experiences.' Science
317:1048.
Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. London:
Routledge,1997.
. 'From Lacan to Darwin.' The Literary Animal: Evolution and the Nature of
Narrative. Ed. Jonathan Gottschall and David Sloan Wilson. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 2005. 38-55.
Fausto-Sterling, Anne. Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction ofSexuality.
New York: Basic Books, 2000.
Felman, Shoshana. 'Woman and Madness: The Critical Phallacy.' Feminisms. Ed. Robyn R.
Warhol and Diane Price Herndl. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1997. 7-20.
Fineman, Joel. Shakespeare's Perjured Eye: The Invention of Poetic Subjectivity in the
Sonnets. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1986.
Fissell, Mary. 'Gender and Generation: Representing Reproduction in Early Modern
England.' Gender & History 1.3 (November 1995): 433-56.
Fleming, Juliet. 'Response to Margreta de Grazia's "Hamlet's Thoughts and Antics".' Early
Modern Culture 2 (2001): Sections 1-9. 1 May 2005. <http://eserver.org/emc/>.
Floyd-Wilson, Mary. 'English Mettle.' Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the
Cultural History of Emotion. Ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-
Wilson. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 130-146.
Floyd-Wilson, Mary, Matthew Greenfield, Gail Kern Paster, Tanya Pollard, Katherine Rowe,
Julian Yates. 'Shakespeare and Embodiment: An E-Conversation.' Literature Compass
2.1 (2005): 1-13. 24 April 2006. <http:www.literature-compass.com>.
Floyd-Wilson, Mary and Garrett A. Sullivan. 'Inhabiting the Body, Inhabiting the World.'
Introduction. Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England. Ed. Mary Floyd-
Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 1-13.
Forker, Charles. 'Longer Notes.' King Richard II. 3rd rev. ed. London: Arden Shakespeare,
2002 .485-505.
Freud, Sigmund. 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle.' The Freud Reader. Ed. Peter Gay.
London: Vintage, 1995. 594-626.
. 'The Ego and the Id.' The Freud Reader. Ed. Peter Gay. London: Vintage, 1995.
628-658.
Foucault, Michel. Madness and Civilization. 1967. Abingdon: Routledge Classics, 2001.
. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 1970. New York:
Vintage Books, 1994.
Fudge, Erica. Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts in Early Modern English Culture.
1999. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002.
Gallagher, Catherine and Stephen Greenblatt. Practising New Historicism. London:
University ofChicago Press, 2000.
Gillet, G. 'Cyborgs and Moral Identity.' Journal ofMedical Ethics 32 (March 2007): 79-83.
Gil Harris, Jonathan. Untimely Matter in the Time ofShakespeare. Philadelphia, University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2009
Gilson, Etienne. The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy. 1936. Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1991.
Goldin, Frederick. The Mirror ofNarcissus in the Courtly Love Lyric. New York: Cornell
University Press, 1967.
247
Goldin-Meadow, Susan. Hearing Gesture: How Our Hands Help Us Think. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press, 2003.
Goody, Jack. The Interface Between the Written and the Oral. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987.
Gorman, Sara. 'The Theatricality of Transformation.' Early Modern Literary Studies 13.3
(2008): Sections 1-37.
Gowing, Laura. Common Bodies: Women, Touch and Power in Seventeenth Century
England. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
Gowland, 'The Problem of Early Modern Melancholy.' Past and Present 191 (May 2006):
77-120.
Grabes, Herbert. The Mutable Glass: Mirror-Imagery in Titles and Texts of the Middle Ages
and English Renaissance. Trans. Gordon Collier. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982.
Grafton, Anthony and Ann Blair (eds.). The Transmission of Culture in Early Modern
Europe. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990.
Graziani, Rene. 'The Numbering of Shakespeare's Sonnets: 12, 60, and 126.' Shakespeare
Quarterly 35 A (Spring 1984): 79-82.
Greenblatt, Stephen. Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture. New York:
Routledge, 1990.
. Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980.
Gregory, Richard L. Mind in Science: A History ofExplanations in Psychology and Physics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
. Mirrors in Mind. London: Penguin, 1997.
. 'Shaving in Ockham's Mirror.' The Book of the Mirror. Ed. Miranda Anderson.
Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007. 94-104.
Grush, Rick. 'The Emulation Theory of Representation: Motor Control, Imagery, and
Perception.' Behavioral andBrain Sciences 27 (2004): 377-96.
Haden, H.J. Rev. of The Development of English Glassmaking, 1560-1640, by Eleanor S.
Godfrey. Technology and Culture 17.4 (October 1976): 788-790.
Hall, Lawrence Sargent. 'Isabella's Angry Ape.' Shakespeare Quarterly 15.3 (Summer
1964): 157-65.
Hampton, Timothy. 'Strange Alteration: Physiology and Psychology from Galen to
Rabelais. 'Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History ofEmotion.
Ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson. Philadelphia: University
ofPennsylvania Press, 2004. 272-293.
Haraway, Donna J. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention ofNature. New York:
Routledge, 1991.
Harnard, Stevan. 'Distributed Processes, Distributed Cognizers and Collaborative
Cognition.' Pragmatics and Cognition 13.3 (2005): 501-514.
Hart, F. Elizabeth. 'The Epistemology of Cognitive Literary Studies.' Philosophy and
Literature 25 (2001): 314-34.
. 'The View of Where We've Been From Where We'd Like To Go.' College
Literature 33.1 (2006): 225-37.
Hayles, N. Katherine. 'Constrained Constructivism: Locating Scientific Enquiry in the
Theater of Representation.' Realism and Representation: Essays on the Problem of
248
Realism in Relation to Science, Literature, and Culture. Ed. George Levine. Madison:
University ofWisconsin Press, 1993. 27-43.
. How We Became Postmodern: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and
Informatics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999
. My Mother Was a Computer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. 1926. Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. Maiden,
MA: Blackwell, 2005
Hillman, David and Carla Mazzio. 'Individual Parts.' Introduction. The Body in Parts:
Fantasies ofCorporeality in Early Modern Europe. Ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio.
London: Routledge, 1997. xi- xxix.
Hillman, Richard. Self-Speaking in Medieval and Early Modern English Drama: Subjectvity,
Discourse and the Stage. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.
Hogan, Patrick Colm. Cognitive Science, Literature and the Arts: A Guide for Humanists.
New York: Routledge, 2003.
Howard, Jean. 'The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies.' English Literary Renaissance
16 (1986): 13-43.
Hurley, Susan. 'The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation
Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading.' Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31
(2008): 1-22.
Hutchins, Edwin. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
Huxley, T.H. 'Science and Culture.' Science and Education: Essays. London, 1893. 134-59.
Iacobini, Marco. 'Mesial Frontal Cortex and Super Mirror Neurons.' Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 31 (2008): 30.
Jackson, Tony. 'Questioning Interdisicplinarity: Cognitive Science, Evolutionary
Psychology, and Literary Criticism.' Poetics Today 21.2 (2000): 319-47.
Jones, Ann Rosalind and Peter Stallybrass. Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of
Memory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Juarrero, Alice. 'We Have Always Been...Cyborgs.' Metascience 13 (2004): 149-53.
Kalas, Rayna. 'The Technology of Reflection: Renaissance Mirrors of Steel and Glass.'
Journal ofMedieval andEarly Modern Studies 32.3 (2002): 519-42.
Kastan, David Scott. 'Is there a Class in This (Shakespearean) Text?' Renaissance Drama 24
(1993): 101-121.
Kelly, Philippa. 'Surpassing Glass: Shakespeare's Mirrors.' Early Modern Literary Studies
8.1 (May 2002): 1-32. <http://purl.oclc.org/emls/08-2/kellglas.htm>.
Kemp, Martin and Marina Wallace. Spectacular Bodies: The Art and Science of the Human
Bodyfrom Leonardo to Now. London: Hayward Gallery, 2000.
Kendon, Adam. Rev. ofHearing Gesture: How our Hands Help us Think, by Susan Goldin-
Meadow. Gesture 4.1 (2001): 91-107.
Kiernan, Michael, ed. The Oxford Francis Bacon IV: The Advancement of Learning. By
Francis Bacon. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.
Kiverstein, Julian and Andy Clark. 'Bootstrapping the Mind.' Behavioral andBrain Sciences
31 (2008): 41-58.
Knowles, James. "'Can ye not tell a man froma marmoset?": Apes and Others on the Early
Modern Stage.'Renaissance Beasts: Of Animals, Humans, and Other Wonderful
Creatures. Ed. Erica Fudge. Urbana: University of Illinois, 2004. 138-163.
Kosslyn, Stephen. Edge: The Third Culture 2005. 18 June 2005. <http://www.edge.org/>.
249
. 'On the Evolution of Human Motivation: The Role of Social Prosthetic Systems.'
Evolutionary cognitive neuroscience. Eds. S. M. Platek and J.P. Keenan. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2006. 541-554.
Kristeller, Paul Oskar. Renaissance Thought and Its Sources. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979.
Kuriyama, Shigehisa. 'Author's Response.' Metascience 10.3 (2001): 337-341.
Lacan, Jacques. 'The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud.'
Ecrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Routledge, 1997. 146-178.
. 'The Dream of Irma's Injection.' The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book Two: The
Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Ed. Jacques-
Alain Miller. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. 146-60.
. 'The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis.' The Language of the Self. Trans.
Anthony Wilden. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981. 1-87.
—. 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I.' Ecrits: A Selection. Trans.
Alan Sheridan. London: Routledge, 1997. 1-7.
. Psychoanalysis and Cybernetics, or On the Nature of Language.' The Seminar of
Jacques Lacan, Book Two: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of
Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. 294-308.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. 1980. Afterword. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003.
. Philosophy in the Flesh. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
Landecker, Hannah. 'Living Differently in Time: Plasticity, Temporality and Cellular
Biotechnologies.' Culture Machine 7 (2005). 12 June 2007.
<http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk>.
Langton, Rae. 'Sexual Solipsism.' Philosophical Topics 23.2 (Fall 1995): 149-187.
Laqueur, Thomas. Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1990.
Leavis, F. R. Two Cultures? The Significance of C. P. Snow. London: Chatto and Windus,
1962.
Lee, John. 'Twins and Doubles as an Aspect of Shakespeare's Pluralism.' Shakespeare in the
Age ofCognitive Science. Ed. Graham Bradshaw. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004. 316-336.
Lee, Huey-Ling. 'The Devil or the Physician: The Politics of Cooking and the Gendering of
Cooks in Jonson and Massinger.' English Literary Renaissance 36.2 (2006): 250-277.
Lewis, C.S. The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature.
1964. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Levao, Ronald. Rev. of Shakepseare's Perjured Eye: The Invention ofPoetic Subjectivity in
the Sonnets, by Joel Fineman. Renaissance Quarterly 40.4 (1987): 814-819.
Liu, Alan.'The Humanities: A Technical Profession.' The Idea and Ideals of the University
(ACLS Occasional Paper No. 63) 2007: 13-22. 14 Jan. 2009.
<http://www.acls.org/Publications/OP/63_Ideas_and_Ideals.pdf>.
Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain ofBeing. 1936. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard
University Press 1982.
MacDonald, Michael. Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety, and Healing in in Seventeenth
Century England. Cambridge, Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1981.
MacDonald, Paul S. History of the Concept of the Mind: Speculations about Soul, Mind, and
Spirit from Homer to Hume. Vol. 1. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.
250
. History of the Concept of the Mind: The Heterodox and Occult Tradition. Vol. 2.
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.
Maravati, Angelo and Atsushi Iriki. 'Tools for the body (schema).' Trends in Cognitive
Science 8.2 (2004): 79-86.
Mason, Stephen F. A History ofthe Sciences. New York: Collier Books, 1971.
Masten, Jeffrey. Textual Intercourse: Collaboration, Authorship, and Sexualities in
Renaissance Drama. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Matthews, Paul M. and Jeffrey McQuain. The Bard on the Brain: Understanding the Mind
through the Art ofShakespeare and the Science ofBrain Imaging. New York: The Dana
Press, 2003.
Maturana, Humberto R. and Francisco J. Varela. Autopoesis and Cognition: The Realization
of the Living. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980.
Maus, Katharine Eisaman. Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Mazzio, Carla. 'Sins of the Tongue.' The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early
Modern Europe. Ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio. London: Routledge, 1997. 54-79.
Mazzio, Carla and Douglas Trevor. 'Dreams of History' Introduction. Historicism,
Psychoanalysis and Early Modern Culture. Ed. Carla Mazzio and Douglas Trevor. New
York: Routledge, 2000. 1-18.
McNeill, David. Gesture and Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Melchior-Bonnet, Sabine. The Mirror: A History. Trans. Katharine H. Jewett. New York:
Routledge, 2002.
Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception. 1962. Trans. Colin Smith. London:
Routledge, 2006.
Michael, Emily. 'Renaissance Theories of Body, Soul and Mind.' Psyche and Soma:
Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to
Enlightenment. Ed. John P. Wright and Paul Potter. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000.147-72.
Michael, Emily and Fred S. Michael. 'Two Early Modern Concepts of Mind: Reflecting
Substance vs. Thinking Substance.' Journal of the History ofPhilosophy 27.1 (1989): 29-
48.
Miller, Jonathan. On Reflection. London: National Gallery Publications, 1998.
Milne, Louise S. Carnivals and Dreams: Pieter Bruegel and the History of the Imagination.
London: Mutus Liber, 2007.
Minnis, A.J. and A.B. Scott, eds. Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism: The Commentary
Tradition. 1988. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
Montrose, Louis. 'New Historicisms.' Redrawing the Boundaries: The Transformation of
English andAmerican Literary Studies. Ed. Stephen Greenblatt and Giles B. Gunn. New
York: MLA, 1992. 392-418.
Moss, Ann. 'The Politica of Justus Lipsius and the Commonplace-Book.' Journal of the
History ofIdeas 59.3 (1998): 421-436.
Nagel, Thomas. Mortal Questions. 1979. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Neely, Carol Thomas. Distracted Subjects: Madness and Gender in Shakespeare and Early
Modern Culture. New York: Cornell University Press, 2004
Newbold, William. Introduction. The Passions of the Mind in General. By Thomas Wright.
New York: Garland Publishing, 1986. 1-88.
Niedenthal, Paula. 'Embodying Emotion.' Science 316 (2007): 1002-05.
251
Noe, Alva. Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.
. 'Experience Without the Head.' Perceptual Experience. Ed. Tamar Szabo Gendler
and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 411-33.
O'Brien, Gerald and Jon Opie. 'A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience.'
Behavioural andBrain Sciences 22 (1999): 127-48.
. 'The Multiplicity of Consciousness and the Emergence of the Self.' The Self in
Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Ed. Tilo Kircher and Anthony David. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.107-20.
Ong, Walter. Orality to Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. 1982. London: Routledge
Press, 1991.
. Rev. of The Art ofMemory, by Frances Yates. Renaissance Quarterly 20.2 (1967):
253-9.
Ortalano, Guy. 'F. R. Leavis, Science, and the Abiding Crisis of Modern Civilisation.'
History ofScience 43 (2005): 161-85.
Paster, Gail Kern. The Body Embarassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early
Modern England. New York: Cornell University Press, 1993.
. Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearian Stage. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2004.
Paster, Gail Kern, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson. 'Reading the Early Modern
Passions.' Introduction. Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural
History of Emotion. Ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson.
Philadelphia: University of Pennysylvania Press, 2004. 1-20.
Pendergrast, Mark. Mirror Mirror: A History of the Human Love Affair with Reflection. New
York: Basic Books, 2004.
Piccolino, Marco and Nicholas J. Wade. 'Galileo's Eye: A New Vision of the Senses in the
Work ofGalileo Galilei.' Perception 37 (2008): 1312-40.
Poole, Rristen. 'Psycholgizing Physics.' Shakespeare Studies 33 (2005): 95-100.
Porter, Roy. Madness: A BriefHistory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
. 'The Two Cultures Revisted.' Boundary 2 23.2 (1996): 1-17.
Radden, Jennifer. Moody Minds Distempered: Essays on Melancholy and Depression.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Ramachandran, V. S. 'The Marco Polo of Neuroscience.' Interview transcript. All in the
Mind: ABC Radio National. 7 May 2005. 10 May 2005.
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/mind/stories/sl358883.htm>.
. 'The Neurology of Self-Awareness.' Edge: The Third Culture. 8 Jan. 2007. 15 Feb
2007. <http://www.edge.org/>.
. 'Mirror Neurons and Imitation Learning as the Driving Force behind "the Great
Leap Forward" in Human Evolution.' Edge: The Third Culture. 29 June 2000. 10 May
2005. <http://www.edge.org/>.
Ramachandran, V. S. and Sandra Blakeslee. Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries
of the Human Mind. New York: Harper Collins, 1998.
Ramachandran, V. S. and Edward M. Hubbard. 'Hearing Colors, Tasting Shapes.' Scientific
American May 2003: 53-9.
Ramachandran, V. S. and D. Rogers Ramachandran. 'Synaesthesia in Phantom Limbs
Induced with Mirrors.' Proceedings: Biological Sciences 263 (1996): 377-386.
Randall Jr., John Herman. Introduction. The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Ed. Ernest
Cassirer and Paul Oskar Kristeller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. 257-79
252
Ree, Jonathan. I See a Voice: Deafness, Language and the Senses - A Philosophical History.
New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999.
Reiss, Timothy J. 'Revising Descartes: on Subject and Community.' Representations of the
Selffrom the Renaissance to Romanticism. Ed. Coleman, Lewis and Kowalk. Cambridge,
University ofCambridge, 2000.16-38.
Richardson, Alan. 'Cognitive Science and the Future of Literary Studies.' Philosophy and
Literature 23.1 (1999): 157-73.
Richardson, Alan and Francis F. Steen. 'Literature and the Cognitive Revolution: An
Introduction.' Poetics Today 23.1 (2002): 1-8.
Rizzolatti, Giacomo and Laila Craighero. 'The Mirror Neuron System.' Annual Review of
Neuroscience 27 (2004): 169-92.
Rizzolatti, Giacomo, Leonardo Fogassi and Vittorio Gallese. 'Mirrors in Mind.' Scientific
American November 2006: 54-61.
Rizzolatti, Giacomo and Corrado Sinigaglia. Mirrors in the Brain: How our Minds Share
Actions andEmotions. Trans. Frances Anderson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Robson, Mark. The Sense of Early Modern Writing: Rhetoric, Poetics, Aesthetics.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007.
Rhodes, Neil and Jonathan Sawday. 'Paperworlds: Imagining the Renaissance Computer.'
The Renaissance Computer. Ed. Neil Rhodes and Jonathan Sawday. London: Routledge,
2000. 1-17.
Rosenberg, Daniel. 'Early Modern Information Overload.' Journal of the History of Ideas
64.1 (2003): 1-10.
Ross, J. Andrew. 'Will Robots See Humans as Dinosaurs?' Journal ofConsciousness Studies
13.12(2006): 97-104.
Rovane, Carol. The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998.
Rowe, Katherine. 'Humoral Knowledge and Liberal Cognition in Davenant's Macbeth.'
Reading the Early Modern Passions. Ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary
Floyd Wilson. Philadelphia: University of Pennysylvania Press: 2004. 169-191.
Rublack, Ulinka. 'Fluxes: the Early Modern Body and the Emotions.' Trans. Pamela Selwyn.
History Workshop Journal 53 (2002): 1-16.
Rumelhart, D.E., P. Smolensky, J.L. McClelland and G.E. Hinton. 'Schemata and Sequential
Thought Processes in PDP Models.' Parallel DistributedProcessing: Explorations in the
Microstructure of Cognition. Vol. 2. Ed. J.L. McClelland, D.E. Rumelhart and PDP
Group. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986. 7-57.
Rumelhart, D.E. and J.L. McClelland. 'PDP Models and General Issues in Cognitive
Science.' Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of
Cognition. Vol. 1. Ed. J.L. McClelland, D.E. Rumelhart and PDP Group. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1986. 110-146.
Rundus, Raymond J. 'Time and His "Glass" in The Winter's Tale.' Shakespeare Quarterly
25.1 (1974), 123-125.
Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics. Ed. Bailey and Sechehaye. Trans. Roy
Harris. Chicago: Open Court, 2006.
Sawday, Jonathan. The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance
Culture. London: Routledge, 1995.
. Engines of the Imagination: Renaissance Culture and the Rise of the Machine.
Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.
253
.'Self and Selfhood in the Seventeenth Century.' Rewriting the Self: Histories from
the Renaissance to the Present. Ed. Roy Porter. London: Routledge, 1997.
Schoenfeldt, Michael C. Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and
Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert and Milton. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
. 'Fables of the Belly in Early Modern England.' The Body in Parts: Fantasies of
Coroporeality in Early Modern Europe. Ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio. New
York: Routledge, 1997. 243-262.
Screech, M.A. 'Good Madness in Christendom.' The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the
History of Psychiatry. Vol. 1. Ed. W.F. Bynum, Roy Porter, and Michael Shepherd.
London: Tavistock, 1985. 25-39.
Sherman, William H. Used Books: Marking Readers in Renaissance England. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Shickman, Allan. 'The Fool's Mirror in King Lear.'' English Literary Renaissance 21.1
(1991): 75-86.
.'The "Perspective Glass" in Shakespeare's RichardII.' Studies in English Literature,
1500-1900 18.2 (1978): 217-228.
Shuger, Deborah. 'Life-writing in Seventeenth Century England.' Representations ofthe Self
from the Renaisance to Romanticism. Ed. Patrick Coleman, Jayne Lewis and Jill Kowalk.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 63-78.
Skultans, Vieda. English Madness: Ideas on Insanity, 1580-1890. London: Routledge and
KeganPaul, 1979.
Smith, A. Mark, ed. Introduction. Witelonis Perspectivae. By Witelo. Ed. and trans. A. Mark
Smith. Warsaw: The Polish Academy of Sciences Press, 1983. 1-72.
Smith, Bruce. Introduction. Shakespeare Studies 29 (2001): 19-26.
Snow, C.P. The Two Cultures. Ed. Stefan Collini. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993.
Sokal, Alan and Jean Bricomont. Intellectual Impostures. 1998. Trans. Alan Sokal and Jean
Bricomont. London: Profile Books, 2003.
Solms, Mark and Edward Nersessian. Editor's Introduction. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 1 (1999):
3.
Speak, Gill. 'An Odd Kind of Melancholy: Reflections on the Glass Delusion in Europe,
1440-1680.' History ofPsychiatry \ (1990): 191-206.
Spivak, Bernard. Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil: The History of a Metaphor in
Relation to his Villains. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.
Spolsky, Ellen. Word vs. Image: Cognitive Hunger in Shakespeare's England. Hampshire:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Spufford, Margaret. Small Books and Pleasant Histories: Popular Fiction and its Readership
in Seventeenth-Century England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Stallybrass, Peter, Roger Chartier, Franklin J. Mowery, and Heather Wolfe. 'Hamlet's Tables
and the Technologies of Writing in Renaissance England.' Shakespeare Quarterly 55.4
(2004): 379-419.
Steen, Francis F. 'Grasping Philosophy by the Roots.' Rev. of Philosophy in the Flesh. By
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Philosophy andLiterature 24 (2000): 197-203.
Stelarc. 'Prosthetic Head: Intelligence, Awareness, and Agency.' CTheory. 19 Oct. 2005. 19
June 2007. <http://www.ctheory.net>.
254
Strier, Richard. 'Against the Rule of Reason: Praise of Passion from Petrarch to Luther to
Shakespeare to Herbert.' Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural
History of Emotion. Ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson.
Philadelphia: University ofPennysylvania Press, 2004. 23-42.
Strier, Richard and Carla Mazzio. 'Two Responses to "Shakespeare and Embodiment: An E-
Converation".' Literature Compass 3.1 (2006): 15-31. 24 April 2006.
<http:www. literature-compass.com>.
Sutton, John. 'Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind and the
Civilizing Process.' John Sutton's Page. March 2005. 20 April 2005.
<http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staff/jsutton/>.
. Philosophy andMemory Traces. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
. 'Spongy Brains and Material Memories.' Environment and Embodiment in Early
Modern England. Ed. Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007
Taylor, Shelley E. and Jonathon D. Brown. 'Illusion and Well-Being: A Social
Psychological Perspective on Mental Health.' Psychological Bulletin 103.2 (1988): 193-
210.
Traub, Valerie. The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Tribble, Evelyn. 'Distributing Cognition in the Globe.' Shakespeare Quarterly 56.2 (2005):
135-55.
. "'To Ease the Burden of the Brain": Distributed Cognition in Early Modern
England.' Scan: Journal of Media Arts Culture 2.2 (2005). 26 Feb. 2008.
<http://scan.net.au/scan/journal>.
Turella, Luca, Andrea C. Pierno, Federico Tubaldi, Umberto Castiello. 'Mirror neurons in
humans: Consisting or confounding evidence.' Brain and Language 30 (2008): 1-12.
Turing, A.M. 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence.' Mind 49 (1950): 433-60.
Turner, J. Scott. The Extended Organism: The Physiology of Animal-Built Structures.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
Turner, Mark. The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996.
Tylus, Jane. "'Par Accident": The Public Work of Modern Theater.' Reading the Early
Modern Passions. Ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd Wilson.
Philadelphia: University of Pennysylvania Press, 2004. 253-271.
Van Leeuwen, Cees. 'What Needs to Emerge to Make You Conscious?' Journal of
Consciousness Studies 14.1-2 (2007): 115-36.
Varela, F.J. 'Metaphor to Mechanism; Natural to Disciplined.' Journal of Consciousness
Studies 4.4 (1997): 344-6.
Varela, F.J., E. Thompson, and E. Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and
Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
Vendler, Helen. The Art of Shakespeare's Sonnets. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1997.
Vickers, Brian. Introduction. English Renaissance Literary Criticism. Ed. Brian Vickers.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 1-55.
Vickers, Nancy J. 'Members Only: Marot's Anatomical Blazons.' The Body in Parts:
Fantasies of Coroporeality in Early Modern Europe. Ed. David Hillman and Carla
Mazzio. London: Routledge, 1997. 3-22.
255
Voss, Stephen. 'Descartes: Heart and Soul.' Psyche and Soma: Physicians and
Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment. Ed. John P.
Wright and Paul Potter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 173-296.
Vygotsky, Lev. Thought and Language. 1962. Trans. Alex Kozulin. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1986.
Waddington, Raymond B. '"All in All": Shakespere, Milton, Donne and the Soul-in-Body
Topos.' English Literary Renaissance 20.1 (2004): 40-68.
Whitaker, Elaine E. 'The Mirror and the Halogen Bulb: A Review Essay.' South Atlantic
Review 59.2(1994): 113-124.
Wheeler, Michael. Reconstructing the Cognitive World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
Williams, Gordon. A Glossary of Shakespeare's Sexual Language. Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Athlone Press, 1997.
Williamson, Beth. 'Mirrors in Art: Images as Mirrors.' The Book of the Mirror. Ed. Miranda
Anderson. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007. 132-150.
Wilson, Timothy D. Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002.
Yates, Francis. The Art ofMemory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.
Zitner, Sheldon P. Introduction. The Knight of the Burning Pestle. By Francis Beaumont.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. 1-50.
Ziokowlski, Theodore. Disenchanted Images: A Literary Iconology. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977.
256
